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This dissertation examines the housing program of the Colombian state agency 
Instituto de Crédito Territorial (ICT) implemented in the mid-twentieth century. Three 
case studies of housing projects located in the city of Bogotá serve as a means to 
critically assess the agency’s contributions to modern architecture in that country and the 
major transformations this agency and its housing program experienced during the period 
of the study: Muzú (1949), Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño - CUAN (1952) and Ciudad 
Kennedy (1961). This dissertation sheds light on the ideas and beliefs that animated the 
stakeholders—technicians, agency leaders, and politicians—intervening in the building of 
low-cost housing, as well as on the implications of their assumptions about the 
populations to be housed in the ICT projects, i.e. low income and middle class sectors. 
This exploration is based on minutes of the ICT’s board of directors meetings, and 




to, blueprints, photos, publications, technical national periodicals, and regulations. A 
multidimensional analysis and interpretation of these sources emanating from different 
authors and stakeholders involves different fields of inquiry, such as politics, socio-
economics, architecture, and urban planning. 
Drawing from postcolonial theory, this dissertation revisits the visible, official 
narratives around concepts such as progress, modernity, and modernization, in order to 
question the emancipatory discourse of modern architecture. This dissertation argues that 
the ICT's housing program emerged as a significant contribution to the advancement of 
modern architecture in Colombia through unexpected and, until now, unexplored ways 
and actors. Simultaneously, this work illuminates the intersections of the housing 
program with the government's political agenda and with the geopolitical dimension of 
international cooperation programs promoted by the United States. These intersections, 
mediated by rationales of development and modernization’s discourse, lay bare the power 
relations underlying the housing program and explain its social component. Through its 
social programs, the agency sought to "educate" and "civilize" the future inhabitants of 
the housing projects, in order to make them compliant with the logics and goals of 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
En innumerables casos, con angustiosa frecuencia, la moral puede ser, y es, 
cuestión de vivienda. Nada tan peligroso como la cohabitación de familias enteras en 
estrechos lugares, descuidados y pobres. Es ese un mal que es preciso eliminar, 
remediar, corregir, porque es causa de inenarrables desventuras. 
Cooperar en esa tarea es obligación inexcusable de cuantos de algún poder 
dispongan, anhelo de cuantos se den cuenta de los problemas que trae la vida. Esa 
obligación hay que cumplirla, cada uno desde la posición que ocupe, como un deber de 
caracteres imperiosos e ineludibles. 
Eduardo Santos 
Bogotá, 30 de Septiembre de 1969 
 
In innumerable cases, with anguished frequency, morality can be, and is, a 
housing issue. Nothing so dangerous as the cohabitation of entire families in narrow 
places, careless and poor. It is an evil that must be eliminated, remedied, corrected, 
because it is the cause of unspeakable misfortunes. 
Cooperating in this task is the inexcusable obligation of those who have some 
power, yearning for those who realize the problems that life brings. That obligation must 
be fulfilled as a duty of imperious and inescapable characteristics. 
Eduardo Santos [Colombian President from 1938 to 1942] 
Bogotá, September 30, 19691 
 
In recalling the first days of the Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ICT (Institute of 
Territorial Credit) Carlos Lleras Restrepo, President Eduardo Santos' Minister of Finance, 
proudly related how he and "all members of the government, with President [Santos] at 
the head; as well as the members of the board of directors" often visited the first houses 
built in the surroundings of Bogotá under the agency’s rural housing program. Lleras 
Restrepo referred to the "truly humanitarian interest" they put "in the development of the 
works" and how they "liked to interview each peasant and his family, to see their 
reactions.”2 
                                                
1 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., 30 Años de Servicio (Bogotá, 1969). 
2 Carlos Lleras Restrepo, Reseña Historica Del ICT (Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1980), 14. 
2 
 
Although Lleras Restrepo was utterly convinced of the importance of facilitating 
access to housing by the "desheredados" (the disinherited or disenfranchised), he also 
knew this was only a partial, and not even the most relevant, solution to the many 
problems afflicting the rural population. The real problem, land tenure, was beyond the 
government’s ability and willingness to solve. Hence, as Lleras Restrepo acknowledged, 
the housing campaign only addressed "questions of hygiene and sanitation, of popular 
education and the transformation of customs."3 It was a pragmatic approach indeed, 
rooted in the assumption that would characterize the housing program throughout the 
period of this study: it was the people the housing program served who had to change. 
Arguments over how they had to change varied over time—overcoming backwardness, 
improving hygiene, learning rules of good citizenship, among others; but the expectation 
that the new built environments would help to bring these changes about was never left 
behind.  
This dissertation tackles the agency’s underlying assumptions about the groups it 
targeted and consider the implications of these assumptions for the housing program and 
the impact of the convictions of those participating in the construction of its housing 
projects—technicians, agency leaders, and politicians. Three case studies located in the 
city of Bogotá serve as a means to critically read the major transformations undergone by 
this agency during the period of the study: Muzú (1949), Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño 
- CUAN (1952) and Ciudad Kennedy (1961). By adding and analyzing the commentaries 
of those who participated in the agency, taken from the minutes of the Board of 
Directors, as source material, this dissertation broadens the current scope and 
                                                
3 Ibid., 18. 
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understanding of existing research on the semiautonomous state agency Instituto de 
Crédito Territorial, ICT.  
The ICT had an impact in each of the different levels in which it operated. First, 
the agency was crucial in shaping most of Colombia’s urban centers during a period of 
rapid urban growth, through the construction and financing of more than half a million 
housing units throughout the national territory from 1939, when it was launched, to 1991, 
when it was liquidated through the enactment of the Law 3 of that year. Second, during 
the period considered in this study, 1939 through 1965, the agency operated as a space of 
convergence, in which various Pan-American events and initiatives consolidated. 
Previous research has made the ICT's contribution to transforming residential 
architecture and residential areas in Colombia its main object of inquiry, giving its 
intersections with the political agenda of the national government scant attention. But 
since the period of this study coincides with a set of political events that profoundly 
marked the nation's history, the absence of such accounts is striking. In contrast, this 
dissertation argues that while the ICT's housing program made a significant contribution 
to the advancement of modern architecture in Colombia, through ways and actors until 
now unexplored, it also advanced the government's political agenda under the aegis of 
‘development’ and ‘modernization’, which simultaneously informed the program's social 
component. Through its social programs, the agency sought to "educate" and "civilize" 
the future inhabitants of the housing projects, in order to make them compliant with the 
logics and goals of developmental policies. 
Although historians have tackled Pan-American events and initiatives as part of 
other histories, I will tell the history of these events from the vantage point of the ICT. In 
doing so, the Pan-American and U.S. initiatives entwined with the agency’s work will be 
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brought to the fore, alongside alternative spaces of encounter with other Latin American 
countries. The set of interactions that started during the Second World War, when the 
ICT's technicians were sent to the United States to get acquainted with the technical 
issues they would employ to minimize the construction costs of the agency's housing 
program, grew substantially more dense and complex in the Post War era. Among other 
initiatives, the Inter-American Center for Housing and Planning, or CINVA, was 
established in Bogotá in 1951 as a cooperative effort during the Cold War between the 
Pan-American Union, the Universidad Nacional of Colombia and the ICT. The apex of 
these interactions was the ambitious U.S. Cooperation Program with the Latin American 
countries, the Alliance for Progress. In Colombia, the ICT received significant loans from 
the Alliance to advance its housing program. 
Drawing on postcolonial theory, I revisit the official narratives around modern 
architecture that emerged in the context of extreme political tensions, economic 
inequalities, and the exclusion of large parts of society from the construction of a modern 
country. In so doing, I question the emancipatory discourse presumed by modern 
architecture, in general, and the consolidation of a modern architecture imagined as clean 
and independent of those realities in Colombia, specifically. Within this framework, I do 
not draw on external sources circulating at the time to legitimize ICT’s work, though I 
acknowledge their importance. Rather, I focus on works by actors in the ICT itself, to 
elucidate the extent to which the initiatives that converged in and emanated from the 
agency were framed by the discourse of development the United States propagated from 
the end of World War Two. This discourse corresponded to the basic principles by which 
the agency also operated, and its impact on the cooperation between the U.S. and Latin 
America that evolved during this period calls for a critical analysis that will evince the 
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invisible dimensions of these officially well-intentioned programs. I will take the ICT and 
its work as a case in point.  
The aspiration of gaining some insight into the agency’s inner workings led me to 
study its written records. Therefore, my main sources are the minutes of the board of 
directors' meetings, some still extant drawings from the case studies, historical photos of 
the projects, and an extensive number of works published by the agency but seldom used 
to study it. I also draw from national legislation governing the agency’s work, 
publications of the Pan-American Union, and a series of papers elaborated by CINVA, 
the Pan-American Center for Housing and Planning located in Bogotá, and its students, 
and finally two technical national periodicals circulating during the period, "Ingenieria y 
Arquitectura" and "Proa."4  
The documented minutes of the board of directors' meetings are an infinitesimal 
part of the indescribably large number of written records the agency produced. Since the 
agency operated nation-wide for 52 years, the sum total of the daily information produced 
is enormous. However, research tackling the agency in the 1990s has already exposed the 
precarious situation of the written documentation produced by the ICT. Several housing 
projects are documented with inexact information, lacking plans or pictures. Twenty 
years later, this situation is far worse and the documents are actually in danger of being 
lost. Since 2013, the Housing Ministry has had oversight of the agency's archives, which 
are stored in a factory ground due to their large number. While the Ministry has given 
extant footprints of the projects to the General National Archive for restoration and 
safekeeping, it declared vast amounts of material "of little interest," and foreseen its 
                                                
4 Regulation’s compilation on housing in Colombia, see: Olga Lucía Ceballos Ramos, Alberto Saldarriaga 
Roa, and Doris Tarchópulos Sierra, Vivienda social en Colombia: una mirada desde su legislación, 1918-
2005 (Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2008). 
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elimination as a measure to enable the storage of the still incoming documentation from 
the regions.  
The different types of information this study draws on requires a multifaceted 
analysis. The minutes call for an almost ethnographic approach that gives answers to 
questions about the practices of, and discussions behind, the housing program. 
Simultaneously, I aim at elucidating the agency’s accomplishments, challenges, and 
contradictions using the board of directors as an object of inquiry. Then, I connect this 
information with other levels of inquiry, such as politics, economics, architecture, and 
urban planning to lay out the basic structure of a network of initiatives, international 
experts, and policies that shaped the outcome of the agency's housing program.  
I do not aim to construct a well-rounded narrative of the ICT with no fissures, 
edges and corners, but one that shows its multiple, sometimes contradictory stories, to 
understand and present it in its complexity. While the minutes facilitate what Arturo 
Escobar calls an "institutional ethnography," taking the agency as an object of 
anthropological study, they also set limits on our understanding.5 They do not record the 
origination of several initiatives the board is known to have made, and their quality and 
quantity varied depending on the person transcribing them. Some conducted the job 
meticulously; others limited themselves to transcribing the basic points. Although the 




                                                
5 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development : The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 106. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In order to unveil the rationales underlying the ICT’s housing program, this 
dissertation tackles three aspects of it: first, its architecture, second the intersections 
between the agency and various geo-political agendas, and third the social component of 
the program. After presenting how these three aspects are interconnected and help to 
explain each other in the theoretical discussion of Chapter 2, each aspect is developed 
separately in the following chapters: Chapter 3 discusses “Housing as an architectural 
artifact,” Chapter 4 considers “Housing as a tool to pacify and as a vehicle to consolidate 
power”, and finally, Chapter 5 develops “Housing as a controlling tool.”  
 
Housing as an architectural artifact 
Historiography has seen the agency’s work in close relationship to the precepts of 
the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne, CIAM (International Congresses of 
Modern Architecture), developed especially through the urban projects of Le Corbusier, 
Jose Luis Sert, and Paul Lester Wiener in Colombia. The ICT's housing projects have 
also usually been explained as evolving out of proposals on minimal housing developed 
in Europe between the two World Wars, which were presented in condensed form at the 
second CIAM meeting held in Frankfurt in 1929 under the motto Wohnen für das 
Existenzminimum. Chapter 3 argues that the ICT’s contribution to modern architecture in 
Colombia through its urban housing program since the end of the 1940s forms part of a 
continuous, albeit nonlinear, development that started with the agency’s inception in the 
rural housing program and, since 1942, in the urban areas. Ideas on minimal housing, 
standardization, modulation, and the prefabrication of building parts, typical for ICT's 
urban housing projects, derive from its experience developing a “rational” building 
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process for rural housing. This experience provided the ICT with a very specific 
knowledge of and expertise on local materials, building techniques and their possibilities. 
Hence, the first part of Chapter 3 addresses the rural housing program and the initiatives 
that served as a platform for the confluence of ideas about modern architecture and the 
aims of the ICT’s work.  
The second part of this chapter inquires about the elements of the "modern 
paradigm" that characterize the three case studies. In that context, the different plans and 
building types each developed offer an opportunity to scrutinize the assumptions on 
modern living pursued by the agency. These assumptions changed over the period of this 
study and with respect to the various targeted groups. High-rise multifamily housing and 
the urban configuration of the neighborhoods as "neighborhood units" offer a space for 
questioning underlying ideas on the modern shape of the ICT's housing projects. In this 
section, I argue that the ICT's housing developments are far more complex than a simple 
intention to build a local version of Le Corbusier's Unité d'Habitation, and to follow José 
Luis Sert's ideas on neighborhood units. 
 
Housing as a tool to pacify and as a vehicle to consolidate power 
Chapter 4 explores the intersections between the agency and Colombia’s national 
politics, on the one hand, and the hemisphere’s geopolitics, on the other. I argue that on 
the national level, the ICT's housing program operated as a tool to demonstrate the 
government's ability to deal with political conflict in times of extreme tensions, as a result 
of the civil war known as La Violencia, which hit the rural areas particularly hard. To 
maintain the status quo, different governments used the housing program to sustain a 
friendly relationship with the army, and joint efforts between it and the ICT were a 
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constant along the way, since the Caja de Vivienda Militar (Fund for Military Housing) 
was founded in 1947. The two institutions grew close alongside with the militarization of 
the government at the end of the 1940s.  
This chapter also examines, using the ICT as case study, to what extent housing 
served as a vehicle to consolidate power. A geopolitics of housing found embodiment in 
the ICT’s ties to the United States from the agency’s establishment, which grew stronger 
after WWII and reached their greatest intensity in the 1960s with the Alliance for 
Progress program. In between, crucial events, such as the World Bank mission to 
Colombia, the agreement to receive technical assistance through U.S. President Truman’s 
"Point Four Program," and the establishment of CINVA in Bogotá expose the U.S. 
offensive to consolidate its influence in Latin America as part of its Cold War geo-
strategy. These encounters were manifold: through financial, educational, and public 
institutions, through private enterprises in the field of housing and the building industry, 
and through individual architects.  
 
Housing as a controlling tool 
Chapter 5 examines how the built environment acted as a tool of social control. I 
argue that social control was achieved through different methods and varied over time. 
The process of selecting future inhabitants, the guidelines for living in the new 
environment (printed or transmitted in workshops), and the social worker visits after the 
inhabitants occupied their houses were essential mechanisms through which control was 
executed. 
The process of selecting inhabitants, guaranteed the ICT that residents would 
comply with the agency’s moral expectations. It served as a tool for controlling the kind 
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of people who would inhabit the projects, implicitly prescribing the moral expectations 
required of the neighborhoods’ inhabitants.  
I also argue in this chapter that the ICT's housing projects were the physical 
expression of a hygienic and ordered environment, with the goal of molding the 
inhabitants in accordance with the assumptions of the agency's leaders. While the 
discourse of hygiene was initially limited to the houses’ physical characteristics, it was 




The ICT was created under the Liberal presidency of Eduardo Santos as part of a 
series of measures to foster the rural economy in 1939. These measures aimed, among 
other things, at the creation of local Bancos de Crédito Territorial (Credit Territorial 
Banks) to provide loans for the construction of "hygienic dwellings for rural workers."6 
The ICT was planned as an autonomous central office to set up local agencies throughout 
the country and coordinate their activities.7 Carlos Lleras Restrepo, minister of Finance 
and Public Credit, who convened its board of directors on March 8, 1939 for the first time 
appears as the driving force in the ICT’s creation.8 From the moment he called the first 
meeting until the end of President Eduardo Santos' term in 1942, Lleras Restrepo clearly 
supported the agency in his role as minister. Due to its purpose, the agency functioned 
                                                
6 Decree 327 of 1938. Minute 3, March 1939, 11. 
7 Decree 200 of 1939 (January 28), Article 2th. 
8 Lleras Restrepo received the advise of Julio Eduardo Lleras Acosta, Manuel Mejía and Luís Angel 
Arango. In: Lleras Restrepo, Reseña Historica Del ICT, 7, 10. To understand the relevance of this program 
in the context of a modernization process as understood in Colombia at the end of the 1930s, see: Susana 
Romero Sánchez, “Ruralizing Urbanization: Credit, Housing, and Modernization in Colombia, 1920-1948” 
(Cornell University, 2015). 
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initially under the oversight of Lleras Restrepo’s ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
This changed in the mid 1950s, when the ICT operated under the jurisdiction of the 
ministry of Development.9 This direct connection with the ministry and its head defined 
the nature and structure of the agency. The ICT was autonomous in its operations, but it 
responded to the minister and through him, to the president himself. However, major 
changes concerning the agency needed to be approved by congress. Thus, crucial 
decisions concerning its work are specified through regulations. 
ICT’s organization structure, which grew more complex over time, consisted 
primarily in a board of directors, the general manager, leaders of the different agency’s 
departments, and their staff. ICT’s maximal authority was the board of directors. Its role 
was to define the guidelines, according to which the ICT should work, to appoint the 
general manager and to approve the major decisions concerning ICT’s financial, 
administrative and technical issues. The board of directors’ composition varied 
throughout the period of this study. What remained constant was the fact that 
representatives of the national government and of different stakeholders’ groups were 
part of the board.  
Throughout the period of this study, the ICT went through a series of 
transformations, which evidence the evolving rationales behind the housing projects 
developed at each moment. I identify five phases over the span of this study: first, the 
beginning from 1939 to 1942; second, the transition from 1942 to 1947; third, the 
beginning of the official history from 1947 to 1953; fourth, working under a military 
government from 1953 to 1957; and finally, a new beginning under the National Front in 
1958.  
 
                                                
9 Decree 2956 of 1955. Article 3. 
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The beginning. 1939-1942 
The decree 200 of 1939, which regulated ICT’s inception, established the basic 
traits of ICT’s organization structure. It determined, for instance, that the agency should 
be managed by a board of directors comprised by the minister of Finance and Public 
Credit, the minister of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare, a representative appointed by the 
President of Colombia and three representatives of banks that purchase ICT’s shares 
(Article 6th). The minister of Finance and Public Credit (Lleras Restrepo) and a small 
committee should write the agency’s statutes (Article 20th). In addition, the selected 
board of directors should appoint the general manager to lead the agency (Article 7th). 
The first general manager, José Vicente Garcés Navas, who previously worked at the 
ministry of Finance and Public Credit, led the agency until the end of the year 1947, but 
remained working at the agency until his dead in 1968.  
A couple of months after ICT’s inception, the board of directors’ composition 
underwent its first significant change. Due to a change in the form of financing the 
agency (the National government would be the only financing source), three 
representatives of the Banco Central Hipotecario, BCH (Central Mortgage Bank) were 
replaced by one representative chosen by the board of directors of the Caja de Crédito 
Agrario (Agrarian Credit Bank) and of the Banco Agrícola Hipotecario (Agrarian Mortgage 
Bank), and two representatives of the “low-income peasants” chosen by the president.10 
With this composition, the agency operated the next years, until the Law 85 was passed at 
the end of 1946.  
During this first phase, the agency's main task was the construction of rural 
housing. Its first specific undertaking was to build one thousand new "hygienic" houses 
                                                
10 Law 46 of 1939, article 4th. 
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for the rural population affected by the spread of bartonellosis epidemic in various rural 
areas of the Nariño province, at the border with Ecuador to "radically change the living 
conditions of the peasants..."11  
Figure 1.1. First house built by the ICT in Sandona, Nariño, 1939. In: Instituto de Crédito 
Territorial and Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico, 40 años. Construyendo vivienda 
para el pueblo colombiano. 
Despite the clear goals and the full support of the government through the 
Minister of Finance and Public Credit, the agency only began to show results very 
slowly. The daily difficulties and specific characteristics of the rural environment 
structured and shaped the agency’s actions. Every new (or undesirable) event led to a 
change in the existing structure of the agency. This empirical approach, based on trial and 
error slowed the agency’s consolidation considerably. The minutes mention no models 
from other countries being adopted during those first years, although in those same years 
                                                




Colombia had participated in the Pan-American Architecture Congresses as well as the 
crucial first Pan-American Congress of Low-Cost Housing held in Buenos Aires in 1939. 
The latter was attended by Julio Lleras Acosta, who was also a member of the ICT board 
of directors, representing the Central Mortgage Bank from the beginning.12 By the end of 
1940, the board meetings still focused on the question of how to broaden the agency's 
impact and under what kind of structure.  
 
The transition. 1942 - 1947 
The first important turning point came in 1942, a couple of months prior to the 
end of Eduardo Santos’ presidential term.13 Lleras Restrepo announced a law transferring 
the contracts between the national government and the various regional entities for urban 
workers’ housing to the agency.14 As a direct consequence of this decree, the ICT 
established the new department for urban housing, through which the new task could be 
accomplished.15  
                                                
12 Three persons with the same last name appear in this story: the here mentioned Julio Lleras Acosta, 
director of the Central Mortgage Bank and member of ICT's board of directors (1939); Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo, liberal politician, ICT's initiator as Finance minister of president Eduardo Santos, and later 
himself president of the country (1966-1970); Alberto Lleras Camargo, was also a liberal politician and 
president of the country (1945-1946, and 1958-1962) and the first director of the Organization of American 
States, OAS. Julio and Alberto were cousins. Julio was Carlos' uncle (his brother, Federico Lleras Acosta, 
was Carlos' father). Leopoldo Villar Borda, Alberto Lleras: El Último Republicano, 1a ed, Colección 
Biografías (Santa Fe de Bogotá: Planeta, 1997). 
13 Thus, the Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, and the representatives of the 
Minister of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare, Arturo Robledo and Gustavo Noguera Saa also ended their 
service time. 
14 The provinces specifically mentioned were: Boyacá, South and North Santander. In: Minute107, June 
1942, p. 271. Furthermore, the decree 380 of 12 February 1942 intended that the national government's 
shares and stocks in the contracts for the construction of working-class ("popular" in Spanish) 
neighborhoods in the urban areas should be transferred to the agency. 
15 The creation of the new department, “Sección de la Vivienda Urbana” was established in the Decree 
1579 of 1942 (Article 2th). 
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I define the period between 1942 and 1947 as a transitional phase in the ICT's 
work. The task of building urban housing marks the beginning of this phase, and the 
implementation of Law 85 of 1946 beginning in mid-1947, its end. It is the agency’s 
transition from building exclusively rural housing to building, as the sole agent, a large 
number of urban neighborhoods that transformed the shape of many urban centers around 
the country. 
This transitional period is characterized by the construction, in collaboration with 
the municipalities, of Barrios Populares Modelo, Model Working-class Neighborhoods, 
and by a constant pursuit of financial stability, which should have been granted by the 
new law that expanded its duties in 1942, but which was never completely implemented. 
The ICT's economic crisis during this transitional period reflects the economic crisis of 
the country as a consequence of, among other things, World War II. Also, as Francis 
Violich and Robert C. Jones discuss in their report on Low-Cost Housing in Latin 
America published in 1949:  
During the war period Colombia experienced the inflationary trends in rents and 
costs of building materials that were to be found in all Latin America. In Bogota, 
rents for dwellings under thirty pesos (The Colombian peso is currently valued at 
approximately US$ .57) per month rose 124.5 percent between the end of 1941 
and the middle of 1945. During this same period, costs of building materials rose 
90 percent. These increases indicate the difficulty of meeting the ever –expanding 
housing needs of that city.16 
Those five years were defined by a series of political transformations, with 
continual changes in central political positions, which saw a number of politicians with 
different ideas about the way the ICT should be financed. All efforts to receive the 
necessary resources to work through this time of deep economic crisis did not come to an 
                                                
16 Violich, Francis, and Robert C. Jones. Low-Cost Housing in Latin America. Edited by Solow, Anatole A. 
Washington: Pan American Union, 1949, 58. 
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end until the enactment of Law 85 in December 1946. This law was the result of Carlos 
Lleras Restrepo’s proposal elaborated in collaboration with Colombia’s National Industry 
Association (Asociación Nacional de Industriales, ANDI).17 According to Francis 
Violich,18 this constituted the "most important revision in Colombia's housing law" of the 
time.19 Violich gives a precise summary of this law, which aimed to assure  
an increase in capital for the Instituto de Credito Territorial amounting to about 
10,000,000 pesos for urban and rural housing for workers and middle class 
groups. This fund is to come from a five percent tax on the net income of private 
firms. The contribution may be made directly to the Institute, or individual 
housing loans may be negotiated with the employees. ... This law, requiring 
forced investment in housing, is to be in effect for a period of 10 years.20 
 
Law 85 had enormous consequences for the agency's structure and activities. The 
first significant change affected the structure of the board of directors. Representatives of 
new associations were called in; others were excluded.21 The new board included 
representatives of the Industry (ANDI), of the Colombian Farmer’s Association, of the 
Chambers of Commerce, of the employees, and of the workers. Neither the poor 
peasant’s representatives nor the representative of the Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial 
y Minero (Bank of Agrarian, Industrial and Mining loans) were included in this new 
                                                
17 In: Minute 255, December 9, 1946, p. 528-back – 531-back. 
18 Francis Violich, U.S. American Landscape architect and planner, was involved in several Inter-American 
initiatives and published a key book on Latin American planning and housing: Francis Violich, Cities of 
Latin America: Housing and Planning to the South (New York: Reinhold publishing corporation, 1944); 
Francis Violich and Robert C. Jones, Low-Cost Housing in Latin America, ed. Solow, Anatole A. 
(Washington: Pan American Union, 1949). 
19 I agree with Violich in the importance of this law as a key event in the development of the agency, unlike 
Saldarriaga, who does not present this law as a turning point for the work of the ICT.  Violich and Jones, 
Low-Cost Housing in Latin America, 60; Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. 
Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989, ed. Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico and 
Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de Interés Social y Reforma Urbana. INURBE (Bogotá: Inurbe, 1995), 14; 
Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda: urbanismo y arquitectura de la vivienda estatal en 
Colombia, 1918-1990 (INURBE, 1996), 39. 
20 Violich and Jones, Low-Cost Housing in Latin America, 60. 
21 Law 85 of 1946, Article 22th. 
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board of directors. This major transformation in the board’s composition probably reveals 
changes in the economic structure of the country, but also the importance some social 
actors were gaining in the housing question.22  
The new funding sources meant a significant capital increase that allowed the ICT 
to build housing at a different scale. The board members agreed the ICT was now able to 
build in one year the same number of houses they had built during the entire seven years 
before.23 This required rearranging the agency's entire structure to cope with this new and 
immense responsibility of building urban housing with vastly increased capital.24 
According to existing historiography, the agency's only task during this 
transitional period was to disburse loans to the municipalities, but in fact the agency 
performed a wide array of activities. First, rural housing still constituted an important part 
in the ICT's work. Furthermore, still lacking enough capital to tackle more building tasks 
on its own, the ICT offered its technical assistance principally to the Ministry of Labor 
and the Coffee Farmers' Federation during this period.25 Finally, the results of some 
Model Working-Class Neighborhoods were already visible beginning in 1943, and during 
the last year of this phase, 1947, the board members spent much of their time preparing 
for a task that would come to fruition in 1948; the date to which historiography traces its 
first urban housing project. By 1947, though, the ICT had been able to build 3,000 rural 
                                                
22 Minute 261, March 18, 1947, p. 545. 
23 Minute 276, August 2, 1947, p. 589-back. 
24 That also meant to solve all financial aspects related to the new means (bonds emission, investment of 
new capital, disbursement of interests, etc.), to refine the law through other decrees, to change the internal 
statutes of the agency, to define the new structure to work national-wide, to search for building materials, to 
begin negotiations with the different municipalities, industry and cooperatives to build the housing projects, 
and a great deal more. 
25 Minute 128, November 1942, P. 327-back, and Minute 132, January 1943, p. 335. 
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housing units and 1,450 urban housing units in twenty-two model working-class 
neighborhoods.26 
 
The official history’s origins. 1947 - 1953 
Although the enactment of Law 85 in December 1946 and the subsequent 
appointment of the new board of directors opened this new period, the nomination of a 
new general manager, Hernando Posada Cuéllar, in December of 1947, constituted the 
ultimate turning point.27 Posada Cuéllar was succeeded by Francisco Puyana Méndez in 
1950.
28
 Puyana Méndez remained in this post until the end of this period, 1953, when 
army General Rojas Pinilla seized power with the support of the country’s elites.29 This 
phase marks the beginning of the official history of the ICT's urban housing projects, 
which is characterized by the consolidation of modern ideas about urban housing against 
the backdrop of intense violence in the country.  
This third phase constituted a crucial moment for the development of the agency. 
After the infrastructure was more or less in place, the new task was to execute the work 
plan arranged during the previous phase, using the new resources provided by Law 85 of 
                                                
26 Minute 276, August 2, 1947, p. 589. 
27 Garcés Navas was gone, but he remained still in the agency, first as administrative advisor, then as the 
manager of the Barranquilla office. Organizational Committee, Minute 92, December 23, 1947. In: Minute 
298, January 2, 1948, p. 664-back. 
After a while his influence and knowledge on the institution were forgotten. Minute 493, November 6, 
1951, p. 1253-back. Posada Cuéllar stayed at the agency until the end of 1949. 
28 A lawyer, Puyana Méndez previously worked at the Bank for Agrarian Credit, in the institutional 
portfolio department. In: Minute 411, January 26, 1950, p. 1004-back. He initiated his work at the ICT as 
the President’s representative in the board of directors in 1949. In: Minute 405, November 10, 1949, p. 
982-back. 
29 General Rojas Pinilla took power on June 13, 1953. However, the meeting of the board of directors, two 
days later, offers no evidence for this extreme event: the same participants, and there is no official comment 
about that in the meeting. Minute 561 (incorrectly numbered: 661), June 15, 1953, p. 0088. 
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1946.30 Thus, the new board of directors created a number of technical committees, so 
that the different and numerous tasks could be managed in a more efficient manner. The 
meetings took place more frequently and the quantity of issues to be handled augmented 
significantly during the first years of this period.  
The housing projects built in the urban areas through this phase served as a space 
for the ICT to deploy the experience it had accumulated in the rural areas and construct 
the "model working-class neighborhoods" in a joint effort with different municipalities in 
the transitional phase. The urban housing projects built in this phase also served as a 
space for experimenting with new ideas circulating around housing, which architectural 
historian Alberto Saldarriaga refers to as the “modern paradigm of social housing.”31 
During this period, an astonishing number of events ensued at all levels, which 
directly or indirectly affected the agency. First, the political conflict escalated to a new 
high after the Liberal politician and presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was 
murdered in April of 1948. This deepened the already existing political confrontation, 
known as La Violencia. Precisely as Gaitán was murdered, the ninth Inter-American 
Conference met in Bogotá, and the Organization of American States, OAS was 
established.32 Second, interactions with the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, IBRD, (later renamed the World Bank) led to the launch of the "Mission 
Currie," which arrived in Colombia in July 1949 and conducted the first comprehensive 
assessment of the country. The mission’s goal was “to formulate a development program 
                                                
30 As specifically stated in a report for "La Superintendencia Bancaria." Minute 374, March 17, 1949. P. 
884-back. 
31 Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda: urbanismo y arquitectura de la vivienda estatal en 
Colombia, 1918-1990 (INURBE, 1996), 28. 
32 Interestingly, high range representatives were present at this meeting: U.S. Secretary of State George 
Marshall, for instance. But also Fidel Castro. The latter attended however a "Latin American student 
conference," financed by the Argentinian government of Juan D. Perón. David Bushnell, The Making of 
Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 203. 
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to raise the standard of living of the mass of the Colombian people.”33 It presented its 
results to the government one year later, in July 1950, elaborating a number of 
recommendations that, in turn, impacted the ICT's organizational structure.34 Most 
importantly, it showed for the first time, in clear numbers, the dimensions of the social 
problems in the country as a whole. Third, the construction of the country’s first steel 
mill, Paz del Río, was one of the Conservative government’s most important projects for 
promoting the nation’s industrialization. At the same time, Paz del Río was a political 
strategy to stimulate the economy in one of the zones most affected by La Violencia.35 
Fourth, the creation of the Centro Interamericano de Vivienda, CINVA (Inter-American 
Center of Housing) in Bogotá in 1951 was the result of a Pan-American Union initiative 
in collaboration with the National University and the ICT. Finally, during this period the 
national and international architectural scenes came into contact with the visits of Le 
Corbusier, Paul Lester Wiener and José Luís Sert to Colombia. Le Corbusier visited for 
the first time in 1947 at the invitation of Fernando Mazuera Villegas, Mayor in Bogotá, 
and later developed the city’s Pilot Plan. The architects Paul Lester Wiener and José Luís 
Sert, in charge of its further development and of the Pilot Plans of other Colombian cities, 
also visited the country several times during this period.  
Two conservative presidents governed the country during that period, Mariano 
Ospina Pérez (1946-1950) and the ultra-conservative Laureano Gómez (1950-1953), 
who, as a politician in Congress, and through his newspaper "El Siglo," had attacked the 
                                                
33 Roger J. Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie: New Dealer, Presidential 
Adviser, and Development Economist (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 160. 
34 World Bank and Lauchlin Bernard Currie, eds., Bases de un programa de fomento para Colombia, 2. ed. 
[Traducción bajo la dirección del Dr. Jaime F. Córdoba] (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1951). With this 
mission emerged in Colombia the paradigm of development, as discussed in: Escobar, Encountering 
Development. 
35 See: Decree 4051 of  (December 20) 1949. 
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ICT as a work of the Liberal Party from the agency's establishment in 1939.36 
Interestingly, as Laureano Gómez took office in August 1950, he expressed his interest in 
the agency and his will to actively support it. However, the plural configuration of the 
board of directors might have been a thorn in his side.
37
 Thus, a big turning point for the 
agency came under his government with the enactment of the decree 469 of 1951, 
according to which the board of directors should be reduced to 3 members appointed 
directly by the president.  
Although the argument supporting this decree, which says: “…. that the 
experience suggests the necessity of performing some organizational reforms in the 
Institute of Territorial Credit, …,” holds some true, the decision, which derived from it, 
expresses rather the changes in the political realm in the country at that moment.38 In fact, 
many different groups of the society were represented in the board of directors from 1947 
until 1951: the urban workers, employees, the cooperatives, the agricultural sector, 
industry and commerce, but also the representatives of the president, the ministries of 
labor, Hygiene, and Finance. Retrospectively, this board composition was probably more 
pluralistic and encompassed the interests of a broader part of the society, but it was 
indeed less efficient. The long and important discussions did not facilitate the process of 
decisions making in the agency. However, its members adjusted to each other, and by the 
beginning of 1951 it could be claimed that they worked optimally. This large group 
                                                
36 One example mentioned in one board meeting was an editorial in the newspaper "El Siglo" of June 9, 
1940, with the title "A Bolshevik Measure," attacking a decree (818 of 1940), which sought to facilitate the 
provision of loans to the peasants through "the constitution of mortgages through a private document." In: 
Minute 35, June of 1940. This measure was also explained and justified by Carlos Lleras Restrepo, in his 
role as Finance minister and leading force of the ICT, in his historical account of the agency. In: Lleras 
Restrepo, Reseña Historica del ICT, 57. 
37 Minute 462, February 1st., 1951, p. 1182-back. In this minute, the general manager reports that he met the 
President twice to discuss different aspects related to the agency, and to express his interest in supporting 
its work. 
38 Decree 469 of February 28, 1951. 
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generated some concern, and the board members were discussing some possible 
arrangements, through which all groups would be still represented in the board.
39
  
Instead of having a diverse board of directors, president Gómez decided to have a 
three-members board appointed by him, in addition to the Minister of Finance. Two of 
the members were already part of the old board, but the third new member was Gabriel 
Serrano Camargo, one of the leading architects of Colombia at that moment.40 One year 
later, the board of directors expanded again, including the general managers of the 
Institute of Parcelaciones (Institute of Land Subdivisions) and of the Bank of Agrarian 
Credit in order to achieve “a better coordination in the activities of these agencies.”
41
 
According to this new decree, the president was also responsible for the general 
manager’s appointment.
42
 Under these conditions, the transformations introduced with 
this decree meant that now the ICT was under his direct command. 
In addition, the transformation of the agency’s funding during this period reflects 
the shifting interests of the national government regarding its social programs. It also 
gives account of the macro-economic rationales shaping the country’s industrialization 
process. The significant legislation that was Law 85 of 1946 was updated and eventually 
eliminated through Decree 1465 of 1953, which allowed the ICT to emit bonds anew as it 
did prior to the enactment of Law 85 but with increased support from the national 
                                                
39 The Decree 614 of 1950 added the Minister of Labor to the already large main board. Minute 416, 
February 23, 1950, p. 1015. Their discussions on possible arrangements are consigned in Minute 453, 
November 21, 1950, p. 1147.  
40 Serrano Camargo stayed only until 1953 though. Minute 464, March 8, 1951, p. 1193-back. This was the 
first session under the new decree, one month after the last session with the previous board composition. In 
this session are Roberto Salazar, previously the president’s representative, Juan Pablo Ortega, previously 
the representative of the industrialists, and Gabriel Serrano Camargo, and the Finance Minister, Antonio 
Álvarez Restrepo.	
41 Minute 521, May 12, 1952, p. 1297-back.	
42 Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1214.	
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government and with a new kind of bonds.43 The "Housing and Savings Bonds" would 
facilitate credit for those who already had a savings account. This measure clearly sought 
to boost the country’s credit system.44 
 
Working under a military government. 1953 - 1957 
The enactment of Decree 1465 of 1953 marking the end of the previous period 
also opened a new era for the agency, coinciding with the coup d'état through which army 
general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power. Therefore, the period that commenced in 
1953 is defined by work under a military government. Throughout this period, several 
army members were in leading positions at the agency. Admiral Rubén Piedrahita 
Arango led the agency between 1953 and 1954, and Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez 
replaced him as ICT’s general manager from 1954 to 1956. I set the end of this phase in 
1957, when Rojas Pinilla was driven from power. This event, again, coincided with a 
major transformation within the agency.  
The military regime of Rojas Pinilla is thus the backdrop against which the 
agency’s development during this period needs to be seen. His regime used populist 
measures to consolidate his mandate. After Rojas Pinilla gained some confidence, he 
decided to take a more independent path that he called the Third Power, for which Juan 
Perón's regime in Argentina served as a model.45 As one can expect, "the systematic 
                                                
43 Decree 4051 of 1949 had already replaced Law 85 of 1946, but the ground idea was still contained in this 
decree, unlike the mentioned Decree 1465 of 1953. The reasons behind this kind of decisions would require 
another study. 
44 Minute 559, June 7, 1953, p. 0084; Minute 562 (incorrectly numbered: 662), June 22, 1953, p. 0090-
back. 
45 This was viewed with enormous distrust by the traditional parties and by the Church leaders. See, among 
others: Carlos H. Urán Rojas, Rojas y La Manipulación Del Poder, 1a ed (Bogotá: C. Valencia Editores, 
1983), 89-102; Fernán E. González, Poderes Enfrentados: Iglesia y Estado En Colombia (Santafé de 
Bogotá, Colombia: Cinep, 1997), 299. 
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development of low-cost housing" and thus, the ICT, were quintessential to his political 
program.46 However, the housing policies he advanced during this period did not result in 
a "systematic" search for solutions to the housing shortage as announced, but rather in a 
series of measures that sought to consolidate his power. These measures, so far as they 
relate to the ICT, included the use of its financial resources to support charitable 
initiatives, especially those coordinated by Rojas Pinilla's wife and daughter, and the 
country’s major labor unions, through which the government sought to gain the workers' 
adherence to the "Army Government."47  Rojas Pinilla's government also sought to make 
the ICT's work visible as part of the military government's achievements. Interestingly, 
the ICT received the support of other populist military regimes during this period, such as 
that of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, in the form of credits for building housing.48  
Rojas Pinilla was a Catholic, who, in David Bushnell's words, "sincerely felt that 
close collaboration between church and state was essential for the moral regeneration he 
                                                
46 As he "explicitly" expressed it in his presidential discourse in August of 1954. In: Instituto de Crédito 
Territorial, ed., Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955 
(Bogotá, 1956), 11. 
47 ICT's board of directors authorized the support of the foundation "Amparo de la Joven" (the protection of 
the young woman) through scholarships. This foundation was created as an initiative of Rojas Pinillas' 
wife. In: Minute 577 (incorrectly numbered: 677), September 21, 1953, p. 0140. The agency SENDAS, 
"Secretariado Nacional de Asistencia Social," National Secretary of Social Welfare, was set up to carry out 
the Social Economic reform program under the direct of his daughter Maria Eugenia Rojas. SENDAS also 
received ICT's support. In:  Minute 652 (incorrectly numbered: 752), December 9, 1955, p. 0305-back. 
Also: Donation of a house in Bogotá to the "Rehabilitation's Committee, recently created by the 
government." In: Minute 569 (incorrectly numbered: 669), August 3, 1953, p. 0115. Another request from 
his daughter, Maria Eugenia in: Minute 622 (incorrectly numbered: 722), December 6, 1954, p. 0272-back. 
Interestingly, the referred Unions were the CTC, supported by the Liberals, and the UTC by the Catholics. 
In: Minute 643 (incorrectly numbered: 743), September 1st, 1955, p. 0295-back. 
One could thus read in this measure, the use of ICT's resources as a means to gain some control over the 
labor Unions historically dominated by the traditional parties. This measure ensued simultaneously with the 
consolidation of a third labor union, the CNT (Confederation Nacional de Trabajadores), which "was 
affiliated with the Latin America-Wide labor confederation that  ... was in turn sponsored by the Perón 
regime in Argentina." In: David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 220. 
48 Offer of Evidia from Venezuela to build housing for the ICT. In: Minute 609 (incorrectly numbered: 
709), May 31st, 1954, p. 0232-back; Contract with Convensa to build and finance 10,000 housing units for 
the ICT. In: Minute 624 (incorrectly numbered: 724), February 7, 1955, p. 0273. 
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had in mind.49 He sought to attract a voting base through a populist "social and economic 
reform program," while simultaneously suppressing any demands for more democratic 
structures.50  
Rojas Pinilla's government used the cult of personality built around him to seal his 
power.51 The use of media to display his image and achievements were essential to this 
strategy, which included among other things the first comprehensive publication on the 
ICT's work, Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de 
Vivienda, 1955 (A Housing Policy for Colombia; First National Housing Seminar). The 
agency intended this seminar to “clarify” for its employees the misunderstandings that led 
to much of the difficulties existing today in the daily practices, “especially in the regional 
offices." This seminar also aimed at "unifying and better directing the housing policy, 
which the ICT is intensely developing today."52 The seminar also sought to "contribute a 
global vision of the housing problem in order to consolidate a housing policy for 
Colombia." These all-encompassing aims illustrate the government’s grandiloquent tone 
in painting the picture of army general Rojas Pinilla in redemptive work, part of his cult 
of personality strategy for guaranteeing his government’s success. 
Furthermore, this publication introduced the more technocratic approach to 
housing that came to characterize the agency’s work in the 1950s, emphasizing socio-
economic planning over the technical innovations stressed in the 1940s, and diminishing 
the relevance of the architectonic considerations. The Lauchlin Currie mission’s report, 
mentioned above, probably also played an important role in this transformation. 
                                                
49 Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, 215. 
50 Ibid., 217. 
51 Urán Rojas, Rojas y La Manipulación Del Poder, 91. 
52 Minute 633 (incorrectly numbered: 733), April 28, 1955, p. 0288. 
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Despite paying lip service to fixing the housing shortage, the ICT's work did not 
take any significant steps in that direction. On the contrary, the board of directors met 
less often than previously. The meetings from the first years of this period transmit the 
sense of a well-exercised routine that does not require external aid to function properly. 
Indeed, several of the requests the ICT's general manager and board of directors 
authorized during this time even suggest outright mismanagement of the agency.  
Curiously, several firms that offered the agency building materials, requested 
advance payments. Since some of them were well known firms or members of the army, 
it remains questionable whether there was a clear strategy on the part of board members 
to promote national industry or if these concessions were only an expression of 
favoritism.53 In general, a more lax management of agency's funds becomes evident.54   
                                                
53 The firm "Prefabricaciones Ltda.," requested in 1954 advancement in money for the delivery of 
prefabricated elements, such as beams, lintels, floor slabs and stairs for the housing development in 
Quiroga, Bogotá. Gabriel Serrano Camargo was shareholder of this firm. He was a member of the most 
renowned architecture firms at that moment, "Cuéllar, Serrano, Gómez" and served as a member of  ICT's 
board of directors from 1951 to 1953. Minute 595 (incorrectly numbered: 695), February 14, 1954, p. 0214; 
Minute 602 (incorrectly numbered: 702), March 31st, 1954, p. 0222. Hernando Posada Cuéllar, general 
manager of the agency from 1948 to 1949, offered the agency the fabrication and supply of cement blocks 
in 1953. However, he required to buy first the machinery to install the manufacture plant, for which end he 
requested a loan from the board of directors. He did receive it.⁠ In: Minute 567 (incorrectly numbered: 667), 
July 24, 1953, p. 0111. In 1954, the board of directors approved to sell Posada Cuéllar equipment for the 
fabrication of brick, for the price as defined in the inventory, and with no interests. The price would be paid 
back in a "prudential period" or in brick. In: ⁠Minute 592 (incorrectly numbered: 692), January 18, 1954, p. 
0203-back. One month later, Posada Cuéllar, as general manager of the society "Macon Ltda." requested an 
advanced payment for the existing contract to supply brick to be paid back in form of brick or in a period of 
four to six months. The board of directors once more accepted this request. In: Minute 597 (incorrectly 
numbered: 697), February 23, 1954, p. 0216. The last time this contract was mentioned in the minutes was 
at the end of April of 1954. Posada Cuéllar asked to extend the period to supply the material and to lower 
the quantity. This time the board of directors only partially agreed to accept his requests. In: Minute 605 
(incorrectly numbered: 705), April 29, 1954, p. 0225. The board authorized the study of a loan's request of 
Lieutenant Colonel  Efraím Reyes Cubillos to explote stone, sand and clay in his property. In: Minute 602 
(incorrectly numbered: 702), March 31st, 1954, p. 0222. 
54 As the board members discussed an offer to build the furniture for an entire working-class neighborhood 
in Bogotá, it came up with the alternative idea to invite the most important furniture fabricants of the city to 
present their proposals. The fact that the board did not question instead the logic of this offer regarding the 
costs such an initiative could have for the agency or for the final user, is one of innumerable situations in 
which the board of directors seems not to be guided by the principle of economy of the agency. Minute 609 
(incorrectly numbered: 709), May 31, 1954, p. 232. 
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This reckless use of ICT funds was only possible because the extremely high 
price of coffee on the international market buoyed Colombia’s economy until 1954. 
Coffee was the country’s most significant resource during that period, and when prices 
declined again, resistance to Rojas Pinilla's regime grew stronger and the agency’s 
financial situation worsened. As a result, the national government took the most radical 
decision concerning the agency since it was established in 1939 and merged it at the end 
of 1955 with the National Agency for Water Resource Use and Electricity Development 
and the National Agency of Municipal Development, forming the new National 
Corporation of Public Services.55 This decision occurred in striking contrast to the 
military government’s discourse during the “First National Housing Seminar” earlier that 
year, discussed above, which placed high importance on the ICT’s function as the 
"coordinating organism of national housing policy." While it is not clear why this step in 
the contrary direction was taken, based on a later report of the then housing department's 
manager within the new corporation, this merger sought to expedite the commercial and 
technical procedures of the state agencies, apparently also part of Currie's mission 
proposal to reorganize the executive branch of the country.56 The agency explained this 
step later in a more objective tone; "the reason for this measure was to offer the country, 
and more specifically, the municipalities, a comprehensive solution to their main 
problems through the linking of the three basic agencies in the development of the 
national cell: the municipality itself.”57  
It was a brutal decision to merge housing, water and electricity into a single 
agency. The scope of the three agencies’ tasks was so different that water and electricity 
                                                
55 Decree 2956 of (November 10) 1955. In: Minute 650 (incorrectly numbered 750), November 10, 1955, p. 
0303. 
56 Minute 6, May 4, 1956, p. 0064. 
57 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 30 Años de Servicio, 25-26. 
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in effect had no connection to the housing. And one might understand this decision as 
logical if it was intended to develop a comprehensive bureaucracy, but this did not 
happen. The three issues were handled by separate committees with no relation to each 
other, and the Board of Directors meetings show no strategy for combining them. 
Housing was given short shrift in the meetings of this period, and issues having little in 
common with the ICT’s cumulative experience over the previous 17 years seems almost 
to have been thrown away. Stunningly, some housing projects were still executed.  
Until the three agencies merged at the end of 1955, the board of directors had 
maintained the structure introduced in March of 1951. In other words, three members 
appointed by the president, the ministers of Finance and of Development, as well as the 
general manager of the Bank of Agrarian Credit participated in the meetings.58 Yet some 
board members occasionally changed for no apparent reason and at no specific moment.59  
Under the figure of the National Corporation of Public Services that started 
operating in 1956, radical changes in the agency’s leadership took place. From this 
moment, the agency operated “under the control” of the ministry of Development. ICT’s 
general manager Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez became the new Corporation’s 
general manager. The new Housing department (former ICT) had two managers during 
its short life. First, Rafael Suárez Guzmán, who led the Housing department from the 
corporation’s establishment until September of 1956.60 The second manager for the 
housing department, lieutenant colonel Gonzalo Díaz, was only appointed at the end of 
                                                
58 However, the minutes only occasionally express whom the participants in the meetings are representing. 
59 Only the changes introduced in the board’s composition after Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez was 
appointment as new ICT’s general manager in 1954 makes some sense. Minute 619 (incorrectly numbered 
719), September 8, 1954, p. 0268-back. 
60 Minute 1, April 5, 1956, p. 0002; Minute 22, September 6, 1956, p. 0287. 
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1956.61 Lieutenant colonel Díaz led the housing department until the National 
Corporation of Public Services was liquidated in May of 1957. 
The difficulties inherent in the sluggish dynamic of this merger were instantly 
evident. However, it took Rojas Pinilla being deposed from power in May 1957 to return 
autonomy to the three agencies.62 The mismanagement, for which Rojas Pinilla's 
government is known, shone through the financial deficit within the corporation, which 
reached six million Colombian pesos in the housing department, even before the 
corporation could be dissolved.63 
 
A new start under the National Front. 1958-1965.  
After the National Corporation of Public Services was dissolved and ICT was an 
independent agency again, the decree 1368 of 1957 determined its general structure. The 
ministry of Development was still ICT’s control instance. In addition, said decree 
determined that the board of directors should be comprised by the minister of 
Development, two representatives appointed by the national government, one 
representative of the Colombian Architects Association, and one representative of the 
National Associations of Industrialists and of Trade. According to this decree, the 
members of the board of directors, with exception of the minister of Development, were 
appointed for two years. 
                                                
61 Minute 33, November 8, 1956. 
62 As the military junta transitorily assumed power, the board members of the corporation resigned. They 
signaled so their willingness to let the new government to set up a new board of directors according to their 
specific plans (Minute 16, May 16, 1957, p. 0771).  However, the next meeting was the last meeting under 
the figure of the Corporation. (Minute 17, May 17, 1957). 
63 Minute 9, June 7, 1956, p. 0131. 
30 
 
The last phase of the agency considered in this study began with the meeting of a 
new board of directors in September of 1957 and its new general manager, Fabio 
Robledo Uribe.64 This period is defined politically by an alliance between the two 
traditional political parties, which enabled the deposition of army General Rojas Pinilla 
from office and put a transitional military junta in place until a plebiscite decided the 
agreement known as the “National Front.” The results of Rojas Pinilla's government in 
general, and of the experiment to merge the three state agencies specifically, were the 
object of several meetings of the board during the next phase of the agency. Diverse 
historians have shown how Rojas Pinilla and his family used the Presidency to come to 
an unprecedented wealth. Through the study of the ICT, it is possible to identify the 
extent to which this general assessment applied to the agency. The new board of directors 
discussed during several sessions the numerous loans to the former president and his 
family, which were never paid back. 
This new period was marked by an accelerated urban growth with a concurrent 
growth of informal housing, and by a nation-wide fear that the revolutionary spirit 
following the Cuban Revolution in 1959 would spread to Colombia. Thus, during this 
period the U.S. presence through the aid program "Alliance for Progress" became central 
to the ICT's activities. Against this backdrop, and with an increasing number of persons 
unable to meet the requirements of the agency’s existing housing program, the ICT 
deployed new self-help, mutual self-help, and incremental housing programs to build a 
many of the period’s urban housing projects. Furthermore, slum clearance projects gained 
                                                
64 Minute 1, September 11, 1957, p. 001. 
Robledo Uribe only stayed until January of 1958 due to conflicts with one member of the military junta that 
replaced Rojas Pinilla, but he assumed the general manager post again in 1961, and held this position until 
1965. In addition, Antonio Garcés Sinisterra led the agency from 1958 to1959 and Anibal López Trujillo 
led it from 1959 to 1961. 
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currency.65 The ICT also introduced programs to attract private investment and supported 
the enactment of those policies, which sought to stimulate a culture of saving in order to 
increase the available resources for housing construction.66 At the end of this period, in 
1965, the financial means obtained through the Alliance for Progress came almost to an 
end, and the ICT's building activity drastically slowed. Moreover, the country’s economic 
recession in 1963 had enduring consequences for the construction of low-cost housing in 
the following years. The lower number of housing units the agency built during those 
years reflects this situation. While in 1963, 12,367 housing units were built, there were 
only 2,339 in 1965.67  
As the agency was able to reactivate its housing programs, and the number of 
housing units increased again in 1966 (9,069), there was a different moment for the 
agency, for the country, and in the architectural discussion. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the 
ICT's initiator twenty-six years before, became President of the country (1966-1970) as 
the third president under the National Front agreement. At the same time, Colombian 
society grew more complex. Guerrilla organizations emerged and consolidated (FARC 
and ELN: 1964, EPL: 1967) in response to the impossibility for any political participation 
outside the two traditional political parties, student movements arose, and the Vatican II 
                                                
65 A regulation regarding "slum clearance" in: Minute 11, November 6, 1957, p. 0068. Since then until the 
end of this period, it was a constant topic. 
66 The "Three Part Plan" (P-3) sought to stimulate private investment in low-cost housing. According to this 
plan, the private investor, the ICT, and the future dweller participated in the housing project. In: Minute 8, 
October 16, 1957, p. 0042-0046. This was a successful program until the end of this period. Several firms, 
some U.S. American firms among them, participated in the construction of housing throughout this period 
in the P-3 program. Another program consistently implemented during this period was the worker's 
program (P-T). Here, the employers participated in the funding of the housing projects. A list with the 
firmes participating in this program is in: Minute 37, June 24, 1963, p. 246-back. 
67 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., Vinculación de La Industria Constructora Privada En Programas 
Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial. 
Sección de Divulgación y Publicaciones, 1969), 16. 
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Council transformed the Church, leading to a Bishops’ Conference in Medellin in 1968.68 
Urban growth was now central to the national discussion. The ICT's general manager 
introduced a series of reforms in the technical department, working with a new generation 
of architects who questioned much of the previous approach to housing, such as that at 
Ciudad Kennedy. They were working then in a decidedly urban country. The urban 
population was 59.6% in 1970, a significant increase compared to the 29.1% living in 
urban areas in 1938, one year before the ICT was launched.69 Under these circumstances, 
the agency was ready to initiate a new period in which its accumulated knowledge could 
serve as a platform to consistently shape the nation’s urban centers over the course of the 
next decades. 
 
THE CASE STUDIES 
Three case studies located in the city of Bogotá serve as a means to critically 
assess the agency’s contributions to modern architecture and the major transformations 
the agency experienced during the period of the study. They shed light on some ideas that 
nurtured ICT’s housing projects. Although using case studies solely located in the Bogotá 
prevents from showing the complexity of a nation-wide operating agency, it allows 
focusing the attention on the interactions and experiences in the center, from which the 
guidelines to other parts of the country emanated. The chronology of the three case 
                                                
68 "The objective of the Medellín conference was to interpret the principles of the Second Vatican Council 
(Vatican II, 1962–1965) within the Latin American context, for their eventual application in Latin America. 
Vatican II redefined the Catholic Church's role in the world and in the lives of its adherents, emphasizing 
that God's grace and salvation were to be found everywhere, not only in the Church." In: Thomas Leonard, 
ed., “Bishops’ Conference, Medellín, 1968,” Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Washington: 
CQ Press, 2018), 79–80, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613. Accessed: April 19, 2018. 
69 Alberto Vásquez Restrepo, Aproximación a Una Política Para Vivienda En Colombia. Ponencia 
Presentada a La XV Asamblea General de La Cámara Colombiana de La Construcción (Camacol), 
Barranquilla, Octubre de 1972 (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1972). 
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studies is reconstructed from the minutes. However, additional primary and secondary 
sources enabled me to gather the existing information about the case studies in one place. 
Consequently with the structure of the agency, whose central quarters were located in the 
capital of the country, the best-documented housing projects are in Bogotá. My case 




Figure 1.2. Muzú’s Location in the city. Proa, December 1949.70  
                                                
70 The same image appeared in: Carlos Martínez and Jorge Arango, Arquitectura En Colombia: 
Arquitectura Colonial 1538-1810,Arquitectura Contemporánea En Cinco Años 1946-1951 (Bogotá: 
Ediciones Proa, 1951). The legend remarks: "In this schematic plan of Bogotá, the location of the 
Neighborhood Unit of Muzú, to the south of the city is represented. Note the favorable location the new 
workers neighborhood will have, in relation to the industrial zone as soon as the J. J. Vargas Avenue, in 




Muzú was one of the first housing projects the agency built with the financial 
means resulting from the Law 85 of 1946. This working-class neighborhood became the 
place in which prefabrication of building parts, produced by the ICT itself, and new urban 
configurations were deployed. On February 17, 1948, the ICT began to discuss building a 
working-class neighborhood in Bogotá.71 Their only criteria for assessing possible 
locations were flood hazards, drainage possibilities, and distance to the city center.72 
Eventually, the Technical Department chose the site "in front of the Police School of 
Muzú .... within the Bogotá municipality" as the location for the planned working-class 
neighborhood.73 This 358,079 m2 site, slightly sloping east, was earlier part of the 
haciendas "la Planada" y "Buenos Aires."74 
At the same time, in April of 1948, architect Jorge Gaitán Cortés was hired as the 
leader of Urban Housing. Gaitán Cortés was one of those emblematic young architects, 
who sought enthusiastically to shape modern architecture and spread the ideas of Le 
Corbusier and the CIAM in Colombia.75 Almost three months later, in July of 1948, he 
presented the first urban master plan and plans for different housing types in the 
"working-class neighborhood Muzú."76  
                                                
71 Minute 305, February 26, 1948, p. 685. 
72 Minute 313, April 8, 1948, p.708. 
73 Price: $0.50 la vara. Minute 315, April 22, 1948, p. 711. 
74 In: purchase promise contract between the ICT and the National Goverment. Minute 477, June 14, 1951, 
p. 1221-back. 
75 He worked not only in public posts, such as the ministry of Public Works and ICT, but he also 
participated in politics. In his role as city councilman of Bogotá at the end of the 1950s and subsequently as 
Mayor of the same city, he consistently advanced the project of the physical modernization of the city. An 
insightful biography of him in: Julio D. Dávila, Planificación y Política En Bogotá: La Vida de Jorge 
Gaitán Cortés (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor, 2000). 
76 Minute 330, July 12, 1948, p. 759-back. 
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By the beginning of November of 1948, the plans for Muzú were ready to start 
construction.77 The board of directors decided to implement various operation systems in 
order to assess which of them was more advantageous for the ICT. The ICT itself would 
be in charge of the construction of 6 to 8 houses ("direct management"). The remaining 
houses were to be awarded to no more than four architecture firms, which would build 
the remaining houses through "delegated management" or for a fixed price.78  
The architecture firms which sent proposals at the invitation of the ICT were 
mentioned in the minutes for the first time at the end of March of 1949: Constructora 
Colombiana, Trujillo Gómez & Martínez Cárdenas, Andina de Construcciones, Atuesta 
Guarín & Pombo, Asodeic, Tejeiro & Lezaca, H. Vargas Rubiano Herrera & Nieto Cano, 
Ingecom, Pizano Pradilla & Caro, Pardo Restrepo & Santamaría, Rocha Santander & 
Cía., Benjamín Villegas R., A. Manrique Martín e hijos, Esguerra Sáenz Urdaneta.79 
However, no further comments appear in the minutes on this initial process of 
construction of Muzú, and no firms were selected, or at least, it was not mentioned in the 
minutes.  
In May 1949, Jorge Gaitán Cortés resigned. Thus, Muzú is indeed the result of his 
proposal, but he was not leading the technical department long enough to oversee the 
construction until the end. In fact, construction did not start before he left the ICT. 
                                                
77 Minute 381, May 12, 1949, p. 904. Executive Committee, Minute 139, April 21, 1949, p. 909-back. In: 
Minute 384, June 2, 1949. 
78 None of the house groups in the original plan of Gaitán results in this amount of houses. It is not clear to 
which houses they refered here. Minute 345, November 4, 1948, p. 797. 




Figure 1.3. Master Plan, neighborhood unit. Proa 30, December 1949. 
In September of 1949, a model of a group of 8 houses was presented to the board 
of directors as a first attempt to evaluate the plans, construction costs, etc., before the ICT 
initiated the construction of the whole neighborhood. This first part of the project was to 
be executed by different contractors "under the direct and immediate direction and 
supervision of the agency."80 It is not clear what happened between May and September 
of 1949. Why was a model of the project elaborated if the project was completed the 
previous year, in November, before the architecture firms were invited to participate? 
One of the reasons might be the absence of Gaitán Cortés. Nonetheless, construction 
finally began, and on November 10th, 1949, the general manager announced that after 40 
days of work the first 8 houses were almost finished.  
                                                
80 Minute 400, September 22, 1949, p. 961-back. 
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Figure 1.4. Housing type 58 F 3. Proa 30, December 1949. 
On November 17, 1949, the new leader of Urban Housing, Bernabé Pineda 
Ropero, presented the current status of Muzú's general construction plan and recalled the 
antecedents of the project. He stated that the "plans necessary to initiate the construction 
of the neighborhood were practically finished, except for the detailed design of social 
services such as the church, schools, market, stadium and meeting hall."81 The 
construction of another two groups of 24 houses each, denominated type 58-F-3, began in 
December of 1949 and in January of 1950. Muzú’s inauguration was on August 5, 1950. 
At the end of July, the initial goal was almost achieved: 296 homes had been finished. 
However, construction of more houses had already started. 432 lacked only a roof, and 
520 houses were in various phases of construction, for a total of 1248 houses.82  
In addition to the basic housing type 58-F-3, two other housing types comprised 
the plans for Muzú: a 79m2 two-story house, on a 124m2 plot, for up to seven persons "in 
generous conditions," at a cost of 7,000 pesos. The third housing type was a 107m2 two-
                                                
81 Minute 406, November 17, 1949, p. 986. 
82 A striking number of houses, for the total according to the original plan of Gaitán for the first phase were 




story house on a plot of 127m2 for up to nine persons at a cost of 10,000 pesos.83 
However, only type 58-F-3 (called “minimal housing type” in a Proa’s article) seems to 
have been built. These houses were two stories high, with concrete floors, brick or 
cement blocks walls, eternit (asbestos cement) roof tiles, and an area of 58m2 on plots of 
89.40 m2 (4.73 by 18.90 meters). The first floor contained the following services: a 
dining room, kitchen, and bathroom. The upper floor had a main bedroom and two small 
ones. The neighborhood had four blocks for commerce, with 16 stores in each block.84  
In September 1950, architect Alvaro Ortega proposed to the ICT the construction 
of 80 houses in Muzú for 5.000 pesos each with the construction system “Vacuum” 
through his firm Inster Ltda. Since this proposal ensued a month after the inauguration of 
the first phase, in August 1950, Ortega’s contract marks the beginning of the second 
phase of the construction process.85 According to this contract, Ortega should build eight 
houses in 60 days in Muzú strictly following “the plans and specifications elaborated by 
both the agency and the contractor.”86 Thus, the houses built by Alvaro Ortega’s firm 
with prefabricated walls and other major elements and assembled on site with the 
Vacuum Concrete system might have been applied in only one sector of Muzú.87  
The process for awarding the first 1,056 houses began in March of 1951.88 From 
this group, 32 houses were awarded to presidential palace workers.89 Another part of the 
                                                
83 Proa 30, December 1949. 
84 Minute 477, June 14, 1951, p. 1222-back. 
85 That means that the first phase of Muzú, already inaugurated before Ospina Perez left the presidency in 
August of the same year, had no buildings built with this system. Minute 443, September 14, 1950, p. 
1108-back. 
86 The construction of one block with eight houses in Muzú. (Block 1, unit 6). In: Minute 446, October 5, 
1950, P. 1119. 
87 Although, the prefabricated elements developed by Ortega and Vacuum Concrete are generally presented 
as the sole construction method deployed in Muzú. See for instance, Proa 44. February 1951. 
88 Minute 464, March 8, 1951, p. 1193-back. 
89 Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1213-back. The supervising engineer reported the strategy to select the 32 
applications from the workers of the presidential palace. Minute 475, May 29, 1951, p. 1219-back. 
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houses should be awarded to the municipal workers in return for the offer of Bogotá’s 
Mayor, Santiago Trujillo Gómez, to install in Muzú the external electricity network, 
telephone and to plant the trees.90 
In June of 1951, the neighborhood with its 1,056 houses (132 blocks with 8 
houses each) was sold to the nation. The sum obtained from this sale was to be used 
solely in the construction of "a popular economic district in the city of Bogota." 
Construction continued until the mid-1950s.91 When the military regime of Rojas Pinilla 
came to power, Muzú was transferred again to the ICT.92  
 
Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN 
Although the complex Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, or CUAN, appears as one 
of the ICT’s housing projects, in reality, it went through several hands before the ICT 
received it from the national government. CUAN became the final manifestation of a 
long search by the Colombian state to construct residential high-rise buildings. The ICT 
was not excluded from this search. When CUAN finally was handed over to ICT in 1958, 
the agency had the opportunity to guide the first experience of living in a multifamily 
housing complex.  
 
                                                
90 Minute 436, July 27, 1950, p. 1083-back.  
91 In: "Contratos en ejecucion+1954_57"(Archivo Fragua) Contrato con Jose Daniel Ospina para 
construccion de 38 casas en Muzu. Contrato de diciembre de 1955. Pagos inician en Febrero 1956. 




Figure 1.5. Centro Antonio Nariño. Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección 
Museo de Bogotá. MdB05181. 
It was the Ministry for Public Works that initiated the construction of this 
multifamily housing complex between 1950 and May of 1952 to supply public 
employees, principally those of the Ministry for Public Works, with housing.93 Located 
along the newly opened Avenida de las Americas, its design was entrusted to a group of 
young architects designated by the Minister of Public Works, Jorge Leyva. They were 
Nestor C. Gutierrez, Juan A. Melendez de C., Daniel Suarez Hoyos, and Rafael Esguerra 
G.94 Some in this group had already been working as a firm, Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, 
                                                
93 Summary of the events related to the development of CUAN. Memorandum of the legal department of 
the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Caja 589. 
94 Carlos Niño Murcia, Arquitectura Y Estado: Contexto Y Significado de Las Construcciones Del 
Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Colombia, 1905-1960, 1. ed, Colección Arquitectura En Colombia (Bogotá, 
Colombia: Centro Editorial, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1991), 
313. The constitution of this designer group varies in the different sources. Silvia Arango and Ana Montoya 
include Enrique Garcia M, and Juan is here Menéndez, not Melendez. Carlos Martinez differs even more 
from the others. In his book on Colombian Architecture published in 1963, he stated that the architects of 
the CUAN were Nestor Gutierrez B. and the firm Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Suarez & Cia. 
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Suarez. This firm begun in 1946 but producing its most important works in the 1960s. 
CUAN is its first building at this scale and part of its early oeuvre. 
The selection of the architects for the construction of CUAN lay completely in 
Minister Leyva's hands. After the enactment of Decree 1953 of 1951, which enabled the 
construction of CUAN, the minister Jorge Leyva directly commissioned architect Nestor 
C. Gutierrez to conduct preliminary research on building multifamily high-rise buildings. 
The project’s construction operated through "delegated management;" the oversight and 
audit of CUAN's building process remained however in the hands of the ministry of 
public works. Under the same scheme, other firms were selected to develop the 
construction of the structure. In July of 1952 a decree was enacted, through which the 
contracts related to the structure's construction were approved.95  
While Nestor Gutierrez claimed that on April 9 of 1953 the project was 
practically complete, decree 873 of 1953 (March 26), three months prior to Rojas Pinilla 
coup d'etat in June of 1953, established special regulations for purchasing building 
materials in order to finish the residential buildings of CUAN for the middle class.96 This 
measure was probably justified by the need to finish the project soon, but it also speaks to 
its incompleteness. After Rojas Pinilla came to power, Santiago Trujillo Gómez, an 
                                                
95 The decree 1718 of 1952 (July 18) approved the contracts of May 28 of the same year to construct the 
structure of CUAN's buildings as "dwellings for the middle class in Bogotá" with following firms:  
a) Pardo Restrepo & Santamaría Ltda.: three buildings, 13 stories high with a total built area of 34,500 m2.  
b) Martínez Cárdenas & Cia. Ltda.: four buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 26,552 m2.  
c) Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez y Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 23,000 m2. 
d) A. Manrique Martín e Hijos Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.  
e) Noguera. Santander & Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.  
f) Pablo Lanceta Pinzón: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.  
The contracts included the construction of all complementary works according to the plans previously 
approved by the ministry of public works. 
96 Interview with Nestor Gutierrez in: Juan Carlos Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como 
laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953.” (Universidad Nacional de Colombia Facultad de Artes, 1998), 162. 
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architect, replaced Jorge Leyva as the new minister of public works.97 In spite 
maintaining an architecture-minded minister, CUAN lost its relevance, and its completion 
and replication was no longer on the new military government's agenda. Nestor Gutierrez 
lamented that Laureano Gomez was deposed from power, for in his view this shift in the 
political realm led the ministry of public works to abandon this project as well as its plans 
to repeat this experience in Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla.98  
In December of 1954, a new decree, number 3619 of 1954, arranged the sale of 
CUAN to the Banco Popular. The decree enabled the Banco Popular to subsequently sell 
the apartments through a system of "horizontal property," and it ran an ad campaign 
aimed “exclusively” at its own clients and those of its Caja de Ahorros (savings bank) 
who had opened accounts throughout the country prior to December 26, 1955. Although 
CUAN was presented as the ideal modern environment to live in ("the best access roads") 
with its amenities within the complex and different apartment types, these characteristics 
seem not to have been enough to attract the public.  
                                                
97 Trujillo Gómez was trained as an architect. He partnered a firm from 1932 to 1949 with Martinez 
Cárdenas, a powerful developer, who was responsible for the construction of the structure of part of the 
CUAN and very close to the deposed president, Laureano Gómez. Trujillo Gómez left the firm to pursue a 
political carrier, and became Bogotá's Mayor from 1949 to 1952. Ibid. 
















Figure 1.6. Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño. 1955. El Espectador. Archivo Documental / 
Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB014445 
As the Banco Popular was unable to sell its apartments to individual families, it 
transformed two of the buildings, C1 and C2 (merged into one long building, as already 
visible in the advertisement of El Espectador), into a hotel. But in light of its inability to 
fulfill the agreement defined in decree 3619 of 1954, the military Junta that had replaced 
General Rojas Pinilla and ruled between May 1957 and August 1958, gave the complex 




months, returned it to the national government, which finally sold CUAN to the ICT.99 
One of the members of the military Junta was Vice Admiral Ruben Piedrahita Arango, 
former ICT's general manager. He became minister of Public Works in 1954, and as a 
member of the Military Junta, participated in the conversations between the ministry of 
public works (Roberto Salazar Gómez, former member of the ICT's board of directors 
and later also Mayor of Bogotá) and the general manager of the ICT, Antonio Garcés, 
that defined the conditions of the agreement for the ICT to receive CUAN. Thus, the 
participants in this conversation knew the ICT well.100 Decree 0261 of 1958 (July 11th) 
authorized the sale of CUAN to the ICT.101  The deed that recorded this transaction 
between the national government and the ICT also specifies that the latter had developed 
a program to manage CUAN. This program comprised the definition of the management 
staff, and the criteria to choose the project’s future tenants.102  
The ICT finished some works still pending at CUAN before it initiated the 
process for selecting its future residents.  By the end of 1958, every apartment had been 
leased. The lease contracts were initially for one year, but the tenants lobbied Congress to 
pass law 143 of December 24, 1959, aiming to become owners under the best possible 
conditions. Indeed, after this law passed, the ICT was able to sell the apartments to the 
                                                
99 Summary of the events related to the development of CUAN. Memorandum of the legal department of 
the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
100 Correspondence between the minister and general manager Garces. June 18 of 1958, Archive Ministerio 
de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
101 CUAN was 30 million worth. This cost was to be paid to the national government in different 
modalities, among them: 1,900,000 pesos for "colonization's works" in the Vásquez region: schools, 
housing, Centers for hygiene, and other community services, also up to 2,500,000 in prefabricated wood 
houses to be installed in Tolima department, in the regions "affected by the violence." The ICT committed 
to building a road between Puerto Boyacá and Puerto Nare to foster the colonization's process in the region, 
and to build housing and community services. The total of payments added up to 20 million. The remaining 
10 million were a contribution of the national government to the ICT. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. 
Box No. 0012. File 00001. Page 1-4. 
102 Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
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tenants at production cost, with no down payment and an amortization period of 20 
years.103 The transformed buildings C1 and C2 then became student housing. Law 45 of 
1959 ordered the assignment of those buildings to "the Corporation of University 
Housing and granted authorization to the National Government, aimed at Affordable 
housing for university students."104 Thus, the buildings were still part of the complex 
when the ICT received it from the National Government. On May 15th of the same year, 
building A2 was sold to the National Army, probably as part of the agreement between 
the ICT and the La Caja de Vivienda Militar, the Housing program of the Army. 
Although what happened between the years 1955 and 1958 is not clear apart from 
the transformations made by the Banco Popular, revising this chronology against the 
political background of the time helps us understand this void in the information. Rojas 
Pinilla came to power in 1953 with a populist program that took shape in the following 
years. Housing for the middle class was not his major preoccupation.105 At the time 
CUAN was sold to the ICT in July 1958, the country was about to return to a civil 
government. Alberto Lleras Camargo, from the Liberal Party, was elected as the first 
president under the National Front. Thus, the final occupation of CUAN occurred under 
different circumstances than those of its initiation and development. The ICT had also 
undergone profound changes during that time.  
                                                
103 Summary of the events related to the development of CUAN. Memorandum of the legal department of 
the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Archive Ministerio de Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
Although general manager Anibal Lopez Trujillo stated in a letter to the representatives of the residents on 
August 21 of 1960, that this law was the result of an ICT's initiative. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. Box 
No. 0012. File 00001, 6. 
104 This law considers the possibility of paying the ICT in money the value of the buildings, or in form of 
land owned by the government to develop housing programs in Bogotá. Nowhere is stated how the ICT 
received this payment. 
105 The first national conference on housing organized by the ICT in 1955 with the whole support of the 
military regime gives account of this. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Una Política de Vivienda Para 




In Ciudad Kennedy converge different levels of inquiry through which housing 
emerges as a geopolitical tool and as a wide field of experimentation. The U.S. aid 
program Alliance for Progress and self-help housing are preponderant traits of this 
development.  
Located southwest of Bogota's historic center, Ciudad Kennedy was built between 
1961 and 1976. Its location on the grounds of the former local airport "Techo," gave the 
project its first name, "Ciudad Techo." Since President Kennedy laid the "first brick" as a 
symbolic act initiating the Alliance for Progress program, the neighborhood changed its 
name to Ciudad Kennedy after his assassination in 1963.106 
 
Figure 1.7. Location. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Proyectos y Realizaciones En 
Vivienda. 
                                                
106 Construction was already ongoing at Kennedy’s visit to Ciudad Techo on December 17, 1961. 
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The inception date for the plan of this megaproject can be traced back to 1957.107 
After General Rojas Pinilla was deposed from the Presidency, and a transitional military 
Junta took power, the ICT’s newly appointed general manager presented the board of 
directors his plan to develop a "kind of satellite city," in which five neighborhood units 
with 1,000 houses each would be built, and where the ICT would be able to implement its 
various operational systems for housing construction. To this end, he analyzed various 
possible locations, among others, one at Techo owned by the firm Bavaria.108 He initiated 
negotiations between Bavaria and the ICT for its purchase, which continued through the 
next year and involved, among other things, conversations with the office of the Plan 
Regulador.109 For the ICT projects, the selection of land was constrained by the need to 
keep total costs low in the construction of low-cost housing, which was no longer 
availalbe within the city limits. Thus, the general manager’s original plan for Cuidad 
Kennedy evolved into a more comprehensive five-year working plan for the city of 
Bogotá, presented to the ICT in March 1958 by René Caballero, manager of the Bogotá 
office. This plan posited the construction of a "satellite city" containing a large housing 
development, which the board of directors decided would be designed by competition.  
They commissioned two of their own members to set the rules and timeline for this 
competition, the architect Francisco Pizano de Brigard and the army captain architect 
Héctor Restrepo.110 This competition was not mentioned ever again. 
                                                
107 Although the possibility to buy land in Techo was already discussed in a board meeting in 1955. Minute 
625 (incorrectly numbered 725), February 21, 1955, p. 0274. 
108 Minute 18, December 11, 1957. 0143. 
109 Bogotá’s master plan of Paul Lester Wiener and José Luís Sert and based on Le Corbusier’s Pilot Plan. 
Minute 9, February 26, 1958, 0281; Minute 12, March 11, 1958, 0306-0307; Minute 19, April 16, 1958, 
0368; Minute 31, June 27, 1958, 0499; Minute 34, July 9, 1958, 0513; Minute 36. July 22, 1958, 0531. 
110 Minute 12, March 11, 1958, 0306-0307. 
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The ICT demarcated the Techo site as the definitive location for this "satellite 
city" in 1960, after the inauguration of the new airport Eldorado on December 10, 1959 
rendered the old airport at Techo obsolete. The national government expressed the 
possibility to offer the Techo land to the ICT, ending negotiations with Bavaria over their 
adjacent property.111 On April 7, 1960, the ICT purchased the old airport together with 
the Caja de Vivienda Militar (Military Housing Fund). Not everyone agreed on this site 
for the development of a satellite city, but in March of 1961 the general manager went 
ahead and presented a design for semidetached houses to the board of directors.112 This is 
the first time the minutes mention a design for Techo. At that moment, it might still have 
been in a very early stage of design development. 
In Le Corbusier's Pilot Plan, officially turned over to the municipal government in 
1950, Techo was still an airport located outside the city limits. However, “Ciudad Techo” 
was already located within the city limits in an article by Gabriel Andrade Lleras 
published in Escala in 1963.113 Figure 1.9 represents the open areas at the metropolitan 
scale. (The thin but dark lines represent the perimeter ring). The proposal to build a 
trolley-bus line for the project indicates its remote location, even after it became part of 
                                                
111 One of the members of the board of directors recalled this event at the discussion about the price the 
airport Techo's owners were requesting in the negotiations that took place two years later. In: Minute 6, 
February 17, 1960, p. 025. 
112 While the Municipal Planning Office confirmed the possibility to develop a housing project on this site, 
based on the issue of the public services that could be provided by the city, the "Planning Junta" had several 
concerns, which it expressed to the board of directors through a communiqué that was discussed during a 
meeting of the board of directors. The concerns were not named in the minute. Minute 25, June 30, 1960, p. 
335-back. 
Minute 10, March 15, 1961, p. 0794-back. In this meeting, the board of directors suggested presenting the 
project to various "prestigious architect firms" that could assess it and if it was the case, to introduce 
recommended changes. 
113 Gabriel Andrade Lleras, “Ciudad Techo y El Diseño Urbano,” Escala, no. 4 (1963): 8–10. 
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the city.114 Ciudad Kennedy thus provides a good example of how the ICT's housing 
projects contributed to the expansion of Colombia’s urban centers.  
 
 
Figure 1.8. Pilot Plan. Le Corbusier, Wiener, Sert. 1950 
Figure 1.9. "Bogotá and its future urban form." In: Andrade Lleras, “Ciudad Techo y El 
Diseño Urbano.” 
The project initially incorporated 20 "super-manzanas," or superblocks, in an area 
of 480 ha / 1185.6 acres. As the Caja de Vivienda Militar owned one fifth of the 
purchased land, developing some of those superblocks was its responsibility. Each 
superblock contained between roughly 400 and 1500 housing units with different housing 
types and with space for social facilities such as schools, sport fields, churches, shops, 
and health centers. According to ICT leadership, this spatial organization was intended to 
                                                
114 Minute 18, 1963, p. 140-back. The general manager of the municipal enterprise for urban transportation 
(Empresa Distrital de Transportes Urbanos) asked for a loan to build the trolley bus's net to Ciudad 
Kennedy. The project was not rejected, but redirected to the national government to facilitate the means to 
build the transportation's facilities. Afterwards, the ICT sold to the institution a plot to build a terminal for 
trolley buses' garages and workshops. In: Minute 18, 1963, p. 137-back. 
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reinforce the relationships between the families participating in the project.115 As per the 
contract on the official partition of the land, Superblocks 4, 9A, and 12 belonged to the 
Caja de Vivienda Militar.116 The ICT developed the remaining superblocks under the 
name Ciudad Techo. Most of the site falls within a polygon defined by preexisting 
streets, with the two triangular superblocks 6A and 12A external to it. 
 
Figure 1.10. General Plan of the neighborhood. In: Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección 
Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia.  
After the presentation of the first draft, the planning process wrapped up speedily 
using the already well-developed scheme repeatedly executed by the ICT. First, the 
departamento de administracion (administrative department) formulated an operating 
plan for the project, determining the number of applicants, the budget, and the system by 
which the housing units would be built. For Ciudad Techo, the board of directors then 
approved, in August 1961, a first phase of 550 housing units to be built through the 
                                                
115 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Ciudad Kennedy, Una Realidad (Bogotá: Oficina de Relaciones Públicas 
del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1965), 17. 




individual aided self-help system and 300 to be built through mutual aided self-help.117 
The document presenting the planning process for Ciudad Techo states that these 850 
plots would be provided with the utilities, and the site would have streets, sidewalks, 
trees, and free areas for parks and recreation. The agency also determined in this proposal 
the size of the available plots, the type of support it would provide, the total cost of each 
option, the eligibility requirements around applicant earnings and assets, and amortization 
period. Once the board approved the project, the ICT distributed the application forms.  
 
Figure 1.11. Master plan, 1980. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.  
                                                
117 Minute 30, August 02, 1961, p. 1079-back. The meaning of these two terms will be explained later. 
They were specifically defined in CINVA's "Self-Help Housing guide," and reproduced in: United States, 
and Harold Robinson, eds. Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential. HUD-427-1A(2). 
Washington: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of International Affairs: For sale by 
the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1976. 
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The magnitude of the challenge of building a "satellite city" required a 
straightforward strategy, which the ICT certainly possessed. The first contract to build 
infrastructure in super-block 6 was awarded on September 20, 1961.118 Simultaneously, 
the ICT started awarding the new apartments to residents. Although no specific date at 
which Ciudad Kennedy’s construction began can be traced, by December 17th, 1961, 
when President John F. Kennedy laid its corner stone, the ICT had already formulated a 
plan to construct homes for another 3,500 residents, awarded contracts to build 
infrastructure for Superblocks 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and selected the 
participants for the self-help program in these blocks.119 The order in which these 
different superblocks were developed is not clearly discernible in the minutes or other 
records, but one way to trace it, at least roughly, is by looking the order in which the bids 
and housing units were awarded to contractors and residents, respectively. Yet even these 
appear only fragmentarily in the existing information.120 That being said, the construction 
process most probably started with the superblock 6, where the first self-help pilot project 
was put in place. Twenty-seven families started building their houses on block 11 on 
                                                
118 Minute 37, September 20, 1961, p. 1248-back. 
119 Minute 45, November 22, 1961, p. 1317-back / 1320-back. Awarding of 3,000 individual aided self-help 
system and 500 housing units through mutual aided self-help. Second group / phase.  
Depiction of three alternatives in this program: 1) 2,000 120m2 large plots, plus a loan of $ 2,000 pesos for 
material purchase. In addition: technical help and social services. Price: $ 6.850 pesos. 2)  1,000 108m2 
large plots, plus a loan of $ 3,700 pesos for material purchase. In addition: technical help and social 
services. Price: $ 10.000 pesos. 3.A) 226 120m2 large plots, plus a loan of $ 3,500 pesos for material 
purchase. In addition: technical help and social services. Price: $ 11.370 pesos. 3.B) 274 75m2 large plots, 
plus a 1,400m2 large communal area, plus material's supply for $ 4,800 pesos. Price: $ 11.370 pesos. 
Minute 46, November 29, 1961, p. 1366-1367. Awarding of 300 aided self-help system and 50 housing 
units through mutual aided self-help for the national police. They are part of the second group / phase. 150 
aided self-help in the first alternative ($6.850 pesos), 150 aided self-help in the second alternative ($10.000 
pesos), and 50 mutual aided self-help, 3A and 3B alternatives, ($11.370 pesos). Minute 48, December 13, 
1961, p. 1425-back: Contract awarding for construction of infrastructure (obras de urbanizacion) in the 
superblocks 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16. One of the board members, Guillermo Gómez Moncayo, did not 
participate in this awarding process because some of the participating persons were relatives. 
120 There is no clear explanation as for why Ciudad Kennedy was developed in that specific order. 
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December 8, 1961.121 A group of superblocks to be built through self-help followed.122 
Almost one year later, in September 1962, the multifamily building in superblocks 2 and 
7 began.123 The second group of superblocks with single-family housing also began in 
1962, and construction was finalized with the completion of superblock 8.124 Ciudad 
                                                
121 Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. Revista Ciudad Kennedy. Vol. No. 01. Bogotá: Instituto 
de Crédito Territorial, Departamento deRelaciones Públicas, 1964. 
122 Minute 48, December 13, 1961, p. 1425-back. Superblocks 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16. 
123 Probably similar to superblock 7. Minute 39, September ?, 1962, p. 0606. Contract awarding for 
superblock 7 infrastructure.  Contract award to the firm Esguerra Urdaneta Suarez y OLAP to build the 
structures of the multifamily housing buildings within the first phase and the installation of the electricity 
net. Minute 42, October 9, 1962, p. 0641-back. Selection of families for 1,997 apartment units in both 
superblocks. Minute 51, November 19, 1962, p. 0829-back. For the construction of the new group of 
multifamily buildings' structures, the ICT awarded the firm Construcciones Sigma Ltda., and Brugues 
Estrada & Cia. Ltda., and the firm Borrero Zamorano Giovanelli. Minute 54, November 28, 1962, p. 0850. 
Contract awarding of finishes for multifamily buildings in superblock 2 to Vargas & Cia. Ltda., Copre 
Triana Vargas Rocha, Vasquez Peña & Cia. Ltda., and Garcia Osorio Ltda. Minute 21, 1963, p. 175. 
Contract awarding for electricity net in the superblock 7. Minute 23, 1963, p. 182. Contract for finishes in 
multifamily buildings of superblock 7 not awarded "due to the severe economic conditions of the last 
months." A new bidding process needs to be started. Minute 32, June 6, 1963, p. 227-back. Contract 
awarding for finishes in the multifamily buildings of superblock 7. Adjustment of contract for finishes in 
the multifamily buildings of superblock 2. Minute 47, August 23, 1963. Contract award for building 4 
multifamily buildings in the superblock 7 for the "Educators' Plan." 
124 Minute 11, March 21, 1962, p. 0198-back. Contract awarding for infrastructure of super-block 15 (it is 
probably a typo. I think it refers to superblock 5). Minute 39, September ?, 1962, p. 0603. Contract 
awarding for Electricity net for superblock 6A. Minute 44, October 18, 1962, p. 0716. Contract awarding 
for 313 plots in superblock 1 infrastructure and utilities. Minute 49, November 8, 1962, p. 0822-back. 
Contract awarding for open spaces (plazas), commercial spaces and exterior hard-surface flooring (zonas 
duras) in the superblocks 2, 3, 5, 6, 6A, 7, 8, 13, and 15 to Jaime Nieto Cano, Manuel J. Melo Saenz and 
Pedro J. Herrera Acosta. Minute 50, November 15, 1962, p. 0827. Contract awarding for the electricity net 
in the superblocks 3, 5, 8, and 12A. Minute 52, November 22, 1962, p. 0834. Transfer of a piece of land in 
superblock 12A to the Empresa de Energia Electrica for the construction of an electricity sub-station. 
Minute 56, December 6, 1962, p. 0859-back. New contract awarding for the electricity net in the 
superblocks 3, 5, 8, and 12A, since one of the awardees did not accept the conditions of the contract. 
Minute 21, , 1963, p. 175. Contract awarding for electricity net in the superblock 7. Minute 27. 1963, p. 
204-back. Contract awarding for the electricity net for 320 plots in the superblock 1. Minute 65. November 
1963. 60 housing units CCDP-4 with all services as part of the "Educators' plan" in the superblock 1. 
Minute 46, November 26, 1965, 0342-back / 0343-back. Building materials purchase (list) and working 
force hired for the construction of 60 houses in the superblock 8 through "direct administration." Minute 
47, December 3, 1965, p. 0350. Building materials purchase for the construction of 32 houses through 
aided self-help and additional $10.000 pesos in the superblock 8. 
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Kennedy was expected to house at least 100,000 inhabitants. "... [B]y the end of July, 
1963, the total number of inhabitants was probably close to 63,000."125  
In sum, Ciudad Kennedy offers crucial glimpses in the ICT’s operating system 
that enabled the construction of housing on a large scale. This housing development, in 
which the most diverse institutions participated, allowed the ICT gathering essential 
knowledge that served as a guide for future developments. Ciudad Kennedy, as the last 
example of the period of this study reveals the level of complexity of ICT’s housing 
projects, its management, and the different actors involved.  
Throughout the next chapters, Housing as an architectonic artifact, as a geo-
political tool, and as a means to educate the residents will be explained through these 
three case studies: Muzú, CUAN, and Ciudad Kennedy. The rationales behind them will 
slowly emerge and shed light on the ideas and beliefs that animated the stakeholders—
technicians, agency leaders, and politicians—intervening in the building of low-cost 
housing, as well as on the implications of their assumptions about the populations to be 
housed in the ICT projects, i.e. low income and middle class sectors. The main arguments 
of this dissertation will be demonstrated through these three case studies.  
  
                                                
125 William B. Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing 
Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,” CINVA Summer 
Research Fellow Yale University, School of Law, Escritos y Monografìas (Bogotá: Centro Interamericano 
de Vivienda –CINVA, 1964), box 53, file 4, Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, 
Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 8. 
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Chapter 2:  Reading ICT’s work through the Postcolonial lens 
The ICT's housing program was established in the context of Colombia's quest for 
modernization. This project of modernization needs to be read critically since it operated 
in a context of political violence and of extreme social and economic inequality and 
exclusion, and the ICT's housing program did not operate independent of this reality. 
Approaching the ICT's work through a lens of postcolonial theory permits a critical 
reading that helps reveal the ambiguous, concealed, or completely invisible rationales of 
the ICT's housing program. Postcolonial theory helps us assess modernization as a means 
to achieving “Development”, and understand how building housing supports this goal. 
Taking this perspective should be seen, as Arturo Escobar claims, "as another way of 
thinking that runs counter to the great modernist narratives," to which the emancipatory 
power of modern architecture belongs.126 The ICT's official discourse supported the 
building of housing for the low-income population as a way to achieve a more equitable 
society, while simultaneously the elites' national project did not include the "less favored 
classes," so oft invoked in ICT's publications.127 A postcolonial reading exposes the 
inherent contradictions of such a discourse, defined by ideas such as civilization and 
justice.128  
While postcolonial theory offers a useful method for reading the ICT’s work, 
Latin American scholars have broadened the scope of the discussion, incorporating other 
elements particular to Latin American history. They critically address the invention of the 
                                                
126 Arturo Escobar, "Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise," Cultural Studies 21, no. 2–3 (March 1, 2007): 
179–210, doi:10.1080/09502380601162506. 
127 The "less favored classes" seem to encompass then all the people, who are not part of this privileged 
elite conforming the leaders of the ICT. 
128 Ashcroft 1998, 192. Quoted in: Felipe Hernández, Bhabha for Architects, Thinkers for Architects ; 04; 
Variation: Thinkers for Architects ; 04. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 13. 
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Americas, the idea of Latin America, and the counterpart of modernity: colonialism.129 In 
a form similar to the postcolonial authors, they deconstruct the narratives of modernity 
and progress. Of special relevance has been the work of Arturo Escobar, who has 
thoroughly deconstructed the different discourses that have had an impact in the so-called 
Third World. Escobar bases his understanding of discourse on Michel Foucault, whose 
work “on the dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of social reality, in 
particular, has been instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of 
discourse produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and 
even making others impossible."130 Since Development, as a goal and as a strategy, 
defined the ICT’s actions throughout the period of this study, and Escobar’s work on 
development is seminal, the theoretical foundations of my research considerably rely on 
it. 
With the project of transforming the built environment of those who lived in 
precarious conditions, the ICT transmitted the idea of progress, based on modern western 
“knowledge."131 The ICT legitimized this vision though an "objective," scientific 
language regarding the living conditions of the targeted population. Extrapolating 
Escobar’s definition of Development, ICT’s housing program also followed a “top-down, 
ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract 
concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of ‘progress’," and 
                                                
129 Edmundo O'Gorman, The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World 
and the Meaning of Its History (Greenwood Press, 1972); Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: 
Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of Modernity, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum Intl 
Pub Group, 1995); Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, Blackwell Manifestos (Malden, MA ; 
Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2005); Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, 
Decolonial Options, Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations (Durham [N.C.]: Duke 
University Press, 2011); Escobar, “Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise. The Latin American Modernity/ 
Coloniality Research Program.” 
130 In: Escobar, Encountering Development. 5, 10. 
131 In the same way development discourse did. Ibid., 13. 
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was conceived "as a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions 
intended to deliver some ‘badly needed’ goods to a ‘target’ population.”132 Indeed, the 
agency worked as a hegemonic force, which contributed to disseminating the western 
paradigm of progress / development, and enabled—to Escobar’s shock—the Third World 
countries themselves to become the strongest believers in this paradigm.133 
Reading the ICT's work through a postcolonial lens shines light on two subjects: 
architecture and power relations, each of which can be read in two ways. Regarding 
architecture, the housing produced by the ICT becomes an account told from the fringes 
of modern architecture’s official narrative, valid on its own, and independent of the 
models defined in western centers of power. On the other hand, these same architectural 
objects can be read as the materialization of the ICT’s educational and civilizing aims. 
Likewise, power relations. On the one hand, the ICT becomes the "underdeveloped" 
object that requires financial and technical support. But on the other, the same agency 
becomes a subject that, in the national context, exerts power over the "less favored 
classes" through the control mechanism that was the educational component of its 
housing program. This dual circumstance is central to understanding the ICT’s history. 
Postcolonial theory has criticized the implicit passivity of the colonized, or lack of 
“historical agency.”134 But –applying postcolonial terminology- the ICT is rather an 
active colonized subject, which is proactive and has its own agenda. Only recent 
scholarship has presented Inter-American relations from the perspective of a Latin 
                                                
132 Ibid., 44. 
133 Ibid., 24. 
134 As discussed in the introduction of: Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, ¡Américas Unidas!: Nelson A. 
Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-46) (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Iberoamericana / 
Vervuert, 2012), 7. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utxa/detail.action?docID=3226394. Also Escobar 
refers to Bhabha’s attention to Said’s seminal postcolonial work Orientalism, in which is suggeseted that 
“colonial power is possessed entirely by the colonizer, given its intentionality and unidirectionality." In: 
Escobar, Encountering Development, 11. 
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America as an active participant.135 This study offers a contribution to enrich this 
perspective.  
Through the lens of postcolonial theory, ICT's architecture appears as an object 
with its own value. The ICT’s housing program operated as a field of experimentation, 
through which modern architecture advanced. However, scholarship has assessed ICT’s 
architecture against its European counterparts in order to legitimate the agency’s 
production. Even though models from the canonical repertoire of modern architecture 
certainly played a role, Colombia’s complex and heterogeneous geography prompted the 
agency to develop strategies similar to those developed under the flag of modernism. The 
systematic use of building types, which varied according to the different regions and 
experiments with building materials to achieve a more rational and efficient building 
process were some of the most relevant strategies. Due to their sometimes-traditional 
appearance, much of ICT's housing projects have not yet been evaluated on their own. 
Most accounts focus on the most modern looking projects since they can be assessed in 
relation to canonical modern residential architecture.  
At the same time however, the underlying political and educational aims of the 
housing program nurtured the architectural design. Modern architecture delivered the 
necessary framework to materialize the ICT's ideas about the right way of living. 
Technical aspects dictated by the premises of hygiene and functionality predominated in 
shaping the built environment through the construction of the ICT's housing projects. The 
ideal form of dwelling was always supported with a seemingly objective argument: the 
current unhygienic conditions of its future residents.  
                                                




From the start, the agency offered what its leaders and technicians considered to 
be the better version of the existing housing conditions. The ICT represented its houses in 
the rural areas as the antithesis of traditional architecture: the ICT dwelling the 
expression of a civilized, hygienic and ordered environment; the traditional hut the 
maximal expression of backwardness. That the depicted dwelling references a vernacular 
architecture with indigenous roots is never mentioned. In the urban areas, the ICT offered 
an alternative to those living in overcrowded conditions, usually in the downtown areas, 
where the old houses from colonial times had been converted in inquilinatos, tenement 
houses, with each family living in a single room.  
Another dimension postcolonial theory brings to the fore is the concept of power 
underlying the ICT's work. From the ICT’s vantage point, there are two levels of 
narration. On the one hand, the ICT is influenced by the rationales of modernization, 
progress, and development defined in Western power centers. On the other hand, it 
replicates the structures of power at the local level, on the margins. I.e., it exercises 
power over those with no power in the country. Here, power relations are mediated by the 
interests of the elites, widely represented on the ICT's board. This dual position hints at, 
what Jyoti Hosagrahar accurately expresses, the ways in which “knowledge about the 
world is generated in specific relationships between those with power and those without 
as a way to justify and perpetuate those conditions of domination."136 Internally, the 
agency underpinned existing power relations by creating an "objective" framework 
according to which it determined the right way of living, and by deploying the housing 
program to accomplish other goals in the quest to make Colombia an economically 
developed country, without diminishing the social inequalities. 
                                                
136 Jyoti Hosagrahar, “Interrogating Difference: Postcolonial Perspectives in Architecture and Urbanism,” 
in The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theory (London: SAGE, 2008), 70–84, 82. 
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The ideas Escobar elaborates to explain the different "tales" around the discourse 
of development describe the same power relations that postcolonial theory has aimed to 
illuminate. Power relations start from the preconceived manner in which “the other” is 
described and assessed by those who wield the power to define them: the colonizer, the 
international organizations, the politicians, the agency's board members and general 
manager, the experts, the social workers, and so on. The same relations have defined the 
ICT from its inception. Poverty, illiteracy, and hunger are directly connected with ideas 
about the “underdeveloped" and the “backward”. Those living in poverty are considered 
to lack the “spiritual and material traits to be developed” and civilized.137  
Power relations also become evident when defining who has a voice. In this 
study, the history is told from the perspective of the ICT. It is a contradictory voice 
however, because it repeats the same "top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic 
approach" of development discourse. The ICT replicates the same models, spread by the 
centers of power, at the next level down of power relations, the national realm. The ICT 
operated as one of the "local centers of power," to use Escobar's terms, through which, 
“people and communities are bound to specific cycles of cultural and economic 
production and through which certain behaviors and rationalities are promoted."138 On 
the other hand, the future residents were never asked. Their knowledge was not 
consulted; on the contrary, it was denied, belittled. They had no voice. Only the experts 
were consulted. Advisors were constantly called in to help the agency’s officials 
understand the situation and make decisions. The experts’ privileged position allowed 
them to impose their views on those targeted by the housing program. 
                                                
137 Escobar, Encountering Development, 53-54. 
138 Escobar, Encountering Development, 46. 
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The unequal power relations instantiated by the ICT shine through the 
consolidation of a center and a periphery. Through its practices at the national level, the 
center, the ICT defined who became part of this national project and on what terms. Since 
the headquarters were located in the capital and the key decisions were taken there, 
Bogotá appears as the center in the national context. By designing the houses and giving 
clear specifications on building methods and urban schemes, the ICT produced models in 
the center, Bogotá, which were transposed indifferently throughout the country as 
simplified ideal housing types. The concomitant simplified understanding of the country 
and its housing needs constitutes the base of one of the most significant effects of the 
ICT’s work in Colombia. The ICT contributed from the start to the consolidation of a 
center and a periphery within the country.139  
The term "periphery" refers here to those territories outside of Bogotá, where the 
ICT’s ideas were introduced. However, this periphery was not homogenous. The 
economic and political periphery of the country (areas mostly inhabited by indigenous 
groups and Afro-Colombians) constitutes another level within the periphery. Due to its 
fragmented view of the country, the agency did not incorporate those peripheral 
territories where it is still only scarcely present today: the Amazonian region, in the East 
plains, the Pacific forest, the south of the Atlantic coast, the Urabá region, and the mid-
Magdalena river region. These constitute the so-called "frontier," which according to 
Amparo Murillo did not enjoy the privileges of the central areas, and which were 
perceived as the unknown and the "savage," "the reverse of the nation," or the opposite of 
the ideal of civilization.140 Furthermore, the disdain with which the agency approached 
                                                
139 The impact of the execution of those models on the communities where the ICT built still needs to be 
studied. 
140 Amparo Murillo Posada, “La Modernizacion y Las Violencias (1930-1957),” in Historia de Colombia: 
Todo Lo Que Hay Que Saber (Bogotá, Colombia: Taurus, 2006), 268. The quotation "the reverse of the 
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the building task in the country’s most neglected areas further reinforced this unequal 
power relationship.141  
As the ICT introduced resident education in its housing programs, it advanced 
onto another terrain, the power over the resident’s bodies. Hygiene and morality became 
instruments of colonization. Since these instruments were deployed mostly among 
women, this level of power relations reinforced disparities in gender relations too. This is 
also the only instance in which women appear in this history. Although they are 
otherwise absent as active role-players, in the realm of the residents’ education programs, 
they appear as the ICT's social workers (they were the "visiting nurses" of the 1940s), 
which teach other women about hygiene and the moral virtues derived from hygienic 
habits. The ones receiving instruction were ascribed only a passive role. They were the 
main objects of the ICT’s education's program.  
Since a segment of the residents in the ICT's urban housing projects migrated 
from rural areas, the politicians and officials, as well as the board members, took it as an 
imperative to educate the residents to live in an urban environment, in which the "bad 
habits" developed in the rural environment and the inquilinatos (tenement houses) in the 
urban centers could be unlearnt. These education programs were the condition sine qua 
non for achieving the goal inherent to the housing program on the political level: 
educating the Other, not to liberate him/her, but to make him/her conform with the 
attitudes expected by the men leading the agency. The power gained over those bodies 
allowed the ICT's officials to inculcate wishes and values identical to those of the ones 
                                                                                                                                            
nation" is a citation in Murillo's text. Source: Margarita Serge, El revés de la nación. Territorios salvajes, 
fronteras y tierras de nadie. Bogotá, Uniandes-Ceso, 2005.  
141 Two cases in relation to the department of Chocó, located along the Pacific Ocean and inhabited mostly 
by African Colombians and indigenous groups, partly reveals ICT's relationship to those frontiers. In: 
Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1216 – 1216-back; Minute 502, January 14, 1952, p. 1273. 
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wielding power. The expected result of this "civilizing mission" is what Homi Bhabha 
calls "mimicry." For him, "colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognisable 
other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite.”142 The frustration 
expressed about this education process not always being successful (complete families 
inhabiting only one single room of the houses, or breeding domestic animals in the 
backyards) demonstrates resistance by the Others subjected to these education programs. 
After presenting how postcolonial theory, and specially Arturo Escobar’s work on 
development, enables to shine light on ICT's architecture and power relations, which the 
ICT created and was subjected to through the geo-political agendas of different actors, 
and the social component of the housing program; next section will discuss how existing 
literature tackles those topics and how a postcolonial approach broadens the scope of the 
discussion on the ICT. 
 
THE MODERN CANON AND ICT 
Tracing the historiography of the ICT's work, two surveys on Colombian 
architecture of the time covered by this research reveal the architectural profession’s 
stance on the ICT. Both publications were written by Carlos Martinez, an emblematic 
figure in the architecture world as editor of the journal Proa, as professor at the 
Universidad Nacional, and as architect. The first, Arquitectura En Colombia: 
Arquitectura Colonial 1538-1810, Arquitectura Contemporánea En Cinco Años 1946-
1951, published in 1951, and coauthored with Jorge Arango, includes two ICT housing 
projects, Muzú and Los Alcázares, both located in Bogotá. While it names the individual 
architects and engineers participating in the design process, whether they worked for 
                                                
142 (Bhabha 1994: 86). Quoted in: Hernández, Bhabha for Architects, 64. 
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private firms or for the ICT, as in Muzú’s case, the ICT itself was not mentioned. One 
possible reason for this omission was their wish to underscore the importance of the 
profession of the architect over the importance of official institutions. 
Martinez and Arango developed two key theses in this canonical work on 
Colombian architecture. First, they recognized the “picturesque and complicated 
topography” of the country.143 However, this characteristic seems not to be relevant to 
explaining the "contemporary architecture" the authors examined.144 As I will show, the 
intricate topography indeed defined the core of the ICT's work methods during the 1940s, 
which constituted its major contribution to modern architecture. Second, for Martinez and 
Arango, the country’s difficult transportation system had hampered its ability to become 
more "civilized.”145  
Carlos Martinez and Edgar Burbano published a second survey on Colombian 
architecture twelve years later, in 1963. The changes in the country during the 
intervening years are an important part of its content.146 Despite the increase of "low-
cost" housing built by the ICT and the BCH (Banco Central Hipotecario - Central 
Mortgage Bank),147 the authors considered that "an adequate and prompt solution" to the 
                                                
143 Martínez and Arango, Arquitectura En Colombia, 6-7. Although this assertion contradicts the narrative 
on modern architecture and nation building, and to the eight points developed by Hugo Mondragón, I refer 
here to its direct implications in the building materials and methods. See: Hugo Mondragón López, "La 
revista Proa,"Departament de Projectes Arquitectònics. UPC, DPA: Documents de Projectes 
d'Arquitectura, no. 24 (2008): 90–95. 
144 Martinez is a fascinating figure in the Colombian architecture realm of the mid' twentieth century. 
Scattered information about him is to find in the different sources. His formation in France, his role in 
introducing the work of Le Corbusier in Colombia, his lectures give account of a highly educated 
intellectual. He also recognized the complexity of the country when trying to explain Colombian 
"contemporary architecture." Yet, probably as most of the leading class of the country, he was also trapped 
in the images of "civilization" in so far as they related to the images developed in the centers of power, 
Europe and the United States. 
145 Interestingly however, he does not recognize the existing railroad as one of the transportation means. 
146 Although this is not central to this discussion, it is interesting that here again, the value of the train as a 
means of transportation is ignored. 
147 Martínez and Burbano, Arquitectura En Colombia, 10. Strikingly, next to housing projects such as La 
Fragua (built with ICT's support as a self-help project), other projects are for "employees with middle 
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existing housing shortage was difficult "due to adverse economic circumstances and 
unassertive urban and architectural approaches.”148 This "unassertiveness" probably 
refers to Ciudad Kennedy, which Martinez and Burbano did not mention. The problem 
posed by housing projects such as Ciudad Kennedy was the Authorship. Martinez was a 
consummate promoter of the profession. His attacks in the journal Proa against non-
professional builders give account of this. Not having a well-known architect as its 
designer, Ciudad Kennedy did not fit into his narrative. In Ciudad Kennedy, the ICT's 
technical department, whit no apparent employment of well-known architects, was 
responsible for its design, planning and construction’s oversight.149 Conversely, Martinez 
included other ICT projects built with the collaboration of renowned local architects. The 
ICT’s name is absent from this publication too.150 
Carlos Martinez, as the leading architecture critic of the time, consolidated the 
official narrative on modern architecture in Colombia through his numerous writings on 
architecture.151 For Martinez, Colombian architecture was defined through “honesty in 
design, the exaltation of building structure, and formal sobriety,”152 and was to be 
appreciated precisely because of these qualities.153 A last element in this official 
                                                                                                                                            
income" appear under the same seal "low-cost." Martinez ample understanding of the term "low-cost" 
applied to the professional architects, and to ICT's officials. It seems that all those houses that were not 
luxurious were "low-cost." 
148 Ibid., 13. 
149 Despite some initial initiatives to do so. A early proposal to conduct a competition, which never took 
place, and the proposal elaborated for the superblock five by Arturo Robledo are some examples. 
150 La Fragua, a project developed with ICT's financial support, but designed by the well-known architect 
German Samper. Under the multifamily housing projects is the ICT housing project "Hans Drews." Again, 
without mentioning the ICT as the facilitator of this project, but its architects. Martínez and Burbano, 
Arquitectura En Colombia, 103. 
151 Hugo Mondragón has analyzed his contribution in his work on Proa. Mondragón López, “La revista 
Proa;” Hugo Mondragón López, "Arquitectura En Colombia 1946-1951, Lecturas Críticas de La Revista 
Proa. (Spanish)," DEARQ: Revista de Arquitectura de La Universidad de Los Andes, no. 2 (May 2008): 
82–95. 
152 Martínez and Burbano, Arquitectura En Colombia, 12. 
153 Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Museum of Modern Art (New York, N.Y.), Latin American Architecture 
since 1945 (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1955). 
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narrative, as introduced by Martinez, is the idea that Colombian modern architecture was 
born in Bogotá, and thrived there. For him, modern architecture could not have developed 
anywhere else in the country as it did in Bogotá. This utterly ethnocentric view of the 
issue aligns perfectly with the discourse the ICT used to consolidate a center and a 
periphery in the development of housing. 
Later accounts have explained the ICT's housing projects as a consequence of the 
proposals on minimal housing developed in Europe between the two World Wars, which 
were presented in condensed form in the second CIAM (Congrès Internationaux 
d'Architecture Moderne) meeting in Frankfurt in 1929 under the motto Wohnen für das 
Existenzminimum. Likewise, historiography has also seen the agency’s work in close 
relationship to the precepts developed by the CIAM, especially from Le Corbusier’s ideas 
on housing and those of Jose Luis Sert on the "neighborhood unit." But what does this 
mean? Does this comparison add to the value of the projects, or diminish it due to the fact 
that it can be read simply as a copy?  
Sert (along with Paul Lester Wiener, his partner in the firm “Town Planning 
Associates”) and Le Corbusier, were in Colombia between 1947 and 1953, following 
Felipe Hernandez' arguments, not only to attract some important contracts to their offices, 
but also to transmit their ideas on modern architecture and urbanism through their 
work.154 They acted as agents of “legitimatization” of modern architecture and urban 
planning in Colombia. Colombian architects trained in the modern way of doing 
architecture, however, also had to deal with the local building industry, economic 
constrains, and their own ideas about the groups they were designing for, among many 
                                                
154 Felipe Hernández, Beyond Modernist Masters: Contemporary Architecture in Latin America (Basel ; 
Boston: Birkhäuser GmbH, 2009); Felipe Hernández, Mark Millington, and Iain Borden, Transculturation: 
Cities, Spaces and Architectures in Latin America (Rodopi, 2005). 
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other things. Hence, what these architects did is more than a simple adaptation of 
European models. It was a translation of global ideas to the specificity of each place.155  
Besides the ICT's own publications, historiography on the ICT rests 
predominantly on two seminal works published in the 1990s by INURBE, the agency that 
replaced it. Both were authored by Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, whose research produced a 
comprehensive compilation of the ICT’s practices and oeuvre, published in “Instituto de 
Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989.” This 
information served as the basis for a second publication, “Estado, ciudad y vivienda: 
urbanismo y arquitectura de la vivienda estatal en Colombia, 1918-1990,” which in 
addition the ICT’s work, included other state agencies that developed low-cost housing 
on national and municipal levels in three main cities: Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali.156 This 
publication presents the inter-relationship between city, state, and architecture and 
connects the notions of minimal dwelling, rational building systems, and between state-
built housing to the modernist paradigm in architecture. Because of its comprehensive 
and systematic approach to the ICT’s work, as well as its emergence from a vacuum of 
comprehensive publications the state’s work on housing; Saldarriaga Roa’s work is the 
main reference for most later scholarship on the ICT.157 Even a recent publication from 
                                                
155 Arturo Escobar interprets the modernization discourse from a similar place as Nestor García Canclini 
does. Arturo Escobar, "Globalización, Desarrollo y Modernidad," in Planeación, Participación y 
Desarrollo, ed. Corporación Región (Medellín: Corporación Región, 2002), 9–32; Néstor García Canclini, 
Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995). 
156 The Banco Central Hipotecario, BCH (Central Mortgage Bank), Caja de Crédito Agrario y Minero 
(Bank of Agrarian and Mining Credit), Caja de Vivienda Militar (Bank of Military Housing), Fondo 
Nacional de Ahorro (National Savings Fond) on a national level, and Caja de Vivienda Popular (Bank of 
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Development Corporation, Medellín), and Instituto de Vivienda de Cali (Housing agency of Cali)  on the 
municipal level. Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 49. 
157 The term "social" is the literal translation for the term used in Spanish; but it is also the way housing 
built by the State is coined in Europe. It compares with the concept of "public housing" in the United 
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the Housing Ministry used these works to describe the historical development of state-
built housing in Colombia.158  
Saldarriaga's account of the state agencies in his second publication, “Estado, 
ciudad y vivienda” (State, City and Housing) relies mostly on legislation governing 
changes to them.159 While still relevant, this publication, has contributed to the enduring 
belief that the agency only started building urban housing at the end of the 1940s. In 
doing so, it ignores the ICT’s extensive collaboration with local municipalities in 
constructing "model working-class neighborhoods” during the transitional period (1942-
1947) of the agency.160 He also did not account for the importance of Law 85 of 1946 for 
the construction of large urban housing developments. 
According to Saldarriaga, “Estado, ciudad y vivienda,” was published at a 
moment when architects looked upon "social housing" with disdain for its apparently 
insignificant contribution to great urban and architectonic themes. Conversely, 
Saldarriaga argued that housing in fact did play a central role in the development of 
modern architecture in Colombia. The problem was, in his view, that the design of state-
built housing projects had not been analyzed in relation to international standards, such as 
those produced by the CIAM. This is the reason why he set out to weave housing projects 
                                                                                                                                            
States, although with the significant difference that housing built by the state in Colombia is to be sold, 
unlike the U.S., where housing will be rented. 
158 Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio para el séptimo foro urbano mundial, Colombia: 100 Años 
de Politicas Habitacionales. Colombia: 100 Years of Housing Policies (Bogotá: Panamericana Formas e 
Impresos S.A., 2014). 
159 Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda,  49-56. 
160 Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 53, 66, 80,107. This unfortunate omission is grounded in the 
own ICT’s publications, which assert that during this period ICT’s work was limited to disburse loans to 
the municipalities (Instituto de Crédito Territorial and República de Colombia, Informe Al Señor Ministro 
de Fomento Para Su Memoria Al Congreso Nacional (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1962), 2, 
31). Unlike him, even if only marginally, Silvia Arango recognizes ICT's work during that period, claiming 
that the ICT extended his work to the urban areas after 1942, where it built "more than 1000 housing units 
in different cities." In: Silvia Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia (Centro Editorial y Facultad 
de Artes, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1990), 206. 
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by Colombian state agencies into the official narrative of modern architectural history.161 
Consequently with this goal, the houses of Muzú are for Saldarriaga a "rather literal 
translation of the existenz-minimum proposed in the CIAM of 1928 [sic]."162 Saldarriaga 
also finds a major influence on state-built housing located in the "international centers of 
study and of professional training."163 This effort to prove the influences of and relations 
to these international centers of study infuses the spirit of most historiography on the 
ICT.  
In addition to Saldarriaga’s publications, the ICT’s historiography consists on 
articles and master theses produced at universities, particularly, the Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia.164 Most of them have also studied the ICT's work mainly from the 
perspective of its formal contribution to modern architecture, which was undeniably 
considerable. In some cases, the ICT is part of the story but not the main object of 
inquiry. Many articles on the ICT only limitedly tackle specific issues. Typically, they are 
based almost entirely on Saldarriaga's information and Silvia Arango’s survey on 
Colombian architecture, and on the authors’ own fieldwork.165 Their approach to 
architectonic topics is mostly aesthetic and/or related to urban development in Bogotá. 
The ICT's post-occupancy transformation is the central theme of Fabio Forero and Jenny 
Forero's research.166 Finally, Saldarriaga collaborated with Olga Ceballos Ramos and 
Doris Tarchópulos Sierra to compile systematically the legislation regulated the 
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164 Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953.” 
165 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia. 
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construction of state-built housing. The laws regulating the ICT's activities are compiled 
in this publication.167 
Two other canonical works of architectural history appeared contemporaneously 
with Saldarriaga's publications: Carlos Niño Murcia's work on the ministry of public 
buildings and Silvia Arango’s comprehensive survey of Colombian architecture, 
previously mentioned.168 The latter presents mass-produced housing for low-income 
families as a place where modern architecture displayed much innovation, both in its 
achievements in Public Policy and its fortunate interactions with the state.169  
When approaching the work of the ICT, Arango refers to the three case studies of 
this dissertation in mostly aesthetic terms. She associates Muzú with Le Corbusier’s floor 
plans of Pessac and highlights its prefab walls and slabs.170 CUAN is defined as "the 
housing complex that exemplifies more clearly the idea of achieving high density through 
isolated high-rise buildings on large green areas."171 Finally, Ciudad Kennedy serves as 
an example for the transformation of mass produced housing. Arango acknowledges that 
despite Ciudad Kennedy's “less elaborated” design, it "has proven over time to have been 
a more acceptable solution than most of the contemporary housing developments.”172 
Recent scholarship has advanced in establishing relationships between the built 
environment and politics, or more specifically, between urbanization, modernization, and 
politics. From her perspective as an economic historian, Susana Romero tackles in her 
                                                
167 Olga Lucía Ceballos Ramos, Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, and Doris Tarchópulos Sierra, Vivienda social en 
Colombia: una mirada desde su legislación, 1918-2005 (Bogotá, D.C.: Editorial Pontificia Universidad 
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168 Niño Murcia, Arquitectura y Estado; Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia. 
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dissertation not only the ICT’s role in Colombia’s urbanization, but also how its function 
as purveyor of credit helped advance the country’s modernization and economic 
development agendas. And in her master’s thesis focused on Bogota, Adriana Suárez 
Mayorga provides an interesting analysis of the extent to which particular configurations 
of power boosted the city’s modernization. Romero as well as Suárez establish necessary 
connections between the transformation of the built environment and the economic and 
political rationales behind them.173  
Furthermore, two recent texts have given new readings on the goals of military 
regimes and their infrastructure and housing programs. Maria del Pilar Sánchez’ 
dissertation on the "National Plan of Public Works" during Rojas Pinilla's military regime 
accurately exposes the imbrications of the political and the architectonic during the 1950s 
with the thorough analysis of a single building, the Naval College of Colombia.174 In 
addition, Lisa Blackmore's work on Venezuela's "spectacular modernity" revises the 
forms in which military dictatorship used modernist aesthetics to convey an idea of 
progress, while at the same time putting all kinds of restrictions on democracy.175 Both 
authors develop their topics from an analysis of military governments’ symbolic use of 
architecture, going so far beyond aesthetic approach to architectural history. 
In the Latin American context, works by Waisman, Eggener, Hernandez and Lara 
and Carranza, just to mention a few, question the architectural history given by canonical 
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works produced in the power centers.176 Their conclusions support the validity of 
addressing those topics, which are not included in the official "NATO-centric" narrative 
of modern architecture.177 
The narrative of modern architecture in Colombia, as inaugurated by Carlos 
Martinez and to which the work of the ICT housing program belongs, has strongly 
centered on the work of the group of architects that produced most of the modern 
architecture during the 1940s and 1950s. According to this narrative, this small, select, 
privileged, and talented group of architects was faced with the immense task of building a 
modern Colombia. On this account, most of these architects were educated abroad and 
came very early into contact with the work of modern European and American 
architects.178 What made them special was their ability to create a clean, sober, and very 
local version of this modern architecture, aided by the close relationship between 
architects and engineers in this period. This narrative excludes a series of events that do 
not fit in, such as some of the technical and architectonic innovations developed in ICT’s 
technical department by architects and engineers, which did not belong to this select 
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group. Therefore, the ICT’s housing projects constitute an excellent canvas on which to 
add nuance to this picture.179  
One of the ICT’s central tasks was to provide solutions to the very modern 
problem of housing an increasing working-class population in the rapidly growing urban 
centers. Many of those involved have been recognized in architectural history as the 
creators of modern architecture in Colombia: Jorge Gaitán Cortés, Alvaro Ortega, Gabriel 
Solano and Hernando Vargas Rubiano; in addition, Gabriel Serrano, Herbert Ritter and 
Francisco Pizano de Brigard participated as members of the ICT’s board of directors and 
constituted a bridge between the agency and the ideas circulating during the period of this 
study. Yet the scope of the ICT's tasks was too complex to be considered a mere field of 
experimentation for the preconceived ideas of renowned modern architects. ICT's 
contribution to the consolidation of modern architecture on its own terms remains a 
much-neglected theme in historiography. Unlike accounts in which the ICT's work 
appears as a space to apply or test the teachings of the “great masters”, in this account the 
architect is only one player among many others who shaped the architecture the agency 
produced.  
The ICT's work offers the opportunity to rethink the evolution of modern 
architecture in Colombia during the three decades covered by the dissertation. In a first 
phase, the ICT took regional differences into consideration, as is evidenced in the rural 
housing program. In the urban realm, this never worked really out, but it received the 
dividends of this first phase through the tools it was able to develop, such as a materials' 
experimentation workshop. This workshop was used in the urban housing program to 
                                                
179 Silvia Arango's mentions that ICT was led basically by Jorge Gaitán Cortés during the first phase of the 
modern period, that for Arango starts in 1945 and lasts roughly until the 60s. In fact, he only stayed one 
year as leader of the urban housing department. He certainly stayed in close contact to the institution for a 
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advance the standardization and prefabrication of building parts as required by "the 
rational paradigm of modern architecture.” A second phase begins with the first large 
housing projects the ICT built in different urban centers throughout the country. Here, 
standards and prefabrication were constituent elements of the projects, but these 
standards were high.180 Muzú is the case study through which much of the entanglement 
between the rural and urban housing program can be seen. 
A technocratic approach to architecture characterizes the 1950s, reflecting the 
politics of the Cold War. U.S. experts through CINVA and President’s Truman technical 
assistance Program “Point Four” vehemently nurtured the model for the developmental 
project analyzed by Escobar. Although CUAN, as the case study for this decade, was 
built prior to the military government, it serves as an example for housing as a stage to 
convey the idea of modernization.181 
After a civil government returned to power in 1958, the accumulated housing 
shortage forced a more pragmatic and humble approach to modernism. Ciudad Kennedy 
is a key example for that. Planned to house 80,000 residents, the project was a significant 
milestone in building low-cost housing through the future-resident participation. U.S. 
prescriptions for implementing self-help methods to broaden the impact of state housing 
programs could finally be deployed on a large scale. The means to build Ciudad Kennedy 
stemmed partly from loans facilitated through the Alliance for Progress, a U.S. Foreign 
aid program, which aimed to halt the spread of Communism in Latin America. 
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Postcolonial theory calls attention to histories created at the fringe, which as such 
are excluded from mainstream historiography. Thus, through postcolonial theory, we can 
read the ICT's work beyond its connections with and derivations from the official 
narrative of modern architecture. In this regard, a number of not yet discussed aspects of 
modernism in Colombia, previously considered irrelevant since they were unconnected to 
centers of power, come here to the fore. We can revisit the ICT’s history from a different 
perspective. As Homi Bhabha expresses it, "a postcolonial reading of architectural history 
would place under scrutiny the authority of architectural history as another kind of 
Europeanising discourse; a discourse which, like colonial discourse, is characterised by a 
simultaneous operation of inclusion and exclusion."182 However, the same relations of 
inclusion and exclusion operate in the history of the ICT by setting the rules by which 
housing has to be created. In doing so, the ICT repeated the same kind of relations within 
the country. This double condition of the ICT can be traced through the efforts to connect 
to the official narrative, and through its exclusion from it. The agency's work was not 
recognized as worthy of any modern architectural history, internationally nor locally, as 
in the case of Ciudad Kennedy. But at the same time, the agency maintained an 
ambivalent attitude towards Colombian traditional architecture; moreover, it further 
consolidated power relations within Colombia in terms of an architecture produced at the 
center, and transposed to the rest of the country.  
Although aesthetic considerations remain on my radar, they are not my 
preponderant concern, and the postcolonial lens refracts my analysis in other directions. 
Some of the issues that arise with this focus are: the tension between building with 
traditional methods or introducing new ones, the methods developed to build rural 
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housing in a rational manner, the ambivalent stance towards traditional housing in the 
rural areas, and the application of knowledge acquired through experimenting with 
building parts in the first urban housing projects built by the agency without direct 
collaboration of the municipalities. This kind of analysis reveals ICT’s architecture as a 
product of many deliberations and negotiations within the agency and with others (e.g., 
politicians, the building industry). In doing so, it becomes evident that the ICT’s housing 
projects are the product of local and regional needs and ideas, but also a product of U.S. 
American-born ideas about how the state should approach building housing. Thus, I do 
not deny Colombian architecture’s interactions with the modernism produced in power 
centers, but I broaden the scope of the elements involved in shaping its urban housing 
projects.  
First, we can see the ICT's ambivalent attitude toward traditional building 
techniques and local materials and its technicians application of them in the rural areas 
until the end of the 1940s in contraposition to the agency’s new, hygienic houses in the 
same period. In its early years, the ICT approved and implemented traditional building 
methods and materials as a valid way to solve the rural housing problem; however, its 
later publications show traditional housing as primitive and always in opposition to its 
more hygienic houses.  
The ICT's first publication on rural housing in 1946 presents a vivid case in point. 
It depicts a traditional house as unhygienic.183 Any practical considerations for building 
in this manner seem to have escaped notice; its otherness was recognized but dismissed. 
Nonetheless, it displays a profound knowledge of traditional building methods and 
materials in the same publication.   
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In addition, the consequences of the agency’s organizational structure, with its 
headquarters in Bogotá, the political and economic center of the country, further 
consolidated the power relationships relations of an architecture produced in the center, 
and transposed upon the rest of the country. The simplistic gaze upon the country, 
blurring regional differences, impacted both the rural and urban housing projects. This 
can be evidenced from the beginning of the 1950s by the employment of prefabricated 
elements throughout the country. In the urban areas, the board of directors proposed 
reusing the same plans in different cities, even if "adjustments" were necessary.184 
Another result of this generalized gaze was the use of basic housing types, which 
emerged from "private competitions between each city’s architecture firms of each city", 
the designs of which served as models throughout the country with minor modifications 
for each climate and social group.185  This principle of replicable models already applied 
to the first "neighborhood units" built by the ICT and widely publicized by Proa. As 
architectural historian Silvia Arango also identified, these ideal types did not recognize 
specific qualities of the site.186 
The system based on plans developed in the Capital, far away from other cities 
and regions, did not always succeed. It caused negative reactions in the peripheral areas, 
which led in turn to countermeasures by the agency.187 As a result, in 1955 the agency 
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publicly recognized the need to include "architects of the province" in its programs, in 
order to achieve a better acceptance of its work by the public.188 
In sum, ICT’s architecture gains profundity and complexity under the light of 
postcolonial thought. Questioning which histories are worth to be told permits to focus on 
those aspects neglected by historiography hitherto. Moreover, it exposes the ways the 
ICT on its part also exercises power over others and expands the circles of power through 
the implementation of architectonic models created in the center. 
 
THE ICT AND ITS DIVERSE POLITICAL AGENDAS 
Historiography has only partially answered the question of the extent to which the 
civil war, La Violencia, and the military regime of Rojas Pinilla informed the 
transformations of the built environment in the mid-twentieth century. The various 
publications typically but paradoxically acknowledge that during both the most acute 
period of conflict and the military regime, modern architecture flourished. Several 
authors have pointed out that high prices in the international coffee market provided the 
state with sufficient revenues to build the infrastructure needed to advance in its 
modernization projects. Those taking this stance, such as Niño Murcia, did not trace the 
reasons for this paradox.189 Others, who attempted a more critical position, centered on 
the urban transformations following "El Bogotazo," the destruction of Bogotá after 
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Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was assassinated in 1948.190 In other words, scant 
attention has been given to the intersection of architectural history and the political 
background against which it unfolded.  
Working at the fringes of architectural, political, and social history and Cold War 
and Latin American Studies, the missing connections between the agency and its 
historical context, and the entanglements between the ICT's housing program and the 
society in which it was developed come to the fore. This research draws from an 
interesting research field consolidating in the Americas that attempts to illuminate the 
role the U.S. has played in Latin American housing and planning history in the context of 
Pan-American institutions and Cold War events. Considering ICT housing as a 
geopolitical tool, this work shows how the U.S. enhanced its relationships with Latin 
America through the work of U.S. technicians and foreign aid programs, such as the 
Alliance for Progress.191  
The ICT contributed to the consolidation of a political project, on the national and 
on hemispheric level that was nurtured by the discourse of development and associated 
with the need for economic progress (in terms of the country as a whole, the inclusion of 
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the "popular classes" in this project was not part of the equation). Development, 
understood as economic progress, implied, in words of the United Nations,  
painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social 
institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed and race have to burst; and 
large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their 
expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to 
pay the full price of economic progress.192 
 
On both levels, national and hemispheric, housing served as a tool to contain 
upheaval and the spread of communism. The fear of communism was so entrenched in 
the national psyche that it constantly erupted in the political discussion. Even the ICT had 
to face accusations of Communism from political adversaries in the Liberal Party at the 
time the agency was established.193 The discussion was nurtured by the constant fear of 
upheaval. Therefore, as Escobar explains, "The fear of communism became one of the 
most compelling arguments for development. It was commonly accepted in the early 
1950s that if poor countries were not rescued from their poverty, they would succumb to 
communism."194 
The ICT's double location, at the periphery of U.S. dominance and the center of 
power in Colombia, identified previously, amalgamated with the nation’s various 
political agendas. Firstly, the ICT became one of the institutions through which the 
United States cemented its influence on the continent. Technical cooperation, loans, and 
military support all served to advance the development agenda in the relationship 
between Colombia and the United States during the period of this research. But, as 
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Bhabha also points out in regard to the international support to the so- called third world, 
"the aim of such aid [was not] to alleviate the uneven distribution of power in the world. 
On the contrary, the practices of 'conditionality' with which economic, educational and 
technological assistance is offered to nations in the developing world guarantee that the 
First World nations retain their position of power."195 The World Bank mission to 
Colombia in 1949 under the direction of Lauchlin Currie was, in Escobar’s terms, "one of 
the first concrete expressions" of the type of development that “conformed to the ideas 
and expectations of the affluent West, to what the Western countries judged to be a 
normal course of evolution and progress."196 According to Escobar, the tone of Currie's 
mission was that "only through development will Colombia become an ‘inspiring 
example’ for the rest of the underdeveloped world," and that "science, technology, 
planning, and international organizations" were the "adequate tools” to achieve that 
goal.197 
Yet, the ICT replicated the same rationale that emanated from the United States 
and the international organizations inside Colombia. In doing so, the same assumptions 
underlying discourse of progress and development shaped the encounters with the Other, 
the rural population and urban poor. In addition, they provided a base to advance a 
national political project of contention and pacification, without resolving the pressing 
social and economic problems already identified by Currie and his group. Finally, and 
similarly to Bhabha’s critique of international aid, the ICT's work did not seek "the 
eradication of poverty" in the country.198 
                                                
195 Hernández, Bhabha for Architects, 15. 
196 Escobar, Encountering Development, 26. 
197 Escobar, Encountering Development, 25-26. 
198 Hernández, Bhabha for Architects, 15. 
82 
 
The development paradigm current in the 1950s helps to explain its engagement 
with the U.S., whose aim was to indicate a path to achieve the same development goals 
the U.S. deployed in Puerto Rico (clearly defined through the Truman administration’s 
Point Four program), and with the international organizations.199 The rationale of the 
ICT's housing program was clearly nurtured by the discourse of development, according 
to which "only through material advancement could social, cultural, and political 
progress be achieved."200 Putting in first place material advancement, the category to 
which home ownership belongs, the ICT depoliticized the housing shortage. The agency 
reduced it to a technical problem of financial means and efficient building design and 
techniques. As happened with the "professionalization of development," the ICT diverted 
the housing shortage problem to the "apparently more neutral realm of science."201 
The "housing problem" as defined in the ICT's writings, was not a political 
problem. It was a technical problem that was quantifiable. From 1957 to the end of my 
research period, the agency’s general managers repeatedly presented reports on the 
country’s missing housing units and the cost required to construct them based on a fixed 
price of each house.202 This was a problem that could be solved with external financial 
aid, with the accompanying national and foreign professionals, and with the appropriate 
technical means. All except issues that questioned the status quo. 
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HYGIENE, CIVILIZATION, EDUCATION AND ICT 
Hygiene was an essential element in the development of ICT's housing program 
from its inception. Prior to the establishment of ICT, governmental measures to boost the 
rural economy included the construction of "hygienic dwellings for the rural workers," 
and the ICT's first task was to build "hygienic" houses for the population affected by the 
spread of bartonellosis epidemic.203  The "hygienic shelter" in the rural areas was 
presented in contraposition to the "unhealthy ranch of dirt floor, wattle and daub walls, 
and straw roof," in a spatial configuration consisting of "a single room that serves as 
kitchen, bedroom, barn and that generally accommodated, not only human beings, but 
also domestic animals, where our modest peasants live since immemorial times."204 Thus, 
‘hygienic’ was the main descriptor for ICT houses—a house with covered walls (i.e. with 
the wattle and daub structure unexposed), asbestos-cement or ceramic tile roofs, and 
cement floors. More importantly, the hygienic house had separate rooms for parents and 
children, who were in turn separated by gender. Hygiene also thus implied "moral 
hygiene."   
Although the physical structure of the ideal "hygienic house” varied over time and 
between the rural and urban areas, the meaning of moral hygiene remained more or less 
in place throughout the period of this study. In the urban areas, a single room for an entire 
family was also condemned for its effect on that family’s moral well-being: 
"Overcrowding, it goes without saying, leads to a series of problems related to hygiene 
and morality, due to the improper mixing of gender and ages within a single bedroom."205  
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Hygiene, as a central topic for the Colombian state at the time of the ICT's 
inception, emerged in several forms. In 1938, the Ministry of Labor, Hygiene and 
Welfare was established. Arturo Robledo represented this Ministry on the original ICT 
board of directors. He was a physician in the cadre of Colombian hygienists strongly 
influencing the housing conversation during the first half of the twentieth century.206 
Jorge Bejarano, who did not participate as a board member, but did collaborate a number 
of times with the ICT, was also an influential physician, who dominated a good part of 
the discussion. Since 1932, Salud y sanidad was the publication through which the 
National Department of Hygiene disseminated the current ideas on hygiene.207   
A number of scholars in Colombia have shown the extent to which ‘hygiene’ 
permeated the country’s politics in the first half of the twentieth century.208 In most cases, 
they present "working class neighborhoods" as an example of hygienic environments for 
the working class.209 Hygiene appears in this context as a field of action in which tensions 
between the "pueblo" and the elites as categories of analysis become manifest.210 When 
trying to establish a direct relationship between hygiene and the built environment in 
Colombia, only one text, based on a master’s thesis and published in a university journal, 
offers some insights. While this text is quite generic, the figures and their subtexts refer 
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specifically to the case of Colombia, where the use of publications to disseminate 
technical knowledge and hygiene appear as part of the technologies of comfort within 
domestic space.211  
While scholarship has not specifically addressed ICT’s housing program in regard 
to its insistence on hygiene as part of its civilizing and moralizing aims, two studies that 
tackle the relationship between built environment, hygiene, and the latter’s connections 
with discourse on morality, control, and civilizing ideas illuminate the intricacies of 
housing promoted by the state and the goals that go beyond supplying a dwelling: Nancy 
Stieber's Housing Design and Society in Amsterdam: Reconfiguring Urban Order and 
Identity, 1900-1920 and Gwendolyn Wright's, Moralism and the Model Home: Domestic 
Architecture and Cultural Conflict in Chicago, 1873-1913. Stieber analyzes housing 
design in Amsterdam beyond its aesthetic aspects "as a product of modern social 
practices, that is, as the product of tensions within modernity."212 Social hygiene, 
civilizing the working class, controlling the urban aesthetic, among other things, become 
central issues in her discussion. Wright on her part focuses on how domestic architecture 
"illuminates norms concerning family life, sex roles, community relations, and social 
equality."213  
Lastly, hygiene, as it refers to the body, has received a lot of attention from 
critical and analytical history in the intersections of the history of science, medical 
knowledge, and practices of power. In Latin America, these perspectives, converging 
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around "body culture studies," has been enriched by gender, race, and cultural studies. 
Michel Foucault's notion of “biopower” is the central axis around which much of these 
studies orbit. Hygiene appears here as a clear strategy through which one group exerts 
power upon another.214 
This analytical and critical approach has enhanced the answers to the basic 
question of this study, which asks about the rationales underlying the housing program. 
As the official narrative goes, the State, through the ICT’s "apostolic" work, not only 
provided hygienic houses for those who could not finance them on their own, but also 
educated their inhabitants to transform them into new, civilized people.215 According to 
this official narrative, "adequate housing" was the necessary support for re-educating the 
people and improving their living standards.216  
 By the end of the 1930s, at the time of ICT's establishment, the conversation on 
hygiene had mostly shifted to a more "scientific" level, in opposition to the discussions in 
the previous decades, which were still defined by race and eugenics. However, as 
Escobar demonstrates, "blatant racist views" persisted in the supposedly neutral scientific 
discourses of demographics and public health.217 The triad "hygiene, progress and, 
civilization," as part of an official narrative appearing to distance itself from arguments of 
race and eugenics, remained current during the 1940s, as the agency already operated in 
both the rural and urban areas.218 This shift was also evidenced by Daniel Pécaut, who 
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recounts in his book Order and Violence 1930-1954, that, even though around 1945 the 
"elites" were skeptical about the possibility of integrating the "pueblo" (the peasant, the 
urban poor, the worker) into the civilizing project, race was no longer the driving 
argument, but rather arguments stemming from "medical knowledge." The resulting 
"medicalization of the political gaze," to use Pécaut's term, led to depoliticizing the 
catastrophic living conditions of the poor. In so doing, the "naturalized" social 
inequalities distinguished only between the "civilized and the sick and savage pueblo.”219  
Providing hygienic homes was not enough to solve Colombia's problems, as the 
ICT's initiator, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, explained. The ICT's "mission" was also to 
transform the habits of the people (the peasants, the poor, all those who did not belong to 
the ruling elite).220  For Lleras Restrepo, unhygienic living conditions encompassed all 
aspects of human life, exerting "a disastrous influence on health and on the future of the 
race, also on customs and the popular morality, on the living standards and on the 
economic capacity of the peasant." They also engendered or reinforced "the customs of 
dirtiness, negligence, indolence... ."221 Lleras’ assertions on the poor correlate with the 
characteristics the ruling class associated the poor with, as quoted by Escobar: "rightly or 
wrongly, [pauperism was associated] with features such as mobility, vagrancy, 
independence, frugality, promiscuity, ignorance, and the refusal to accept social duties to 
work and submit to the logic of the expansion of ‘needs.’”222  
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These characteristics pointed to the backwardness of the poor. However, there 
were also subcategories in this characterization, nurtured by other rationales. The rural 
poor were considered better than the urban. For some agency board members, the rural 
poor were the worthy poor because of their "moral attributes,” which were higher than 
those of the urban population, despite being the most "devoid of hygienic services." In 
fact, they were considered, as a member of the board of directors claimed at the 
beginning of the 1950s, and in the middle of the worst moment of La Violencia, "an 
element of order and the support of this regime.”223 Considering that this statement was 
made in 1953, six days prior to General Rojas Pinilla’s coup d'erat, these words resonate 
differently. They hint to the implicit rationales of welfare policies. 
Education was the means to transform those habits of the poor, with all their 
flaws, into those of responsible citizens. In general, as Escobar quotes, "the management 
of poverty called for interventions in education, health, hygiene, morality, and 
employment and the instilment of good habits of association, savings, child rearing, and 
so on..."224 This is the context in which Lleras claims should be read. For him, "what the 
transformation of dwelling and social habits” represents as "an educational and civilizing 
work, as an effective increase in work performance, as moral improvement in customs, as 
hygiene and sanitation is easily perceptible."225 Hence, the ICT's housing program could 
only accomplish its civilizing task through technical and educational means.226 The ICT's 
general manager still shared these same views in 1956.227  
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 Yet the agency did not understand education as a liberating act, in the sense of 
Paulo Freire.228 Rather, education forged a non-critical, obedient subject, who 
acknowledges authority. Words such as "indoctrination" to refer to the training required 
for those applicants participating in the self-help housing program in Ciudad Kennedy are 
illustrative. According to ICT’s initiator Lleras Restrepo, through education, the future 
resident was to learn the value of a home, how to operate on a “more logical scale of 
needs,” to aim for improvement, and to become a “more nobly nonconformist.”229 But a 
resident of an ICT home needed also to learn that he  
is not just another debtor on a long list, but a cell, which must be cared for, guided 
and directed toward the achievement of positive aspirations within the social set 
of the Colombian family. With this, the agency seeks not to abandon the residents, 
but to keep them closely united, to create a clear conscience that the social work 
of the housing program the government carries out through the Territorial Credit 
Institute, not only tries to protect them from the natural elements with a roof, but 
also shows them the path of responsibility that citizens have in society, and the 
obligations and duties they have before the State, before their fellow citizens, and 
before the family.230  
The ICT's leaders expressed the goals of their educational work in the same terms. 
It was a work that  
not only benefits the resident, but also the agency. Through a cultural uplift of the 
group, living conditions would improve and a sense of responsibility would be 
awakened, with respect to the conservation and maintenance of the houses and of 
the facilities in the neighborhoods and neighborhood units.231 
In the ruling class’ terms, education meant "civilized" living. This implied to 
recognize the value of "home life," and to stay away from bars, where people “invest the 
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product of their work in the consumption of alcoholic beverages.”232 This moralizing task 
of home life was closely connected with the moral views also supported by the Catholic 
Church. The education of the residents was mediated by the ideas of hygiene and 
morality. The scientific community, physicians, sanitary engineers, and also the church 
were close to the agency’s work and nurtured many of the ideas behind the educational 
process linked to the housing program. Finally, the government considered civilizing the 
people through education to be a necessary requirement to achieve their political project 
of appeasement and containment in order to avoid the spread of revolutionary ideas. 
Moralizing campaigns through the church and the elite aimed at control over customs and 
the containment of political upheaval.233 They sought to "harmonize" the relationships 
between employer and employees and the "moral and material improvement" of the 
working class.234 The ICT offered a unique field of operations to achieve this goal. 
The ICT's representatives firmly believed that unhygienic living conditions also 
explained the lack of interest among the poor in having a "better life". For the agency's 
officials, this was something that also needed to be learned.235   
There were compatriots without an awareness of their own roof, who had not even 
thought of the need for a hygienic, low-cost home that was more appropriate for 
modern life. Accustomed for generations to occupying an undesirable place in the 
world, the possibility of dignifying their own home did not pass through their 
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minds. Moreover, there are cases of humble people for whom a blackened and 
narrow ranch or urban overcrowding is preferable to decent housing.236 
 
Considering this lack of interest, agency leaders shared with both the ruling class and the 
international organizations the conviction that the poor were incapable of doing anything 
on their own.237 It was as if "the subaltern could not speak."238 The residents were never 
asked what they needed or desired; their participation was limited to accepting the 
conditions imposed by the ICT. And even at Ciudad Kennedy, with the self-help program 
in place, the participants were only allowed to follow rules previously defined by the 
experts. Their point of view really did not matter. 
Who had the authority to teach what? What did they need to learn? Why? The 
power Authority exercised over the Other enabled it to decide what residents had to learn 
in order to be able to live in a house built by the ICT. Despite its aim to improve the 
living conditions of a segment of society, power relationships and techniques of social 
control mediated the ICT’s expectations towards the education of the inhabitants of its 
housing projects. 
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Chapter 3:  Housing as an architectural artifact: Reflections on Modern 
Architecture in Colombia through the work of the ICT 
The ICT built 154,949 housing units between 1939 and 1968 throughout the 
country.239 Architectural historians have regarded some of its urban housing projects in 
particular as a significant field of action in which modern architecture has thrived in 
Colombia since the 1940s.240 Clearly, the ideas circulating around modern architecture 
did inform the search for new building methods, materials and typologies in developing 
the housing projects; the "modern paradigm of social housing" is thus recognizable in the 
ICT's work.241 Nevertheless, in addition to applying ideas produced in industrialized 
countries in a Colombian context, the ICT also had its own agenda, animated and 
nurtured by what was occurring in other parts of the world, but also responding to very 
specific and local challenges. To mention just a few: the agency operated nationwide in a 
country with an extremely diverse geography and a precarious road system, and had 
limited financial means to solve a housing deficit in the urban areas that accelerated 
throughout the period of this study due to the civil war predominantly afflicting the rural 
areas. In fact, according to the 1951 census, the country had a shortage of 117,222 
housing units in the urban areas; which corresponded to 13,6% of the urban 
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population.242 By 1968, the urban housing shortage had increased to 458,278 units, 
roughly 28%.243 I argue that the remarkable contribution to modern architecture in 
Colombia through ICT's urban housing program since the end of the 1940s forms part of 
a continuous, albeit nonlinear, development that begins, at the agency’s inception, with 
the rural housing program and then, beginning in 1942, in the urban areas. This early date 
challenges most accounts of the ICT, which claim the agency built its first urban projects 
in 1948. I argue, however, that the projects built prior to the construction of the "official" 
first urban housing projects offered the needed experience to be able to tackle those urban 
projects. Hence, the first part of this chapter addresses the rural housing program and the 
initiatives that served as a platform for the confluence of the ideas about modern 
architecture and the work of the ICT. The second part of the chapter inquires about the 
elements of the "modern paradigm" that characterize three the case studies: Muzú, Centro 
Urbano Antonio Nariño –CUAN- and Ciudad Kennedy. 
The experiences collected from the agency’s inception in rural areas, and since 
1942 in urban areas, trickled into the housing projects built in the urban areas after the 
enactment of Law 85 in 1946. This law, as I mentioned in the introduction, opened a new 
period for the agency, after which it was able to develop housing projects on its own in 
the urban areas on a much larger scale than was possible previously, when the agency 
built a series of barrios populares modelo (model working-class neighborhoods) 
throughout the country in a joint effort with local municipalities and private contractors. 
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Ideas about minimal housing, standardization, modulation and prefabrication of building 
parts—typical for the urban housing projects the ICT built as a result of the Law 85—
derive from the agency’s efforts to rationalize the building process in rural housing.244 
This experience provided the ICT with a very specific knowledge of and expertise in 
local materials and building techniques, and the possibilities these provided.  
Various strategies connect the rural housing program with an expressly modern 
understanding of making architecture, despite the absence of formal traits that allude to 
Modernism. First, the agency constantly searched for replicable models in similar regions 
of a geographically diverse country. Also, it created the materials experimentation 
workshop, El Tabor, to find the materials best-suited for each region. This was where the 
prefabricated elements for the first urban housing projects were developed.  The collected 
experience in the rural housing program was published in an extremely detailed book, 
Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales (Manual on Rural Buildings), in 1946. This 
publication is key to understanding the vision that guided the agency’s work during this 
first period. It consisted in the implementation of housing typologies rooted in a deep 
understanding of regional differences and a profound knowledge of local building 
techniques. This allusion to traditional local building techniques and materials did not 
reflect a nostalgic attitude, but a forward-looking vision that was simply pragmatic. It 
was based on the guiding principle that modern suitable rural housing was only feasible 
through the improvement of existing building techniques and through a systematic 
approach to the building process.  
However, in the same process of systematizing and rationalizing the building 
process, the ICT contributed to a loss of regional differentiation in the modern 
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architecture that emerged at the end of the 1940s. While the earliest process of producing 
architecture reflected a conscious determination to incorporate local building materials 
and techniques, the modus operandi consolidated after the enactment of Law 85 of 1946 
developed simplified models in the center that were reproduced throughout the country in 
the form of specific ideal housing types with slight variations. Even after the regional 
offices achieved more independence, a more generic approach to architecture and urban 
planning can be perceived in the whole country. The use of prefabricated structures in the 
rural program and of standardized building methods in the urban program play a 
significant role in that process. 
 
RURAL HOUSING - AN ARCHEOLOGY OF ICT'S MODERN URBAN HOUSING PROJECTS: 
STANDARDIZED HOUSING TYPES, TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS, AND 
PREFABRICATION 
The ICT built 14,000 housing units in the rural areas between 1939, when the 
agency was established, and 1956, when the rural housing program was handed over to 
the Agrarian bank.245  By its very nature, the rural housing program required large 
amounts of financial resources. Building single-family homes disseminated in rural areas 
of a land with a complex topography (the country is crossed by three ranges of the 
Andean mountains) and with a precarious road system challenged all intentions to make 
these houses affordable for the rural population. In that context, the agency continuously 
explored multiple avenues to reduce construction costs that oscillated between building 
houses with traditional building materials and methods and searching for new alternatives 
to facilitate construction and reduced building costs. Although this main goal was not 
                                                
245 Decree 2114 de 1956; Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Vinculación de La Industria Constructora 
Privada En Programas Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 16. 
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achieved during the 1940s, standardization, systematization, and prefabrication became 
key words related to the building process in the rural areas and directly impacted the 
agency’s urban housing projects. In fact, the material's experiment workshop, established 
on the site "El Tabor" in 1948, constitutes the bridge between the two programs. In this 
workshop, born from the need to explore new possibilities in construction methods for 
the rural housing program, eventually developed prefabricated building parts for the 
urban housing programs.246 
 
Between Traditional Building Methods and Innovation  
From its inception, the ICT started a process of scrutinizing all available 
techniques for building rural housing. The search for the most appropriate building 
materials and techniques in each of the different regions, the development of standardized 
housing typologies, and the gathering of a wide array of models for rural housing 
constituted the predominant activities during the agency’s first years. It analyzed several 
alternatives in its exploration of building materials, and during the first year it focused 
primarily on the acquisition of building materials and of model houses.247 Ideas related to 
building materials and techniques emerged rather arbitrarily during that first year. 
Finance minister Carlos Lleras Restrepo invited Hernando Gómez Tanco, for instance, 
who had been in Chile learning about a building technology in asbestos cement, which he 
presented to the board of directors.248 This report probably led to the next step, in which 
                                                
246 The Plan for Rural Housing of 1948 mentions experiments with new materials. In: Minute 306, February 
27, 1948, p. 687 - 690. 
247 Minute 3, March 1939, p. 10. 
248 Minute 1, 1939, p. 3. Minute 7, 1939, p. 16. Gómez Tanco also participated in the 1950s as member of 
ICT’s board of directors, and was simoultaneously member of the board of the firm Eternit, which 
produced asbestos cement roofs, broadly deployed in the ICT’s housing projects. 
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the ICT spent a good part of the first year inquiring about the possibility of mining 
asbestos. 
In spite of the apparent arbitrariness in the search for new building materials, the 
agency sought to organize and systematize the construction process of the rural housing 
program. Deploying standardized housing types was one strategy. Engineers from the 
Ministry of Labor’s hygiene department developed the initial typologies used in the rural 
housing program. They followed the explicit wish of the board of directors to have 
different building types with different shapes, program and materials, according to the 
different climate conditions where the houses would be built.249 The engineers, later hired 
to work directly for the ICT, further elaborated the development of standardized housing 
typologies, incorporating regional differences.250 When the first architects were hired at 
the beginning of the 1940s, they were additionally tasked with a study of building 
materials that could take advantage of local resources in order to minimize transport 
costs.251 The regional differentiation of building types the ICT developed during the first 
years responded to a very specific and clearly identifiable problem. It was a 
straightforward answer to the task of building rural housing in a vast country with a 
significant variety of climate zones. This task was approached by the state for the first 
time at this scale with the creation of ICT.  
                                                
249 Minute 3, March 1939, p. 10. This idea was probably nurtured by the national school building program, 
which the Ministry of Public Works had been developing since the 1930s. With this program, the Ministry 
of Public Works built schools throughout the country based on a basic model, but with variations that 
responded to each climate and region. Silvia Arango presents this characteristic of the schools built under 
the direction of architect Ernest Blumenthal in the Ministry of Public Works. In: Arango, Historia de la 
Arquitectura en Colombia, 202. 
250 The assistant engineer in charge of the rural housing program in Antioquia, Arturo Orozco A., reported 
on "the study of a new type of construction for Antioquia, adapted to the living conditions of the peasants 
[in that area]." Minute 59, February 1941, p. 124. 
251 Minute 63, March 1941, p. 135 – 142. 
98 
 
Concurrent with the development of standardized housing types, the agency 
worked to gather a wide array of models for the rural housing program, experimenting 
with each in order to determine which ones performed most advantageously. During the 
first year, the agency received a series of proposals to initiate its program.252 Hence, 
Model Housing was the key word in those first two years.  Everything was viewed as a 
paradigm to experiment with before deciding if it was replicable in other parts of the 
country. However, by 1941, the possibility of implementing any of those model houses 
lost relevance, and this path did not have any major impact in the work of the ICT. A 
possible reason resides in the fact that World War II made all imports excessively 
expensive. However, the call to introduce prefabricated houses to solve the rural housing 
problem appeared intermittently throughout the 1940s, what eventually happened at the 
end of that decade.253 
Despite the multiple experiments with different modern building methods and 
materials during the agency’s first two years, traditional building techniques and local 
building materials clearly prevailed after 1941, and remained as a ruling principle in the 
                                                
252 The proposals should be implemented as the base for model houses in the neighborhood "Restrepo" 
being built at the same time in Bogotá by the Central Mortgage Bank (Banco Central Hipotecario, BCH) in 
order to assess the quality of the model houses: a "Dutch house" in asbestos-cement, a model house from an 
"American Firm" in Wood, another from "Pyramid" in cement blocks, one from "J.M. Obando" in a 
"special paste made from the sugarcane bagasse," one from "Cement Plant Titán," one from "Armor 
Products, Inc.," from New York (Minute 9 of 1939, p. 22), a model house made in "homasote." (Minute 20, 
October of 1939, p.52. -Homasote is a brand name associated with the product generically known 
as cellulose based fiber wallboard, which is similar in composition to paper-mâché, and made from 
recycled paper compressed under high temperature and pressure and held together with an adhesive. 
Wikipedia-). The general manager also received the authorization to request the model house "Eternit" in 
asbestos-cement. (Minute 21, October 19, 1939, p. 55). A year later, in 1940, and in spite of some 
reluctance of the board of directors, the general manager, Garcés Navas, obtained its authorization to 
acquire an additional model house from "W. CH. Lamb." (Minute 37, July 1940). 
253 For example, after a period without mention of this topic, a new offer of prefabricated houses came to 
the board of directors; this time in "wood from the sawmills of Tumaco." This offer was made by Arturo E. 
Márquez. One of the members of the board of directors, Lobo Guerrero was commissioned to analyze and 
inform the board. This proposal did not succeed, at least immediately, due to the costs (higher than with 
brick or adobe) and uncertainty about the material over the long term. A few houses were purchased to test 
their behavior and real value over time. In: Minute 110, June 1942, p. 282. 
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construction of rural housing until at least 1947.254 Rural housing was then 
predominantly built according to local building techniques: adobe, tapia (rammed earth 
walls), and bahareque (wattle-and-daub).255 These techniques guaranteed the possibility 
of finding local craftsmen who could build high quality rural homes. In some regions 
only specific building technics worked appropriately due to topography and soil structure, 
as in Caldas, an important coffee region with an extreme stepped topography where a 
common building technic, partly still in use today, is made of bamboo or bahareque.256  
Diverse circumstances resulted in high construction costs of rural housing, which 
posed serious challenges to the work of the ICT from the start. First, high transport costs 
of building materials due to a complex geography and a deficient road system were a 
constant complaint at least until the end of the economic crisis in the post war period.257 
Furthermore, the agency pinpointed several other problems to account for the high costs: 
the economic crisis derived from World War II, the traditional building techniques, and 
the costs of modern building materials (brick and cement).258  
                                                
254 Interestingly, one of the goals of hiring a new engineer was to "study the constructions made of 
bahareque in order to acquire the exact cost and specifications for the general work of the technical 
department throughout the country." According to this statement, the construction based on local building 
traditions and expertise is worth being applied throughout the country. In: Minute 61, February 1941, p. 
128. 
Minute 267, June 2, 1947, p. 563. 
255 Minute 267, June 2, 1947, p. 563. 
256 Minute 197, November 06, 1944, p. 442. 
257 Minute 140, April 1943, p. 346-back. Minute 143, April 1943, p. 355. Minute 165, November 1943, p. 
391. Minute 167, November 1943, p. 394-back. Minute 175, February 21, 1944, p. 408-back. Minute 205, 
January 15, 1945, p. 453-back. 
258 Traditional building techniques became too expensive due to the long periods needed to complete 
construction and the intensity of craftsmanship required. According to a general manager's report, building 
with brick would require at least two months, while bahareque (wattle- and-daub) would require four 




To offset the high transport costs seeking to reduce the construction costs, the 
agency continued to rely on local materials and traditional building technics.259 But these 
same techniques kept costs high due to long construction periods. Hence, high 
construction costs in rural housing remained a dilemma throughout the agency's 
transitional phase.  
Regardless of the continuous search for solutions in the rural housing program, 
after 1947 the agency’s leaders seem to have dismissed the previous experience.260 The 
general work plan the agency elaborated for the years 1948 and 1949, as well as later 
reports, ignored the earlier work of the agency in the rural areas. This obliviousness about 
the previous experiences survived in the historiography on the ICT. Alberto Saldarriaga's 
work does not establish any connections between the rural and the urban housing 
program. In spite of the contradictions, the obliviousness, the loss of local building 
technics, and countless other problems related to the housing program, the long and 
continued experience made the ICT an expert in the construction of rural housing; indeed, 
even the Ministry of Hygiene asked the agency for housing plans at the beginning of the 
1950s to send them to the government of Venezuela.261 
                                                
259 To mention only two examples: due to the soil, the transport and other factors, no other kind of 
construction than wood or bahareque is possible in Caldas. In: Minute 197, November 06, 1944, p. 442. 
For the work zones of Cúcuta y Pamplona, the architects consider that the only possible construction 
method is rammed earth, due to the high costs of transport and building materials. In: Minute 175, 21 
February 1944, p. 408-back. 
260 Presenting the low quality of the rural houses previously built, all accumulated knowledge and 
successful experiences were simply ignored. In: Minute 366, February 21, 1949, p. 855-back. 
261 Minute 459, January 18, 1951, p. 1171-back. 
The problems of rural housing built in the Department of Bolivar are mentioned in: Minute 491, October 
25, 1951, p. 1247-back. 
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Technical experiments: Terra-concrete 
Technical experimentation was inherent to the work of the ICT from its inception. 
Terra-concrete is an interesting case in point, insofar as it reveals the mechanisms 
through which such experiments emerged and evolved. Haphazard and contradictory at 
times, this process conveys the willingness of the ICT's leaders to apply any method 
through which the final goal of building houses for lower prices could be achieved. 
Terra-concrete was introduced and developed for the ICT by the architect Hernando 
Vargas Rubiano.262 He worked for the ICT from 1941 on, after he obtained his degree in 
architecture from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.263 Initially, Vargas Rubiano 
was tasked with the design of rural housing. There, he was able to build rural houses at 
costs below the ICT average at that time.264 His preoccupation with building materials, 
which made up 35 to 40% of the houses’ total cost, led him to delve into the study of 
traditional building techniques such as adobe and rammed earth. In that process, he 
learned about Alfred Kastner's work in Washington DC, and became particularly 
interested in Kastner's work improving rammed earth walls with aggregating cement.265 
For Vargas Rubiano, the most interesting aspect of this technique was the possibility of 
using materials found on site.  
In October of 1941, the Board of Directors discussed the possibility of Vargas 
Rubiano travelling to the United States to further his research. He had already received 
                                                
262 Hernando Vargas Rubiano and Hernando Vargas Caicedo, "El Terraconcreto En Colombia: Apuntes 
Para Su Historia," Dearq. Revista de Arquitectura, no. 1 (January 2008): 120–145, https://doi.org/DOI: 
10.18389/dearq1.2008.14. Accessed: March 14, 2015. 
263 Already mentioned in Minute 66, April 1941. Minute 67, April 1941. Minute 79, August 1941, p. 186. 
264 Luis Fernando Acebedo and Omar Moreno, “Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner Era La Academia, 
Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística,” Revista Bitácora Urbano Territorial 1, no. 7 (2003): 70–75. 
Accessed: January 3, 2018 
265 Casner in the original text. But, Vargas Rubiano and Vargas Caicedo, “El Terraconcreto En Colombia: 
Apuntes Para Su Historia” mention the correct name and expands on him. 
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support from the dean of the Architecture School to participate in an exchange program 
between the Universidad Nacional and the University of Pennsylvania on low-cost 
housing.266 The board of directors was willing to further that support if they could be 
assured that the trip would be used to learn about "the building materials appropriate for 
the rural houses in Colombia, and specifically, rammed earth walls and adobe mixed with 
residues of oil and asphalt, as it is being used in the states of the south... with evident 
success, ... ."267 Although he did not follow this charge of the board of directors precisely, 
the Board welcomed his report on terra-concrete and hoped he would soon start with the 
necessary material experiments in order to begin applying terra-concrete in the 
construction of rural housing.268 
After some experiments with terra-concrete near Bogotá, which resulted in 
cheaper houses than those built in brick, the material was used in other rural areas of the 
country as well, such as in the department of Nariño.269 However, some technical 
difficulties emerged. In some cases, these required demolition of the houses, and the 
agency and the architect sought different solutions.270 Consequently, the agency 
requested more rigorous soil analysis, using experienced master builders.271 In addition, it 
requested more research that could clearly determine the advantages and final costs of 
houses built with this material, and even enlisted the laboratory of the School of 
Engineering of the Universidad Nacional. The assistant to the general manager, Alberto 
Wills Ferro, went so far as to request - and received the Board of Directors’ approval- the 
                                                
266 Minute 87, October de 1941 
267 Minute 86, October de 1941 
268 Minute 102, 26 March 1942, P. 252 
269 Acebedo and Moreno, “Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La 
Revolución Urbanística.”  Minute 130, December 1942, P. 331. 
270 Minute 157, August 1943, p. 379. 
271 Minute 159, September 1943, p. 380. Minute 160, September 1943, p. 382-back. 
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purchase of a laboratory to conduct the necessary soil studies so that optimal results with 
this building technique could be achieved.272 Vargas Rubiano on his part, proposed and 
applied this building technique in the elaboration of terra-concrete blocks instead of 
walls, and developed the necessary wooden framework for the blocks.273 This constitutes 
the antecedent of the famous technical development of CINVA, the CINVA-RAM.274 
The CINVA-RAM is a manual press widely used around the world to produce 
compressed earth blocks.275 
The ideas that emerged in this process are crucial to the ICT’s evolution and can 
be seen as an antecedent to establishing a workshop to experiment with building 
materials, which played a central role in developing some of the most emblematic 
modernist urban housing developments built by the ICT.276 Thus, terra-concrete is an 
outstanding example of how a process that emerged from a very specific need later 
evolved into something more vast, and served divergent purposes.  Even if the minutes do 
not convey a doubtless continuity between the different processes, the experience with 
terra-concrete already confronted the technicians and the leaders with technical issues 
that necessarily required technical answers. Once such difficulties emerged, it was easier 
for both the agency’s technicians and leaders to grasp the missing elements. From this 
angle, the materials experiment workshop, established some years later, did not operate in 
an institutional vacuum. The agency had already confronted technical difficulties that 
                                                
272 Minute 158, August 1943, p. 380. 
273 Minute 175, 21 February 1944, p. 408-back. 
274 Vargas Rubiano claimed in the earlier mentioned interview that when he sat in the board of directors of 
CINVA in 1955 as representative of the Colombian Society of Architects, he promoted the development of 
a machine to make those terra-concrete blocks. Acebedo and Moreno, “Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: 
Brunner Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística.” 
275 Through international organizations its use was promoted in countries such as Ghana, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Peru and Mexico. In: Vargas Rubiano and Vargas Caicedo, “El Terraconcreto En Colombia: 
Apuntes Para Su Historia.” 
276 Minute 173, 7 February 1944, p. 405. 
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needed to be addressed through such strategies as the establishment of its own center to 
experiment with building materials. There was no other path that could lead them to 
success, based on their accumulated experience.277 
 
Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales - Manual on Rural Buildings 
The ICT compiled its experience building rural housing based on standardized 
typologies, which sought to respond to regional differences, at least until 1947, in the 
manual of rural housing, Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales, published in 1946. The 
examples the ICT collected in this book shows with extreme clarity the most relevant 
aspects of its work during the first half of the 1940s. It was a differentiated reading of the 
variety of climate conditions of the country and its impact in the construction of housing. 
It is at any rate a seemingly contrasting approach to a generic interpretation of housing. 
Its authors, Alberto Wills Ferro and Gustavo Maldonado, fulfilled an initiative 
that had emerged earlier with an opposing intent.278 Former finance minister, Alfonso 
Araujo, complained in a board meeting in May of 1943 about the high administration 
costs of the ICT. In his opinion, the technical department had "an excess of architects and 
[he] suggested [creating] a construction manual, which would be enough [to co-ordinate 
future projects]."279 During that meeting, general manager Garcés Navas passionately 
argued against the minister's proposals; yet a couple of months later, in July of 1943, he 
suggested the preparation of just such a booklet. This booklet would present each one of 
                                                
277 The minutes do not offer information about the time when Vargas Rubiano left the ICT. But the agency 
presented terra-concrete extensively in its publication on rural housing. 
278 Alberto Wills Ferro was an architect from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia (1932) and held an 
M.S. in architecture from Columbia University. Gustavo Maldonado, engineer of the in the Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia, and of the University of Michigan, was "Technical Consultant of Materials and 
Control of Constructions." In: Minute 173, 7 February 1944, p. 405 
279 Minute 146, May 1943, p. 364-back.  
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the housing types' plans and complete details about the projects the agency had built in 
the different regions of the country. It would contain "particular specifications of 
construction, according to the materials used and the budgets with quantity and volume of 
materials."280 
Figure 3.1. ICT’s rural housing, Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales, 1946. 
Several months later, in April of 1944, Alberto Wills Ferro was commissioned to 
write the manual of rural housing.281 Wills Ferro (1906-1968) had been working at the 
                                                
280 Minute 155, July 1943, p. 378. 
281 At the end of the same year, the general manager insisted on the urgency of elaborating the said manual 
in order to systematize the building process and the budget. In: Minute 168, December 1943, p. 396-back. 
Minute 180, April 3, 1944, p. 413. Minute 189, June 27, 1944, p. 425-back. Minute 195, September 24, 




agency since 1941.282 After one year there, he went to New York, with ICT's support, to 
pursue graduate studies in architecture.283 In 1943, he returned to the agency and became 
assistant to the general manager.284 However, in November of 1945, before he had even 
finished the manual of rural housing, he resigned.285 
Following the guidelines requested by the agency's leaders, the booklet was to 
work as a guide for "the master builder and simultaneously, as a compilation of practical 
knowledge for the architects and the engineers" working for the ICT.286 Improved 
construction standards were the main goal the agency seemingly wanted to achieve with 
this publication. High technical quality was at the core of the rural housing program. The 
manual presented a depiction of all building materials used in the construction of rural 
housing in the first part. It tackled equally all materials typically used in the construction 
of the houses, such as cement, brick, concrete, terra-concrete, and traditional materials 
such as bamboo, wood, wattle and daub, and even lianas and pita cord in the same line 
with “iron galvanized wire.”287 The second part addressed the cost of different building 
elements. The third part contained practical instructions with drawings explaining the 
                                                
282 Minute 64, March 1941, P. 144. The general manager consulted with former finance minister, Lleras 
Restrepo about this hiring, for what Wills Ferro asked for a salary as a condition to accept the position was 
out of the budget. The minister gave green light and offered as an argument to accede to his request that "he 
would be a valuable element for the widening of the work of the Institute, for his great experience in 
construction and his magnificent poster in Architecture, in addition to his experience in office 
management." 
283 The case of Wills Ferro is one of those cases in which some well-known architects used the agency as a 
means to advance in their own professional trajectories. Minute 99, February 1942, P. 247. Minute 139, 
March 1943, p. 344, back.  
284 Minute 144, May 1943, p. 356. 
285 Nonetheless, he promised to finish the booklet, and the general manager even suggested to maintain him 
as technical advisor for the housing projects in the "popular neighborhoods."  Minute 223, November 12, 
1945, p. 479. 
286 Wills Ferro and Maldonado, Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales, 3. 
287 Ibid., 3-11. Although bahareque is not a building material, the authors included it in the chapter on 
materials, clarifying that they would go into detail again in the chapter about building techniques, and that 
they just mentioned the essential aspects of this technique in the chapter on materials. 
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building process with different materials. The last part presented drawings of nine 
housing types (a minimal house and types 1-8) with a short written description of each. 
The text also specified the changes for each type in order to account for different climate 
zones.288 Emphasis was made on the interchangeability of materials between types. Only 
housing types 6 and 8 were preferably to be built with bamboo and earth, bahareque or 
wood. 
Figure 3.2. Axonometric and section of minimal housing type, Cartilla de 
Construcciones Rurales, 1946. 
While the value of this manual lays in its systematic approach to the building 
process in rural areas and its equal treatment of all building techniques and materials, the 
plans of the houses included in it clearly transmit ideas about rural housing as seen by 
architects from the city. The insistence on the inclusion of a living room, and the absence 
                                                
288 Most housing types (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7) were intended for cold to mild climate zones. Only types 6 and 
8 were specifically for warm climate zones. 1 and 2 were described as a small type. Types 4 and 5 were 




of storage space for tools and other implements in most housing types (only the housing 
types 3, 6 and 7 have one) are only two examples hinting at this point of view. By the 
same token, the furniture seems to relate little to peasants’ needs and lifestyles.   
In addition, the manual’s beautiful perspective drawings present an idyllic yet 
misrepresentative image of the countryside. The only color drawing shown in the book 
avoids depicting any tropical vegetation, and while this does not necessarily show an 
intention to deceive or mislead, it does seem to convey the wish to transmit the more 
manageable landscape of the mild and cold climate zones, and to leave unseen the 
exuberant tropical condition of the country.289 The same ambiguity expressed in the 
perspective drawings can be found in the final section of the book. The images from 
traditional peasant homes are the same images presented later in the ICT publications of 
the ICT to establish a contrast between the archaic / primitive dwellings and the 
“hygienic” houses built by the ICT. Yet the housing types, construction methods, and 
building materials compiled do not deny the existence of traditional architecture; they 
simply aim to improve it. The most noticeable changes to the traditional, rural 
architecture are the replacement of thatched roofs, unfinished walls, and earthen floors 
with updated materials. 
                                                
289 However, it also can be that the other perspectives are missing in the copy available to me. Since the 
pages with the drawings are not numbered, it is not possible to know with certainty if other colored 
drawings are missing. 
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Additional strategies emerged in the effort to overcome the conundrum of the 
high costs of transport and building techniques; namely, minimal housing and 
prefabrication. Both alternatives were partially objected to by the agency’s engineers, 
since they did not address the diverse local characteristics of the building culture. Both 
strategies remained part of the agency's repertoire, and even if these solutions only 
attained tangible results to a limited extent at the moment they were proposed, they 
certainly provided the technicians and the ICT leaders with the basic elements of modern 
architecture. They would show their full impact later, in the urban housing program. 
The need to generate ideas on building housing for a minimal cost arose at the 




manager of the ICT presented the idea of holding a competition among the agency’s 
engineers and architects to develop a rural house prototype with a maximum cost of 
$500.00 Colombian pesos. He wanted to be able to offer a product for those who did not 
have access to one of the usual houses the ICT built due to their high costs.290 The results 
of the competition were presented in August 1943, and its winner, Alvaro Hermina, 
began referring to his design as the "minimal house."291 The term was already known to 
the agency, as the financial support on Alberto Wills Ferro’s and Rubiano’s 1942 travels 
to the U.S. aiming to learn about "minimal housing" attest.292 Yet, the term made its way 
into the Board of Directors meetings and prevailed in the agency’s architectonic 
vocabulary after this competition took place.293 
The implications of this minimal house were discussed in a meeting in Bogotá in 
December 1943 in which all of the leading engineers and architects working in the 
different regions of the country participated. There, Luis Cano, one of the board 
members, explained that the rural "housing with a minimal cost does not mean a house of 
a single type, but a house with the minimal price, without losing its soundness, hygiene, 
relative comfort, and allowing future transformations.”294 At the same time, some 
architects expressed their concerns about this model minimal house, for it would not 
                                                
290 Minute 138, March 1943, p. 344. 
291 Minute 164, October 1943, p. 387. The jury was: Alberto Wills, Manuel Samper and Ezequiel Sánchez, 
leading architects and engineer of the Institute. In: Minute 157, August 1943, p. 379. 
292 Minute 99, February 1942, P. 247. Minute 102, March 1942, P. 252. However, there is no evidence that 
any of them contributed in a concrete way to that issue. Only the interview, in which Rubiano states that he 
was able to develop low-cost rural houses. Acebedo and Moreno, “Hernando Vargas Vida y Obra: Brunner 
Era La Academia, Le Corbusier La Revolución Urbanística;” Vargas Rubiano and Vargas Caicedo, “El 
Terraconcreto En Colombia: Apuntes Para Su Historia.” 
293 Although Vargas Rubiano as well as Alberto Wills, both remarkable architects, were in the U.S. 
studying the issue of "minimal housing" partially financed by the ICT, this topic was never discussed in the 
board meetings until this competition took place. However, the insights both architects brought with them 
could have influenced the general manager's views that led to this competition. There is no evidence for 
that, though. 
294 Minute 169, December 1943, p. 397 - back. 
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work everywhere, e.g. the Santander department, where people might consider it unsafe, 
and consequently, be constantly on guard against their possible enemies.295 From that 
time on, the relation between minimal house and minimal cost remained a regular 
concern in the ICT’s work.  
The minimal house was evidently applied in the rural housing program, for it was 
also catalogued in Wills Ferro's publication of 1946. According to the depiction in this 
book, the minimal house had the advantage that it could be built similarly in all climate 
zones, with minimal variations in response to geographical differences. It was also 
adaptable to "any kind of building material such as brick, stone, cement blocks, rammed 
earth walls, and others." This aspect further ensured the ability to adapt the generic unit to 
different geographical conditions.296 
Though the ICT’s technical department was acquainted with the minimal house 
from its experience in the rural housing program, they linked the term later to the urban 
housing projects developed at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s in Bogotá, 
Muzú among them. Under the supervision of architect Jorge Gaitán Cortés, the technical 
department developed minimal housing type 58F3.297 Yet in doing so, it exhibited a set 
of limitations derived from a particular understanding of how "minimal" was to be 
interpreted. One of the three rooms of the program was at the same time circulation 
space. It was necessary to cross one of the small bedrooms in order to enter the second 
one. Also, its dining space was seemingly insufficient to accommodate the number of 
                                                
295 This is an assertion that shows the limits of standardized housing, and tangentially expresses the 
political context of the moment in the rural areas in 1943. Minute 169, December 1943, p. 398. 
296 Wills Ferro and Maldonado, Cartilla de Construcciones Rurales. 
297 Gaitán Cortés played a key role in the development of modern architecture. He interacted with ICT at 
different moments in different roles. He will be mentioned several times throughout this chapter. Essentials 
about him in: Dávila, Julio D. Planificación y Política En Bogotá: La Vida de Jorge Gaitán Cortés. 
Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor, 2000.  
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inhabitants it was planned for. The only bathroom located on the ground floor is also 
strikingly small. Finally, the workspace in the kitchen is almost inexistent.  
Figure 3.4. Muzú. Housing type 58F3. First and second floor. Proa 30, December 1949. 
What ideas about the minimal house can be perceived in this context? Although 
Carlos Martinez expressed in an editorial of the journal Proa issue, in which Muzú was 
presented, that "minimal" was meant "according to functional concepts which can be 
achieved through a rational distribution," one can but wonder if this included a notion of 
a minimum to perform any specific activity.298 Nonetheless, this minimal housing type 
had the approval of Martinez, for it was in any regard an improvement compared to the 
                                                




previous living conditions of the targeted population. He claimed in the article on Muzú 
that  
[i]n the inquilinatos [tenement houses] for workers, the worker's family has a 
single room, where the residents cook, receive, chat, rest and sleep. The only 
shared toilet facility is unhygienic or does not work. There is no sun, no pure air, 
no light; nor the delight of a nearby playground. That is the overcrowding with its 
lamentable pathological consequences and its tremendous physical and moral 
decompositions.299 
This is a well-known discourse of modern architecture that nurtured the development of 
social housing, even if at the end those discussed by Martinez were not necessarily the 
same awarded the right to live in Muzú.  
The ICT sought to achieve a minimal house for a minimal cost through 
technological innovations and through the optimization of the program, for which Muzú 
was an important antecedent.300 After a series of experiences with minimal housing, the 
board of directors proclaimed in 1952 that the agency only should build urban housing of 
a "minimal type, with a maximal cost of 4000 pesos." The board of directors considered 
that only so the agency could solve the "housing problem" with its "sparse resources."301 
 
                                                
299 Proa 8, August 1947. 
300 A minimal housing type was finally developed in the Quiroga neighborhood after a good number of 
experiments, in which the Inter-American Center for Housing, Centro Interamericano de Vivienda, 
CINVA, was also involved. The third phase of Quiroga was awarded to the architects Pedro Helí Vega, 
Guillermo Melo, Esguerra & Herrera, and Álvaro Ortega for a price of 1.580.20 pesos each. (Minute 539, 
September 22, 1952, p. 0029.) This represented an enormous difference compared with some of the houses 
that were built in the last years of the 1940s, which were never less than 10.000 Colombian pesos. 
301 Furthermore, the main board decided to “eliminate the mixed financing system,” that operates in some 
cities, since those who are able to give “more or less substantial contributions,” can also solve their housing 
problem on their own. Which means that middle class housing loses some importance, at least during the 
rest of this period. What is interesting is that Juan Pablo Ortega, (former representative of the 
industrialists), the Institute of Parcelaciones general manager, and Gabriel Serrano Camargo, participated in 
this meeting. Minute 533, August 4, 1952, p. 0018. 
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The Materials Application Workshop "El Tabor" 
The origins of a workshop in which experiments with materials could be 
conducted are directly connected with the never-ending search for a means to lower costs 
for the rural housing program. In this search program general manager Garcés Navas 
incessantly proposed housing prefabrication. Although he made several attempts to 
introduce prefabricated houses and to make prefabrication a priority for the agency 
throughout the time he served as general manager, his initiatives did not significantly 
impact the production of rural housing.302 Toward the end of his term, in 1947, he still 
claimed that 
only when we can obtain a prefabricated rural house with all the necessary safety, 
soundness, hygiene and conditions of comfort, the Institute is going to be able to 
make an efficient work in improving the quality of rural housing. It will be able to 
build not hundreds but thousand housing units that could be built in a year in the 
Colombian rural areas with specialized equipment to assemble one house in only 
a few days.303  
His views, very much in line with what was happening at the global level in this period 
after World War II, exemplify the faith in prefabrication as a way to solve once and for 
all the housing shortage, without considering the extremely high costs of this "specialized 
equipment."  
Although prefabrication did not characterize the building methods implemented 
by the ICT during general manager Garcés Navas' term, it certainly became the initial 
reason for the establishment of a workshop to conduct technical experiments with 
building materials. The financial crisis during World War II probably nurtured in Garcés 
                                                
302 For instance, in Minute 110, June 1942, P. 282. Arturo E. Márquez offers the ICT prefabricated houses 
in "wood from the sawmills of Tumaco." This offer does not have any positive response, since after 
evaluating it the board members came to the conclusion that it was more expensive than brick or adobe and 
that its performance over the long term was uncertain. 
303 Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578. 
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Navas more reasons to assume that prefabrication was the path to follow, for he 
reinforced his vehement pledge to the board of directors to advance the development of 
prefabrication for the rural housing program with his request to establish a commission to 
study and develop prefabricated rural housing.304 This technological commission, 
according to Garcés Navas' proposal, was to be comprised of engineer Ricardo 
Rodríguez, Leader of the Rural Housing section; the Industrial engineer Juan Consuegra 
de la Cruz, and the U.S. American architect John C. Knight, specialized in the 
construction of prefabricated houses for the US. Navy.305 
The technical commission traveled to Puerto Rico, where it would be informed 
about the latest advances in prefabrication methods and materials.306 Though these 
technologies would not be adopted into Colombia outright, the commission’s visit did 
enable new and unexpected ideas to enter the agency, with far-reaching consequences for 
its future. Based on the commission’s findings, Juan Consuegra de la Cruz concluded in a 
report on prefabricated housing that prefabrication would not work in Colombia as it did 
in other countries, due to Colombia’s vast and irregular topography. But recognizing the 
difficulty in bringing materials from other places had always been the main argument for 
using local materials and building methods, he presented an intermediate path that could 
be followed in order to achieve a more effective building process. This report thoroughly 
                                                
304 Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578 - 578-back. 
305 Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578. They all were working for the Institute at that point. 
306 Minute 280, September 10, 1947, p. 600. Jacob Crane, from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
who was in Colombia at the beginning of 1946, (Minute 230, January 21, 1946, p. 489-back) and 
suggested, among others, "to contact the Institute for Tropical Housing in Puerto Rico, ... "to exchange 
ideas and to seek international orientation regarding the issue of housing..." In: Minute 231, February 4, 
1946, p. 491. But also, Robert L. King, who also worked with the Inter-American Cooperative Service for 
Public Health, and John C. Knight, specialized in the construction of prefabricated houses for the US. 
Navy. (Minute 260, March 17, 1947, p. 541. Minute 272, July 10, 1947, p. 578) and provided their services 
to the ICT at least during 1947. Any of them might have contributed to this proposal. It does not exclude 
the possibility of other existing sources for this proposal. 
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informed the agency about all the extant possibilities for implementing efficient building 
systems, but it did not succumb to the belief that only foreign materials were worthy, in 
contrast to the general manager's idealization of prefabrication. Instead, the report gave a 
sensible understanding of how to use foreign construction elements without losing sight 
of the particular conditions of the country, and what this implied in terms of construction 
techniques.307 The singular approaches required by the diverse geographic conditions is 
Consuegras’ core argument for setting up a workshop to conduct experiments with 
building materials rather than introducing prefabrication methods that could not work in 
the country. His unique point of view was the basis in the search for alternatives, which 
in his view would need to combine traditional building methods and materials with 
improvements through new technologies and modern materials. In that context, 
technological experiments were required to ascertain the appropriate materials for each 
region. As a first step to accomplishing this, he presented a complete project, which 
included the establishment of a workshop to experiment with building materials.308 
Consuegra's report, with its proposal to build a materials workshop, enabled two 
apparently contradictory aspects of the building processes at the ICT. On the one hand, 
the workshop should allow exploring the best way to increase the quality of rural housing 
by implementing the best possible building methods and materials in each region, 
according to its climate and customs. On the other hand, this was the place where 
experiments were conducted to advance the prefabrication process to be employed in the 
                                                
307 Minute 280, September 10, 1947, 600-back– 602-back. 
308 In: Board Directive committee, Minute 76, September 26, 1947, p. 611 – 614. This proposal had an 
important antecedent within the agency in the earlier work of Vargas Rubiano with terra-concrete. Vargas 
Rubiano's curiosity about alternatives to improve local building materials and techniques persisted in 
Consuegra's proposal. In fact, when Consuegra presented a report on the activities and results of this 
workshop, he mentioned that the first experiments with terra-concrete had presented excellent results in 
Muzú. Yet, Vargas Rubiano’s name and any reference to previous experiences in the agency with this 
material were not mentioned. Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 898-back. 
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urban projects that would be built in the next years: Los Alcázares (Bogotá, 1948), Muzú, 
(Bogotá, 1949) and Quiroga (Bogotá, 1951). The guiding principles of such a workshop 
were in tune with the statutes of the agency, which according to law 85 of 1946, 
established that "the agency will have a technical department in charge of the study of 
diverse rural as well as urban housing typologies, appropriated for diverse weather 
conditions and customs in the different regions of the country. This technical department 
will also have as a task the study of urban planning, the production of materials and the 
research on prefabricated housing."309 Although the realization of the workshop was not 
mentioned in the remaining meetings of 1947, Consuegra's proposal was the basis for the 
materials workshop finally installed in the site "El Tabor" in 1948. 
However, the inception of "El Tabor" was unrelated to Consuegra's proposal. 
Throughout the 1940s, different causes led to a decisive migration into the cities. While 
in 1938 the rural population represented 70.9% of the total, by 1951 it was 61.1%.310 The 
increased housing shortage that resulted in the main cities became more evident as the 
1940s advanced. This situation required quick actions that would enable the construction 
of more houses in a short time. It involved the search for additional sources for the 
industrialized production of building materials. As a response, the ICT's board members 
agreed on the need of producing building materials on its own. With this in mind, the ICT 
initiated a search for a site to produce brick and tile on a large scale, and to that end, the 
ICT sought advice from geologists at the Ministry of Mines and Oil (Ministerio de Minas 
y Petróleos) and the Institute of Industrial Development (Instituto de Fomento 
Industrial).311 The ICT purchased a piece of land close to Bogotá in October 1946, El 
                                                
309 Minute 261, March 18, 1947, p. 545. Article 45. 
310 Pécaut, Orden y violencia, 349-350. 
311 Minute 251, September 30, 1946, p. 522-back. Soon after, the geologist of the Institute of Industrial 
Development, Benjamin Alvarado, indicated in his reports of October 5 and 9 of 1946 that the sites offered 
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Tabor.312 The initial project of a production plant for brick and tile expanded to include a 
quarry and a clay source.313 Until the end of the term of general manager Garcés Navas in 
December of 1947, the ICT conducted a series of activities aimed at setting up the 
production plant.314 Yet the plant never produced building materials at the scale 
envisioned when it was first established. 
During the next years, from 1948 on, the relevance and purpose of the production 
plant and quarry at El Tabor changed to a "Materials Application Workshop." Two 
circumstances probably propelled this transformation. On the one hand, Juan Consuegra 
de la Cruz’ project to establish a workshop to experiment with building materials, 
proposed in September 1947, had not yet materialized. On the other hand, despite studies 
undertaken under general manager Hernando Posada Cuéllar (1948-1949) to define the 
suitability of the site for the planned tasks, it was repeatedly claimed that El Tabor was 
not suitable for these tasks.315 The materials application workshop operated then under 
                                                                                                                                            
to the ICT for purchase were appropriated. Minute 252, October 14, 1946, p. 525. In spite of the board of 
director's approval to continue the negotiations, he informed about a new site. In: Minute 253, October 21, 
1946, p. 525-back. 
312 Minute 254, October 28, 1946, p. 526-back. In this meeting, the positive report by the geologist 
Alvarado was read, and the site’s purchase approved. Although the site was not yet called "El Tabor" this 
nomination can be inferred from the request to build two or three houses for the site-keepers in "El Tabor," 
in the next meeting.  Minute 255, December 9, 1946, p. 532.  From that moment on, this site would always 
be referred as El Tabor. 
313 Board Directive Committee, Minute 57; January 17, 1947. In: Minute 259, February 24, 1947, p. 539. 
314 Report of Directive committee, Minute 62, 28 de June de 1947, p. 573. In: Minute 271, July 3, 1947. 
Minute 273, July 17, 1947.  
315 The general manager gave as an explanation for the inactivity of the brick kilns, that they were still 
expecting the results of a geologic study. The ICT technicians wanted to have a final report on the 
possibility to install a kiln for a steady production and the associated drying spaces. This was a paradoxical 
situation given the fact that it presumably had the capability of producing 60 thousand bricks, but with not 
enough space to dry them! Executive Committee, Minute 119, August 17, 1948, p. 774-back. In: Minute 
338, September 16, 1948, p. 773-back. One year later, the general manager explained that they were not 
producing brick on a large scale as planned, for the lack of water and the limited resistance of the ground to 
support the installment of drying spaces and the Hoffman kiln. Minute 401, September 29, 1949, p. 970. 
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the supervision of Juan Consuegra de la Cruz, who worked in the ICT’s technical 
department.316 
Consuegra had a key role in the development of new materials through his 
experiments and expanded the work of the Materials Application Workshop with the 
elaboration of prefabricated elements. Consuegra introduced a system of prefabricated 
floors and walls, which were employed in Los Alcázares and approved for "Muzú and the 
whole national territory."317 The ICT was indeed able to directly and efficiently use the 
products of these experiments in Muzú with great profit.318 The close collaboration 
between the Technical Department and the material's workshop at El Tabor resulted in 
the design of houses based using prefabricated parts developed and produced there. 
Bernabé Pineda Ropero, director of the urban housing program, reported that the 
workshop was able to supply a large part of the building construction materials needed 
for these houses.319 Eight houses of type 58-F-3 were almost finished in November of 
1949 for a final price of 5,098.39 Colombian pesos each, and immediate construction of 
another 144 houses under the same scheme was planned.320 
                                                
316 One of the members of the board of directors, Wiesner, one of the most devout advocates of Consuegra, 
was convinced of the benefits this workshop would give the ICT. Minute 327, July 5, 1948, p. 751-back. 
317 Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 897-back. 
318 In his 1950's report, the general manager specified that El Tabor offered great service to the ICT with 
the production of cement blocks, floor planks, ceramic bricks, hollow bricks, among others, for the 
buildings of Muzú. With those products, El Tabor not only sustained itself, but it produced additional 
profit. Minute 461, January 26, 1951, p. 1179. 
319 Minute 406, November 17, 1949, p. 987. 
320 This estimated cost was presented in the report of Pineda Ropero. Minute 406, November 17, 1949, p. 
986-back.  
In: Minute 405, of November 10, 1949, (p. 982-back) general manager Posada Cuéllar announced that the 



















Figure 3.5. Materials Application Workshop, Proa 28. October 1949. 
Consuegra's understanding of technology is quintessential for grasping a 
particular strand of modernism in Colombia, and coheres, I argue, with the sensitivity for 
regional differences in the rural housing program until the time El Tabor was 
established.321 In a report in 1949, Consuegra, as the Chief Engineer of the Materials 
                                                
321 This perspective faded in the next years and was first proclaimed by the architects several years later 




Research and Application Section, provided an extensive presentation of the work in the 
El Tabor workshop. Consuegra defined Technique as "the employment of scientific 
knowledge with specific economic goals, based on a given place, time and 
circumstances." This definition is still similar to what he expressed earlier about the need 
to adjust all knowledge to the particularity of the place. He reinforced this idea with his 
views on transformations in the realm of the materials. He observed that the 
transformation of materials, essential in the "evolution of construction," should be one of 
local materials.  He defended the use of the name "workshop" rather than "laboratory" for 
El Tabor because, for him, a workshop was closer to the “pilot plant” of the U.S. 
Americans. This was "a series of installations and machines with a relatively small or 
limited production but big enough to conduct technical experiments."322  Consuegra was a 
definitively singular specimen within the agency, as his understanding of the particular 
characteristics of this diverse and complex country clear did not shine through ICT’s 
official discourse at the time when Jorge Gaitán Cortés' was the leader of the urban 
housing program, between April of 1948 and May of 1949. However, Consuegra 
expressed his full gratitude to Gaitán Cortés, "without whom he would have not been able 
to move forward with his experiments."323 
Despite the outstanding results of the experiments conducted in El Tabor, these 
new technologies were probably never applied in the rural housing program. As the 
workshop was established in 1948, the program of rural housing was still guided by the 
need of building low-cost and by the need of having building types that responded to the 
different geographic regions and customs of the country.324 This changed soon. The 
                                                
322 Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 897 – 897-back. 
323 Minute 378, April 11, 1949, p. 897-back. 
324 Minute 341, October 7, 1948, p. 791. 
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assistant to the general manager explained the high costs of the houses built during 1948 
as the result of increased labor costs, and the use of "better materials."325 He meant by 
that the use of brick instead of wattle and daub (bahareque) or rammed earth walls, and 
metal windows instead of wooded ones, among others. This is an unfortunate assessment, 
if one considers the kind of ideas that guided the work for several years in the rural areas, 
and Consuegra's arguments to maintain the local building techniques. After the 
establishment of the materials workshop at El Tabor, the rural houses did not become any 
less expensive, and it seems that the interactions between Consuegra and the rural 
housing program were not free of conflict.326  
In sum, the Materials Application Workshop "El Tabor" certainly surged from the 
need to optimize the building process of the rural housing program through the 
improvement of local building technics and materials. This idea totally contrasted with 
the experience of prefabrication in Puerto Rico, which was the initial model for the plan 
in Consuegra's proposal. However, the agency eventually conducted experiments that 
enabled the production of a series of prefabricated elements, which were introduced in 
the construction of the most emblematic neighborhoods built by the ICT during the last 
years of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. Although El Tabor only developed at 
the end of the agency’s transitional period, when the interest in regional differentiation of 
architecture had started to fade, the concern that triggered this initiative was precisely the 
need to experiment with local materials for their improvement. And it arose in response 
to the dilemma of the high cost of rural housing, for which the optimization of regionally 
                                                
325 Minute 383, May 28, 1949, p. 908-back. 
326 Consuegra did complain at some point about the lack of interest of the rural housing program in the 
experiments of El Tabor. This complaint was confronted by the assistant to the general manager, who 
claimed that the problem resided in the fact that the workshop was dedicated to the development of 
materials for the urban housing program. Minute 379, April 21, 1949, p. 900. 
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differentiated building techniques and materials seemed to be the most appropriate 
answer. Thus, contradictory circumstances led to the creation of one of the most 
important pieces of the ICT in the process of building houses, and one of the ICT's most 
interesting contributions to modern architecture in Colombia, even if not recognized as 
such by historiography.  
 
Prefabrication and the loss of regional differences 
The introduction of prefabricated building elements in urban housing projects and 
prefabricated houses in the rural housing program throughout Colombia in the late 1940s 
slowly lost sight of conceiving an architecture that embraced local building materials and 
methods, and shows instead an increasingly simplified understanding of architecture, 
which ignores the complexity and the extreme heterogeneous geography of the country 
outside the capital. While Jorge Gaitán Cortés very likely supported the experimentation 
that began with the rural housing program, improvements in the prefabrication of 
building parts for the urban housing programs took precedence in the experiments under 
his leadership. The differentiated use of materials and building techniques that responded 
to the country’s heterogeneous characteristics lost its relevance in the process. At the 
beginning of 1949, Gaitán Cortés tackled again the successful deployment of 
prefabricated elements in Los Alcázares as the basis for its broader application 
throughout the country, but a country that should be divided in six similar geographic 
zones.327 Even if some members expressed their concern about Gaitán's plans to expand 
the experience with prefabricated elements to the whole country, these concerns were not 
related to those expressed previously by some ICT's engineers, namely the incapacity of 
                                                
327 Minute 358, January 20, 1949, p. 837. 
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prefabricated elements to take account of the geographically extreme heterogeneous 
country. They were rather related to the risk of investing a considerable sum of money in 
a new project, in light of the instability and lack of continuity of many Colombian 
industries.328  
When new general manager Francisco Puyana arrived in 1950, he introduced a 
series of changes to reduce the administration costs of the agency and the final cost of the 
houses. One of them, the simplification of the design process had the most far-reaching 
consequences for the architectural development of the rural housing units. In the same 
way Gaitán Cortés' proposal for the urban areas, building types for rural housing were 
now established for large geographical regions.329 This approach advanced to a new stage 
of simplification, when the ICT started using prefabricated metal structures for the rural 
housing program throughout the national territory. First, Puyana proposed to purchase a 
prefabricated metallic structure from Talleres Centrales that could serve to test its 
usefulness in the rural housing program in May of 1950.330 A series of purchases of iron 
structures to build prefabricated houses followed during the same year.331  Thereafter, the 
rural housing program used this kind of structure exclusively.332 Puyana's commitment to 
solve definitively the rural housing problem in this way implied the lack of space for any 
kind of experimentation or for a careful adaptation to any specific region. These metal 
structures constituted the central part of Puyana's rural housing program. Some of the 
board members shared his belief in the prefabricated house, as the one called to solve the 
                                                
328 Minute 366, February 21, 1949, p. 855. 
329 The main board proposed to "adapt" the plans used in Cartagena and Barranquilla to develop a housing 
project in Magangé. Minute 498, December 5, 1951, p. 1262. 
330 Minute 425, May 16, 1950, p. 1042. 
331 Minute 431, July 7, 1950, p. 1066-back. Minute 442, September 7, 1950, p. 1104.  Minute 450, 
November 3, 1950, p. 1133-back.  Minute 456, December 5, 1950, p. 1157. 
332 Minute 452, November 16, 1950, p. 1144. 
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multiple problems associated with peasant housing.333 Particularly, an earthquake in 
North Santander in the same year triggered the large-scale implementation of 
prefabricated houses in order to be able to respond quickly to the need of housing in that 
region.334 Several firms offered prefabricated houses, but the ICT worked primarily with 
Talleres Centrales. The prefabricated rural houses were developed in a joint effort 
between the Technical Department of the ICT and this firm. These houses caused some 
fascination for the engineers due to their low cost, even after the firm was compelled to 
increase the price of the houses because of the price increase of iron.335 Inspired by the 
possibilities it seemed to offer (low prices, and quick construction), the ICT also 
imported such structures from other firms.336 Eventually, the ICT purchased a number of 
structures from a German firm, W. Mackeben & Co., and others structures from la 
Societé Métallurgique d'Enghien St. Eloi, from Belgium, which were even lower-priced 
than the Germans.337 
Prefabricated houses were preferably used where there was a lack of materials and 
labor, and transportation was difficult.338 But even there, they were not necessarily well 
received by the rural population. As in the case of the population affected by the 
earthquake in Santander, they wanted to have their houses in bahareque (wattle and 
daub), for this building technique permitted more economical and hence larger houses.339 
Strikingly, this situation did not spark any further discussion on the suitability of 
                                                
333 Minute 446, October 5, 1950, p. 1118 – 1118-back. Camilo Gómez mentioned the prefabricated models 
as part of the strategies to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of the Magdalena River's region. 
334 Minute 432, July 10, 1950, p. 1071-back. 
335 Minute 430, July 6, 1950, p. 1061-back. Minute 444, September 21, 1950, p. 1109-back. 
336 200 structures purchased from the German firm W. Mackeben & Co. Executive Committee, Minute 153 
(incorrectly numbered: 423), August 17, 1950, p. 1089-back. Minute 439, August 22, 1950. 
337 Minute 439, August 22, 1950, p. 1089; Minute 455, November 30, 1950. 
338 Minute 482, August 2, 1951, p. 1233-back. Minute 530, July 7, 1952, p. 0011. 
339 Minute 457, December 7, 1950, p. 1161-back. 
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prefabricated houses for the rural population. The strategy of using prefabricated 
structures for the rural housing program remained in place until the ICT handed it over to 
the Agrarian Bank in 1956.340 Yet, the agency also introduced other forms of 
prefabricated buildings for the rural housing program, such as wooden prefabricated 














Figure 3.6. Talleres Centrales Advertisement. In: Vivienda, Nr. 2 of 1955. 
What architectural historian Silvia Arango identified for Colombian architecture 
in general between 1945 and 1960, applies to the architecture produced in the ICT:  "The 
                                                




centralization of decisions and technical efficiency determined an architectural 
homogenization that erased regional differences."341 This change probably expresses the 
turning point in the understanding of a regional differentiated architecture, which goes 
hand in hand with the emergence of a discourse of modern architecture in its more 
schematic version with no regard for regional differences.342 
 
URBAN HOUSING - INNER SPATIAL ARRANGEMENT 
An analytic approach to the spatial arrangement of the three case studies evince 
the extent to which ideas on modern living permeated the ICT's projects. Thus, a 
comparison with some aspects of traditional housing plans will serve as a way to discuss 
Muzú. In the case of CUAN the identification of colonial residues, as discussed by 
Fernando Lara, are at the front of the discussion.343 While a process of simplification in 
the rural housing program at the expense of a more nuanced view of local differences was 
evidenced, the evolution in the urban housing program shows new preoccupations that 
needed to be accommodated in the housing program. In Ciudad Kennedy, the 
transformations required by the different social conditions are expressed in a new space; 
a flexible space that could be converted in a room for commerce within the house or to 
maintain it simply as a bedroom. The possibility to transform the space in the future, 
according to the needs of those who dwell there, reacted to some of the critical points of 
                                                
341 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 228. 
342 A parallel with the debate in the U.S. on regionalism led by Mumford and the MoMa leaders, aka 
Johnson and Hitchcock, comes here to mind. 
343 Fernando Luiz Lara, "Incomplete Utopias: Embedded Inequalities in Brazilian Modern Architecture," 




modern housing. This strategy became better known with the experimental housing 











Figure 3.7. Muzú. Housing type 79F. Ground floor, second floor. In: Martinez, 1951. 
In Muzú, the service area is the most interesting part of the house with respect to 
examining the transformation of domestic space in ICT's housing programs. The service 
areas, comprised of kitchen, bathroom, and laundry, constitute an organic whole 
associated with the backyard of the house. At first glance, the necessity of exiting the 
house to enter the bathroom seems a bit cruel; if one considers the constantly chilly 
weather in a city that is located at 8,675 feet (2,644m) above see level. However, it 
begins to make sense when one understands the bathroom as a unity with the laundry area 
(lavadero) and the backyard. The little covered open space between the entrance to the 




mirror. This little space is thus an extension of the bathroom but outside the house. This 
makes the spatial distribution of Muzú housing units reminiscent of vernacular 
architecture, which despite the many regional differences commonly presents a direct 
connection of each room with the outer space. The spatial organization relates at least in 
two aspects to vernacular (pre-modern?) architecture; the service areas are in direct 
connection with the outer space, and the dual qualities of some spaces as bedrooms and 
circulation, as discussed in the section on minimal housing.344 In other words, although 
the prefabricated elements certainly sped up the building process in Muzú, and the urban 
structure was indeed an innovation in the local context, the spatial organization of the 
spaces was not the realm of transformation where modern architecture flourished.  
While the architects of CUAN intended the design of different apartment types 
that would cover a range of possible family configurations, the same versatility was not 
guaranteed within the apartments. In the booklet published in 1958, the ICT presented 
floor plans of seven apartment types, with the number of people each could 
accommodate. A lack of flexibility becomes evident in the two and a half bedroom 
apartments. Here, the main bedroom functions also as a circulation space, for it is 
necessary to cross it in order to enter into a smaller room. Presumably, this room was 
planned for a baby. Yet, this solution expresses a static view of the families, as the 
comments of the inhabitants seem to confirm. They did not see themselves living in 
CUAN for a long time. The apartments of CUAN simply did not offer the flexibility they 
inhabitants need in the changing configuration of their families.345  
                                                
344 In this context, a possible further step to understand the new elements introduced in social housing 
consists in comparing the architecture built by the same architects for the workers or for those "most in 
need," and the houses they built for their private clients, where the budget did not posed the same 
limitations and they were able to design freely according to what they considered was modern architecture. 
345 Also, this probably reflects the abstract or idealized image of what a middle class family looks like. In: 
G. Triana and J. Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas," Publicaciones, XII Curso Regular de 
130 
 
Figure 3.8. Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN. Apartment type 2.  
Except for the service bedroom and bathroom, the internal arrangement of the 
apartments of CUAN does not greatly differ from other floor plans developed during that 
period by the state. These apartments were designed for the middle class, for whom it 
seemed to be obvious to include at least one person in charge of the housekeeping living 
in the apartment. This residue from the colonial time found its way in the "modern" 
housing complex for the middle class. Interesting or ironically, the "service bathroom," 
the housekeeper's bathroom is only for one person, while the main bathroom is for three 
to eight persons. But this is just a minimal compensation for the fact that this person is 
confined in the small area between the kitchen and her bathroom. Moreover, in some of 
                                                                                                                                            
Vivienda (Bogotá, Colombia: Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento (CINVA), October 1, 




the apartments, this service bathroom is used as the space to dry the clothes.346 Thus, not 
even that minimal space is a private space for the housekeepers. The service areas 
constitute in all apartment types a completely segregated block from the social and 
private areas. In fact, none of these three areas have any relation to each other. The same 
differentiation works even in the smallest apartment units, in the one-bedroom studios.  
This programmatic distribution of the apartments neatly aligns with the already 
existing housing typology in Colombia. Architectural historian Silvia Arango depicted its 
basic scheme in her book on Colombian architecture:  
Designing a house in any social sector will consist, from this moment [from the 
1930s], in articulating within a restricted set of possibilities a series of 
independent and functionally specialized spaces: social area (living room, dining 
room, hall), services (kitchen, service rooms, laundry, etc.), and private area 
(bedrooms and family bathroom). .... Housing is now an isolated unit for a 
nucleated family.347  
The interiors on the CUAN apartments need to be seen in this light. They are thus much 
more connected to the local housing developments than their architects would like to 
admit. 
Several housing types were built throughout the extensive housing development 
Ciudad Kennedy. Some similarities to the spatial arrangement developed already in Muzú 
are here identifiable. Other traits of the spatial organization differ from previous projects, 
exemplified in Muzú. In the housing type A built through the program of self-help in the 
super-block 6A, the kitchen, the bathroom and the sink for the laundry are external to the 
house. It is necessary to exit the house in the back to access the service area. In the 
housing type B of the same super-block, the kitchen is accessible from inside the house, 
yet it still configures a unit with the bathroom and the laundry. This external location of 
                                                
346 Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas." 
347 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 178. 
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the service areas seems rather awkward, until the parallel with rural housing can be 
established, as in the case of Muzú. In the rural areas, the spaces for the laundry, kitchen 
and bathroom are usually directly connected with the exterior of the dwellings.348  
 
Figure 3.9. Ciudad Kennedy, housing type A, super-block 6A. 
                                                
348 Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, ed., Pasados Presentes: La Vivienda En Colombia, 1. ed, Opera Eximia 




Figure 3.10. Ciudad Kennedy, housing type B, super-block 6A. 
The floor plan of housing type B in the super-blocks 5 and 8 presents again a new 
aspect, not developed until now. The space for the laundry is located to the front side of 
the house. It provides the kitchen with natural light and ventilation, for the kitchen is 
connected to the living / dinning room on the other side. This main space is connected to 
the free space in the back of the house. As in the housing type A, there is a 
multifunctional room next to the entrance that can be used either as a bedroom or as a 
commercial space. Upstairs, a terrace indicates the possibility of building later another 





Figure 3.11. Ciudad Kennedy. Housing type B. Super-block 5, 8. First and second floor. 
Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.  
Housing type 3 was widely used in Ciudad Kennedy. Superblocks 1, 8, 8A and 11 
contain such a housing type. It is so characteristic of this project that it was the housing 
type published in the architecture journal Proa 179 when it published this project in April 
of 1966. This housing type presents, again, the typical traits of minimal housing as 
developed by the ICT. The common areas are on the ground floor, and the kitchen and 
bathroom built as a constructive consecutive unit. The bathroom however, is more 
generous than the one in Muzú. Here, the bathroom is located towards the front of the 
house. The sink for the laundry is again in the back of the house, and it resembles rather 




Figure 3.12. Ciudad Kennedy. House type 3 in Super-blocks 1, 8, 8A and 11. First and 
second floor. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua.  
Another housing type A built in super-blocks 1, 3, 5 is interesting for its two 
rooms on the ground floor that provide alternative uses. The bedroom next to the entrance 
can also be used for commerce, and the small room to the other side of the entrance, 
accessible from the kitchen, can be used for different purposes, probably for the laundry, 
but the plan also foresees there a second bathroom in the future. The option in this 
housing type of transforming spaces or adding others in the future brings the meaning of 
its label closest to the nomination as incremental houses. The construction system 
identified for these same super-blocks is casas de desarrollo progresivo. A total of 1,209 
housing units should be developed as incremental houses in Ciudad Kennedy.349  
                                                





Figure 3.13. Ground floor and second floor plans of House type A. SM 1, 3, 5. ICT. 
Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. 
Saldarriaga reports that this program was offered by the agency beginning in 
1963, but that it equated to the program of casas inconclusas ("unfinished" houses). The 
casas inconclusas program was implemented in 1959. Under this program, families 
moved into a housing unit with the basic elements to make it habitable. The families 
could then gradually finish its construction. This program focused on families who were 
not able to pay the installments for a completely finished house, but could neither 
participate in the aided self-help programs.350 The fact that the self-help program also 
indicated that the housing units should be finished by the dwellers is a hint to the broad 
                                                
350 Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 
1939-1989, 35; Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 67-68. However, the call to implement 
“incremental housing” in ICT’s program had been considerably earlier discussed in a board of director’s 
meeting as a strategy to lower the housing units prices through the contribution of the future dweller with 




understanding and implementation of the "unfinished" or incremental houses in Ciudad 
Kennedy.351 
This floor plan with its bathroom on the second floor, close to the bedrooms, its 
living and dining rooms directly connected to the backyard and its kitchen completely 
integrated in the inner space, it is the most distant from the traditional rural housing type, 
which considers the service areas such as kitchen and bathroom external to the sleeping 
area. But also, this is the first time that a proposed housing type included one 
multifunctional room that could be used for commerce, as is often the case in informal 
settlements. Is this a response to the features recognized in the informally developed 
housing? Already in 1958, the Board of Directors engaged in intense discussions about 
the use of houses built by the ICT for commercial use. The agency tried to eliminate this 
situation through regulation, which obviously led to complaints from the inhabitants.352 
Consequently, the agency sought to implement a series of measures to lower the pressure 
for such activities in the ICT neighborhoods.353 Including such rooms in the initial plan 
of the house in Ciudad Kennedy can be understood as part of these measures. 
Self-help, incremental housing, and rooms that can accommodate functions that 
guarantee extra income for the family, or a place where they can practice their trade, are 
clear traits that reflect the moment the city was going through at the beginning of the 
1960s. It evinces recognition that the final users were no longer the clearly defined 
                                                
351 Elsa Gómez Gómez, “Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 
8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas.,” Investigacion Individual. (Centro 
interamericano de vivienda y planeamiento –CINVA, November 1966), Colección Centro Interamericano 
de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Box 28, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 7, 26. If one 
may think that the backyard was intended as the space for future expansion of the house, as I do, the study 
of Elsa Gomez might surprise, then when she visited the homes a couple of years later, the study was 
published in 1966, she notes that the backyard conserves still its original "nature," namely, laundry, a space 
for drying clothes, vegetable garden, space for small domestic animals, and others.  
352 Minute 9, February 26, 1958, 0282. 
353 Minute 11. March 5, 1958, p. 0304. 
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"worker" of a firm, but a much more diffuse group of workers, for whom informality was 
part of the daily life, and who had come to predominate in the big cities beginning in the 
previous decade. This is a situation resulting from the fact that the existing formal 











Figure 3.14. Housing type A, in SM5. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Ciudad 
Kennedy. Una realidad. 1965.  
Despite the project’s negative assessment by architects, this housing development 
offered a vast field of experimentation, which certainly explored, in various ways, the 
spatial configurations of different housing types. The experiments tested the formal 
aspects of design, but also the responses to a now clearly urbanizing country, whose 






A long discussion about the construction of multifamily housing buildings 
preceded the realization of the first high-rise building for multi-family housing built by 
the state, Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN. The specific references for the projects 
planned prior to the construction of CUAN, and CUAN itself, derive from experiences in 
other parts of Latin America. Even if high-rise buildings for multifamily housing 
populate the plans, projects and ideas that the agency intended to realize beginning in the 
mid 1940s, what finally evolved as the ground type for state-promoted multifamily 
housing was not high- but middle-rise buildings. Much simpler in their structure and 
technical requirements, the ICT replicated mid-rises in Colombia’s urban centers from 
the 1960s on, during which time Ciudad Kennedy was built. In the context of the 
discussions of the 1960s, the idea that prevailed was that it was more important to build 
according to the possibilities of the country than to import costly technology gained 
momentum. 
 
CUAN: The long road to building the first multifamily building 
Historiography refers to CUAN (Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño), inhabited since 
1958, as ICT's first multifamily building. However, a long discussion about the 
construction of multifamily housing buildings preceded the realization of this project 
outside and within the agency. CUAN is in this context the manifestation of a series of 
ideas circulating in the city of Bogotá several years prior to its final construction. The 
different projects that emerged in this process are part of the same discussion, though 
they do not present a clear continuous narrative line. They offer a fragmentary picture of 
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different initiatives that might be connected but whose connections are not easily 
discernible from the diverse documents that tackle the issue.  
The idea of building multifamily housing for leasing to the middle class was 
discussed for the first time in the meetings of the board of directors in April of 1946. 
Former general manager, Garcés Navas, suggested the development of  "seven or eight 
multifamily seven-story buildings in San Diego," for leasing to the middle class (to 
official and private employees). According to this presentation, the buildings should have 
shops on the first floor, and apartments above, with all kinds of "modern amenities" such 
as electric stove, refrigerator, warm water, among others. The general manager imagined 
these apartments of good quality but not luxurious and for a maximum price of ten 
thousand pesos.354 Although the general manager received a green light to pursue this 
negotiation, the project was not mentioned again in the board meetings. But, how did 
Garcés Navas develop such a detailed proposal with such divergent ideas from what was 
being developed in the middle of the 1940s? The architecture student Edgar Burbano 
proposed at that time a high-density housing project in San Diego as one of the 
constitutive elements of an urban plan for the transformation of the Avenue Carrera 10th 
(Number 1 in figure 3.15).  
 
                                                
354 The project should be built on land owned by the Caja de Sueldos de Retiro del Ejército. This plan 
should be built with the collaboration of la Caja de Previsión Social Nacional. Minute 237, April 15, 1946. 
P. 502 – 502-back. 
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Figure 3.15. Bogotá 1944. Secretaria de Obras Públicas Municipales. Departamento de 
Urbanismo y Proyectos. (1): Location of the student's project (Edgar Burbano, 
1945) published in Proa 01, August of 1946. (2): Location of the project designed 
by Gabriel Solano Mesa for the Ministry of National Education, 1947. (3): 
Location of Unidad de Habitación. D.T.M. Ortega & Solano, 1951. Published in 
Proa 53, November of 1951.  
Edgar Burbano belonged to a group of students of the Universidad Nacional, 
whose proposals for the urban renovation of the traditional center of Bogotá were 
published in the first issue of the journal Proa, in August of 1946. The importance of the 
Avenue Carrera 10th for the development of the old city center was highlighted in the 
article that accompanied the images of this student project. Burbano's project was part of 






in architecture at the Universidad Nacional in 1945 under the instruction of the professors 
Jorge Arango Sanin, Jorge Gaitán Cortés and Carlos Martinez.355 Martinez and Arango, 
along with M. de Vengoechea, were simultaneously Proa's editors.  Carlos Martinez, on 
his part, figured on the ICT's staff in October 1944 as an advisor in urban planning 
issues.356 Thus, through Martinez the general manager possibly had contacts among the 
group of young architects around him and Proa. What is more, in this first issue of Proa, 
Garcés Navas also contributed an article on the housing crisis in Colombia.357  The 
housing proposal Garcés Navas' had presented three months earlier to the board of 
directors closely resembled Burbano's proposal for the same city sector, San Diego, and it 
neatly fit into the spirit of this first Proa's issue, which clearly expressed the vision of a 
modern Bogotá.  
 
 
                                                
355 Eduardo Angulo Flórez and Asociación de Arquitectos de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, eds., 
Cincuenta Años de Arquitetura, 1936-1986: Universidad Nacional, 1. ed (Bogotá: Asociación de 
Arquitectos de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1987), 93. 
356 Minute 196, October 02, 1944, p. 441. 
357 In this article, Garcés Navas presented his views on the problem of the rural and urban areas, and the 
possible solutions (following the format of the Chart of Athens). José Vicente Garcés Navas, "La Crisis de 
Las Habitaciones En Colombia," Proa: Urbanismo, Arquitectura, Industrias, no. 1 (August 1946): 13–14. 
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Figure 3.16. Edgar Burbano's project for the Carrera 10th in the San Diego area, 1945. 
Source: Proa 1, august 1946. 
In 1947, the Ministry of National Education commissioned the architect Gabriel 
Solano to design a high-rise building complex with six housing towers and a hotel in 
Bogotá. This complex was to be located in the Calle 15 and the Carrera 17, adjacent to 
the central rail station (Number 2 in figure 3.15).358 Gabriel Solano's proposal echoes 
Edgar Burbano's. However, the author of the quintessential book on the Ministry of 
Public Works, Carlos Niño Murcia, argues that this project was inspired by all the 
modern architectural precepts the architect Gabriel Solano was acquainted with through 
his studies at Harvard University under Walter Gropius.359 
                                                





Figure 3.17. Housing project for the Ministry of Education. Gabriel Solano. 1947. 
Published in Niño Murcia, Arquitectura Y Estado. 1991. 
The proposals of the Universidad Nacional student's group as well as Gabriel 
Solano's proposal for the Ministry of Education need to be seen in the context of a major 
discussion on the transformation of the city's traditional center during the 1940s, and to 
which the invitation of Le Corbusier to develop a pilot plan belongs. This discussion was 
widely promoted by the group around the journal Proa. Moreover, the initiative of ICT's 
former general manager Garcés Navas probably expressed the wish of the ICT to connect 
to this discussion and be part of the actors contributing to the modernization of the city. 
All these projects for high-rise multifamily buildings were still in the realm of the 
planning ideas for a near future, since at that point no law regulating the horizontal 
property existed. Such a law was enacted in 1948 (Law182 of 1948). However, it is 
important to recall that at that time multifamily buildings for rent were already built in 
Bogotá. As Silvia Arango claims, these "apartment buildings were conceived, as a small-
scale business, so that ‘they left the owner a rent proportional to the invested capital’... 




(intellectual, but not economic minorities) ... "360 Cite Restrepo, designed by the 
renowned “architect” Gabriel Serrano in 1939, was the most emblematic example of the 
period in Bogotá361. It consisted in 99 lofty apartments with services such as restaurant, 
apartment cleaning, and laundry service.362 That said, Law 182 of 1948 was only relevant 
for high-rise buildings, which were intended to be sold to the future apartment dwellers.  
Within the agency, the issue of multifamily housing emerged again in 1948, yet in 
a different context. Already at the beginning of the year, some firms, which were 
subjected to a tax defined by Law 85 of 1946, asked for permission to build multifamily 
buildings to lease to their workers.363 The discussion was rather about the legal 
background of the law, which did not foresee housing for lease but explicitly defined that 
the houses built with this tax by the firms themselves should be sold to their workers or 
employees. Nonetheless, this discussion opened again the question about whether leasing 
or selling and whether single family or multifamily housing was the best option for the 
ICT. One year later, this topic was still being discussed.364 Following the logic of those 
discussions, multifamily buildings were intrinsically for lease, while single-family homes 
were to be sold. Although the ICT was primarily concerned with selling the houses it 
produced, it eventually leased those houses, which were not instantly awarded for various 
                                                
360 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 206. 
361 He was trained as an engineer, worked but as an architect in the firm he founded with Camilo Cuéllar, 
and the engineer José Gómez Pinzón in 1933. Ernesto Cuéllar and architect Gabriel Largacha joined later 
the firm. Their architectonic production greatly shaped modern architecture in Colombia during its 
consolidation phase, principally during the 1950s. 
362 Edificio Cité Restrepo. Ingeniería y Arquitectura, 14 y 15, 1940. p. 28-30. Serrano reflected on the 
implications of this new kind of housing in his article "Apartamentos modernos, "published in Ingeniería y 
Arquitectura No. 17, 1940. 
363 Minute 300, January 15, 1948, p. 670-back – 671. 
364 The textile factory Tejicondor built a multistoy building in Medellin to lease units to its single 
employees. Wiesner, one of the board members, declared that the issue of multifamily housing could not be 
defined in a general form, since some employees could prefer to live close to their work places even if they 
do not own them. Minute 401, September 29, 1949, p. 971. 
146 
 
reasons (high costs, animadversion against the ICT, and so on), in order to avoid 
remaining empty.365 The implications of the question about single family homes versus 
multifamily buildings are best seen in the minutes of a meeting in which board members 
discussed building multifamily housing like that seen in Europe and Peru. One board 
member concluded that, at that moment, the agency should focus its attention rather on 
building the highest number possible of low-cost housing, although he did not reject the 
possibility to "apply these new theories on urbanizations" in the future.366 Hence, in his 
view, low-cost housing was equal to single-family housing, and multifamily housing was 
associated with higher costs. 
Although the Ministry of National Education did not pursue the plan developed 
by Gabriel Solano in 1947 any further at that time, in 1951 Solano presented with his 
partners Alvaro Ortega and Guillermo Gonzalez Zuleta another multifamily housing 
project, which was published in Proa 53, in November of 1951. The unauthored article, 
which may have been written by Carlos Martinez, titled Unidad de Habitación. D.T.M., 
explained that the project’s purpose was to fill newly vacant land resulting from the 
abolition of the streetcar. In this account, Bogotá's Mayor, Santiago Trujillo (1949-1952), 
an architect himself, "initiated the idea of erecting buildings in this area that, in addition 
to having a social content, would be a contribution to the embellishment of such an 
important sector."367 This area was a block limited by the calle 26, the diagonal 29, the 
streets Carrera 13B and carrera 14 or Avenida Caracas, with and extension of 22,000 m2 
                                                
365 Since several houses in Altos del Prado en Barranquilla have not been sold due to their high price, the 
main board decided to lease them. Minute 413, February 6, 1950, p. 1009. The situation is the same in 
Armero, San Gil y Ocaña. In: Minute 460, January 23, 1951. In the case of El Cedro in Cali and in Los 
Libertadores, Medellín, two owners asked for permission to sell the houses, since they were not able to 
assume the mortgages. However, the main board did not authorize that; instead, they ordered to rent the 
houses and use the money to pay the mortgages. Minute 454, November 23, 1950, p. 1147-back. 
366 Minute 332, July 23, 1948, p. 761. 
367 Proa 53. November 1951. 
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(Number 3 in figure 3.15). As with the other projects, the reasons why Ortega and 
Solano's proposal from 1951 was never built are unknown. 
Figure 3.18. Unidad de Habitacion D.T.M. Ortega & Solano. Published in Proa 53, 
November 1951. 
The ICT was still discussing the prospect of building multifamily buildings, either 
for sale or for lease, in 1950.368 Later, as Gabriel Serrano Camargo took his place on the 
ICT board of directors in 1951, Carlos Martinez explicitly expressed in the journal Proa 
that "such a distinguished professional [Serrano] demonstrates to his colleagues the 
economic, social and hygienic advantages offered by collective housing in multi-story 
buildings."369 In May of 1952, Carlos Martinez' request seemed to finally have come to 
fruition when a meeting with the minister of public works, Jorge Leyva, took place. Even 
though the Ministry of Public Works, under Leyva's direction, was in the process of 
designing and building CUAN at this point, he presented yet another project to construct 
multifamily buildings for the middle class, to be located where the planned highway in 
the north of Bogotá met with Caracas Avenue. The minister offered the ICT part of this 
                                                
368 Minute 411, January 26, 1950, p. 1004-back. 




land to develop the buildings. The general plan was to be developed in a collaborative 
work between the Ministry and the Technical Department of the ICT.370 One month later, 
the firms Ortega & Solano, together with the architecture firm Obregón & Valenzuela 
were invited to design the project.371 With Serrano on the ICT's board of directors, this 
invitation was probably his initiative. In August 1952, the ICT signed the contract with 
those firms to collaborate with the Ministry of Public Works in drafting the multifamily 
housing complex.372 However, nothing about this project was mentioned ever again in the 





                                                
370 Minute 523, May 26, 1952, p. 0001-back. 
371 Minute 528, June 19, 1952, p. 0009-back.According to Martinez in his 1951 publication on Colombian 
Architecture, the firm Obregón & Valenzuela was founded in 1944 with the architects Rafael Obregón, 
José M. Obregón and Pablo Valenzuela, as the general manager. They won the ICT's competition for 
"Economic Housing" [Los Alcazarez] in 1948. In addition, Martinez informs that Alvaro Ortega and 
Gabriel Solano founded the firm Ortega & Solano in 1945 with the engineer Guillermo Gonzalez Zuleta. 
372 Minute 535, August 18, 1952, p. 0020-back. 
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Figure 3.19. Pilot Plan for Bogotá. Le Corbusier, Wiener and Sert. Roadway plan, 1951. 
The bubble shows the area where the planned highway towards the north of the 
city meets with the Carrera 14 (Avenida Caracas).373  
From this account, several questions come to the fore. First, why did the minister 
Jorge Leyva seek the collaboration of the ICT to build another multifamily building 
complex, when he already was leading the construction of the CUAN? Also, why was 
Gabriel Solano not under the designers of CUAN or of its structure, although he was 
working at the Ministry for Public Works at that time and was the designer of the most 
relevant multifamily housing projects in the city until that time? Moreover, he was 
chosen at the same time to develop the joint effort between the ICT and the ministry of 
public works to build multifamily housing. The answers to these questions would 
certainly constitute a different and interesting architectural story. 
The significance of the previous unrealized projects consists not only in the fact 
that they animated a necessary discussion about the rapidly transforming urban centers, 
                                                
373 http://cartografia.bogotaendocumentos.com. Site managed by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
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but also in the fact that they represent a different way of living in the city. This is not only 
expressed through the architectonic configuration but also through the location within the 
city. By comparing the location of the CUAN with the previous proposals for multifamily 
housing, one commonality comes to the fore. The multifamily housing projects prior to 
the CUAN are placed along or close to two important circulation arteries that run south-
to-north: Carrera 14 (Avenida Caracas) and Carrera 10th.  Only the CUAN lies outside of 
this growth dynamic towards the north, outside the traditional center of the city. CUAN's 
location thus can be seen as a keystone of the city's expansion to the west, along the 
newly inaugurated Avenida de las Americas.  
Figure 3.20. Bogotá, 1954. Instituto Geográfico de Colombia, Agustin Codazzi. Location 
of CUAN and previous unrealized multifamily housing projects  
Evidently, these projects were deemed appropriate in conjunction with the 
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only reduced to the shape of architecture and construction methods, but to the way of life 
they implied. Their location within the city's urban fabric complies with this idea. 
Furthermore, the images of the precedent projects highlight the importance of having a 
more urban program on the first floor. Consequently, the urban configuration of the 
predecessors of CUAN and of CUAN itself gives account of a less isolated view of these 
modern developments. Through the permeability of the open spaces but also through the 
first floor program, these platforms should constitute a binding element to the existing 
city. 
Beyond these discussions, and after CUAN was completed through the ministry 
of public works, ICT still pursued the construction of high-rise multifamily buildings. In 
September of 1955 the general manager received the Board of Directors’ authorization to 
negotiate the purchase of land close to the neighborhood Los Alcázares –built by the 
ICT- in Bogotá, to develop "a group of multi-family" buildings.374 The project was so 
advanced, that it was even published in ICT's journal Vivienda in June of 1955, under the 
grandiloquent title "Grupos Multifamiliares Serán Construidos," (Multifamily buildings 
will be built). Its design was the product of the work of the "design section of the 
Technical department of ICT, interestingly, under the direction of Gabriel Solano.375 
Obviously, a very detailed depiction of the project appeared in this article.376 Despite its 
approval by the board of directors, its greatly advanced stage of development, and the 
wide publicity it received, this effort also remained incomplete.  
                                                
374 Landowner was the Beneficencia de Cundinamarca. Minute 645 (incorrectly numbered: 745), 
September 15, 1955, p. 0297. 
375 Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed., Vivienda, vol. 2 (Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 
1955). The authorship of the project appears in the table of contents, p. 2. 















Figure 3.21. Project for multifamily housing in Los Alcázares. Bogotá. Vivienda. Revista 
Ilustrada. Organo del Instituto de Crédito Territorial. Nr. 2. June, 1955.  
What circumstances prevented the institution from bringing these projects to 
completion are not stated or even hinted at in the minutes. This hesitation regarding 
realizing the construction of multifamily buildings is all the more inexplicable, as the 
ICT's board members acknowledged CUAN as a relevant experience in the realm of 
housing, and did not seem to question the very idea of this typology.377 According to 
                                                
377 This acknowledgement came in the context of discussing a new decree, 1983 of 1955, which exempted 
the Banco Popular and the Caja Agraria from the emission housing and saving bonds to support the ICT in 
exchange of building rural housing. Since at that moment the Banco Popular already managed CUAN, the 
ICT board asked the president to wait and see how well they were able to do with this project before it was 
commissioned with the task of building rural housing. Minute 643 (incorrectly numbered: 743), September 




Silvia Arango, the reason why all these proposals never materialized is "not architectural 
or urban, nor was it due to professional polemics: the low cost of urban land prices meant 
that the large investments necessary to build high-rise buildings were not justified at that 
time."378 It probably also relates to the circumstances of the agency at that moment. 
Almost two months after the board of directors authorized the negotiations to acquire the 
land adjacent to the neighborhood Los Alcázares, in which the multifamily housing 
project was supposed to be located, the launching of the new Corporación Nacional de 
Servicios Públicos (National Corporation of Public Services).379 Under this new structure 
the ICT lost its autonomy, and its capability to develop new projects vanished. As the 
ICT recovered its autonomy in May of 1957, the political context was quite different.380 
On May 10th, General Rojas Pinilla was deposed from power and a military Junta 
assumed control until a civil government was elected one year later.381  The new board of 
directors met in its new configuration first in September of 1957.382 At the time of this 
meeting the proposal to receive CUAN was probably already looming, since the final 
purchase took place in July 1958. Under these circumstances, to reassume the 
multifamily housing project of Los Alcazares was probably not realistic. 
 
CUAN and the regional models.  
The theoretical models for the construction of multifamily building derive from 
the reflections on the modern city as developed by Le Corbusier and within the CIAM. 
Thus, Carlos Martinez and the architects around him promoted and supported Le 
                                                
378 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 225 
379 Minute 650 (incorrectly numbered: 750), November 10, 1955, p. 0303. 
380 Decreto Legislativo 0094, 1957. (Mayo 29) 
381 Minute 16, May 16, 1957, 0771. 
382 Minute 1, September 11, 1957, p. 001.  
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Corbusier's invitation to Bogotá. However, specific references for CUAN, and CUAN 
itself, emanate from projects built in other Latin American countries. It would seem that 
the projects in Europe and the United States were too different in their technical 
requirements from those in Colombia, while projects being built in in other Latin 
American countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, Peru or Mexico shared more similarities 
with the circumstances there. In fact, the references presented in the article on the last 
multifamily housing project planned by the ICT in Los Alcázares before CUAN was 
acquired, included Pani's project in Mexico city as well as the Neighborhood Unit Nr. 3 
in Lima, and the multifamily housing projects in Caracas.383 
These housing projects in Mexico City and Caracas seem to have also been 
referenced in CUAN’s design.  In 1951 Nestor C. Gutierrez, one of the architects of the 
group responsible for the design of CUAN was sent to various countries in order to 
acquire the knowledge he needed to build the first multifamily building of this scale in 
the country.384 He went to Venezuela, Mexico and to the United States. In Caracas he 
visited El Silencio, but, as he stated, the housing projects from which he could learn the 
most were the projects of Mario Pani in Mexico City, Multifamiliar Presidente Miguel 
Alemán (1948-50), and Multifamiliar Presidente Benito Juarez, (1950).385  
                                                
383 Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), Vivienda. 
384 Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953.” 
385 Ibid.,160. Afterwards, he visited some housing developments in the United States, which were not very 
helpful as a model, Gutierrez claimed, since they did not have any social services and were rather for the 
"wealthy typical American family." In this interview, Gutierrez referred to "Doctor Herrán," as the 
responsible for this research. 
155 
 
Figure 3.22. CUAN, Bogotá. Published in:  Martínez, Carlos, and Edgar Burbano. 
Arquitectura En Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones “Proa,” 1963. 
Even though Pani's projects are rooted in Le Corbusier's ideas and CUAN is 
therefore also connected to these ideas, two significant differences to Le Corbusier’s 
Unité d'Habitation in Marseille were already noted by Pani himself: the different building 
types and the fact that the corridors are on the buildings’ exterior.386 Furthermore, the 
services external to the housing buildings establish a significant difference to Le 
Corbusier's project. Those are also the characteristics that bring Pani's projects and 
CUAN closer together. In spite of Nestor Gutierrez' explanations, some authors highlight 
to a great extent its similarities with the Unité d'Habitation. The formal relation 
                                                





established almost automatically between the buildings of the CUAN and the Unité 
d'Habitacion is also part of Ana Montoya's depiction of the complex. She mentions that 
this "Corbusian image" was adapted to the particular context of Bogotá. However, she 
moderates her assertion with the argument that CUAN did not follow the five points of 
Le Corbusier's architecture, and that conceptually there is no textual correspondence 
between the Unité d'habitation and CUAN.387 Although Nestor Gutierrez did not deny 
the influence of Le Corbusier, he clarified that the architects who designed CUAN 
studied examples from "all over the world" and used what they considered would 
contribute best to the solution of each apartment typology they were planning. 
Beyond any formal reference to other contemporary multifamily housing projects, 
CUAN enabled the implementation of some technical developments. From the firms 
appointed by the ministry of public works to build the structure of CUAN, "Cuellar, 
Serrano and Gomez" is of particular interest in this account.388 The advertisement of the 
building method implemented by this firm is the most relevant hint to the construction of 
the structure of their buildings in CUAN. The firm deployed in CUAN its newly patented 
building system "reticular celulado," a grid system of concrete floor slabs with 
prefabricated elements, which reduced the use of material.389 Whether this system was 
                                                
387 Ana Patricia Montoya Pino, "El C.U.A.N.: La Modernización de Un Habitar" (2003), 112. 
388 As explained previously in the text: Decree 1718 of 1952 (July 18) approved the contracts of May 28 of 
the same year to construct the structure of CUAN's buildings as "dwellings for the middle class in Bogotá" 
with following firms:  
a) Pardo Restrepo & Santamaría Ltda.: three buildings, 13 stories high with a total built area of 34,500 m2.  
b) Martínez Cárdenas & Cia. Ltda.: four buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 26,552 m2.  
c) Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez y Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 13 stories high with a total built area of 23,000 m2. 
d) A. Manrique Martín e Hijos Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.  
e) Noguera. Santander & Cia. Ltda.: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.  
f) Pablo Lanceta Pinzón: two buildings 4 stories high with a total built area of 5,127.20 m2.  
The contracts included the construction of all complementary works according to the plans previously 
approved by the ministry of public works. 
389 According to Silvia Arango, it was the engineer Domenico Parma, who developed the system "reticular 
celulado" around 1950. In: Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 218. However, according to 
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implemented in all buildings or only in those of which this firm was in charge, is not 
clear. As I said previously, for unknown reasons, Proa did not publish anything about the 
construction of the CUAN. However, the journal had previously presented the material 













Figure 3.23. Proa 33, March 1950. P. 24. 
                                                                                                                                            
Alberto Mayor Mora et al, this was developed in house as teamwork between several divisions of the firm. 
Serrano brought from his trip to Brazil his observations of the system Lucio Costa was using to build 
concrete floor slabs. The firm developed then a grid system of concrete floor slabs with prefabricated 
elements, which reduced the materials and, consequently, achieved a reduction in the construction costs. 
The people involved in this process were, thus, many others besides Parma. As Proa presented the issue, 
they were Domenico Parma and Andrius Malko from the department of Engineering, Gabriel Serrano from 
the Department of Architecture, and Enrique Acosta from the department of construction of the firm. The 
general coordinator was the general manager from the firm engineer José Gómez Pinzón. In: Proa No. 33, 
March of 1950. P. 13. And Alberto Mayor Mora, Silvia Inés Jiménez Gómez, and Hugo Cardona Bueno, 
Inventos y patentes en Colombia 1930-2000: de los límites de las herramientas a las fronteras del 
conocimiento (Medellín: Instituto Técnológico Metropolitano, 2005), 126-131. 




Some advertisements in the same journal give an account of various technical 
aspects of CUAN.391 First, the firm highlighted the short time needed in the construction 
of the buildings: 50 workdays to finish the 11.500 m2 of structure of the buildings they 












Figure 3.24. Advertisement of Cuellar, Serrano, Gómez & Cia. Ltda., of its building 
method "Reticular Celulado." Published in Proa 65, November 1952. 
Also, the firm "Prefabricated materials Moggio Ltda" promoted its prefabricated 
floors used in the six buildings type A (four stories high), which according to the ads 
were installed in 60 days. The names of the firms in charge of the construction of those 
buildings, Pablo Lanzetta Pinzon, A. Manrique Martin e Hijos Ltda., and Noguera 
                                                
391 Interestingly, not even the monograph on Serrano's work authored by Germán Tellez mentions this 
project. Téllez, Germán. Cuéllar Serrano Gómez: Arquitectura, 1933-1983. Colección Arquitectura 11. 








Figure 3.25. Advertisement of Prefabricated materials Moggio Ltda. Detail. Published in 
Proa 67. January 1953 
Both advertised products were used in the fabrication of concrete slabs, one of the 
main components of the concrete frame. Both products were prefabricated and both firms 
presented the short construction times as an argument for the quality of the products. The 
use of these prefabricated elements in the structure offers a tangible vision of the way 
industrialized housing was conceived at that moment in Colombia.  
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Figure 3.26. Building type B's structure.392  
 
Ciudad Kennedy and the generalization of a building type in the work of the ICT 
Even if high-rise buildings for multifamily housing populate the plans, projects 
and ideas that the agency intended to realize in the mid 1940s, what finally evolved as 
ICT’s model for multifamily housing was not high-rise but middle-rise buildings. Much 
simpler in its structure and technical requirements, this type was replicated with 
variations throughout the urban centers of the country, beginning in the 1960s, almost 
simultaneously with the superblocks two and seven in Ciudad Kennedy. In the 1960s, the 
idea of building according to the possibilities within the country rather than to import 
                                                
392 Author unknown. https://html1-f.scribdassets.com/6d57t0ti8053t3es/images/4-0e802742d8.jpg. 




costly technology gained momentum. Grandiloquence of formal expression is absent 
here. The buildings look rather modest. The multifamily buildings in Ciudad Kennedy 
evolved into a kind of model of simplicity and economy while maintaining the 
advantages of multifamily buildings.  
Figure 3.27. Ciudad Kennedy. 22/12/1964. Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / 
Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB06083. Detail of SM7 and SM9B.  
Ciudad Kennedy offered the ideal environment to test this building type. The 
architecture in Ciudad Kennedy was centered on technical aspects. But this did not 
necessarily mean the pursuit of innovation. The technique focused on efficient building 
methods that enable easy construction at low cost. Although well known architecture 
firms participated in the construction of the four-story multifamily buildings, no crucial 
innovations were introduced. The technical aspects seem to build on the experience in 
Quiroga (with Alvaro Ortega's prefabricated concrete slabs), rather than on the 
construction of CUAN. The differences to CUAN, are evident. The most prominent 
difference is the height, which at Ciudad Kennedy is limited to four stories to avoid the 




the construction of the buildings in Ciudad Kennedy, Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Suarez 
also built CUAN.393 
The structure of this building typology in Ciudad Kennedy consists of 20cm thick 
concrete walls, cast on site, working as the vertical load bearing structural elements. Non-
load bearing walls are brick or cement block. In addition, the 12 cm thick horizontal slabs 
(placas) are pre-stressed, and allow for spans of 7.20m. Stairs, windowsills and lintels are 
prefabricated.394 The construction process does not evince the use of complex industrial 
machinery. Clearly, prefabricated elements and slabs for floors and walls predominated, 
piled up like a meccano. 
Figure 3.28. SM2, in construction. Sin título (Sin catalogar). Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. 
Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB26814. Detail. 
                                                
393 Minute 27, 1963, p. 204. The same firm which designed CUAN ten years earlier. The architects Rafael 
Esguerra, Alvaro Saenz, Rafael Urdaneta and Daniel Suarez Hoyos were the partners of the firm based in 
Bogota since 1946. Suarez Hoyos acted as general manager. In: Martínez and Arango, Arquitectura En 
Colombia. 
Aside from them, the firm OLAP built the structures for the multifamily buildings in the super-block two 
(SM2). The finishes were in charge of the firms Vargas & Cia. Ltda., Copre Triana Vargas Rocha, Vasquez 
Peña & Cia. Ltda., and Garcia Osorio Ltda. In: Minute 54, November 28, 1962, p. 0850. 
The construction of the multifamily buildings in superblock 7 was in charge of the firms Borrero Zamorano 
Giovanelli and Construcciones Sigma y Brugues Estrada & Cia. Ltda. In: Minute 19, 1963, p. 150-back. 




Figure 3.29. SM2 in construction. Sin título (Sin catalogar). Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. 
Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB26808. Detail.  
 
When comparing Ciudad Kennedy with CUAN, several differences come to the 
fore. The main difference consists in the lack of a space for a housekeeper in Ciudad 
Kennedy floor plans. This feature clearly defines a difference between the targeted 
residents of each project. Ciudad Kennedy was not intended primarily for the middle 
class. At the same time however, the lack of space for a housekeeper can mean that ICT 
understood multifamily housing not only for the middle classes, but also a viable 
typology for groups with lower incomes. Secondly, if there is something the ICT learned 
from its experience of CUAN is the fact that apartments need a small laundry area in each 
unit. This work area occupies thus in Ciudad Kennedy at times a relatively large part of 
the apartments. Interestingly, this space is hardly noticeable in the facades. The door that 
separates this space from the kitchen also expresses that this is a more ventilated area. 




apartments. Finally, there is still only one bathroom in the apartments. Even if the 
furniture in the floor plan drawings indicates the idea that quite a few persons should live 
in the apartments, the planners still considered one bathroom enough for the whole 
family. Although the dream to build high-rise buildings for multifamily housing never 
stopped, this simplified structure of the inner organization of the apartments is the base 
for the type replicated throughout the country in the next decades.395 
 
Figure 3.30. Apartment type B-2. Detail of building Number 8, superblock 7. December 




                                                
395 The agency's discourse in the 1970s tackled anew the need for industrializing the construction process in 
order to be able to solve the housing shortage. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Vinculación de La 
Industria Constructora Privada En Programas Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial. The only multifamily 
housing project that went beyond the typical four to five stories is located in downtown Medellin: Marco 
Fidel Suarez 25-story towers, planned as part or a urban renewal /redensification of the traditional center in 
the mid 1970s. In: Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En 





Figure 3.31. Apartment type B-2 and C-1. Building Number 8, superblock 7. December 











Figure 3.32. Multifamily housing. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Ciudad Kennedy. 
Una realidad. 1965. 
 
THE URBAN DIMENSION OF ICT'S HOUSING PROJECTS 
Model working-class neighborhoods 
The ICT was entrusted to build and grant loans to municipalities to finance 
barrios populares modelo (model working-class neighborhoods) through its 
simultaneously created department of urban housing in 1942. However existing accounts 
do not consider the model working-class neighborhoods as part of ICT's oeuvre. The 
general claim in these accounts is that the housing agency's sole role was to disburse the 
loans provided by the national government to the municipalities, while the municipalities 




agency’s history, since it further claims that it built the first housing projects in the urban 
areas in 1948 under the leadership of general manager Hernando Posada Cuellar (1948-
1949).396 Yet, evidence shows that the agency participated in the design and construction 
process of the "model working-class neighborhoods" with several municipalities from 
1942 to at least 1947. Filling in this gap through the integration of these projects as part 
of ICT's oeuvre, allows considering the "model working-class neighborhoods" in a new 
light. First, it allows understanding that the period between 1942 and 1947 was not a void 
in the agency’s history. Furthermore, the projects become the missing link between the 
housing developed by the municipalities and by private initiatives prior to 1942 and the 
ICT’s supposedly first urban housing developments built after 1947. In this new light, 
ICT's modern housing projects are part of a continuous process within the agency. I argue 
that the model popular neighborhoods are relevant to ICT's history, for they are a 
preamble to the urban housing projects the agency built on its own after 1948. The joint 
development effort with the municipalities provided the agency with the necessary tools 
to be able to undertake the urban housing projects it was required to after Law 85 was 
issued in 1946. 
The ICT's involvement in the construction of “model working-class 
neighborhoods” beginning in 1942 represents continuity with an existing process from 
the 1918 onwards, when the country’s first regulation of social housing was enacted. 
“Model working-class neighborhoods,” had already had a decisive impact on the 
construction of so-called low-cost housing in the country. The concept of "model" 
applied during the transitional phase of Colombian architecture derives from what the 
author of this periodization, historian Silvia Arango, explains as a "model architectonic 
                                                
396 Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda. But also Silvia Arango's account begins with the 
neighborhood Los Alcázares, inaugurated first in 1949. Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia. 
168 
 
unit."  This notion consists "in the execution of specific constructions that represent the 
correct way to physically organize a society."397 For her, this notion was also associated 
with the design of low-cost housing.398 In this light, ICT's urban housing projects are part 
of a process that sought to realize the ideal form of working-class housing in the model 
working-class neighborhoods. 
Although in some cases the agency indeed only disbursed loans from the national 
government to the municipalities, its participation in the planning process and 
construction of the Model working-class Neighborhoods ranged widely. In December 
1942 general manager Garcés Navas presented a report about the development and 
advancement of the Model Working-class Neighborhoods in the different cities he 
visited.399 In the first place, the ICT had to approve the neighborhoods’ sites, selected by 
the municipalities. While no urban general planning considerations were taken into 
account in this assessment, at least the question of distance to the work places or location 
in relation to a city or town center was discussed in approving or denying the permit to 
build on the selected site.400 Furthermore, the agency’s architects elaborated a series of 
design guidelines for the municipalities to follow; yet there is no information about their 
content or about the municipalities' attitude towards these guidelines.401 Lastly, 
participation in the different planning stages of the Model Working-class Neighborhoods 
                                                
397 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 202. 
398 Ibid., 203 
399 Minute129, December 1942, P. 328-back - 330. 
400 Minute121, September 1942, p. 311. Also the case of Cartagena as described in the general manager's 
report in: Minute 129, December 11, 1942. P. 329-back. 
401 Manuel Samper in: Minute 120, September 1942, P. 307. Later, in the Minute 173, from February 7, 
1944, p. 405-back, the general manager announces that this architect finished his work as "consulting 




is clearly stated in this key report.402 Many of those Model Working-class Neighborhoods 
were completed and allocated already in 1944. In summary, the neighborhoods built in 
this transitional period were the product of a joint commitment between the ICT, the 
municipalities and private construction firms. In October 1947, at the end of this period, 
when the ICT participated in the VI Pan-American Conference of Architects in Lima, it 
was able to exhibit photos, plans and models of 22 Model Working-class Neighborhoods 
for workers and employees.403 
In seeking to determine the reasons for historiography’s silence about the ICT of 
this period, Law 85 of 1946 emerges as the turning point. This law quickly began to be 
seen within the institute itself as the inception of its work in urban areas, ignoring the 
                                                
402 Minute 129, December 11, 1942. According to it, the cities of Tunja and Chiquinquirá were already 
provided with the necessary "urbanization's plans." Besides, in Chiquinquirá, "the plans for the dwellings 
were delivered." (P. 328-back) In the case of Medellin, the "urbanization's project" was approved, but the 
"dwelling's plan is still being examined" due to the Institute's Technical Section's serious observations on 
the plan the Municipality presented. (P. 329) This ambiguous formulation hinders to determine who 
elaborated first the plans. What is certain from the minutes is that the ICT's Technical Section had to 
approve the plans before the municipalities could begin the construction process, as in the mentioned case 
of Medellin and also in Pereira, in which case, the Institute was still waiting for the dwelling's projects so 
that its Technical Section could examine them. (P. 329-back) Moreover, the general manager reported that 
the construction firm "Robledo Hermanos" was doing a good job in the execution of the dwellings in the 
Model Neighborhood in Bucaramanga, and even that the neighborhood presented "an interesting aspect"; 
still he made some observations about elements that needed to be corrected. (P. 328-back.) The 
construction process was thus in charge of diverse firms, but the ICT had the control and supervision over 
it. In Barranquilla, "la Casa Parrish" (two U.S. American brothers, who settled in Colombia at the 
beginning of the 20th century, and began a series of business like the subdivision of the famous 
neighborhood "El Prado" in Barranquilla) offers the ICT "urbanized" lots (meaning: with the necessary 
infrastructure: aqueduct, sewage, and electricity) for the workers neighborhoods and even to build the 
houses under "the ICT's direction and control." (P. 328-back). The case of Bucaramanga, as well as San Gil 
and Socorro, all in the Santander's Department are explicit examples for this. In the case of Armenia, 
however, the "Barrio Popular Modelo" was finished with the ICT acting as the constructor. (Minute 216, 
July 2, 1945, p. 468-back). 
403 In addition to: the guidelines and results of the competition on the neighborhood Los Alcázares, located 
in Bogotá models, and plans, photos and a booklet of rural housing. In: Minute 274, July 24, 1947, p. 584. 
The information on ICT's accomplishments until that moment is more specific in the Minute 276, August 




production of the previous period.404 In a report in 1952, general manager Puyana 
presented the number of houses in the rural and urban areas built by the ICT from "its 
beginnings." Remarkably, it starts in 1948, when construction of the first projects to be 
produced under this law began.405 This kind of reports likely contributed to the official 
narrative, to the myth of 1948 as the beginning of urban housing in the institution.406   
Was the construction of the model working-class neighborhoods so different from 
the construction process the ICT started on its own after law 85 of 1946 was issued? The 
building process was not necessarily very different, since in both cases, the ICT played 
the role of auditor, supervisor, sometimes designer, and even contractor. The main 
difference seems to lie in land ownership. During the transitional period, the 
municipalities were the landowners. After the law 85 of 1946 granted the ICT increased 
financial means to pursue the construction of low-cost housing in urban areas, the ICT 
was made the owner of the land on which the projects were built.  
 
A dialog with the city: ICT and the local planning agencies 
The acquisition of urban land for ICT housing projects implicated a series of 
issues unknown to the agency until the enactment of Law 85. They were related to the 
means of finding appropriate sites for housing projects, their location within the city and 
their physical conditions. After the enactment of the law, the ICT generally searched for 
                                                
404 It does not mean that Saldarriaga included the model popular neighborhoods in the production of the 
ICT. He simply states that the agency directly built the first urban housing projects in 1948. Saldarriaga 
Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 66. Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de 
Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989, 34. 
405 Minute 506, February 4, 1952, p. 1276. 
406 Centro Estadístico Nacional de la Construcción (Colombia), ed., Inversión y Construcciones Del 




urban land with hints from the municipalities or with help from the local chamber of 
commerce to build its housing projects directly or through contractors. In some cases the 
municipalities offered the ICT land for purchase at lower prices, and in turn the ICT built 
housing for the working class and for employees there.407 After the first large pieces of 
urban land were bought in Bogotá (Los Alcázares) and in Medellín (Los Libertadores), 
many other purchases followed in the main urban centers. In most cases, the 
municipalities sold the land for very low prices. According to supervising engineer 
Botero Isaza, these negotiations enabled the ICT to obtain large pieces of land to plan and 
develop "modern neighborhoods," for several years ahead. By the same token, he 
recognized that the ICT profited from the valorization of the land, whose value the 
agency itself increased with its urbanizations and buildings.408  
A transformation in the negotiations to find suitable urban land becomes evident 
after 1950. Under Puyana's management a procedure predominated under which the 
municipalities offered the ICT a specific piece of land in their urban area for a specific 
price and the municipalities sometimes even added money to the offer to develop the 
housing program.409 By the end of 1950, and in light of the financial struggles of the 
agency, selling parts of the previously acquired urban land was discussed as a way to 
improve the institute's finances.410 After discussing the situation, the board of directors 
agreed that the ICT should preserve those segments of land that were previously defined 
                                                
407 Already in September 1947 the municipality of Medellin offered the ICT the first large amount of urban 
land to build housing on its own. Minute 281, September 12, 1947. p. 604-back. 
408 Minute 346, November 15, 1948, p. 801-back. In this context, the agency's role as promoter of urban 
expansion's processes needs to be further analyzed. 
409 A possible explanation for this transformation lies in the fact that the houses built during the first years 
of this period with the resources granted by law 85 of 1946, were finished and awarded. A new process of 
land acquirement began; by then the municipalities were more aware of the available aid from the national 
government through the ICT, and they sought to attract this aid of the ICT through an ample offer that 
suited the ICT to invest the resources in these municipalities. 
410 Minute 417, March 2, 1950, p. 1017. 
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for working-class neighborhoods.411 By 1953, the ICT began a new process of land 
acquisition, but the landowners were mostly private persons. 
The aspects that helped to define the suitability of sites for ICT’s housing 
developments were the site’s topography, its location within the city, and its distance to 
main center. Flat topography was characteristic of most of the acquired urban land as a 
condition for developing low-cost housing. The ICT leaders sought in this way to avoid 
high urbanization expenses due to complex topography. In doing so, many areas of the 
country’s urban centers did not qualify for the ICT projects at least during the first years 
after the enactment of Law 85. This had serious consequences for cities such as 
Manizales, shaped by its very steep topography.412 Moreover, the central criterion to 
define the suitability of sites for neighborhoods developed by the ICT was the distance to 
the town / city center. Although this did not necessarily imply a lack of awareness of 
urban planning issues, or of the impact these housing projects would have on a city’s 
growth, it foregrounds the existence of a mono-centric urban structure and the absence of 
any intention to change this structure with the housing projects.413 
The process of finding adequate sites and planning future housing developments 
eventually required an increasingly complex relationship between the agency and the 
local planning offices. When the agency was first entrusted with building urban housing 
in 1942, it incorporated urban planning issues into its work, although in a very limited 
                                                
411 Minute 418, March 16, 1950, p. 1020. 
412 Minute 363, February 11, 1949, p. 850. Discussion on the land for El Guamal neighborhood in 
Manizales. Executive Committee, Minute 122, September 3, 1948, p. 781. In: Minute 340, September 30, 
1948, p. 780-back. 
413 Minute 327, July 5, 1948, p. 753-back. 
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way. In a first stage, an urban planner was hired simultaneously with the leader of the 
newly created urban housing section.414  
However, urban planning as a key issue first appears in 1947. Law 85 consigns its 
relevance to the agency’s inner statutes, according to which "this agency will be able to 
cooperate through its technical department in the study and elaboration of master plans 
and urban services through contracts with municipalities, with approval of the board of 
directors."415 Although the interactions with local urban planning offices were limited to 
the selection of the best sites for housing projects, new aspects start appearing in the 
process of selecting land for the construction projects. In Cali, when considering 
purchasing the land for the neighborhood El Cedro, the board members discussed the 
possibilities of the city’s future development, as well as the increase of the value of 
adjacent lots through the work of the ICT, and the subsequent need to buy them, in order 
to avoid speculation.416  
Interactions between the ICT and the local planning agencies are best described 
with the case of the city of Bogotá. The agency interacted intensely with the department 
of urbanism of the office for public buildings in Bogotá during the planning process of 
Los Alcázares in 1947.417 Later, the Oficina del Plano Regulador (Regulating Plan 
Office) was created to develop the urban Pilot Plan proposed by Le Corbusier, and 
further developed by Paul Lester Wiener and Jose Luis Sert.418 The agency worked 
                                                
414 In July 1942, Joaquín Martínez Alvarado became the leader of the "Section of Urban Popular Housing", 
and José Gregorio Olarte became the urban planner of the same section.  Minute 113, July 1942, P. 291. 
415 Minute 261, March 18, 1947. P. 545 – back. 
416 Minute 304, February 19, 1948, P. 680-back. 
417 Departamento de Urbanismo de la Secretaría de Obras Públicas del Municipio de Bogotá. His director, 
Herbert Ritter developed the first drafts together with ICT's engineer Alfredo Ardila Oramas, leader of the 
project "Los Alcázares." Minute 257, February10, 1947, p. 536; Minute 259, February 24, 1947, p. 539. 
418 One of the most studied issues in Colombian urban history, I will refer here only to the interactions 
between the agency and this office, whose first director was Herbert Ritter. Some references: Maria Cecilia 
O’Byrne Orozco, ed., LC BOG. Le Corbusier En Bogotá : 1947-1951. Precisiones En Torno Al Plan 
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closely with this office during the first years of its establishment, and consulted with 
them on many specific issues related to the housing projects developed at that time—e.g., 
the future location of an avenue that could affect Muzú and the location of the working-
class neighborhoods in compliance with the land uses proposed in the Plano 
Regulador.419 The prominent architect Gabriel Serrano Camargo, who was a member of 
the board of directors, presented the Pilot Plan to the other members in April 1951.420 
Shortly after Serrano's presentation, general manager Puyana worked with the Mayor of 
the city to define which areas would be transferred to the ICT to build low-cost housing 
for the people displaced by the projects anticipated in the Plano Regulador.421 Through 
1952, these interactions between ICT and the Plano Regulador office grew closer. With 
the help of the Office, Serrano Camargo chose several areas of the city for the ICT’s 
housing plans in compliance with the Plano Regualdor.422 The interactions strengthened 
even more during the planning process of building the neighborhood Quiroga in Bogotá 
                                                                                                                                            
Director, vol. Tomo II (Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Arquitectura y Diseno, Departamento de 
Arquitectura, Ediciones Uniandes, Pontifica Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de Arquitectura y Diseno, 
2010); Carlos Eduardo Hernández Rodríguez, Las Ideas Modernas Del Plan Para Bogotá En 1950: El 
Trabajo de Le Corbusier, Wiener y Sert, 1. ed (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá : Instituto Distrital de 
Cultura y Turismo, 2004); Fernando Arias Lemos, Le Corbusier en Bogotá: el proyecto del “grand 
immeuble”, 1950-1951 (Universidad Nacional de Bogotá, 2008); Patricia Schnitter Castellanos, José Luis 
Sert y Colombia: de la Carta de Atenas a una Carta del Hábitat, Colección monografías y tesis, 3; 
(Medellín: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, 2004); Hugo Mondragón López, "Arquitectura En Colombia 
1946-1951, Lecturas Críticas de La Revista Proa. (Spanish)," DEARQ: Revista de Arquitectura de La 
Universidad de Los Andes, no. 2 (May 2008): 82–95; Carlos Iván Rueda Plata, Construyendo Identidades 
En El Lugar, Sendas de La Modernidad (Universidad Piloto, 2012); Doris Tarchópulos  Sierra, "Las 
Huellas Del Plan Para Bogotá de Le Corbusier, Sert y Wiener," Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de 
Geografía y Ciencias Sociales X, no. 218 (86) (de agosto de 2006), http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/sn-218-
86.htm. 
419 Minute 439, August 22, 1950. 
420 Minute 470, April 16, 1951, p. 1212. 
421 Minute 471, April 27, 1951, p. 1215. 
422 Minute 474, May 25, 1951, p. 1219-back. 
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in the first two years of the 1950s.423 After the military government of Rojas Pinilla took 
power in 1953, the guidelines defined in the Plano Regulador ceased to be considered. 
Although other cities like Medellín and Cali were also elaborating their urban 
pilot plans at the end of the 1940s, only the case of Bogotá is included in the minutes. 
Remarkably, despite the fact that Le Corbusier visited the city five times between 1947 
and 1951 during the development of the Pilot Plan for Bogotá, and even ICT leadership 
planned to invite him to collaborate with the design of Los Alcázares, they neither 
mentioned this proposal again nor him in the board meetings after his first visit.424 Jorge 
Gaitán Cortés and Gabriel Serrano Camargo certainly mentioned him when they 
introduced the ideas of the CIAM and the Pilot Plan, respectively, to the board, but the 
institution apparently was not directly involved in any of Le Corbuiser’s visits, or in the 
development of the Pilot Plan.  
 
The transformation of an idea: ICT’s Neighborhood Units 
The notion of the neighborhood unit gained relevance for the future development 
of Colombia’s residential areas through the pilot plan designed by Le Corbusier, in 
collaboration with Jose Luis Sert and Paul Lester Wiener for Bogotá, and the pilot plans 
                                                
423 Minute 485, August 23, 1951, p. 1237. The Technical Department of the ICT developed the bids for this 
neighborhood, using the parameters defined in the Plano Regulador as a guideline. The bidding process for 
sidewalks in Quiroga applied the recommendations of the Plano Regualdor. See: Minute 507, February 11, 
1952, p. 1279. The two institutions even worked on two different alternatives for the second phase of this 
neighborhood. Although in the end the Technical Department’s alternative was chosen for the development 
of this phase, it is an interesting case of collaboration. See: Minute 527, June 16, 1952, p. 0008-back, and 
Minute 532, July 17, 1952, p. 0013-back. 
424 Minute 282, September 25, 1947, p. 605. The board imparted the authorization to the general manager to 
“initiate conversations with the Mayor of Bogotá, Doctor Mazuera Villegas, with the aim to study a joint 
plan to bring a commission of the Institute ATBAT of Paris, led by the professor Le Corbusier to study the 
remaining part of the housing development “Los Alcázares” …” However, Le Corbusier' visit was from 




designed by Sert and Wiener for other Colombian cities. The Pilot Plan as well as the 
neighborhood unit share ideas emanated from CIAM through the work of the authors of 
the pilot plan for Bogotá and of Jorge Gaitán Cortés.  In his role as leader of the urban 
housing program, the latter introduced the concept of the Unidad Vecinal (neighborhood 
unit) in 1948 for the first time, bridging CIAM ideas and the work of the ICT.  Gaitán 
Cortés presented this concept, as developed by Jose Luis Sert, in the context of a 
presentation to the board of directors on his plan for the city of Buenaventura.425 While 
there is no information on the realization of this plan, in January 1950 the Muzú 
neighborhood in Bogotá is mentioned for the first time as a neighborhood unit.426 
Although the concept did not appear very often later, CUAN and Ciudad Kennedy offer 
insights into the transformed urban configuration grounded in the neighborhood unit. 
Ciudad Kennedy presents an extreme transformation of the initial idea, retaining only 
pieces of it. In all of them, the community facilities or rather the lack of them, constitute a 
further connection with the concept of the neighborhood unit. 
 
Muzú 
In December 1949, the journal Proa published the master plan of Muzú and one of 
the housing types developed for it, along with two other neighborhood units planned by 
the ICT in the cities of Cúcuta and Tuluá. This representation of the master plan of Muzú 
can be considered as the first version of the plan since all later versions present variations 
on this one. What stands out most is the “free” location of the houses upon a green 
ground, yet the composition is far from arbitrary. 
                                                
425 Minute 325, June 25, 1948, p. 744-746-back. 
426 Minute 410, January 13, 1950, p. 998-back. 
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Figure 3.33. Neighborhood unit Muzú. Proa 30, December 1949. 
A closer look allows one to perceive a hierarchy of open spaces: those isolating 
the neighborhood from the surroundings, those between the houses, and the central one, 
with the larger social services, such as schools, playgrounds, and so on. The isolating 
green areas work as a kind of invasive or growing plant that penetrates the built 
structures. The question here is why the neighborhood should be separated from its 
surroundings with green areas, and why did Gaitán choose the same response to all sides 
of the neighborhood? If beside the existing connection to the city, the "Carretera Sur," a 
large avenue (J.J. Vargas) was in construction, it is striking that the spatial response 
adopted to isolate the neighborhood through green areas is the same along these arteries 
as on the sides that later should form boundaries with other neighborhoods.427 
Noticeably, the surrounding green areas connect directly with the larger open space 
                                                




dedicated to the social services. One could expect that this central open space is 
connected with the green areas in the inner parts of the neighborhood unit, but the central 
space connects with the small open spaces through the only street within the 
neighborhood unit. The inner open green spaces between the housing lines, which are not 
directly connected to the surrounding green areas, are twofold, depending on the kind of 
enclosure. Some of them are defined by the facades of houses, the second by an inner 
open space with only one main façade facing it. The other enclosing elements are 
dividing sidewalls between houses.428  
 
Figure 3.34. Detail. Proa 30. December 1949. 
                                                
428 In spite of these different characteristics of enclosing elements, the inhabitants judged positively 
generous green areas in front of the houses. See: Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como 
laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953.” 
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Figure 3.35. Picture of open space in front of one housing line. In: Martínez and Arango, 
Arquitectura En Colombia. 
The different qualities of open spaces allow imagining that there is a smaller, 
more controlled open space in front of the houses, where little children can play while 
being attended by their parents / under the supervision of adults (even if its spatial quality 
is not identical in all the cases), and the larger open space not directly connected to the 
houses, for more organized activities. This is the place where, community could be 
fostered and the education of body and spirit could be promoted. 
The structure of this neighborhood presented a breaking point with the traditional 
spatial organization of a housing block in the Colombian cities. The green areas in the 
traditional block are confined to the houses’ inner spaces. Here, the green areas also 
surround the houses. The organization of the built structure seems also divergent from the 
traditional structure, yet some continuity remains. At a first glance, the configuration of 
houses seems to be one of freestanding structures, only loosely connected with each 
other. This impression is strengthened by a system of pathways. 
Yet this representation of the general plan is misleading. On the one hand, the 
organic layout of sidewalks seems to serve merely formal design aims, for the different 
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paths do not connect specific buildings, entrances or areas of the neighborhood. On the 
other hand, the backyards of the houses are enclosed with a wall, the small private garden 
areas are not open, as it is the case in the German Siedlungen, but enclosed. This results 
in a very different spatial experience as the one suggested in the drawings. One walks 
through closed paths, which suddenly open into small public spaces. Although the 
structure of the superblock with only one main street which does not completely cross the 
neighborhood derives from Jose Luis Sert's conception of the neighborhood unit, the 
organization of the houses within the block is defined by a series of subgroups, which 
somewhat reminds one of the structure of a traditional block. Within this subgroup, and 
taking into account that the houses form a whole with the enclosed backyard, one can 
identify a kind of exploding traditional block with two, three or four facades. 





Differently to Muzú, CUAN only occupies a small part of the super-block, despite 
the large program. The footprint of the residential buildings is 11,874.10 m2, 7.9% of the 
whole project area. CUAN is constituted by a series of slabs, which are labeled according 
to their typology. The six buildings of type A are four-stories high and contain the largest 
apartment types. The five buildings of type B are 13-stories high and contain mid-sized 
apartments. Lastly, the three buildings of type C –also 13-stories high- contain the 
smallest apartment units. Parking spaces are located perimeter to the super-block. The 
resulting spacious green areas and the red (brick walls) slabs are the most significant 
traits of CUAN.  
The urban configuration of these fourteen buildings offers the possibility of a 
green transition between the Avenida de las Americas and the Carrera 40.429 This 
continuous flow of green areas in the central part of the site is only interrupted by 
building B-2. At the same time, B-2 creates two spaces that are bounded by three high-
rise buildings. The resulting spaces are clearer defined and easier to control. They are in 
any case no transitional spaces. They are spaces to linger. Simultaneously, buildings 
C1/C2 and C3, C4 build a wall towards the streets Carrera 36 and Calle 22 F, in the 
same way as the buildings B-4 and B-5 constitute a wall to the west (expressed in grey in 
the diagram).430  
 
                                                
429 Initially planned with 15 buildings, the complex was reduced to fourteen when two of the buildings of 
type C were consolidated into a single building slab. 
430 The street numbers have changed over time. The numbers shown here are those used as CUAN was 








                                                
431 The plans of the complex and of one building type (B) were provided by the Housing Ministry. They are 
original plans with the ICT as the author. However, since the buildings were designed earlier under the 
direction of the minister of public works, it is possible that older plans exist. Thus, the plans used for this 
analysis are those signed by the ICT and therefore probably from 1958, the year the building complex was 
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Figure 3.38. The aerial view in Martinez book exposes the permeability of the project 
from La Avenida de las Americas to the Carrera 40 and the enclosing effect of the 




















Figure 3.39. CUAN and surroundings. The green transition seems to build a corridor 
leading to the grounds of the fair's center "Corferias" and the Universidad 
Nacional. Source: Sin título (Sin catalogar). Siglo XX. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl 
Orduz / Colección Museo de Bogotá. MdB26766.  
Despite the aim of allowing a free pedestrian circulation through the CUAN as a 
way to connect to adjacent streets, a fence runs through the space. According to Aguilera 
Rojas, it was, there from the beginning, but both the testimony of a former resident and a 
picture in the Martinez book from 1963, which shows one edge of the CUAN with no 
fence visible, contradict this statement.432 
                                                
432 Interview with Nestor Gutierrez. In: Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como 
laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953.”  
Interviewed No.3 refers to the problem of people from outside damaging the furniture in the children's 




























Figure 3.40. Photo CUAN. Martinez and Burbano, 1963. 
 
Ciudad Kennedy  
The ICT’s technical department planned Ciudad Kennedy as a "satellite city" 
comprised by a series of super-blocks. To have an idea of its overall size, one need only 
imagine Ciudad Kennedy as sixteen Muzús.433  Some clusters of super-blocks form 
neighborhoods in and of themselves, such as super-blocks 13 and 14, which forms the 
Barrio Los Estados Unidos (The United States), and super-blocks 11 and 15 constitutes 
                                                
433 The equalization of neighborhood units and superblocks appears in: "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 
(1964): 8–17. The text explains the criteria for the urban plan. The reason for this equal definition of the 




the Barrio Gran Colombiano (Great Colombian).434 However, unlike at CUAN and, to 
some extent, Muzú, at Ciudad Kennedy it is possible to cross most of the super-blocks 
with a car. Although there are also exclusively pedestrian paths here, a good part of the 
circulation system is a shared system for cars and pedestrians. These internal streets are 
not straight lines that cross the super-block from one side to the other. They almost 
always end within the super-block. As a result, the person or car crossing the super-block 
needs to turn several times until coming to the other side. Even if the streets are 









Figure 3.41. super-block 5. Master plan's Detail, 1980. ICT. Archive Minvivienda, La 
Fragua.  
                                                
434 Superblock 13 contains 16 blocks, superblock 14, 21 blocks. 8000 inhabitants live in these two 
superblocks. Superblocks 11 and 15, which constitute the neighborhood Gran Colombiano, are comprised 
of 31 housing blocks and inhabited by 887 families (513 in superblock 11 and 374 in superblock 15). In: 
William B. Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing 
Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,” CINVA Summer 
Research Fellow Yale University, School of Law, Escritos y Monografìas (Bogotá: Centro Interamericano 
de Vivienda –CINVA, 1964), box 53, file 4, Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, 




Although the term "super-block" echoes Brasilia's model, Ciudad Kennedy's 
layout consists in an organizational system, a functional scheme. Its super-blocks are 
characterized by a central open space, which the ICT's technicians refer to as "Civic 
Center," with community facilities for the surrounding houses and a free area for the 
school. The super-blocks are actually constituted by a series of housing blocks, as they 
are commonly found in traditional neighborhoods. The difference between the housing 
blocks in most of Ciudad Kennedy’s super-blocks and those in traditional neighborhoods 
is the external shape and the size of the blocks. Here, the housing blocks are smaller than 
in traditional housing blocks and rectangular, unlike the common square shape of the 
traditional block. The super-block is thus an artificial term. It is only discernible in the 
master plan due to the existence of wider streets that are longer than the other streets 
within the limit of each super-block. Furthermore, the open spaces do not provide a 
ground on which buildings pile up as single and separate elements. There are only 
sections where open space surrounds the buildings, which would make this urban 
configuration closer to the neighborhood unit, as elaborated in Muzú. In that sense, the 
only “true” super-blocks are number two and seven, those with four-story multifamily 
housing. These two super-blocks constitute roughly 30% of the housing area. They were 





                                                
435 At least that is what is formulated by the ICT. In: "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 8–17. 
Otherwise, there is no information on the densities, and it is not possible to establish it for the number of 










Figure 3.42. Super-block 6, super-block 7. Master plan's Detail, 1980. ICT. Archive 
Minvivienda, La Fragua.  
Ciudad Kennedy constitutes thus a mixture of urban configurations when 
compared with Muzú and CUAN. Rather than an evolution in the concept of the 
neighborhood unit, Ciudad Kennedy was the field in which ICT’s technicians deployed 
the different urban possibilities they had explored according to the principles of modern 
urban planning. 
 
ICT's neighborhoods - communal facilities 
Before the neighborhood unit was introduced in the ICT’s work, one element of 
this concept was already part of the "model working-class neighborhoods" built between 
1942 and 1947: the community facilities. The first model working-class neighborhood the 
ICT and a municipality built was inaugurated in Bucaramanga in December of 1942. 
Here, the design provided a series of community facilities following the law governing 
the construction of these neighborhoods.436 Decree 380 of 1942 specified the necessity to 
                                                
436 Minute 129, December 1942, P. 328 –back. 
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equip those model neighborhoods with a Catholic Church, primary schools, school 
restaurants, daycare for babies and toddlers, social workers, sports fields, recreation 
centers, a cultural center, workers’ restaurants, a marketplace, and a police station; a 
small city within the city, the same idea behind the neighborhood units. Since no graphic 
information is enclosed in the minutes, it is difficult to see if this regulation was fulfilled 
in all model working-class neighborhoods, but at least the community facilities were part 
of their ideal form. That this idea was not a utopia shines through Silvia Arango's 
depiction of one model working-class neighborhood built by the "Caja de vivienda 
popular" in 1942. The neighborhood, "Barrio Popular Modelo del Norte," cataloged by 
Arango as an "ambitious project," was comprised of 327 housing units and "an ample net 
of community amenities." Arango informs us that in 1944, 152 housing units and some 
amenities were already finished.437 
When the ICT built the first large urban neighborhoods, it only partially 
implemented the idea of the neighborhood unit. Usually, the design of the urban plan for 
housing projects designated free areas as playgrounds, sidewalks, streets, and green areas. 
But in Muzú, for example, the first official neighborhood unit, the ICT only foresaw 
"ample free areas" intended as playgrounds for children, because the cost of funding 
social services limited their design.438 Who should pay for these? If the ICT built them, 
they would need to be charged to the cost of the houses, which would increase their cost 
notably. But there were no dispositions to rule that issue. Even the law of 1942 only 
specified that the model working-class neighborhoods should provide those services, but 
not one word was said about how they should be funded, and who should undertake their 
                                                
437 Arango, Historia de la Arquitectura en Colombia, 206 
438 The report informs about the beginning of the Unidad Vecinal Muzu with the construction of 24 houses 




construction. The ICT focused, then, on the task the law presented it with; namely, to 
employ its financial resources to build houses. When Gabriel Serrano first tackled that 
issue, after he became a member of the board of directors, the problem of the social 
services in Muzú was discussed. He noted that Muzú lacked in schools, a hospital, a 
health center, or a market, among other things. Thus, he asked immediately for 
collaboration with the municipality to build these social services as soon as possible.439 In 
1953 the minister expressed the need for having social services, such as schools and 
health centers.440    
The case of CUAN was different. From its inception, the CUAN was intended as 
an autonomous urban center within the structure of the city. To respond adequately to its 
name Urban Center Antonio Nariño, the architects sought to include a set of services 
inside the complex. They also aimed to house young, recently married professionals. 
With this in mind, those young professionals could either bring their kids to the 
kindergarten or to the primary school, or take breakfast in one of the restaurants, and then 
go to work. Free time was to be spent, and basic needs were to be met, inside the 
complex. 
Providing residents with social services was the main tactic the ICT deployed to 
achieve the goal of building an autonomous urban center. The largest services were 
located outside the housing buildings, the smaller on the first floor of certain buildings. 
The following services were located in independent buildings: an elementary school for 
girls (794.58 m2), an elementary school for boys (794.58 m2), a daycare / kindergarten 
                                                
439 He pointed out to the crucial problem of funding when he also suggested that in case the municipality 
would not cooperate, the ICT itself should undertake this task. This would however mean that their cost 
would need to be added to the cost of the houses. It sounds realistic but in doing so, this would increase the 
costs of the houses in such a way that it would be then really impossible to call them low-cost housing. In: 
Minute 468, April 5, 1951, p. 1206. 
440 Minute 549, January 19, 1953, p. 0052. 
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facility (837.16 m2), a movie theater –Teatro Cádiz- (659.76 m2), a supermarket -El Ley- 
(1082.95 m2), a laundry (859.64 m2), and a church. Among those buildings, the laundry is 
the most striking service of all. On the one hand, only the largest apartments have a space 
for the laundry. On the other, and in spite of the laundry's large size (larger than the 
theater!) nobody seemed to make use of this service.441 Concurrently, the residents 
complained almost only about the lack of space to wash and dry their clothes inside their 
apartments. Within the buildings, a set of services was located: a post and "telegraph" 
office, commercial spaces, stores, a café, offices and storage for the complex’s 
management, administration's maintenance workshops (garden, wood, electricity and 
plumbing), bedrooms and housing for watchmen and "skilled workers," and offices for 
medical attention and for the CUAN's management.442 The building with the smallest 
apartment types, C1 and C2, which was converted into a hotel by the Banco Popular and 
which later became apartments for students, were to contain services such as restaurants 
and laundry, to replace the lack of space for the laundry in these apartments.443 
Although ICT's primary mission was to build housing, in Ciudad Kennedy the 
agency was confronted once again with the question of how to handle the facilities' 
construction, which this new development required. Given the huge scale of this project, 
the task became more complicated than in previously developed housing projects. 
                                                
441 Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas.” 
442 In building B-1: a post and "telegraph" office with an area of 195.41 m2 and five additional commercial 
spaces with a total area of 251.78 m2—two for a bank (Banco de Comercio), one for a drugstore (Drogueria 
Nueva York), and two additional stores. In building B-2: café (468.26 m2) and the complex’s management 
offices (252.6 m2). In building B-3: the administration's maintenance workshops (garden, wood, electricity 
and plumbing) with an area of 182.86 m2. In building B-5: the management's storage (300 m2). In building 
C4: bedrooms and housing for watchmen and "skilled workers" (173.62 m2), and finally, 10 offices in one-
bedroom apartments in C3 and C4 for medical attention and for the CUAN's management. In: Regulation 
of co-ownership outlines the rights and obligations of the co-owners, and residents. Archive Ministerio de 
Vivienda, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
443 Interview with Nestor Gutierrez. Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como laboratorio 
de arquitectura 1948-1953.”161. 
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Strangely, the planners set aside land within each superblock and the type of facility 
required, but they did not envision a strategy from the outset to realize these facilities. 
The planned Communal services were 8 theaters, 9 roofed outdoor markets, 2 general 
markets, 1 supermarket, 6 open markets, 11 commercial spaces, 9 churches, 8 community 
centers, 2 spaces for handcrafts, 15 schools, 36 children playgrounds, 1 fire station, 1 
police station, 2 gas stations.444  
The ICT planning team defined which social services and facilities were needed 
and located them in concordance with the hierarchy of the open spaces. As in Muzú, the 
open spaces were differentiated according to their size. This also determined the scope of 
groups who would use it and the accompanying services. The main open space for sports 
and schools is located in the northwest side of the satellite city, along the main 
connection axis with the city center, La Avenida de las Americas. Hierarchically, two 
civic centers follow. Those civic centers were intended to house general administrative 
activities, specialized retailers, educational institutions, cultural centers and health 
facilities of higher level. One is located along La Avenida de las Americas as well, but 
disconnected from the main open space. The second major civic center is surrounded by 
the superblocks 8, 10, 11, 14 and 16. Except for the superblock 8, none of them has an 
own civic center. Each superblock contained several open spaces: a civic center with 
community services, supermarkets, retail, churches, community rooms and health centers, 
usually located on one edge of the superblock, an open public space for the school of the 
superblock, kindergartens and daycare facilities; and finally, smaller scaled open spaces 
                                                
444 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed. Proyectos y Realizaciones En Vivienda: La Alianza Para El 
Progreso. Colombia: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1962. 
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intended as meeting places or children playgrounds, which are probably only used by the 
immediate neighbors.445  
The almost 11,000 housing units would house some 80,000 inhabitants in an area 
that was outside the city limits and thus far from all kinds of infrastructure.446 As a 
consequence, the inclusion of a series of social services and facilities was essential to the 
planning process of Ciudad Kennedy. Its realization was complicated, and so this issue 
caused a great amount of criticism and conflict with other institutions after the first group 
of families started settling down.  
The ICT was certain about the fact that it could not limit its work to building 
houses, but it needed to include social services and facilities. Although it was not part of 
ICT's agenda, the general manager, aware of this critical need, asked the board of 
directors for permission to build some communal buildings since a considerable number 
of families was about to settle down in the new development, lacking all basic services in 
the surroundings of Ciudad Kennedy.447 The ICT thus built some of the primary schools, 
a commercial center, and an urban park with cultural and recreational facilities. This also 
was partly related to the fact that Ciudad Kennedy was a showpiece for the Alliance for 
Progress. However, most of the social facilities such as health centers, schools, hospitals, 
markets, or parks were delegated to other governmental agencies. This led to some delays 
in the construction of these facilities for they lacked the necessary funds. Some entities 
                                                
445 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Ciudad Kennedy Una Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965. 
446 This number differs in the different plans elaborated by the ICT and in the different articles written 
during the process of construction of Ciudad Kennedy. In the plan from Ciudad Kennedy, Una realidad: 
10,223. In table from Andrade Lleras:10,574 (Escala 4), in "Instituto de Crédito Territorial. 25 Años." 
Escala, no. 7 (1964): 1–7.: 14,000 housing units. 10,789 housing units in the same journal, but in another 
article: "Ciudad Kennedy." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 8–17 
447 Minute 46, November 29, 1961, p. 1366.  Interestingly, those community buildings are not primarily 
schools and health centers (they are probably included in the etc. mentioned after the listing of buildings), 




expressed their willingness to support the construction of some facilities. Agencies such 
as the police offered their services to build facilities not directly connected to their work, 
such as supermarkets.448 Moreover, the "worker's circle" (Círculo de Obreros) built a 
Cultural Integration's Center (Centro de Integracion Cultural, CICRAL) in a sector 
adjacent to Ciudad Kennedy, with the goal to provide education to 5,000 students from 
low-income families.449 
The process of building the social facilities was not an easy one, especially in 
regard to the schools, and the involvement of outside agencies generated conflict when 
the was required to negotiate with them.450 The root of this confrontation seems to be the 
lack of legal clarity as of who was responsible for the construction of the various 
supplementary facilities that were required in each new housing development to attain its 
proper performance. Bogotá's mayor, who at that moment was the architect Jorge Gaitán 
Cortés, believed that the construction of schools was ICT's task, and that it should charge 
its cost to the cost of the houses, especially to the multifamily buildings. However, as the 
general manager recalled, former president Lleras Camargo had forbidden charging the 
houses with the cost of the community services, since in his view it was the state's 
responsibility to provide these services.451 
The demands of the new residents did not allow time for long negotiations to 
build the schools. Therefore, ICT's general manager expressed in a meeting with the 
minister of education and Bogota's mayor, the need to build schools in Ciudad Kennedy 
as soon as possible, since "by the end of December [of 1962] more than 5,000 families 
                                                
448 Minute 15, 1963, p. 116-back. Authorization to sell a plot in the civic center of superblock four to the 
National Police with an amortization period of 15 years and interest of 6% yearly to build a supermarket, 
stores, and building materials from the rotary fund. 
449 Minute 52, November 22, 1962, p. 0836 
450 The meeting reported in this minute is a good example of this. Minute 48, November 5, 1962, p. 0819. 
451 Minute 48, November 5, 1962, p. 0819. 
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are expected to move to this housing development," from the 12,000 families that will be 
living in Ciudad Kennedy, once the construction phase is complete. This was an acute 
problem that in his view could lead to "disruptions" in the community.452 The general 
manager conveyed the need to build at least 20 schools, beside the already existing 
school "Presidente Kennedy."453  
During the negotiations over the construction of the schools with the ministry of 
education and the municipality, a third actor appeared, La Caja de Vivienda Popular (The 
Bank of Popular Housing). Once the ICT's general manager would arrive to an agreement 
with the ministry and the municipality, the board of directors approved to contract the 
construction of the schools for one million pesos, with La Caja de Vivienda Popular.454 
This decision to give the contract to La Caja to build the schools is probably related to 
Bogotá's Mayor, Gaitán Cortés’ radical opposition to the idea that the ICT built the 
schools. He argued that La Caja de la Vivienda Popular was able to build the schools for 
much less money than the ICT.455 
The dispute on whose duty it was to build the schools was finally resolved once it 
was possible to establish the funding for the schools through the national government, 
through the program for building schools of the Alliance. The National Government 
created a fund from the budget of the AID, BID and Point 4 loans to build 200 
classrooms for primary schools and for secondary schools in Ciudad Kennedy.456 With 
the decree 404 of February 27 1963, 4 million pesos for primary schools and 1 million for 
the secondary school in Ciudad Kennedy were guaranteed. At that moment, the ministry 
                                                
452 Idem. 
453 Minute 48, November 5, 1962, p. 0818-back. 
454 Minute 56, December 6, 1962, p. 0860. Minute 5, 1963, p. 017, 017-back. 
455 Minute 32, June 6 de 1963, p. 228. 
456 Communication from April 18, 1963. In: Minute 19, 1963, p. 151. 
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of education assumed the construction of the schools through La Caja de Vivienda 
Popular. The ICT's only responsibility in this regard was the registration of the plots' 
deeds for the schools.457 
Conclusively, when considering the housing projects produced by the ICT as an 
architectural artifact, a wide range of aspects to be pondered come to the fore. First, the 
rural housing program emerges as the source of a number of elements implemented later 
in ICT's modern urban housing projects through the initial search of standardized housing 
types, technological experiments with materials such as Terra-concrete, and the 
production of prefabricated elements in the Materials Application Workshop "El Tabor." 
Second, the notion of “modern” in ICT’s housing projects emerges as the result of 
a set of intricate flow of proposals. Globally well-known architects and current ideas of 
modern architecture blend with concrete questions and requests posed by the agency and 
other public institutions in the country. The result of these interactions can be traced in 
the inner spatial arrangement of the three case studies and in the development of 
multifamily high-rise buildings. 
Lastly, the interactions between the ICT and the local planning agencies were 
complex and certainly determined much of the transformation of the urban centers in 
which the agency built housing. The fact that land acquisition also benefited private 
landowners hints to the need for more research on the economic impact of these housing 
developments. The complex interactions with local official planning agencies are also a 
hint to the intertwined net of relations between professionals, scholars and politicians in 
the work of the ICT and the impact of the projects in the cities. In this study, the 
intersections between the political level and the work of the ICT have been given special 
                                                
457 Minute 32, June 6 de 1963, p. 228. 
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attention. The interactions between the agency and the architects and engineers and their 




Chapter 4:  the Geo-Politics of Housing 
NATIONAL REALM: HOUSING AS A TOOL TO PACIFY 
When the ICT was established in 1939, the country was undergoing a period of 
deep transformation. After a devastating war at the beginning of the century, the so-called 
"Thousand Days' War” (1899-1902), the Conservative Party assumed power and 
governed the country for nearly 30 years. Then, Colombia’s other significant party the 
Liberal Party was elected in 1930 and stayed in power until 1946, taking significant steps 
toward the modernization and secularization of the country.  
However criticism of some conservative politicians and clergymen was 
continuous and intense throughout these years. This criticism was supported by a 
considerable segment of the church, which allied itself with the goals of the conservative 
party. These never-ending confrontations between the two main parties contributed 
significantly to the eruption of a new civil war that swept over some rural areas of the 
country for much of the period of this study, known as La Violencia. Its beginning is 
generally considered to be 1946, when the Conservatives won the presidency again, and 
its end to be 1964.458 The assassination of Liberal presidential candidate, Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitán, in 1948 was a key turning point, from which moment the violence in the rural 
areas worsened.  
My inquiries in this section center on points of intersection between the ICT’s 
work and political events during the period of my research, as well as on both (1) the 
                                                
458 This time frame follows: Williford, Thomas J. "Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La 'Cuestión Religiosa' En 
Colombia, 1930-1935." Revista de Estudios Sociales, no. 41 (December 1, 2011): 28–43. However, there is 
no consensus about an exact time frame due to the nature of the conflict. Moreover, unlike the specific 
event that can be pointed out for the start of the Violencia, the election of a conservative president and the 
following violent acts against Liberals on the rural areas, an end point is not clearly defined. Some speak 
about the death of the last leaders fighting in the rural areas, but the true is that at that point, different 




ways ICT developed these housing projects in the midst of such a violent environment, 
and (2) how this environment informed the housing projects they built. Historiography 
has had little to say about this, making it seem that the ICT operated in a political 
vacuum.459 However, throughout the period of this study, significant events that 
inevitably had an impact on the ICT’s work took place in many areas where it was asked 
to work. La Violencia was the canvas against which the agency acted, and against which 
its needs to be analyzed. In addition, World War II caused an economic crisis in the 
country that hindered work in rural areas. More importantly, the outcome of this war 
strengthened a set of unbalanced power relations in the hemisphere, which also played an 
important role in the agency’s housing programs: namely, the housing program in urban 
areas was greatly shaped by the geopolitics of the Cold War. I argue that ICT's housing 
projects became a tool to display the government's ability to deal with political conflict, 
and as a strategy to counteract extreme political tensions. Moreover, they served as a way 
to promote the respective governments, and to maintain the status quo, in a time of acute 
political unrest. Fear of social upheaval and Communism influenced most state 
institutions and both of the traditional political parties, and drove many the actions of the 
politicians behind the agency. 
Concurrently with the financial crisis, the country’s political instability also 
impacted the ICT during WWII. Although politics are never specifically mentioned in the 
minutes of the board of directors’ meetings, political turmoil is reflected in the constant 
changes in ministerial posts. Since the ICT was dependent on the Ministry of Finance and 
                                                
459 Alberto Saldarriaga’s key works on the ICT, but also Carlos Martinez and Silvia Arango’s accounts on 
Colombian architecture and later works, such as Samper Martínez and Ramírez Nieto, Arquitectura 
Moderna En Colombia; Fontana et al., Colombia Arquitectura Moderna; Forero Suárez and Forero Forero, 
Vivienda social, modernidad e informalidad en Bogotá, 1911-1982; Patricia Eugenia Montes, ed., Ciudad y 
Arquitectura Moderna En Colombia, 1950-1970. Presencia y Vigencia Del Patrimonio Moderno 
(Ministerio de Cultura, Colombia, 2008). 
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Public Credit, changes in this ministry impacted it directly. In 1942, Alfonso López 
Pumarejo was elected as the new president of the country. However, he resigned in 1945 
before he could complete his term and Alberto Lleras Camargo was designated as the 
new president.460 With each new president, a different Finance Minister took office.461 
These constant changes made the continuity of any initiative almost impossible.462 In 
spite of such instability and uncertainty, the institution preserved its structure and 
independence throughout those years.463 Then, the election of 1946 produced a major 
change in the government, bringing Mariano Ospina Perez from the Conservative party to 
the presidency and ending a period of 16 years of Liberals in power in August of that 
year.464 His new Finance Minister, Francisco de Paula Pérez, expressed his full support 
for the institution at the first ICT board of directors meeting he attended.465 In spite of 
                                                
460 Minute 223, November 12, 1945, p. 480. President Alberto Lleras Camargo, cousin of ICT’s promoter 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo's, was in the Liberal party, and as such, -one would expect- he would stand very 
close to the working class; however, he did an odd observation in a meeting with the general managers of 
all banks working in Bogotá. He claimed that he did not agree with the extreme generosity loans have been 
given for the construction of Barrios Populares, for he considered it was a privilege for employees and 
workers. 
461 In 1942, Alfonso Araujo Gaviria succeeded Carlos Lleras Restrepo, ICT's co-initiator and former 
Finance Minister. As a response to the financial crisis that chased the agency as well, Araujo Gaviria 
brought to the board of directors at the end of the year 1942 the proposal of merging diverse Credit 
institutions with the ICT in one big institution. (Minute 126, November 1942, P. 323) The initiative had a 
basically economic perspective of the problem; entirely suppressing the social aspect of the work of the 
ICT (no matter how contradictory). No wonder his relationship was always confrontational with the board 
of directors and especially with the general manager. These constant discussions about the financial 
sustainability of the institution and the search for alternatives to this initial proposal absorbed the final 
months of 1942 and a good part of the year 1943. In August 1943 Araujo left office. A new Finance 
Minister stayed only a couple of months, and then Lleras Restrepo returned in October. Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo stayed just one more year, until President Lopez Pumarejo resigned in 1945. 
462 The general manager's role in this context was very often to explain and justify what the ICT had been 
doing during that period, and how. He was repeatedly asked to explain the high costs of the 
administration’s operation and the high costs of rural housing—a role he played convincingly. 
463 Minute 213, May 14, 1945, p. 462-back. 
464 Mariano Ospina Perez, other member of the traditional elite families of the country, was one of the two 
owners of the still today operating real state and construction office "Ospinas y Cia." See: 
http://ospinas.com.co/en/about-us/history/. The firm continued being active during that period; however it 
did not contract with the government, as claimed in the firm's Internet web site. (It appears in a list of firms 
that applied for building housing directly for their workers. In: Minute 275, July 1947, p. 587). 
465 Francisco de Paula Pérez was the founder of the conservative newspaper El Colombiano. 
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this claim of support, 1946 was not a good year for the ICT. Its financial situation 
suffered throughout the year like a dying patient. By the end of the year, one can perceive 
the manager's exhaustion, as he submitted his resignation, which was rejected by the 
board of directors. Given the steady rise of materials, wages and transport costs on 
account of the serious economic crisis the country was facing at that moment, the ICT's 
work became increasingly difficult.466 More than anything, this National Government's 
indecision on how to make the institution sustainable reveals the lack of a clear (rural and 
urban) housing policy in the country.467  
The use of housing programs as a sign of the government's ability to handle 
political conflicts is one of the most conspicuous ways in which politicians’ goals 
intersected with the agency’s. This was especially true for the rural housing program. 
When presenting the plan for rural housing in 1948, the general manager referred 
explicitly to the plan as an answer to the political situation and its consequences in the 
countryside. He specifically mentioned the need to increase the budget for the department 
of North Santander, where in addition to the existing rural housing shortage, the "absurd 
and inexcusable destruction" of La Violencia had added even more to an already acute 
problem. In doing this, the general manager was certain to be acting according to "the 
desire of the national government to work with every means to repair the harm caused 
and to collaborate to the appeasement of sectarian passions, in that martyred and 
progressive Department."468  
                                                
466 Things were still being done, loans were still approved, but all this was happening on a very small scale, 
considering the existing infrastructure and the accumulated experience of the ICT. 
467 As an example, the general manager asked Minister Araujo in a meeting in June 1943 about the reasons 
why it is so difficult to disburse the money the ICT is entitled to, and the Minister's answer was that the 
government and the congress still had to decide, "what should be done with this institution." In Minute 150, 
p. 370 – back. See also: Romero Sánchez, “Ruralizing Urbanization.” 
468 Plan for Rural Housing. In: Minute 306, February 27, 1948. p. 687 - 690. 
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The same strategy surfaced frequently and was clearly implemented again after 
the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in 1948. Political unrest exacerbated after 
Gaitán's murder. In a first meeting with the ICT's general manager after this tragic event, 
conservative President Ospina Pérez agreed to postpone the decision over a decree that 
was detrimental to the institution's financial resources. In return, the president asked the 
ICT to build 1,000 rural houses by the end of 1948. He clearly expressed that his wish 
was to do this in order to achieve, as soon and as efficiently as possible, the building of 
housing for the "most needy social classes," emphasizing the need to reduce construction 
costs to the minimum possible.469 These housing projects constituted an excellent 
mechanism to promote the government in the least suspicious way, in a highly conflictive 
moment. Moreover, the president implemented a series of measures as a reaction to the 
escalating violence, after Gaitan's assassination.470 By the end of 1948, the national 
government issued a new regulation supplemental to the rural housing program, which 
gave the peasants who received a loan for the construction of a rural house the right to 
apply for additional financial aid to buy tools and animals.471 Apart from its populist 
nature, this regulation shows the abyss between the country of norms and laws and the 
real country.  
A further measure to reestablish social order in rural areas after Gaitán's 
assasination was the creation of the Instituto de Parcelaciones, Colonización y Defensa 
Forestal (Institute of Subdivisions, Colonization and Forest Protection). The Instituto de 
Parcelaciones was responsible for the title of baldios (uncultivated, public lands). As 
other governmental initiatives seeking to create synergies between different agencies that 
                                                
469 Minute 320, May 19, 1948, p. 727. 
470 He declared the state of siege in the whole territory of the country through the decrees 1239 and 1259, of 
April 10 and 16, of1948. 
471 Regulation of Decree 2241 de 1948. Minute 353, December 17, 1948, p. 829. 
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would lead, theoretically, to more comprehensive actions, the ICT was required to work 
with both this institute and the Caja Agraria (Agrarian Bank).472 Therefore, the agency 
had a representative in that Institute at least until 1951.473 Initially, their interactions were 
sporadic and the ICT was not fully committed to this collaboration.474 Nevertheless, as 
the conflict in the rural areas gained more intensity, the two institutions were asked to 
work more closely together in those regions.475  
While the minutes do not always specifically describe events resulting from 
political turmoil during this period, they do include other events that give an account of 
this untold story. The impact of La Violencia on rural housing built by the ICT is 
undeniable. First, in view of the upcoming elections of the House of Representatives on 
June 3th, 1949, general managers of all offices throughout the country were commanded 
to protect the agency’s vehicles of the institutions, bringing them to a safe place. Clearly, 
                                                
472 An historical elaboration on this topic in the context of agrarian land tenure in Colombia is presented in: 
Alvaro Ramírez and Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas, Estudio histórico sobre las actividades 
de parcelación de tierras agrícolas en Colombia (Bogotá: IICA, OEA, 1966), LTC-10-8. 
473 After the board of directors changed at the beginning of 1951, Wiesner quitted as representative of the 
ICT in the Instituo de Parcelaciones, and long after, Mario García y García, former member of ICT's board 
of directors as representative of the Minister of Finance, was selected as new representative for the ICT in 
the board of directors of the Instituto de Parcelaciones. Minute 494, November 13, 1951, p. 1254-back. 
It is not clear until when a member of ICT's board of directors remained in this peculiar agency, which was 
replaced through the Instituto de Colonización e Inmigración, issued through Law 1894 of 1953 and ruled 
by the decree 2436 of 1953 under the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla. 
474 Minute 379, April 21, 1949, p. 901. The Instituto de Parcelaciones asked the ICT's to collaborate in the " 
construction of housing for the farms that the referred agency plans to award in the subdivision of Buena 
Vista, located between the municipalities of Cota and Funza." Although this project counts with the direct 
support of the president, they decided not to intervene due to conflicts with ICT's regulations (rural housing 
on suburban land) 
475 Specifically, in the area of the irrigation dam of Saldaña, in Tolima department. The three institutions 
(instituto de parcelaciones, Caja De Crédito Agrario and ICT) were asked by the national government to 
build 100 houses for the peasants, who received a piece of land in this area. Interesting here is the question, 
who were those selected peasants in this highly conflicted region. In: Minute 516, April 7, 1952, p. 1290, 
and in Minute 497, December 3, 1951, p. 1261. The interest to handle the rural housing program in 
association with the Institute of Parcelaciones is also discussed during the session transcribed in Minute 
559, June 7, 1953, p. 0084. However, this process of land entitlement was not free of conflict and 
repeatedly was imposed over historical communal land tenure of peasants with strong indigenous roots. 
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violent events were expected as a result of these elections.476 Second, reports of destroyed 
or abandoned peasants’ houses in Cundinamarca, Santander, Cauca y Nariño, due to the 
political events at the end of 1949, posed the question of how to address this, for the 
victims were asking for aid either to rebuild and repair their destroyed homes, or to 
cancel the mortgages on them.477 These cases occurred so regularly that the national 
government was asked to issue a general regulation.478 Third, the stated difficulty about 
developing planned housing programs offers glimpses on the consequences to the ICT's 
work that violent outbursts in specific regions brought about. (In the minutes, these were 
euphemistically called "political events"). According to a general manager's report in 
December 1952, in Villavicencio, the capital of Meta Province and epicenter of the 
confrontation in the east part of the country, where Liberal guerrillas predominated, the 
housing program could not be developed as originally planned because of the "special 
circumstances of public order" in that region. Instead, the new housing program should 
be built with "the collaboration of the army."479 After the military seized government 
power in June 1953, the extreme violence in the rural areas decreased momentarily. In 
this context, the general manager proposed to develop a plan to reconstruct destroyed 
houses in La Palma and Yacopi, two municipalities strongly affected by the war. Many 
peasants, who were displaced from their farms, were going back to their destroyed 
homes. As the general manager reported, all official agencies were contributing to the 
restoration of this region.480 
                                                
476 Minute 382, May 25, 1949, p. 905. 
477 Minute 407, December 1, 1949, p. 991-back. 
478 Minute 416, February 23, 1950, p. 1016. Minute 507, February 11, 1952, p. 1278-back. 
479 Minute 545, December 1, 1952, p. 0043-back. 
480 Minute 563 (incorrectly numbered: 663), July 13, 1953, p. 0091. 
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Gaitan's assassination is mentioned in the minutes as the cause of subsequent 
violent outbursts in different parts of the country, which also affected the agency’s work 
to some extent.481 Yet a number of other significant events go unmentioned: the closing 
of Congress, of the Departmental assemblies, and of the city councils in November 1949; 
a series of restrictive measures that record a de facto dictatorship; the election of the 
ultra-conservative politician Laureano Gómez, a staunch adversary of any of the Liberal 
Party’s reform initiatives; and the installation of the military regime in 1953.482 At the 
same time, the specter of Communism, which was nurtured by politicians like Gomez,483 
clearly trickled into the board of directors’ meetings and critically shaped the country’s 
housing policies, finding its complement in the post WWII foreign policy of the United 
States. The apex of this encounter materialized in the ninth Pan-American meeting in 
Bogotá in April of 1948, where the anti-Communist Truman Doctrine was supported by 
all nations in attendance. Gaitán was murdered while this meeting, which gave birth to 
the OAS, was taking place.  
Even technical journals subtly nurtured the relationship between housing and the 
fight against Communism. As the editor of the journal Proa, Carlos Martinez wrote in the 
editorial of the issue in which the first neighborhood units that had been built by the ICT, 
Cúcuta, Tuluá, and Muzú, were presented that "[i]n some countries such as the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries it has been found that in addition to the 
                                                
481 Minute 314, April 16, 1948, p. 710. Report that shows the violent events after this assassination had 
almost no impact on the ICT's infrastructure. But the board of directors expressed his wish to participate in 
the works of Removal of debris, cleaning and reconstruction of Bogotá. The board of directors also 
published a series of statements condemning the assassination of the liberal politician Gaitán, but also 
condemning the destruction of the "archbishop's palace." They also expressed their support to the president. 
482 See: Murillo Posada, “La Modernizacion y Las Violencias (1930-1957),” 296. 
483 See: Renán Vega Cantor and Eduardo Rodríguez Ruiz, Economía Y Violencia: El Antidemocrático 
Desarrollo Capitalista de Colombia En Los Años Cincuenta, 1. ed, Colección Cultura Universitaria 4 




hygienic, economic and social benefits to which good housing contributes they are an 
excellent stimulus for the anti-communist struggle."484 In this editorial and in the article 
on the ICT's neighborhood units, one finds some of the common ideas behind social 
housing: an appropriate dwelling can ameliorate not only the living conditions of the 
workers but it can avoid social upheaval. This sentiment certainly also informed the 
Alliance for Progress, launched in 1961, which was firmly supported by liberal 
politicians like Alberto Lleras Camargo, president of the country for the second time 
between 1958 and 1962.  But, this will be explained in depth later in this chapter. 
Rural migration into the cities noticeably increased beginning at the end of the 
1940s, worsening the existing urban housing shortage. Subsequently, the strategy applied 
in rural areas saw its urban counter-part emerge in working-class neighborhoods. These 
neighborhoods were used as a tool to demonstrate the state’s capability to solve the social 
problems resulting from rural-urban migration. Shortly before president Mariano Ospina 
Pérez left office in 1950, he inaugurated the neighborhood Muzú, to "demonstrate his 
interest in the agency and his effective support."485 But also, since this neighborhood was 
strongly associated with Ospina Perez, the ICT sought different ways to make visible this 
relationship. First, one of the board members proposed to change the name from Muzú to 
Unidad Vecinal Ospina Pérez, in response to the support received by the president.486 In 
addition, the general manager proposed that a segment of the housing units of Muzú 
should be awarded to the employees of the presidential palace.487 Mariano Ospina Pérez' 
                                                
484 Proa 30, December 1949, 5. 
485 Minute 435, July 24, 1950, p. 1081. 
486 Minute 426, May 26, 1950, p. 1043-back. 
487 As a way to justify his proposal he explained that "the agreement focuses on the old and poor servants of 
the presidential palace, porters, sweepers, elevator men, etc., and on some non-commissioned officers of 
the presidential guard battalion, men with many family obligations, low salary and no clear future. There 
are members of both political parties, ...... servants of 15 years the most and of 4 the less, .... nobody better 
than they have right and nobody better than the president can qualify those services. This is therefore the 
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successor, Laureano Gómez, also recognized from the beginning the "valuable 
collaboration that this institution offered him in his task of governing."488 He did likewise 
use the work of the ICT as promotion and as a symbol of what could be presented as a 
social policy, and finally, to reinforce loyalties. That is the context in which Quiroga, in 
Bogotá was built. This low-cost working-class neighborhood was to be finished in the 
shortest time. Some of these homes were given to workers of the presidential palace and 
to the members of the Battalion of the presidential guard.489  
The ICT sought political neutrality as a way to navigate and survive in a moment 
of highly polarized political convictions, especially in the regions where the bipartisan 
tensions were so fierce. Thus, the lack of comments on political events, their assessment, 
or how they would be able to shape institutional policies corresponded with this 
specifically stated aim. By the end of 1948, the institution forbade any kind of political 
activity or militancy under its employees, in order to "avoid by any means that the work 
of the agency can be influenced by political interests of any party, and by the personal 
ambitions of politicians."490 This decision will be used constantly to confirm that the 
board did not represent the interests of any particular party. However, the ICT operated 
during this period under a conservative government, and many saw the agency as a 
conservative one, despite the support it received from liberal politicians from the time of 
its establishment. In fact, the agency was established under a Liberal government, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
ultimate sense of this agreement and not with the purpose of flattery or the desire to ingratiate with a 
representative whose period expires in 15 days." In: Minute 435, July 24, 1950, p. 1081-back. Another part 
of the houses should be awarded to the municipal workers in return for the offer of Bogotá's Mayor, 
Santiago Trujillo Gómez, to install in Muzú the external electricity network, telephone and to plant the 
trees. Minute 436, July 27, 1950, p. 1083-back. 
488 Minute 441, August 31, 1950, p. 1102. 
489 Minute 524, June 2, 1952, p. 0003. Minute 529, June 30, 1952, p. 0009-back. The president asks for 26 
houses of Quiroga for his close servants. 
490 Minute 354, December 20, 1948, p. 831. 
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liberal politician Carlos Lleras Restrepo was one of the initiators. He always supported 
the agency and guaranteed its survival as Finance Minister. He also developed, with the 
support of industrialists from Medellín and Bogotá, the project for the Law 85 of 1946. 
Yet this law was ultimately approved under the conservative President Mariano Ospina 
Perez. Since Ospina Pérez openly supported the agency’s work, some interpreted this as 
proof of the ICT’s political orientation. The newspapers reinforced this image. The 
conservative ones praised the ICT excessively, while the liberal ones criticized it.491 
Conversely, one could interpret this changing perception of the agency’s political 
orientation as its ability to adapt to the interests of all political parties, independently of 
their orientation. As one of the board members reported in one meeting in May 1949, in 
the public's opinion, the ICT's work was indeed the result of official efforts and 
responded therefore to a specific political ideology. In addition, some employees in the 
regions had been participating in politics, against the explicitly stated indication to 
remain neutral.492 As a result of this evidence, the board of directors released a statement 
declaring its absolute political neutrality, fearing otherwise the "total and definitive ruin 
of an entity dedicated exclusively to the service of the less favored classes of society."493 
They added, that people of both parties worked together in the agency, as an argument 
against the claim it would perform any kind of political activity.494  
 
                                                
491 Minute 430, July 6, 1950, p. 1061-back.  Article in the newspaper The Liberal of July 5, 1950. They 
criticized the ICT for an apparently disproportionate purchase of painting, "harming so the housing 
program" of the ICT. 
492 Minute 382, May 25, 1949, p. 906. 
493 I would add, to maintain the power of the political establishment. Interesting in this statement is also the 
stated conviction that the ICT work for the "less favored classes," which seem to encompass then all the 
people, who are not part of this privileged elite conforming the leaders of the ICT. 




The ICT’s board of directors assembled Colombia’s elites, whose knowledge and 
interests were strongly intermingled with the agency’s. Guillermo Wiesner Rozo is an 
excellent example. Wiesner, owner and manager of the construction firm “Wiesner & 
Cia.” was also one of the founders of the Lonja de Propiedad Raiz (Real Estate 
Association) in 1945. Wiesner offered to evaluate the bids the ICT received for the 
construction of a well in Muzú, in light of the bids his office had received for similar 
work.495 Also the main arguments for selecting him to represent the ICT on the executive 
board of the Instituto de Parcelaciones (Agency for Subdivisions), were that he was 
conversant in matters of land subdivisions, that he knew all the country’s departments 
and regions, and because he was a farmer and rancher.496 He would remain the ICT’s 
representative on that board until he left the ICT’s board of directors, when it was 
transformed in 1951. In other words, his expertise favored the ICT, yet his knowledge on 
governmental policies and his proximity to particular political institutions certainly 
favored the development of his businesses. The case of Guillermo Wiesner demonstrates 
how the mechanisms of power work, how they form feedback loops and get reproduced. 
Generally speaking, the board members' thoughts and plans were always in compliance 
with the interests of the specific groups they represented. 
The economic role played by another member of the board of directors sheds light 
of the intertwined net of relations between its members and local elites. Juan Pablo 
Ortega, general manager of Cementos Samper, the oldest and one of the largest cement 
production plants in the country, was able to propose very specific arrangements related 
to the supply of cement to the agency at the end of the 1940s, when the agency was 
                                                
495 Minute 449, November 2, 1950, p. 1132. 
496 Minute 329, July 8, 1948, p. 756. 
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building its first large urban housing projects in different cities across the country.497 This 
same Juan Pablo Ortega then participated on the agency’s board of directors as the 
representative of the Industrialists (ANDI), eventually being directly appointed to the 
board by the president, from October 1950 to August of 1954.498 His participation on the 
board must have been regarded as an essential asset for the agency, due to his varied 
connections.  
Juan Pablo Ortega’s economic power and social recognition come to the fore 
here. He was member of the board of directors of a major and powerful industry in 
Colombia, “Consorcio Cervecerias Bavaria” (beer production, still today a large 
emporium),499 and director of the oldest and most important Colombian Airline, 
Avianca.500 He was also a member of the board of directors of the Polo Club Bogotá, and 
his family owned the land that “Urbanizaciones Samper” at some point wanted to sell to 
the ICT.501 Finally, he sat on a bipartisan committee convened by the conservative 
president, Mariano Ospina Pérez, to convert the recommendations of the Currie Mission 
into concrete policies.502 His need to leave the meeting room when decisions related to 
the purchase of cement tiles from the firm “Manufacturas de Cemento,” of whose board 
of directors he was a member as well, illustrates the conflict of interest caused by his 
participation in multiple arenas.503 
                                                
497 Minute 336, August 26, 1948, p. 767.  
498 Minute 447, October 1950, p. 1120. Minute 464, March 1951, p. 1193-back. Minute 618 (incorrectly 
numbered: 718), August 16, 1954, p. 0268. 
499 Minute 531, July 1952, p. 0013. 
500 Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 171. 
501 Minute 576 (incorrectly numbered: 676), September 7, 1953, p. 0135. If the owners of “Urbanizaciones 
Samper” are the same persons who owned “Cementos Samper” is not part of this investigation, but it is 
certainly a necessary topic to develop further. 
502 Juan Pablo Ortega participated in this committee as one of the three liberal politicians. In: Sandilands, 
The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 169. 
503 Minute 600 (incorrectly numbered: 700), March 15, 1954, p. 0220. 
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The ICT’s involvement in the country’s politics was clearly mediated by the 
convictions of its leaders. That these convictions could clash with the interests of other 
groups became evident when Lleras Restrepo's successor at the Ministry of Finance and 
Public Credit, Alfonso Araujo, arrived as president of the board of directors and proposed 
that the ICT should merge with the Caja de Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero 
(Agrarian, Industrial and Mining Credit Bank). The general manager's comments about 
this proposal were very cautious, but nevertheless it was clear that he strongly disagreed 
with it. He made his case showing the different goals of the two institutions, the ICT 
having the small farmer in mind, the Caja de Crédito Agrario, the large-farm owners. 
The one non-profit, the other for-profit. To give an example, the general manager tackled 
the issue of rural housing in Nariño, where mortgages were issued even if to people who 
lacked the income to ensure payments, in order to disburse the loans to build the new 
homes. In his view, this way of proceeding was guided by "humanitarian criteria to 
defend the human race, rather than acting according to productive rationales," seeking 
"the protection of the physical and physiological integrity of the individual and his 
family.”504 Furthermore, in this key talk, the general manager expressed his open mistrust 
of those behind this proposal:  
"Those farmers and ranchers who have been working on incorporating all credit 
agencies into one single agency with the state's money are just considering this 
proposal from an economic point of view. None of them has ever considered 
improving the living conditions of their workers, or the value of the human factor 
as the fundamental aspect of the country’s economy. None of them has sought the 
services of the ICT to improve the miserable ranches where their tenant famers 
and laborers live...."505 
                                                
504 Minute 126, November 1942, P. 324-back. 
505 Minute 126, November 1942, P. 324-back. 
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This strongly worded exposition not only explains his argument against such a measure, 
but it also shows the historical conflicts in rural Colombia. 
 
The ICT and the Army 
The ICT's urban housing program channeled the amiable relationship between the 
civil governments and the army.  When army general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power 
in June of 1953, this close relationship only intensified. Even after a civil government 
returned to power in 1958, the deference to the army through the housing program 
remained. The joined effort with the army since the Caja de Vivienda Militar (Fund for 
Military Housing), founded in 1947, remained constant in the work of the ICT. The Fund 
for Military Housing was created as an independent institution, but it was in fact 
managed by the ICT.506 From its inception until the end of the period studied in this 
dissertation, the Fund received a portion of the homes the ICT built throughout the 
country, according to the army's needs and preferences.507 This was the most relevant 
trait in the collaboration between the agency and the Fund.508 The closeness between 
them grew alongside the militarization of the political realm. From August 1951 on, the 
ICT's general manager became also the general manager of the Caja de Vivienda 
Militar.509 And in 1952 the assistant general manager of the Fund, Captain Carlos 
                                                
506 The Law 87 of 1947, through which the Bank for Military Housing was created. Minute 308, March 4, 
1948, p. 695. 
507 Minute 334, August 19, 1948, p. 762-back. Minute 394, August 4, 1949, p. 936. J. Rico reported that in 
a meeting with the Bank for Military Housing committee, six housing units in Altos de Prado in 
Barranquilla were requested to be handed over to army officials. 
508 That meant that the Institute received an administration percentage, and it hired the employees required 
to attend this service within its organization Minute 374, March 17, 1949, p. 884-back. Executive 
Committee, Minute 147, November 8, 1949, p. 991-back. In: Minute 407, December 1st., 1949. Selling of 
5 plots in El Cedro, Cali, to the army for sub-officials of Air Force, so that it can build for them through the 
Bank of Military Housing. Minute 380, April 28, 1949, p. 902. 
509 Minute 482, August 2, 1951, p. 1232-back. 
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Pacheco, and the Minister of War (!) requested the ICT to free part of its budget in order 
to be able to build more military housing in Bogota and other departments.510 
The increasing inclusion of army members as part of the government and the 
military’s subsequent influence on ICT programs beginning in the late 1940s contrasts 
with the idea that the army only intervened directly in politics in 1953 when army general 
Rojas Pinilla took power. The appointment of army members in some posts in the agency 
and as city mayors in regions where conflict roared, show that this infiltration was 
already taking place at the end of the 1940s.511 During the military government, two army 
representatives were appointed as the ICT's general managers, Navy Captain Rubén 
Piedrahita Arango (1953-1954) and Colonel Alvaro Calderón Rodríguez (1954-1957). 
After the end of the military regime, the general manager of the Fund for Military 
Housing was on the ICT's board of directors. 
The ICT's general manager reminded military president Rojas Pinilla in a meeting 
that the agency was "investing more than six million pesos per year in discounts to the 
Fund of Military Housing for buildings for officials of the Colombian army." Moreover, 
in the same meeting he acknowledged that the compromise to invest at least five million 
pesos in housing through the unions (UCT and CTC) would "induce and conduct the 
union forces toward a more effective support for the government of the armed forces" in 
addition to "greatly benefiting the proletariat."512 Throughout Rojas Pinilla’s presidency, 
                                                
510 Minute 540, September 29, 1952, p. 0032-back. 
511 In January 1949, an army member was appointed in a leading position in the ICT for the first time. 
Major engineer José Bernardo Daste was appointed as the general manager of the Nariño Department 
office. Minute 356, January 11, 1949, p. 833-back. Also, in the same month another army member was 
appointed as engineer of rural housing in Santander Department, army captain and civil engineer Gerardo 
Hurtado. Minute 358, January 20, 1949, p. 837. Also, the Major of Buenaventura, a key city due to its 
condition as main port of the country in the Pacific, was also an army member: Captain Castellanos. Minute 
361, February 8, 1949, p. 846-back. 
512 Minute 643 (incorrectly numbered: 743), September 1st, 1955, p. 0295, 0295-back. 
214 
 
the agency not only further committed part of its resources to the construction of housing 
for the army; it also used the housing program directly to gain the support of the working 
class. This measure adequately corresponds with a populist tone like that of Perón in 
Argentina. 
In 1955, after a period of consolidating power, Rojas Pinilla decided to take a 
more autonomous path, developing what would be called a "third force." The elites did 
not forgive him this attempt to become more independent and their support began to 
crumble. Additionally, the economic downturn of 1956, caused by a decline in coffee 
prices, also contributed to the end of the Rojas Pinilla era of power.  
 
The ICT and the Church  
The ideological differences between the Catholic Church and the politicians of the 
Liberal Party in Colombia are well known. In reality, however, they met in at least one 
place: the ICT. Both institutions profited from each other through mutual cooperation. 
For the agency, the participation of the church on the board of directors facilitated its 
work in the rural areas, where the church had strong influence, mediating between the 
agency and the parish priests. During the first years, the church also served as a guarantor 
for farmers asking for loans there. On the other side, the church and a wide array of 
Catholic institutions requested the ICT's financial support to execute different works of 
beneficence, to which the agency, for its part, responded benevolently. Yet, the 
cooperation between the agency and the Catholic Church resulted from an apparently 
ideologically contradictory background. 
The Catholic Church has had a prominent role in Colombia, heavily influencing 
the course of politics in the country since colonial times. Only with the Constitution of 
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1991 did Catholicism cease being the official country's religion, as religious freedom was 
recognized. In the rural areas, this influence was even stronger. Not a few civil wars after 
independence were nurtured by the stance of the two main political parties, the 
conservative and the liberal, towards the Catholic Church. During La Violencia, the 
Church played a significant role stoking the bipartisan hatred with a harsh rhetoric that 
condemned those who did not identified as "Catholics." Interestingly, the Colombian 
population was predominantly Catholic during that period. Even today, 70.9% of 
Colombians are Catholic.  
The relation between church and state defined the most significant difference 
between the two traditional Colombian parties. The Conservatives sought to maintain the 
church’s influence on the civil life, while the Liberals favored a clear separation of 
church and state affairs.513 However, according to Helen Delpar, the Liberals consistently 
underscored “that they were not antagonistic to religion itself but to the political activity 
of some members of the Roman Catholic clergy and to their efforts to hinder the 
intellectual and spiritual enlightenment of the Colombian people."514 Consequently, the 
cuestión religiosa (the religious question) played an important role in the ideological 
disputes between the two parties, with different intensities at different times over the 
years.515 The cuestión religiosa was relevant not only at the level of debates, but also as 
fuel to strengthen political conflict. The church's actions were aligned with the political 
goals of the Conservative party; they shared the same worldview. But also the church 
"considered the Conservative party as the political agent by which the teachings of Christ 
                                                
513 See Williford, “Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La ‘cuestión Religiosa’ En Colombia, 1930-1935.” 
514 Helen Delpar, “Chapter 2. Liberalism and Anticlericalism: Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in 
Colombian Politics, 1863-1899,” in Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and 
Interpretations, ed. James A. Wood, Fourth edition, Latin American Silhouettes. (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 72. 
515 Acevedo C., La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949, 202. 
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and the interests of the church might best be protected and advanced in Colombia," and 
the Conservative party "regarded the Catholic church as the sole depository and 
interpreter of the divine truths of Christianity."516 
If historically the Catholic Church in Colombia was radically opposed to all that 
the liberal party represented, how was this cooperation possible between two so 
dissimilar institutions? How was it possible that high range representatives of the clergy 
were called to participate on the board of directors? What is more, why did the Church 
accept such participation? I argue that despite their ideological differences, the Church 
and Liberals shared commonalities that enabled these interactions. To begin with, 
following Fernán Gonzalez' work, neither the Catholic Church nor the Liberal Party were 
monolithic institutions with a single, unified view of the country.517 Moreover, the 
agency tackled social issues that were also the church's concern as a result of encyclicals 
produced at the end of the ninetieth century, which informed much of the social doctrine 
characterizing the church’s work from that time forward. The preoccupation with the 
problems of farmers and the working-class became a priority—the same groups that 
Liberal governments’ social policies targeted. Finally, I argue that the similarities in the 
goals pursued by the two institutions explain why this ideologically conflicted 
cooperation nevertheless did perform so well. First, both sought to relive the problems of 
the targeted population without changing the conditions that originated those problems. 
Second, the moral code that underlay the housing program did align with the Catholic 
moral doctrine. Lastly and most importantly, the housing program, as a social policy, 
                                                
516 Delpar, “Chapter 2. Liberalism and Anticlericalism: Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian 
Politics, 1863-1899,” 73. 




served as a tool to maintain the status quo. In doing so, the angst of social unrest could be 
circumvented.  
Although the Liberal and Conservative parties stood on different sides of the 
ideological spectrum, both parties, as well as the church, each contained more moderate 
voices within their respective ranks. It was repeatedly evident that different forces were at 
work within these groups.518 The joint action of the church and the agency is an example 
of this. Eduardo Santos, the liberal president governing at the time the agency was set up, 
was more conciliatory than other members of the party, who were decidedly 
"anticlerical." His Finance minister, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the ICT’s initiator, shared a 
similar conciliatory stance towards the church. As he later recalled, the church was also 
divided. On the one hand, where the parish priests “obeyed” monsignor Ismael Perdomo 
Borrero, the agency did not find any difficulties carrying out the rural housing 
program.519 Monsignor Ismael Perdomo Borrero was simultaneously the archbishop from 
Bogotá and Primate from Colombia; thus, the maximal authority of the Catholic Church 
in Colombia. Different sources describe him as a moderate person who always intended 
to maintain a dialog with the Liberal party.520 But if the parish priest followed the 
conservative politician Laureano Gómez, the work of the ICT became extremely 
difficult.521 
The work of the state through the ICT was clearly oriented to the same group the 
Church was addressing: the peasants and the working class. Their problems became more 
evident through the papal encyclicals about the "so-called social doctrine of the 
                                                
518 Williford, “Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La ‘cuestión Religiosa’ En Colombia, 1930-1935.” 
519 Lleras Restrepo, Reseña Historica Del ICT, 37. 
520 González, Poderes Enfrentados, 294; Williford, “Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La ‘cuestión Religiosa’ En 
Colombia, 1930-1935;” Acevedo C., La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-
1949, 154, 158. 
521 Lleras Restrepo, Reseña Historica Del ICT, 37. 
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Church."522 Thus, the Vatican promoted the "Catholic Action" movement "as a way to 
mend the injustice of modern industrial society, in accord with the social teachings of the 
[Catholic] Church."523 The Catholic Action had a deep impact on the work the Church 
was doing in the first half of the twentieth century. Several initiatives were born against 
this background, such as "workers and farmers groups," a labor union (Unión de 
Trabajadores de Colombia, UTC) led by the Jesuits, and the Juventud Obrera Católica 
(Catholic Working Youth).524  
On the other hand, the ICT’s establishment was not only a consequence of the 
liberal government’s interventionist stance at the end of the 1930s, but also a channel to 
execute social policies intended to advance the project of modernizing the country. As 
Fernán Gonzalez explains in his key work on the relations between Church and State in 
Colombia, understanding social policies as part of the realm of the state was in fact 
already defined in the reform to the Constitution in 1936. One of the many reasons both 
Conservatives and the Catholic Church opposed this reform was that declaring "public 
beneficence as a task of the State" meant an "inadmissible intromission in the work of the 
Church."525 This pronouncement illuminates the overlapping addressed groups.  
The similarities between the Catholic Church and the ICT that emerged in the 
context of a mutually targeted population were strengthened by similarities in the 
rationales of their work. Some objectives of both the Church and the ICT met in state-
built housing. It was about relieving the problems of the targeted population based on the 
Catholic moral doctrine without giving the tools to change the conditions that made their 
support necessary. Changing the causes of poverty and "unhygienic" living conditions 
                                                
522 González, Poderes Enfrentados, 288. 
523 Williford, “Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La ‘cuestión Religiosa’ En Colombia, 1930-1935.” 
524 González, Poderes Enfrentados, 290. 
525 Ibid., 287. 
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was not part of the programs of either institution. Furthermore, the fear of social unrest or 
of losing those peasants and workers to Communism underlay their actions. 
Although the ICT was created under a liberal government, its impact was limited 
since it did not function as a tool to transform society, but rather as a tool to maintain the 
status quo. This correlates with the goals proclaimed by the Church, which -Fernán 
Gonzalez remarks- did not "seek any structural change that modified the conditions of the 
poor workers."526 Somehow ICT's housing program did the same. Although in the long 
term the ownership enabled by the urban housing program did indeed help a part of 
society advance in its economic development, a housing shortage and unequal access to 
existing housing never ceased; to the contrary, these conditions rapidly increased with the 
country's urbanization. 
To understand this static vision of Colombia’s social structure, which greatly 
permeated the work of the ICT, it is important to understand first the ideas that informed 
the Catholic Church’s work. As Fernán Gonzalez magnificently explains, the Church’s 
awareness of the problems of the rural population and working class, as evidenced and 
condemned in the papal encyclicals of the late nineteenth century, did not lead to efforts 
to change the conditions causing these imbalances, but to "paternalistic" actions. 
According to Gonzalez, this was possible through "the abstraction of the structural 
conditionals of society and politics.”527 The initiative of Jesuit Jose Maria Campoamor 
serves as an example. He founded the Círculo de Obreros de San Francisco Javier 
(Workers group of San Francisco Javier) in 1911, with a Caja Social de Ahorros (Social 
Savings Fund) and a plan for the working-class neighborhood Villa Javier, initiated in 
Bogotá in 1913. Members of this group were prohibited from participating in politics, 
                                                
526 Ibid., 289. 
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required to strictly follow the "commandments of God" and "the precepts of the Church," 
and prescribed a series of rules to make the neighborhood "a palace of poverty, proudly 
accepted, imitating poor Jesus Christ." As when discussing the problems of the rural 
housing program at the ICT, land tenure conditions were never discussed, in the same 
vein a Church "pastoral" to the rural population expressed their hope the state would be 
able "to provide cheap seeds, tools, and machinery."528 This same framework could easily 
be ascribed to the work of the ICT, for the conditions that led to the incapability of an 
increasingly larger part of society to gain access to a house without the state's help were 
never discussed, nor were changing these conditions part of the agency’s goals.  
Furthermore, as Helen Delpar brings to light, many of the ideas at the core of the 
Conservative Party’s ideology already after the Republic’s emerged in nineteenth 
century, which remained current well into the twentieth century, were shaped by Catholic 
moral teaching that sought to relieve the problems of the poor working-class and rural 
population without changing the status quo. Delpar explains that while Conservatives 
affirmed “the right of all citizens to equality of treatment before the law, they were likely 
to express hostility to those who condemned economic inequality." Delpar further 
expressed that similarly, the newspaper  
La Sociedad of Medellin condemned "socialist equality," which it said was 
engendered by envy and based on injustice. "Its purpose is to level the human 
race, reducing all that is outstanding until it descends to the lowest, meatiest, and 
most brutish level in society." This kind of equality, the newspaper asserted, was 
totally incompatible with Christian equality, which rested on the oneness of the 
"human race and the universality of God's moral law."529  
These ideas likely informed the social policies of the different governments through 
institutions such as the ICT, which was in fact imbued by Catholic moral rules. 
                                                
528 Ibid., 289. 
529 Helen Delpar, Red against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899, 74-75. 
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The rationales behind the Catholic Church’s beneficent actions resulting from its 
social doctrine derived from the encyclicals are the same ones behind the ICT's housing 
projects. Moreover, the goals of the housing program did not run against the moral 
precepts of the church. Indeed, the opposite was the case. The insistence on the moral 
suitability of the awardees, the selection of families who complied with the Catholic 
ideal, and the measures to guarantee that these moral standards prevailed after the agency 
had finished construction and the families had moved in, are only a few examples of 
ways the ICT's housing projects complied with the moral precepts of the church, and 
what the agency expected from their inhabitants. I will discuss further how these ideas 
developed in the case studies in the last chapter. 
In the same vein, the Catholic Church promoted the Catholic Action movement 
according to the "social teachings of the Church" to counteract "the Marxist socialism on 
the one side, and the liberal capitalism, on the other," ICT's leaders did not understand or 
define their work as being aligned with the goals of communism. On the contrary, their 
work contributed to the reinforcement of the goals the church sought to achieve through 
the principle of "Catholic Action."530 As mentioned earlier, Carlos Martinez suggested in 
the architecture journal Proa to use housing as a tool to prevent the spread of communism 
in 1949. Housing development as part of the social agenda put in place as a strategy to 
stop the spread of communism gained even more traction after the Cuban Revolution in 
1959. The same rationales were operative as the Alliance for Progress was launched in 
1961 and Ciudad Kennedy was built.  
Thus, Colombian society’s fear of the spread of communism did not first appear 
with the Truman doctrine after World War II, and it did not disappear soon after. 
                                                
530 Although, according to Williford, in theory, Catholic Action was not intended to participate in politics. 
Williford, “Aspectos Del Debate Sobre La ‘cuestión Religiosa’ En Colombia, 1930-1935.” 
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(Strikingly, the same fear still infuses arguments in the extremely polarized political 
disputes of the present day). This fear is rooted in several papal encyclicals of the end of 
nineteenth century.531 The encyclical Quanta Cura, issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864, 
condemned "the errors of modernity," and appended "a list of 80 unacceptable 
propositions, known as the Syllabus Errorum, which summarize a condemnation of a 
liberal conception of religion and society."532 The encyclical Rerum Novarum, issued by 
Pope Leo XIII in 1891, explained the "eagerness for new things in the social realm, .... 
the new situations produced by the industrial development, as well as the 
dechristianization"  as the reason for the "working-class problem."533 These papal 
encyclicals give accounts of the dispute between Christianity and Modernity on a global 
level. On the local level they meant that the values of Christianity represented by the 
Catholic Church and the Conservative Party were at risk through the new, the modern, 
and the anticlerical in the form of liberalism, which very often was set together with 
socialism, communism, and even masonry. In Colombia, the Church’s different 
initiatives based on the "Catholic Action" movement sought to undermine any effort of 
the communists to gain adherents under the workers and the peasants. For the Church, 
                                                
531 Although an exact date as to when Gonzalez mentions that a segment of the clergy started to think about 
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2018; González, Poderes Enfrentados, 380. 
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communism expressed the downfall of Christian principles and values. This idea was 
reinforced by the fear that the working class in the cities, and the peasants in the rural 
areas, could be "infected" with the ideas of communism.534 
Anti-communism was entrenched in the mentality of the church and of the 
country’s elites, which included both Conservative and Liberal politicians. Nevertheless, 
it was used by both the church and the Conservative party as a way to discredit and fight 
against the Liberals. All social policies and measures of the liberal governments that 
sought to separate the church and state, were interpreted by the conservatives as well as 
the church as a proof that they were infiltrated by communist ideas and ideals. The 
Conferencia Episcopal (Episcopal Conference) in 1944 alerted against the “communist 
danger that inconspicuously works through the Liberal Party.”535 This was also the 
background for different initiatives consolidated by the Church during the 1940s. The 
fear of communist infiltration in the existing labor unions, such as the CTC, 
Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia, (Workers Confederation of Colombia), led 
to the creation of an alternative union, the UTC, Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia 
(Workers Union of Colombia), with the guidance of the Jesuits and with a clear anti-
communist perspective.536 
At the time the anti-communist Truman doctrine received backing by the 
representatives of the American nations during the ninth Inter-American Conference in 
Bogota in 1948, several events took place simultaneously, which, perhaps by destiny or 
fate, strengthened anti-communist sentiment in Colombia.537 At the time of this 
                                                
534 The language that alludes to the other, to the Communists and Liberals as a sickness is tackled in 
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535 González, Poderes Enfrentados, 290. 
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conference, Colombia already had a Conservative president, Mariano Ospina Perez, and 
his successor, Laureano Gómez, at that moment Foreign Minister of Colombia and 
President of the conference, was one of the most staunch anti-liberals and anti-
communists in the country, as earlier mentioned. Moreover, while the treaty for 
hemispheric defense had already been agreed upon one year earlier during the Inter-
American meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the riots that followed the assassination of Gaitán 
led to the enactment of a "strongly worded resolution" supported by "many Latin 
American delegations." This resolution "denounced the antidemocratic nature of 
communism as well as its interventionist tendencies as a threat to freedom in the region. 
It called on each nation to eradicate those groups who would collaborate with foreign 
governments to threaten the internal security of any Latin American nation.”538 The 
conservative government had explained Gaitán's assassination as the work of communists 
and external forces.539 For the church, the events of April 9th were "a ‘catastrophe,’ [the] 
‘product of a communist conspiracy’ and a ‘diabolic act’, ... the expression of ‘satanic 
hatred’ and ‘communist brutality.’”540 U.S. Secretary of State Marshall, present at the 
conference in Bogotá, also accepted this point of view of the Conservatives and the 
church.  
Thus, although the fear of the emergence of communism in the country had been 
latent for a long time, Gaitán's murder and the events that followed made this fear more 
tangible, and gave Conservatives more arguments to criminalize social movements and 
                                                                                                                                            
economic and political systems around the globe." Mark Eric Williams, Understanding U.S.-Latin 
American Relations: Theory and History (New York: Routledge, 2012), 155. 
538 Thomas M. Leonard, ed., “Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, 1948,” 
Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Washington: CQ Press, 2012), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613.n614. Accessed: February 17, 2018. 
539 Acevedo C., La Mentalidad de Las Élites Sobre La Violencia En Colombia, 1936-1949, 52. 
540 Ibid., 1936-1949, 160. 
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unions, continuing a process of suppressing any kind of social protest.541 In this context, 
housing was a complementary tool. The working class in the urban areas and the peasants 
in the rural areas were subjected not only to the welfare of the state, but to the social 
controls implemented. This was a necessary measure to contain the emergence of 
communism, so much feared by the elites, and much more by Laureano Gómez, who 
assumed the presidency of the country in 1950. 
The church, with its own fear of communism, was an important catalyst in this 
project of contention. Given the cruelty and aggravation of the civil war La Violencia 
after Gaitán's murder, one could affirm that neither the church nor the welfare programs 
of the state, to which the ICT's housing program accounted, were able to contain the 
slaughter. However a social revolution did not take place at that moment. In that sense, 
both institutions were successful in their efforts to stop a revolution that would overthrow 
the government. Despite the differences between the two traditional parties, which were 
aggravated by the extreme rhetoric of some conservative politicians such as Laureano 
Gómez, and some representatives of the church such as Monsignor Builles, bishop of 
Santa Rosa de Osos in the department of Antioquia, the ICT served them equally 
showing their capability to deal with the conflict, and to gain some support under the 
working class and rural population.  
Fear of communism was the name for fear of social upheaval. Several sources 
agree that the country’s elites did not want to acknowledge that the myriad social 
problems the country had accumulated over a long period required not only welfare and 
social programs, but also profound changes in the political and economic structure of the 
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country.542 It was easier to blame the risk of communist expansion than to tackle the 
country’s real problems. Hence, after the two traditional parties achieved an agreement to 
end the year-long bloodbath in the rural areas, and the liberal politician Alberto Lleras 
Camargo came to power in 1958, the political conflict was dissolved—but not so the 
social unrest. This is what made the military support of the U.S. necessary, and this is the 
reason why Colombia backed so enthusiastically and helped to advance the U.S. proposal 
to launch the hemispheric cooperation's program Alliance for Progress in 1961. The 
Cuban Revolution intensified the fear, now seen as something concrete and possible in 
other Latin American countries. Communism became a real threat that needed to be 
confronted with more energy. The U.S. and the elites in the various Latin American 
countries understood this, and all were eager to participate in this program. The social 
work developed in neighborhoods such as Ciudad Kennedy sought to counteract the 
forces that animated the people to follow the example of Cuba. Thus, the social 
programs, which I discuss in the last chapter, were also animated from the same old fear. 
The role of the Catholic Church within the agency can be traced through Bishop 
Emilio de Brigard Ortiz’ and Monsignor José Joaquín Salcedo’s participation on the 
board of directors. A couple of months after the ICT's inception, Finance Minister Carlos 
Lleras Restrepo proposed the inclusion on the board of two representatives for the rural 
population.543  From that moment on, Bishop Emilio de Brigard Ortiz was part of the 
board of directors, acting as one of the peasant representatives during the first phase of 
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the agency.544 De Brigard continued as representative of the president after the 
configuration of the board changed in 1942. Monsignor Salcedo joined the board during 
the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla, in September of 1954, and stayed on until 
Rojas Pinilla was deposed again from power in May of 1957.545 Both outstanding figures 
of the Catholic Church, they offered important support to the agency at different 
moments. Monsignor de Brigard was auxiliary bishop of Bogotá until his death. His 
proximity to the archbishop from Bogotá and Primate from Colombia, Ismael Perdomo, 
facilitated the latter in writing a memo to the bishops and the parish priests asking them 
to collaborate with work the government was doing on the rural housing campaign 
through the ICT. Although archbishop Perdomo probably approved the ICT's work, the 
closeness of de Brigard must have played an important role by receiving his direct 
support. The board acknowledged de Brigard's work for "the intelligent way in which he 
had grasped this work of social redemption."546 Having de Brigard on the board of 
directors was also a strategic measure for mediating any of the regional parish priests’ 
hostilities towards the agency’s work.547 Monsignor José Joaquín Salcedo on the other 
hand, was already well known in the country when he joined the ICT's board of directors 
in 1954. Beginning in 1947, he coordinated an extraordinary program to educate the rural 
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population through radio broadcasting. The radio Station Radio Sutatenza constitutes a 
milestone in the popular education in the country. Salcedo did not have the same tasks 
that de Brigard had had in the past. But he certainly asked for help to consolidate his 
program before he joined the agency, and once there, it seems that the president, General 
Rojas Pinilla, appreciated his opinions.548 
The Church’s collaboration in the agency’s work can also be traced in the rural 
areas through the creation of the Ligas Municipales Pro-Habitación Campesina 
(Municipal Leagues Pro- Rural Housing) right at the time the agency was established, in 
1939. As a result, these Ligas Municipales were set up in order to combine "advertising 
and action," following a proposal by Carlos Lleras Restrepo. As part of this proposal, the 
Mayor and the priest of every small town interested in participating in the ICT's rural 
housing program would be represented in these leagues, which ended up certifying the 
small farmer's landownership when no deed existed, which occurred in most cases.549 
Simultaneously, this initiative elucidates the power of the parish priests and the 
dependence on them in carrying the program out in the rural areas of the country. Many 
parish priests in the different regions refused to sign the certificates needed by the 
peasants in order to be able receive the credits offered to get their houses built by the 
agency.550 As discussed in one of the board meetings, this refusal was in part related to 
possible obligations towards the peasants, who asked for their signatures, and to the fact 
that the priests were asked to certify that they "personally visited the parcels," which was 
seldom the case. Although they were reassured through a memo from the agency that 
their signatures, which were necessary for the peasant's applications, did not imply any 
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549 Minute 23, November 15, 1939, p. 58. 
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compromise with the peasants, and the part of the certificate with the claim that the priest 
personally visited the parcels was eliminated, this refusal elucidates another deeper 
problem in the relation between the agency and the clergy, namely, the distrust of the 
agency by the regional parish priests.551 They might have seen the ICT's work as an 
instrument of the liberal party to gain influence in their parishes.552 In this light, the joint 
work with the church was not a contradiction but a much needed and pragmatic strategy 
to overcome the hurdle raised by hostile parish priests.   
Although the Catholic Church significantly contributed to the agency’s expansion 
and consolidation in the rural areas during its first years of existence, this close 
relationship implied a number of services from which the Catholic Church greatly 
profited. They asked for loans to build houses on their land; applications, which were in 
most cases approved without any difficulty. The various boards of directors generally 
responded in a friendly manner to the requests of the clergy. This friendly stance became 
more evident during the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla. During that period, the 
Church’s use of the ICT became more prevalent, taking advantage of the military’s 
friendly stance. Hence, the Church also benefited from the agency.553  
In sum, this joint work between the church and the agency was a win-win 
relationship, in which the presence of each helped the other achieve its own goals, which 
in the end never implied a change to the existing conditions of the country. During the 
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First National Housing Seminar of 1955, in the middle of Rojas Pinilla's regime, the 
church’s participation in the agency’s work was associated with the need to stimulate the 
country of the peasants, "victims of the confrontation of political passions and its 
multiple pernicious consequences," with the "Social Catholic doctrine." This was the 
reason why the ICT "has not hesitated to ask the clergy to collaborate with its apostolic 
assistance by the construction of the ‘houses for the peasantry,’ located in the 
municipalities' urban centers, under whose influence rural life will achieve the civilizing 
dignity it needs.”554 
 
HOUSING AS A VEHICLE TO CONSOLIDATE POWER: THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.S. 
THROUGH TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. COLOMBIA AND THE ICT AS A 
CASE STUDY 
The cooperation between the United States and the ICT started at the end of 
WWII, although U.S. interactions with the Colombian government were already active in 
the field of rural housing since the end of the 1930s. The interactions took shape through 
financial, educational, and public institutions, through cooperation agencies, private 
enterprises in the field of housing and building materials, and individual architects. These 
relations reached their climax in the 1960s with the program Alliance for Progress. Self-
help programs then became a crucial tool in this cooperation, and were broadly 
implemented in the construction of Ciudad Kennedy. This section identifies the different 
settings in which these interactions took place. What comes to the fore at a first glance as 
                                                
554 Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer 
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support from the one participant in this cooperation program to the other reveals as a 
strategy for the U.S. to support itself, to serve its own interests. Lars Shoultz succinctly 
captures the essence of the rationale behind U.S. Cooperation programs:  
For nearly two centuries, U.S. policy has invariably intended to serve the interests 
of the United States -interests variously related to our nation's security, to our 
domestic politics, or to our economic development. As the challenges to those 
interests ebb and flow, U.S. Policy adjusts to meet them. What remains 
unchanged are the interests. 
Although these three interests are central to any explanation of United States 
policy toward Latin America, there is more to a full explanation. Underlying these 
three interests is a pervasive belief that Latin Americans constitute an inferior 
branch of the human species.555 
The technical and financial cooperation in the field of housing through the ICT 
served the economic interests of the United States and its security, using the cooperation 
program as a tool against the spread of communism on the continent. Although the 
resulting relationship was defined by a power imbalance between the U.S. and Latin 
America, some of the spaces created under the direct guidance of the U.S. promoted 
alternative spaces of deliberation, conversation, and of interactions between the Latin 
American countries. The regional Pan-American meetings and one of its major 
endeavors, the creation of the "Centro Interamericano de Vivienda," CINVA (Inter-
American Center of Housing) are some of them. Furthermore, the ICT also had its own 
agenda, which is expressed in the constant search for additional financial resources and 
for external advisors to conduct its commended endeavor. Based on these ideas, I argue 
that the interactions between Colombia and the U.S. that took shape in the specific case 
of the ICT, served as a way to consolidate this imbalanced relationship between the two 
parties. Thus, the U.S., which declared itself as an example to be emulated, used housing 
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policy as a geo-strategic tool to strengthen its dominant position in Latin America. Its 
interactions with the ICT serve as a case study to observe and analyze the different forms 
this process unfolded. Yet the same case study serves as a way to understand the 
complexity of these interactions through the agency's own agenda and the unexpected 
spaces of interaction that strengthened the exchange of information with other Latin 
American countries. 
Already by the ICT's inception at the end of the 1930s, interactions between the 
Colombian government and U.S. cooperation agencies ensued in the field of housing. 
The representative of the Ministry of Labor, Hygiene and Welfare on the ICT's board of 
directors, Arturo Robledo, reported in a board meeting in 1939 that this ministry sent a 
"Colombian engineer" to the U.S. with the Bolsa Viajera (Travel Scholarship) from the 
Rockefeller Foundation “to study all that related to the rural housing.” Also, two other 
scholarships offered by the U.S. government through the Union Sanitaria Panamericana 
(“Pan-American Sanitary Bureau”) were to be given to an engineer and a physician to 
study preferably the same topic.556  The Rockefeller Foundation was active through 
hygiene campaigns in Colombia since 1916.557 By the end of the 1940s, the education of 
professionals in the field of sanitation was supported by the Sanitary Pan-American 
Bureau and a series of U.S. NGOs and governmental health agencies: the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation, and the Service of Public Health.558 This 
cooperation program encompassed more than just sanitation issues, as Maria Teresa 
Gutierrez claims, the Rockefeller Foundation's "influence spread to other fields such as 
                                                
556 Minute 3, March 1939, p. 10. 
557 Gutierrez, “Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En 
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the political, social and economic, as well as the scientific."559 This close involvement of 
such diverse U.S. agencies in Colombia exposes the close relations between the two 
countries already by the time the ICT was established, and foretells the direction of the 
technical support the agency would take after WWII under Truman’s Point Four policy 
and later in the 1960s through the Alliance for Progress. 
Technical support was always backed by economic interests, which sought to 
promote U.S. industry. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) sent a representative, 
Jacob Crane, to Colombia at the beginning of 1946 in order to get acquainted with its 
"building methods, architectonic building styles in the cities and in the rural areas, as well 
as building material’s prices and transportation."560  Crane, the same man who promoted 
self-help housing from within the U.S. housing authorities, expressed the possibility of 
offering loans to the ICT, "not in money but in building materials, toilets, zinc tiles, nails, 
etc." He also encouraged contacting the Institute for Tropical Housing in Puerto Rico, "to 
exchange ideas and to seek international orientation regarding the issue of housing..."561  
Later, the consequences of the destruction produced by the assassination of Gaitán 
in Bogotá, known as "El Bogotazo", led to launching a Junta de Reconstrucción 
(Reconstruction Junta). Through this measure, a series of measures were taken, and the 
government received support from the U.S. government. The Export & Import Bank 
guaranteed a US$10 million credit that the Colombian government was to use in form of 
building materials purchased from U.S. firms.562 That this was more than only aid for the 
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reconstruction of the city was clear from the start. But that this was a state-led strategy 
became evident when Thomas O'Keefe, Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce of the 
United States, visited the country in October 1948 "in order to get acquainted with the 
[country’s] needs regarding the import of building materials, especially those for the 
reconstruction of Bogotá and the ICT's projects." In this context, O'Keefe planned to visit 
a number of ICT neighborhoods in different cities.563 This agreement was still in effect as 
late as December 1949 and the arrival of materials bought with this credit coincided with 
the expansion of the ICT's endeavors in urban areas throughout the country.564 Three 
years earlier the Colombian government had already considered using such a credit 
institution to accomplish some of its own goals. In October 1945, the president Alberto 
Lleras Camargo, discussed in a meeting with the general managers of the Banks of the 
city of Bogotá the possibility to consider this financial institution as a possible buyer of 
the bonds emitted by the ICT, and even to receive building materials and prefabricated 
houses produced in the United States from it.565  
While this reciprocal interest received a decisive impulse in the wake of the 
reconstruction of Bogotá, the Currie Mission arrived in Colombia in 1949. The Currie 
mission was another result of the Colombian government's efforts to find external aid. 
This mission was sent by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (an 
earlier denomination of the World Bank). It was lead by the Canadian Lauchlin Currie 
and comprised merely of U.S. American technocrats. In September of 1950, they visited 
the ICT's general manager and gathered a vast amount of information about the 
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institute.566 The same year, they delivered their final report, which constitutes the first 
comprehensive assessment of different aspects of the country, and an action plan based 
on this diagnostic.567 Unfortunately, the specific suggestions regarding the ICT are not 
part of this final report, only some general suggestions are included, which hint at the 
major transformations that characterize the course of the agency during the 1950s: 
stronger inclusion of private capital in the housing program and merging with other state 
agencies. 
Since the 1950s, self-help housing programs were strongly supported by U.S. aid 
agencies. They envisioned these programs as a panacea to solving social problems in the 
developing world, and as a means to successfully solve the housing shortage in Latin 
America. The aim of the assistance based on self-help programs is related to what W.W. 
Rostow stated in his work The Stages of Economic Growth. For Rostow, the role of the 
United States consisted in supporting developing countries, by the promotion of 
"development through self-sustaining economic growth and industrialization."568 "Self-
sustaining economic growth" went hand in hand with self-help housing programs like 
those the U.S. housing agencies had already experimented with in Puerto Rico.569 
Probably due to the favorable assessment of this experience, official policies "on housing 
promulgated to the field missions gave emphasis to the concept of aided self-help" as "the 
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most promising modern approach to housing problems in the underdeveloped areas."570 
This same idea was part of the U.S. technical assistance program Point Four. Puerto Rico 
served as the model, which was taught and disseminated through the CINVA (Inter-
American Center of Housing). CINVA, installed in Bogotá in 1951, educated an entire 
generation of Latin American professionals in housing. Thus, it impacted consistently the 
approach to solving the housing deficit in Latin America. 
When the U.S. foreign aid program for Latin America the "Alliance for Progress" 
was launched in 1961, the idea of progress was only one of its components. The other, 
equally important and directly connected with the idea of progress, and an obvious 
component of the program, was U.S. Security, which was being threatened by the 
expansion of Communism. The Cuban Revolution sharply elucidated this threat, which 
was equally felt in Colombia.  
As explained earlier, the specter of Communism had animated internal political 
confrontations at least since the 1930s. Thus, the Alliance was a two-sided program, but 
Colombia consciously embraced it with all its different components. Alberto Lleras 
Camargo, who was president of the country for the second time between 1958 and 1962, 
when the Alliance was launched, seems to have counted as one of the major Latin 
American supporters of the formation of the Alliance as a means to "pacifically" 
neutralize Cuban influence in Latin America.571 The Alliance propelled the agency’s low-
cost housing construction program and made housing improvement a matter of high 
political priority in Colombia.  
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Since Ciudad Kennedy was developed to a large extent with financial support 
from the United States through the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. Americans were 
present, unsurprisingly, in the construction of Ciudad Kennedy through two different 
groups, the United States Peace Corps Volunteers and the United States Information 
Service (USIS).572  The former lived and worked in Ciudad Kennedy. President Kennedy 
created the Peace Corps at the time the Alliance for Progress was launched, thus the 
volunteer's task was to support the achievement of the goals of this program. The latter 
operated a mobile unit, which was "equipped with a movie projector, screen, movies, etc., 
and staffed by a projectionist. Aside from "entertaining," its purpose was unknown even 
to the U.S. American CINVA summer research fellow, who is the source of most of the 
information about the institutions working in Ciudad Kennedy. He claimed in his report 
that "the full nature, scope and impact of its operations is unknown. .... However, this 
activity falls under the jurisdiction of the newly-created USIS Community Development 
Office, which might lead some to believe that there would be more of a rationale behind 
such programs than merely gratuitous entertainment for children."573  
These series of events evidence the existence of a much broader structure, which 
involved technical support as well as financial help from the United States, who sought 
closer ties with the Latin American states through it. As many scholars in the U.S. have 
shown, this was not a naïve and altruistic intervention by the United States. It had clear 
political and economic goals, and all these events are part of its implemented strategies. 
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However, the spaces the U.S. helped to create through the Pan American Union had other 
unpredictable consequences. Regional conferences, served as a space of relevant 
exchange with other Latin American countries. The ICT was invited to participate in the 
Colombian Delegation to the Regional Conference in Quito, from May 28th to June 10th 
of 1950, and organized by the Pan-American Union to discuss topics such as 
cooperatives, workers education, social services, housing and urban planning.574  
The omnipresence of the U.S. during this period spanned from the extensive 
proposals previously presented, to minor events such as the note of thanks the U.S. 
embassy sent to the ICT for the rural housing plans it made available to Ecuador to assist 
in the construction of the houses recently destroyed by earthquakes there.575 Although the 
influence of the United States defending and enforcing its views and own interests is 
undeniable, the overwhelming presence of technicians of other Latin American countries 
sharing their experiences, contributed to a diverse body of thought on issues regarding 
housing. 
 
Pan-American meetings and CINVA 
In this section I develop the connections between the ICT and numerous Pan-
American initiatives, which individually reveal subtle interactions between Colombia and 
both other Latin American countries and the United States, but become particularly 
                                                
574 Minute 423, May 4, 1950, p. 1031.  
One concrete result of this Pan American cooperation was the fellowship two of the ICT's technicians 
received to travel abroad and to specialize. The engineer and director assistant of the Technical 
Department, Eduardo Albornoz Plata, and the general manager of the Cali ICT's office, Gustavo 
Aristizabal. Minute 550, February 9, 1953, p. 0056. 
In addition, the government of Ecuador sent a group of architects and engineers to visit the ICT’s housing 
programs. Since the agency paid the expenses of the Ecuadorian delegation, one suspects that there was a 
special interest between those two countries. In: Minute 535, August 18, 1952, p. 0020-back. 
575 Minute 398, September 1, 1949, p. 951-back. 
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evident in the establishment of CINVA, the Inter-American Center for Housing and 
Planning, and its subsequent collaboration with the ICT. Although the ICT itself was not 
involved in the inception of this initiative, CINVA’s establishment in Bogotá in 1951 and 
the cooperation between the two institutions had a lasting impact on the ICT’s work 
during the 1950s and 1960s, enabling the agency to significantly advance its development 
of building technology. The CINVA students used the real projects of the ICT to acquire 
practical experience or apply the theoretical content taught at the Center. They conducted 
their fieldwork by experimenting directly with new materials and building methods in the 
housing projects built by the ICT, interviewing the residents at CUAN, and, in the case of 
students in the construction through self-help courses, accompanying the future residents 
of Ciudad Kennedy in the process of aided self-help during construction.576 The close-
knit set of relations between the ICT and the United States through the different Pan-
American initiatives of the period of this study clearly materialized in CINVA. Some of 
the most significant ideas emanating from the U.S. government on technical cooperation 
with the Latin American countries, such as self-help, were channeled through this 
research and education center.  
However, the process of establishing CINVA was not straightforward. Several 
meetings on a Pan-American level from the end of the 1930s were necessary to finally 
crystallize this initiative for the improvement of housing in Latin America. In this 
process, numerous meetings provided alternative spaces, in which the different Latin 
American countries were able to develop their own agendas as well, despite significant 
U.S. interference in the approach to housing. Thus, the Pan-American initiatives served 
not only as a platform to solidify U.S. American influence on the continent, but they also 
                                                
576 At least in the super-blocks 6, 6A, 8, 8A, and 16. 
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constituted the space where other American countries met and learned from each other. 
Colombia participated in many of these meetings, and the ICT, being the main state 
agency responsible for building low-cost housing, participated likewise in some of these 
encounters. This section explores the various Pan-American meetings, which finally led 
to the establishment of CINVA, and how these meetings and CINVA itself informed the 
ICT’s work.   
The Inter-American Conferences promoted by the Pan-American Union and the 
Pan-American Conferences of Architects were the two different spaces in which the 
discussions on housing took place on a hemispheric level, and in which, eventually, the 
need to establish a Pan-American center for housing emerged. The origin of these 
meetings responded to separate rationales and occurred at different moments, but they 
converged several times throughout the period in which they operated. On the one hand, 
the Pan-American Union met for the first time in Washington from October 1889 to April 
1890, under the denomination the "First International Conference of American States."577 
In these meetings "issues such as closer trade and smoother political relations" were 
discussed. The agreement on a "peaceful settlement of disputes" was also central aim of 
this first meeting.578  On the other hand, the first Pan-American Congress of Architects 
was held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1920, as a space for reflection, exchange and 
consolidation of the profession.579 
                                                
577 http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp. Accessed: March 8, 2018. 
578 Williams, Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations, 127. 
579 The Architects' meetings still occur today, now under the name of La Federación Panamericana de 
Asociaciones de Arquitectos, FPAA (Pan-American Federation of Architect's Associations). 
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The architects' meetings, like the Inter-American Conferences, were 
simultaneously nurtured by and an expression of "Pan-Americanism."580  This concept 
enabled the most diverse interpretations, from a completely idealized view according to 
which Pan-Americanism "is not a doctrine, in the true sense of the word, but a feeling, or 
better: an ideal," to the harsh verdict of the Peruvian politician Raul Haya de la Torre, 
who in his publication of 1935, "Where does Indo-America Go?", rejected the term Pan-
American "for being an expression of Yankee imperialism."581 The tensions that arose 
around this term spoke in the Inter-American Conferences reveal the competing interests 
of its members and especially, between the United States and Latin America. They also 
reflect the political and economic premises that had defined relations between the United 
States and Latin America as far back as the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine.  
However, despite the real confrontations between the U.S. and Latin America, the Pan-
American Union’s well-known publication on "housing, architecture and urban planning 
issues" enabled a dissemination of Pan-Americanism among the professionals working 
on housing.582 
The pressing need of housing that crystallized with the inclusion of Latin America 
in the logics of industrialization and subsequent urbanization processes, drove these two 
Pan-American interest groups to tackle the issue of low-cost housing. The discussions 
                                                
580 The realization of this idea in the built environment is studied and presented in: Robert Alexander 
Gonzalez, Designing Pan-America: U.S. Architectural Visions for the Western Hemisphere, 1st ed, Roger 
Fullington Series in Architecture (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011). 
581 The more idealistic opinion on Pan-Americanism was expressed by one of the speakers at the Pan 
American Conference of Architects in 1947 in Lima. In: Actas Del VI. Congreso Panamericano de 
Arquitectos: Lima, 15 de Octubre de 1947, Cuzco 25 de Octubre de 1947 (Lima: s.n., 1953), 74.  
The quotation from Raúl Haya de la Torre is in: Silvia Arango, Ciudad y Arquitectura: Seis Generaciones 
Que Construyeron La América Latina Moderna, Arte Universal (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica : 
Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 2012), 209. 
582 Ramón Gutiérrez, Jorge Tartarini, and Rubens Stagno, Congresos Panamericanos de Arquitectos, 1920-
2000: Aportes Para Su Historia (Buenos Aires: CEDODAL, 2007), 9. 
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about the scarcity of low-cost housing in those meetings reflect the specific concerns of 
each country and the way in which each of them explored possible strategies to solve the 
problem. The meetings of the architects and of the Pan-American Union simultaneously 
reveal the search for collaborative solutions between the different countries through the 
exchange of experiences and through the development of Pan-American initiatives, such 
as the consolidation of the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, CINVA. In 
these meetings, the need for the state’s active participation in, and architects’ active 
intervention in, the production of low-cost housing was also corroborated.583  
Low-cost housing was addressed from the very first Pan-American Conference of 
Architects in 1920, though with significant transformations over time regarding content 
and focus. While the need to "promote the construction of hygienic and cheap spaces" 
was formulated during the first conference, it was at the 1960 Congress that housing was 
defined as the fulfillment of a human right, which can not be "dissociated from other 
human rights,..."584  This definition clearly derived from the notion of the Right to 
housing that was embodied in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948. Moreover, the transformation of the concept “low-cost housing” was mediated 
by the proportion of homes comprising the housing deficit in the continent. Whereas 
approximately 25 million homes were needed to be added or replaced in Latin America at 
the end of the 1940s, by 1960 40 million dwellings were already needed.585 That said, the 
measures finally taken in the different countries to address this deficit also changed over 
                                                
583 The call for architects to get more involved in social issues was made both in the Congress of 1927 and 
of 1955. In the latter, it was asserted that architecture and planning are "specifically linked to the living 
spaces," understanding this as the social function of architects. In: Gutiérrez, Tartarini, and Stagno, 
Congresos Panamericanos de Arquitectos, 1920-2000, 25. 
584 Ibid., 86. 
585 Violich and Jones, Low-Cost Housing in Latin America, 8; Marcia Koth de Paredes et al., Housing in 
Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 36. A calculation prior to these dates is difficult 
given the precarious censuses and of the housing deficit calculation. 
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time in correlation with the recommendations made during the conferences. Although 
several countries had already implemented strategies aimed at the construction of low-
cost housing prior to the first architects' meeting, it was only from the 1930s on that the 
state institutions consolidated. The establishment of the state institutions responded to the 
spirit of the "Official Commissions of Cheap Homes," recommended in the conference of 
1927. The ICT’s launch in 1939 clearly corresponds to this chronology. 
The Pan-American conferences and institutions offered a space to "introduce 
North and South American technicians to one another and to stimulate sustained 
programs of contact by exchange of ideas, manpower, and students."586 They also 
positively infused the work of the ICT with new ideas. At the beginning of 1947 the 
general manager presented a report of his participation in the 12th Pan-American Sanitary 
Conference in Caracas, where he also had the opportunity to visit El Silencio, other 
working-class neighborhoods, and hospitals, as well as the organization from El Banco 
Obrero (The Worker's Bank), from which he hoped the Institute could learn plenty in 
terms of administration, building methods, and materials.587 The ICT members’ visits to 
Puerto Rico and Venezuela created connections that led the agency to hire and receive 
guest architects from these two countries (and to get familiar with the body of thought on 
a Pan-American level, which was very fertile at that moment). In addition to extending an 
invitation to the "eminent Spanish architect Fernando Salvador, Chief of the Section of 
Architecture in the Sanitary Engineering Division of the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
                                                
586 Violich, Cities of Latin America, 217. 
587 
Minute 256, February 2 1947, p. 534 – back. 
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of the United States of Venezuela,"588 the general manager received from the board the 
authorization to hire the engineer Adolfo A. Mussenden, from Puerto Rico.589 
Technological cooperation in the spirit of Pan-Americanism gained relevance 
after WWII through the various Inter-American institutions. In Colombia, the 
government and, specifically, the ICT were in communication with different Inter-
American organizations. In August 1946, the general manager met Mr. Charles val Polse 
during the inspection of a slum in the city of Popayán. Val Polse was from the Servicio 
Cooperativo Interamericano (Inter-American Cooperative Service), which was active in 
the area at the time.590 Although slum clearance was not yet a major endeavor for the 
ICT, this meeting was indeed related to the clearance of a slum at the river Ejido 
constituted by 31 houses across three blocks. The representatives of the two agencies 
discussed relocating the families. Afterwards, the ICT directly sought the advice of the 
Inter-American Service for Public Health in developing the first large urban housing 
project in Bogotá.591 
These crisscrossed interactions with both regional institutions and the United 
States present a more nuanced picture of the influences that nurtured the ICT at the end of 
the 1940s. The visits of some ICT members to Venezuela and Puerto Rico, as well as 
their participation in the Pan-American Conference of Architects in Lima in 1947, 
established distinct connections with other Latin American countries’ experiences with 
housing development. Moreover, after the Conference in Lima, the board of directors 
                                                
588 
Minute 263, April 14, 1947, p. 550. 
589 Minute 282, September 25, 1947, p. 605 
590 Minute 247, August 19, 1946, p. 514 –back. 
591 Minute 250, September 23, 1946, p. 518-back. 
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proposed sending a commission representing the ICT to Santiago to "study what is being 
done in that nation in regard to working-class neighborhoods."592  
While the recommendations regarding housing that emerged, on the one hand, 
from the Pan-American meetings of Architects and, on the other, from the Inter-
American Conferences, seem to be the result of separate worlds, the establishment of the 
Inter-American Center for Housing and Planning, CINVA, indicates the existence of 
convergence points between them. The First Pan-American Popular Housing Conference 
in Buenos Aires in 1939 recommended the creation of a Pan-American Institute of 
Popular Housing.593 This proposal was justified, among many other reasons, by the need 
for an entity that could both unify and lead efforts to turn the recommendations 
emanating from the various Pan-American conferences into action. The recommendations 
of that historic meeting were adopted at the Architects' meeting of 1940 in Montevideo. 
Despite the clear will of both groups to consolidate this institution, this proposal received 
a new impulse only after the Second World War. The Pan-American Union set up a 
program to recollect information on housing and planning issues in Latin America in 
1945.594 The architects, for their part, agreed during the sixth Pan-American Meeting of 
Architects in Lima in 1947 to hold a "Pan-American Conference on Housing" the 
following year, with the main goal being to establish "the Pan-American Institute of 
Housing."595 That conference never took place. Instead, the Organization of American 
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594 Anatole A. Solow and Rodrigo Masís, Cooperación Interamericana En El Campo de Vivienda y 
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States, OAS, was established that same year, 1948, at the Inter-American Conference in 
Bogotá.  
Within the OAS, a Housing and Planning Section was created in 1949 as part of 
the Division of Social Affairs and Labor. This section studied "different aspects of 
housing, such as production and building methods, design, codes, program 
administration, finance methods, housing inventories, housing needs, the elimination of 
unsanitary neighborhoods and rehabilitation." It also provided countries such as Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador with technical advisory services on housing and urban 
planning.596 In addition, and in compliance with the provisions of Point Four of the 
Truman policy of 1949, the Housing and Planning Section was in charge of the 
"establishment of a research center for the testing of building materials for the 
construction of low-cost housing..." In 1950, the Division of Social Affairs and Labor 
supported and organized a Regional Conference in Quito, in which one member of the 
ICT's board of directors, Efrain Fierro, participated with the Colombian delegation.597 At 
this conference, Pan American cooperation was also extensively discussed. One of the 
most important proposals of the Pan American Union was a "tropical housing institute," 
the centerpiece of the envisioned cooperation. The proposed initiative also considered a 
group of [U.S.] advisers in housing and urban planning for the different American states, 
while the institute would be responsible for the design, development of materials, and 
practical research.598 The proposal focused on training professionals in the field of 
housing and urban planning through a number of centers advised by Pan American 
technicians, the establishment of research institutions throughout the region, and 
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Presentado Ante El VII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos, Habana, Cuba, Abril 10-16, 1950, 8. 
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strengthening the Pan-American Union’s section of housing and urban planning, 
ostensibly with the support of Latin American technicians. Some of the proposals 
included aspects showing the other side of the coin of this magnificent proposal: that the 
advice given should help to "determine the potential of local resources," and that a 
strengthened section of housing and planning in the Pan American Union should set the 
establishment of commercial contacts in order to produce consumer goods in Latin 
America as a primary goal.599  
Finally, one year later, in 1951, the oft-mentioned center ultimately became the 
longed-for Pan-American Institute for Housing. The Inter-American Center for Housing 
and Planning, CINVA, as it was finally named, initiated its activities under the direction 
of Leonard J. Currie in 1952 in Bogotá, basically as had been foreseen since the 1939 
Conference. Currie worked previously at Harvard University, where he taught design, 
and was part of The Architects Collaborative with Walter Gropius.600 The decision to 
establish this center in Bogotá responded to the advantages of its location. Relatively 
equidistant to the north and south of the hemisphere, the city offered a wide variety of 
climate zones in proximate distance.601 Also, the willingness of the Universidad Nacional 
and the ICT to participate in this project played a major role. Interestingly, former 
Colombian president Alberto Lleras Camargo was Secretary General of the OAS (1947 - 
1954) at the time Bogotá was selected as the seat of CINVA. He was the emissary of the 
good news602.  
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The meetings convened for the establishment of the CINVA in Bogota took place 
in 1951. According to Gabriel Serrano Camargo, architect and former member of the ICT 
board of directors, representatives of the Universidad Nacional, of the Association of 
Architects, and one delegate each of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Bank of 
the Republic, and finally, of Anatole A. Solow as the representative of the Pan-American 
Union participated in these meetings. These conversations aimed to select Colombia as 
the seat for the Centro Interamericano Experimental de Adiestramiento en Vivienda 
Económica (Experimental Inter-American Center for Training in Low-Cost Housing). 
Serrano Camargo explained to the board of directors about the importance this center 
could have for the work of the ICT.603 This was not the first time the importance of such 
a center was discussed in the board meetings. When the ICT received the invitation to 
participate in the Conference on Tropical Housing to be held in Caracas in December of 
1947, one of the board members, Guillermo Wiesner, claimed that the ICT should 
participate in the conference and offer all its support. Furthermore, he noted the 
convenience of establishing a permanent office for tropical housing headquartered in 
Bogota; an office for which the ICT could offer its management, with the necessary staff 
being paid by all participating countries."604 At the end of May 1951, the conversations 
between the ICT's general manager and the architect of the Bank of the Republic, Carlos 
E. Perez, indicate that the process to establish this training center in Colombia was 
ongoing at the highest governmental level.605  The agreement between the three 
cooperating institutions, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, the ICT and the OAS, was 
finally signed in October of 1951. The center appears as "Project 22" of the Technical 
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Cooperation Program of the OAS. In this agreement, a the responsibilities of each of the 
three participating institutions were defined, as well as the four main goals and tasks of 
the center: "experimentation and research on urban and rural housing, training of 
professionals of the different member states of the OAS in the different aspects of ‘the 
housing problem’, dissemination of knowledge on housing resulting from the studies and 
experiences conducted in the Center and outside, and finally, technical support on 
housing improvement."606 
CINVA thus became a space for the production and transmission of knowledge, 
in which an entire generation of Latin American professionals met and received training 
on issues related to housing.607 The training comprehended six courses of lectures on the 
"theoretical, physical, technological economic and social aspects of housing" and two 
interdisciplinary projects, during which the theoretical knowledge could be applied. In a 
second part of the program, issues related to project management, seminars on "the 
philosophy of housing, and research methods," two electives as well as two 
interdisciplinary projects were also taught.608 An article on the Information 
Documentation's service of CINVA, which appeared in the journal Ingenieria y 
Arquitectura in 1954, describes the tasks fulfilled by this service, and how it contributed 
to the dissemination of information produced on housing.609   
                                                
606 “Acuedo entre la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, el Instituto de Crédito Territorial y la Unión 
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bibliographic research. The publication of the results of the technicians at CINVA is part of the goals of 
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Figure 4.1. CINVAs library. Ingenieria y Arquitectura No. 119 (vol. 10) September - 
October 1954, 44. 
Technical cooperation was the key word to overcoming Latin America’s housing 
problems. The ICT acknowledged the importance of all American governments’ 
participation in the various seminars and conferences organized by the Pan-American 
Union and other Inter-American institutions during the first National Housing Seminar it 
organized in 1955. They recognized the need to maximize the "general cooperation of all 
countries in solving, through technical and economic formulas, the horrific problem of 
the lack of low-cost housing, which threateningly darkens the social condition of the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the fellows to this information certainly constitutes a space of exchange of ideas, through the 
accessibility to new and relevant information produced in other parts of the world. Circa 2500 institutions 
and persons from all over the world, but especially from Latin America, are registered in the program of 
exchange, which share with CINVA publications. Especially the fellows have contributed to this bank of 
information, sharing "unpublished material with information on plans and research works of their own 
countries." Luis Floren, leader of the Service for scientific exchange. In: Ingenieria y Arquitectura No. 119 




nations.”610 Indeed, as Francis Violich pointed out in his publication on Latin American 
cities, Latin Americans wanted “technical assistance in order to raise their standard of 
living so that they may achieve democratic freedom.” In his view, not acting to alleviate 
the "low standards of living" in Latin America would "remain a threat to their democracy 
and to ours.”611 This cooperation was thus seen as an enterprise that would benefit both 
parties. Violich asserted that 
[t]ruly human objectives in hemisphere relations will be advantageous not to 
Latin America alone: benefits will accrue to both Latin America and the United 
States. We can learn as much from the Latin Americans as they can from us. 
Waldo Frank, in a public address given in San Francisco, spoke of the western 
hemisphere as two incomplete "half-worlds" that are essential to one another for 
complete maturity.612  
The spirit that emanates from Violich's publication was still infused with the spirit 
of the good neighbor policy.  
Never before have we been in such close contact with our neighbors as now, 
during World War II, and never before have we sent North Americans in such 
large groups, or for such a varied number of reasons, to Latin America. And, as 
we have seen, we are now offering the kind of cooperation the Latins want of 
us.613  
Although Violich foresaw some of the needs of the time at the end of the war with 
astonishingly clarity, this optimistic, egalitarian view of Inter-American relations became 
more uni-directional shortly thereafter. Truman's Point Four policy maintained the idea of 
offering technical support, but the idea that the U.S. could also learn something from 
Latin America was lost.  
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Point Four and the University of Illinois 
Technical cooperation between Colombia and the United States on one side and 
Latin America on the other, evolved within Pan-American institutions such as CINVA, 
but also in a more unidirectional strain executed directly by the U.S. Government in the 
various countries through the Point Four Program. The ICT received direct support from 
the U.S. through this program from 1954 through 1957, coinciding with most of the 
military government of General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). The program, stemming from 
the "Fourth Point of President Truman Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949," basically 
sought, as Anatole Solow informs us, "to help economically and technologically less-
developed countries to apply technical know-how to all phases of social and economic 
life, to bridge the gap between prevailing practices and available knowledge, and to raise, 
in this manner, the standard of living for millions of people."614 Harold Robinson, former 
chief of Housing and Urban Development at the Latin America Bureau of the (U.S.) 
Agency for International Development claimed that among the strategies to overcome 
underdevelopment, Truman included in this program the "production of materials for 
housing."615 He further reported that  
[e]ven prior to the enactment of the Point Four legislation in June 1950, a State 
Department publication explaining the proposed technical assistance agreed that 
"adequate shelter is a fundamental objective of economic development, and is 
essential to progress in other fields of development. It is therefore, desirable to 
make housing experts available to countries requesting them, and to bring 
professionals and trainees to the U.S. for observation and education.”616  
Thus, cooperation with the ICT conformed to the basic lines of the program. 
Consequently, the U.S. and Colombia signed an agreement "for the initiation of a 
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technical cooperation project with the Instituto de Crédito Territorial in the field of 
housing to be carried out through a contract with the Small Homes Council of the 
University of Illinois."617  
The Point Four Program was, however, embedded in a complex net of initiatives 
to strengthen the position of the U.S. in Latin America after WWII. The direct 
involvement in Latin America became most visible during the war with the creation of 
the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) in 1942. This institute, with a colorful 
agenda, and directed by Nelson Rockefeller, changed its nature after the end of the war. 
Although this program did not conduct major assistance programs in Colombia during the 
war, it is relevant for this account since it became "the administrative agency for Point 
Four in Latin America."618 In fact, the agreement for technical cooperation between the 
U.S. and Colombian government reads: "The Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the 
Foreign Operations Administration (hereinafter referred to as IIAA/FOA) will furnish a 
group of technicians and specialists to collaborate with the Inscredial [ICT] in carrying 
out a cooperative program of Housing in Colombia.”619 The IIAA remained in place after 
the war with a series of variations, and became part of the U.S. post-war foreign policy 
toward Latin America. The IIAA was transferred to the State Department in 1946, which, 
in 1947 "prepared legislation" according to which, "[t]he reorganized agency would 
continue its aid program" through June 1950.620 However, President Truman introduced 
                                                
617 Technical cooperation - Program of Housing. Agreement between the United States of America and 
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the assistance program in his inaugural address as the Point Four Program. In 1953, under 
Eisenhower's presidency, the reorganization "of various foreign aid functions and 
agencies" took place, and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was established. 
The Institute of Inter-American Affairs was thereby transferred to the newly established 
agency, whose purpose was "to bring together in one agency all of our foreign assistance 
and related activities so that they may be efficiently coordinated and planned on a 
worldwide basis."621 The agency was abolished in 1955. Its functions were transferred to 
the International Cooperation Administration of the Department of State (ICA).622 These 
mutating U.S. agencies constituted the interlude to the "creation of the Development 
Loan Fund (DLF), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Social Progress Fund" 
at the end of the 1950s.623 Both were directly involved in the development of Ciudad 
Kennedy through the Alliance for Progress program. Thus, Point Four is part of a 
continuous thread of development assistance through which very specific ideas found an 
uninterrupted path into the work of the agency through the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Point Four Program allows us to envision two sides of ‘technical cooperation’ 
between the Unites States and Colombia. On the one hand, the program aimed to advance 
U.S. economic and security interests in Latin America. On the other hand, the Colombian 
government—and thus, the ICT—also had vested interests that shaped how the project 
finally materialized. The U.S.’s underlying interests in the program are not evident at a 
first glance, but analyzing the tacit reasons for the selection of the University of Illinois’ 
Small Homes Council to carry out the technical cooperation contract is telling. According 
                                                
621 United States, Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of 1953 (Foreign Operations Administration) (United 
States Information Agency) (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1953), 2-3, 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001142244. 
622 https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10477107. Accessed on March 16, 2018. 
623 Thomas Leonard, ed., “Point Four Program,” Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations 
(Washington: CQ Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613. Accessed on March 12, 2018. 
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to the ICT, the FOA commissioned the University of Illinois to send a housing expert to 
Colombia. However, given what Small Homes Council was designed to do, its selection 
for this task can be seen in a different light. The University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign established the Small Homes Council in 1944 to address “the [U.S.] small 
home problems, rural and urban." Small Homes Council’s task also considered building 
of homes “on campus to demonstrate good homes to thousands of visitors to the 
campus.” In sum, its target was the U.S. building industry, which it should support 
through research and information.624 
Interestingly, the council's publications did focus on technical and spatial aspects 
of the small home in the United States. None of the publications seem to be informed by 
the experience in Colombia, if it ever had any consequences in council’s work. Instead, a 
close relationship to the U.S. building industry is rather visible.625 The 1954 publication 
"Homes From Pre-Assembled Wall Panels" for instance, was "part of a research project 
sponsored by the lumber dealers research council."626  
For Truman the Point Four Program was “a ‘bold new program’ that extolled 
private corporate investment.”627 This was the basis for the agreements with other 
governments and became increasingly binding during the Cold War on the American 
continent. Based on the idea that "those countries that were the least developed 
economically were the most susceptible to the appeal of communism…. U.S. private 
investment would contribute to containment" through the promotion of economic 
                                                
624 https://archives.library.illinois.edu/archon/?p=creators/creator&id=206. Accessed on March 12, 2018 
625 The publications of the council are available at: 
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/39968/browse?order=ASC&rpp=20&sort_by=2&etal=-
1&offset=0&type=dateissued. Accessed on March 12, 2018. 
626 University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign campus) and Small Homes Council-Building Research 
Council, Homes from Pre-Assembled Wall Panels; a New Cost-Saving Concept of Home Construction, 
(Urbana, 1954). 
627 Leonard, “Point Four Program.” 
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development.628 Housing was certainly one of the areas in which private investment 
could thrive alongside “technical cooperation”. 
Nonetheless, the grantee of this aid, the government of Colombia, was not a 
passive actor. It sought to establish synergies between the Point Four program and other 
programs, to make the most of this aid. To begin with, Lauchlin Currie, the leader of the 
World Bank mission for Colombia, was commissioned in 1950 "to act as adviser on 
technicians to be sent to Colombia under Truman's Point Four Program and the UN 
Technical Assistance Program, with a view to enlisting their support in the work of the 
public administration mission and the Economic Development Committee." Currie was to 
fulfill this task as part of a new contract he signed with the Colombian government “to 
perform a follow-up to the report,” elaborated by the World Bank mission.629 Moreover, 
the Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the Foreign Operations Administration 
(IIAA/FOA) provided an agreement for Technical Cooperation within the Point Four 
Program that was sufficiently general to allow the agency to impart its own guidelines for 
applying this technical assistance. While the agreement broadly defined as components of 
the program "technical assistance in a program of housing in Colombia in the fields of 
planning, designing, constructing, maintaining and operating projects" and "related 
training activities, both within and outside of Colombia," in words of an ICT's 
representative, these agreed upon activities looked much more aligned with and focused 
upon the needs of the agency.630 These activities were discussed in ICT board meetings, 
the results of which were then published in "Housing Policy for Colombia: First National 
                                                
628 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation Treaties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4. 
629 Sandilands, The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie, 167. 




Housing Seminar 1955." First, the U.S. government was to send a head of the mission, 
preceded by his résumé for ICT’s approval, to work in the Socio-economic department. 
The head of the mission was to stay in the country for at least one month to get 
acquainted with the operation of the agency and the tasks of each department, and to visit 
some of the agency’s main offices. The leader of the mission would then conduct a 
preliminary study on the "country’s housing problems and analyze the agency's 
policies."631 Once he finalized his tour, he would suggest to the general manager the 
number of technicians he considered necessary. These technicians were then to be 
selected in agreement with the ICT. The technicians sent through Point Four were 
assigned the same tasks as other employees of the agency and would serve the 
department they were assigned to as advisers to the permanent employees. The product of 
their work was to be in the form of a practical orientation for each department they were 
assigned to, and not a report on the general needs and conditions of housing in 
Colombia.632 And finally, they were also tasked to conduct Research on economic and 
communal planning in general, construction problems, community and city planning, 
building methods and quality control, problems of the rural economy, and mutual self-
help in the development of housing.633  
                                                
631 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional 
de Vivienda, 1955, 52. 
632 Minute 630 (incorrectly numbered: 730), March 14, 1955, p. 0283-back – 0284. 
633 The original word for "research" is "Estudios." It can be understood in various ways: as a study or as a 
draft. It is not clear way the authors were using it in this instance. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Una 
Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955, 52. 
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Figure 4.2. Meeting between technicians of CINVA and of the Point Four Program and 
ICT's general manager. Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., Una Política de 
Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955 (Bogotá, 
1956), 232. 
A number of events took place both in the United States and Colombia between 
the time the cooperation project under the Point Four Program was initially formulated in 
1951 and the time it finally went into effect in 1954. These events greatly affected the 
program’s execution. Nonetheless, the reason it took so long to put the initial proposal 
into concrete action is not stated in the minutes. In June 1951, one year after the 
enactment of the Point Four legislation, the U.S. initiated conversations with the 
Colombian Government, which led to a "[g]eneral Agreement for Technical Cooperation 
between the Government of Colombia and the Government of the United States of 




....”634 The discussions to establish CINVA in Bogotá were going on simultaneously. 
Strikingly, no specific project was defined at that moment, possibly due to the major 
reconfiguration of the ICT’s board that was taking place at precisely the same time.635 
Under the newly established Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in the 
United States, "conversations between the ICT and the U.S. Operations' Mission in 
Colombia about cooperation with the housing program" resumed under the military 
government, on December 14, 1953.636 These conversations constituted the preamble to 
the "technical cooperation project with the Instituto de Crédito Territorial." The selection 
of "the Small Homes Council of the University of Illinois" as a "possible contractor" was 
approved by the ICT in the said meeting with the Institute of Inter-American Affairs of 
the Foreign Operations Administration (IIAA/FOA) in December of 1953.637 Former 
U.S. American Ambassador to Colombia, Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, elaborated a note, which 
defined the terms of the agreement "entered into force" on June 30, 1954. Only when the 
agreement officially went into effect in 1954 did the ICT’s board of directors first tackle 
the topic.638 
                                                
634 From the footnote in the original: "the footnotes were dated Mar. 5 and 9, 1951, respectively." In: 
Department of State and United States of America, United States Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, 2296. 
635 As mentioned in the introduction, on March 8, 1951, one day before the agreement for technical 
cooperation was established, the board met for the first time under a new configuration: instead the 
previous board configuration, comprised by representatives of seven interests groups, only three 
representatives, directly appointed by the president, in concordance with the enactment of the decree 469 of 
1951 were part of the new board of directors: Roberto Salazar, Juan Pablo Ortega, and Gabriel Serrano 
Camargo (the only new member). Minute 464, March 8, 1951, p. 1193-back.  
636 The general secretary of the agency read a memorandum on these previous conversations. The content of 
that memorandum was not transcribed in the minutes, but the board of directors approved it in all its parts. 
In: Minute 611 (incorrectly numbered: 711), June 14, 1954, p. 0233. 
637 Department of State and United States of America, United States Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, 2296, 2298. 
638 Minute 611 (incorrectly numbered: 711), June 14, 1954, p. 0233. 
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1955 was an intense year for both parties to the agreement, with direct 
consequences to the project. According to agreement, U.S. American and Colombian 
cooperation should end in June of 1955. However, a report read to the board of directors 
on March 14, 1955, stated that "two members of the North American government" had 
recently arrived in Colombia to work with the ICT, one of them being the architect R. 
Jones.639 Thus, the process of regularizing "the technical assistance offered by the 
University of Illinois and Small Home Council" might have taken longer than initially 
planned. Although the Foreign Operations Administration, FOA, was presented in the 
National Housing Seminar as part of ICT's general structure, this same year FOA was 
transformed into the International Cooperation Administration, ICA.640 Finally, at the end 
of this year, the ICT lost its autonomy when it was merged with the Instituto Nacional de 
Aprovechamiento de Aguas y Fomento Eléctrico (National Institute of Water Resource 
Use and Electricity Development) and with the Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal 
(National Institute of Municipal Development) into the new Corporación Nacional de 
Servicios Públicos (National Corporation of Public Services).641  
The "organizational problem" generated by merging these three state agencies led 
the general manager to request authorization from the board to reorganize the 
Corporation’s leadership. He noted, as the responsible for the "enterprise," that 
substantial difficulties hindered the agency’s organization and effectiveness. To that end, 
he proposed hiring the experts Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff.642 Due to 
                                                
639 Minute 630 (incorrectly numbered: 730), March 14, 1955, p. 0283-back - 0284 
640 FOA and ICT in: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer 
Seminario Nacional de Vivienda, 1955, 51. 
ICA in: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10477107. Accessed on March 16, 2018. 
641 Minute 650 (incorrectly numbered: 750), November 10, 1955, p. 0303. 
642 On Hirschman in Colombia: Carlos Caballero Argáez, "Albert Hirschman En Colombia y La Planeación 
Del Desarrollo," Desarrollo y Sociedad, 2008, 165–202. 
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some concerns expressed about this request, the board agreed rather to solicit the Point 
Four technicians to collaborate in reorganizing the National Corporation.643 
While according to the agreement, the cooperation project should "remain in force 
through June 30, 1955," it seems that the U.S. advisers remained in Colombia until 
1957.644 The circumstances under which this prolonged stay was determined are not 
stated in the sources that give account of this agreement. At any rate, 1957 can be seen as 
the end of this cooperation project between the two countries. Yet the aid through the 
Point Four Program continued. Fellowships, as a different facet of the cooperation, were 
awarded to four ICT professionals to study in the United States.645 These fellowships 
responded strongly to Jacob Crane’s proposal to broaden the view of technical 
cooperation.646  
The outcome of the cooperation with the University of Illinois team was not 
discussed in the board of directors meetings, and no publication gives account of it; 
nevertheless, one concept crisscrosses most every conversation about the cooperation 
projects with the United States during the 1950s—namely, the implementation of self-
help construction. This very principle of "self-help" fitted perfectly with the idea behind 
the Point IV program of offering "technical assistance to help people to help 
themselves."647 Clearly, the economic side of self-help was also part of the calculation. 
As the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the agency that set forth the work 
of the Foreign Operations Administration, FOA, expressed in a Manual Order of 1957, 
                                                
643 Minute 4, April 18, 1956, p. 0014. 
644 Minute 18, 1957, p. 0144. Thanks note to the Point Four representatives through the University of 
Illinois, after two years as advisers in housing. 
645 Minute 10, October 30, 1957, p. 0058. 
646 United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 16. 




"one of the activities falling within the purview of the International Cooperation 
Administration's program of technical assistance was the ‘use of self-help to reduce costs 
and increase productivity.’"648 In fact, "[t]echnicians were recruited for the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (TCA), Foreign Operation Administration (FOA) and 
International Cooperation Administration (ICA) largely for work in the relatively 
unexplored field of aided self-help housing."649 One of the people who helped to promote 
the idea of self-help was Jacob Crane. Crane was essential in establishing this long-
lasting connection. As mentioned earlier, he visited the ICT in the 1940s as a 
representative of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). His experience in Puerto 
Rico with self-help projects had converted him into a convinced advocate of the 
advantages of self-help in developing low-income housing projects. CINVA also 
disseminated self-help and interacted with the Point Four Program in Colombia. The 
assistance through the Point Four program reached into the 1960s.650 Part of this financial 
support went to the creation of a rotary fund with 10,000 pesos for the mutual self-help 
program in Ciudad Kennedy.651 In addition, the Point IV Program financed the health 
center “Lorenzo Alcantuz” in the superblock 6, completed in February 1964, in a joint 
effort with the Junta committees from Superblocks 6 and 8, the Servicio Cooperativo 
Interamericano de Salud Publica, and the District’s Ministry of Health.652 
                                                
648 United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 16. 
649 United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 16. 
650 Although the nomination Point Four had been abolished in the United States since the establishment of FOA, the ICT continued 
referring to the U.S. aid agencies as Point Four. 
651 Jorge La Rotta, self-help coordinator assistant of Ciudad Kennedy, was in charge of managing this fund. 
Minute 8, February 28, 1962, p. 0156-back. 
652 “Shortly after its construction, several faculties of the Universidad Javeriana took responsibility for 
program development and implementation.” A considerable number of physicians offered services 
throughout the day, but they may not have been sufficient, since at that point this was the only health 
facility serving “the needs of the population of Ciudad Kennedy.” ⁠ The staff and institutions working in this 
specific institution were listed in: Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination 
of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,” 38. 
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Despite the big plans and exaggerated rhetoric of the many institutions involved, 
the visibility of the results was rather limited. Their presence is recorded, as well as the 
tasks they were charged to accomplish, but if their work contributed to any changes for 
the ICT, it is not stated anywhere. "Truman considered Point Four to be one of his most 
constructive programs. The results, however, were meager. Although popular and well-
intentioned, Point Four did not result in increased U.S. aid to Latin America. Its 
announcement raised expectations for increased aid, however, and thus increased tensions 
when that aid did not materialize.”653 
 
The Alliance for Progress and Self-help programs  
In the 1930s and 40s, U.S. interest in Latin America was directed by its Good Neighbor 
Policy, which sought to create and maintain hemispheric unity and solidarity. Increased 
Axis presence in some Latin American countries during World War II, especially in 
South America, prompted Roosevelt to accept the initiative of Nelson Rockefeller, to 
redirect the relations with Latin America against the Fascist threat. Rockefeller’s proposal 
led to the formal establishment of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and 
Cultural Relations between the American Republics in 1940 with him at its head. It was 
                                                                                                                                            
Mornings: one dentist from the Universidad Javeriana, one Doctor (provided by the District Ministry of 
Health), one Doctor (who volunteers his services), 7 Medical students from the Javeriana University, 9 
Students from the Faculty of Dietetics and Nutrition at Javeriana University, one Peace Corps Volunteer, 
one Sanitation Engineer, one Director of the Javeriana Health Program in Ciudad Kennedy (Dr. Henry 
Simonds, Universidad Javeriana), one Dentist’s Assistant (volunteer from U.S.A.) one attendant at the 
Health Center’s Dispensary. In the afternoons: one Program Director (Dr. Serpa, Secrataria de Salud 
Publica del Distrito), one Dentist (from Secretaria de Salud Publica del Distrito), 2 Pediatricians (from 
Secretaria de Salud Publica del Distrito). Full-time: 5 Auxiliaries (Nurses, Nurses’ Aides—supplied by the 
District), 2 Inspectors (provided by the District), one attendant at the Health Center’s Dispensary. 
653 Leonard, “Point Four Program.” 
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later renamed as the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA).654 The Institute for Inter-
American Affaires, or IIAA, one of OIAA’s five supporting agencies to conduct the 
programs of the office, was established in 1942.655 As developed in the previous section, 
a rebranded IIAA after the war became direct antecedent of Truman’s Point Four 
Program.656 Since Truman's Point Four Program was an antecedent on its part of 
President John F. Kennedy’s "Alliance for Progress" continuity in U.S. foreign policies 
can be evidenced throughout the period of this study. However, some differences 
between them come to the fore. Still aligning with the principles of economic progress 
that had nurtured Truman's Point Four Program, Kennedy maintained that social justice 
was equally indispensable. To develop specific initiatives that allowed achieving the 
missing social aims of previous interactions, Brazil’s President Juscelino Kubitschek 
proposed “Operation Pan-America.” This proposal is the base for the “Act of Bogotá,” 
after which the program Alliance for Progress was launched in 1961.657 This program for 
foreign aid and regional co-operation aimed to stimulate the Latin American economies 
through technical and economic assistance in order to impede the advance of 
communism, but the program also offered options to advance some of the ICT’s 
previously stated interests.  
                                                
654 André Luiz Vieira De Campos, “The Institute of Inter-American Affairs and Its Health Policies in Brazil 
during World War II,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1998): 523–34. On the economic interests 
behind this initiative see also: Benmergui, “The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro 
and Buenos Aires in the 1960s;” Patricio Del Real, "Building a Continent: The Idea of Latin American 
Architecture in the Early Postwar" (Ph.D., Columbia University, 2012); For further reading on 
Rockefeller’s initiative: Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, ¡Américas Unidas!: Nelson A. Rockefeller’s 
Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-46) (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Iberoamericana / Vervuert, 2012). 
655 Thomas Leonard, “Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA),” Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American 
Relations (Washington: CQ Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608717613. Accessed on March 12, 
2018; The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, “The Program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs,” 
1949. 
656 Erb, “Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs.” 
657 For further reading on the Alliance for Progress' political background: Williams, Understanding U.S.-
Latin American Relations, 199-200. 
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This account of events allows for a different reading than that of the prevailing 
narrative on the Alliance for Progress and Ciudad Kennedy. Specifically, it was not the 
program itself that enabled the development of Ciudad Kennedy. The ICT had already 
been an active force long before the inception of the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, 
Ciudad Kennedy was part of a larger plan the agency had initiated to respond to the acute 
housing shortage in the urban areas under a new political context at the end of the 1950s. 
In 1958, the first civil government after five years of military rule assumed power, 
representing a kind of new beginning for the country under the National Front. The 
Alliance originated in the Pan-American context and was an expression of the Cold War. 
While the ICT was certainly seeking financial aid from the U.S., the U.S. itself was 
searching for allies to develop a containment program against Communism’s expansion 
on the continent. The confluence of the Alliance for Progress and the housing project 
Ciudad Kennedy can be read as the point where two forces, coming from different 
directions and with different expectations, met. At that intersection point, the two forces 
nurtured each other, helped each other to achieve their different goals. The Ciudad 
Kennedy housing project thus became a symbol of the U.S. strategy to combat 
communism on the continent, and of the efforts of the Colombian government to 
overcome years of violence and sectarianism. Ciudad Kennedy is the embodiment of 
political interplay in the Pan-American context.  
The search for the financial means to develop Colombia’s much-needed housing 
projects was a constant throughout the period in which the ICT operated. The ICT leaders 
were persistently searching for alternative financial resources that would allow it to 
overcome the limits imposed by the national government’s allotted budget; a budget, 
which had constantly increased since the agency’s launch, but which had never been 
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enough to cover the country’s even more rapidly increasing housing shortage. The ICT 
invested $4,778,972 pesos between 1942 and 1945 and $129,353,136 pesos between 
1946 and 1956. By comparison, in 1957 alone, the ICT built housing for $33,843,924 
pesos and in 1960, $68,049,648 pesos.658 Meanwhile, the country’s housing shortage 
grew from 87,716 housing units in 1951 to 294,322 in 1963, over three times the shortage 
of the previous decade.659 
The mid-1950s was a moment of realization about how immense the task of 
solving the housing shortage was.660 The purchase of Techo, the old airport on the 
outskirts of Bogotá where Ciudad Kennedy was to be located, was a direct answer to this 
realization. The general manager presented a report in June of 1960 about the existing 
housing shortage and the financing required solving the devastatingly large housing 
deficit the country had accumulated over the past decades.661 According to this report, 
this financial need surpassed the ICT’s then-current income by far. Consequently, the 
Minister of Development offered different alternatives to increase the agency’s financial 
support. One of them was the always-present idea to seek loans abroad. In fact, the ICT 
had conversations with the Moore Lopier Corporation at the time of this meeting.662 
Thus, when the proposal to obtain credits for the housing program through the Alliance 
for Progress finally became tangible, the ICT was more than prepared to receive them.  
In the same vein, the ICT had already long-considered the strategy of self-help by 
the time it emerged as one of the Alliance’s preferred means to support Latin American 
                                                
658 Minute 15, April 19, 1961, p. 0855-back. 
659 Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed., La Demanda de Viviendas En Los Programas Del ICT y 
Las Condiciones Socio-Económicas de Los Solicitantes (Bogotá: Sección de Publicaciones del Instituto de 
Crédito Territorial, 1964), 27. 
660 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional 
de Vivienda, 1955; Instituto de Crédito Territorial, El Problema de la vivienda en Colombia.  




housing programs and was finally introduced in the 1950s on CINVA recommendation.  
Already in 1942, the former general manager had proposed a structure by which 
henceforth the agency would only work as the "auditor or controlling agent in the 
building process and the farmer would build his own house, with the technical advise of 
the agency ...." Although the Board of Directors discussed the idea of implementing self-
help programs, it had no further impact at that moment. Yet by 1955, the board 
authorized the execution of a plan to develop a mutual self-help housing program for 
"shoeshine workers" and lottery ticket vendors in Bogotá.663 
On July 1, 1958, the general manager presented the board of directors a proposal 
developed by Yolanda Martinez de Samper, which she would execute with her husband, 
architect Germán Samper Gnecco, and which they approved.664 They gathered a group of 
12 families who were seeking ways to build their own houses despite their low incomes. 
Martinez and Samper Gnecco were initially advised by CINVA's Chilean architect and 
professor, René Eyheralde Frías, who also became their permanent collaborator during 
the project’s first phase.665 Architect Francisco Pizano de Brigard, member of the ICT's 
board of directors at that time, indicated the best way to utilize the ICT's support was 
through loans for building materials and the purchase of land in La Fragua, Bogotá.666 
                                                
663 Minute 640 (incorrectly numbered: 740), August 4, 1955, p. 0293. 
664 Minute 32, July 1, 1958, p. 0504.  
665 Germán Samper. "Primer Ensayo de Construcción de Viviendas Por Ayuda Mutua y Esfuerzo Propio. 
Barrio 'La Fragua', Bogotá." Proa: Urbanismo, Arquitectura, Industrias, no. 147 (July 1961): 8-?. Other 
collaborating architects were Enrique Cerda and Jesus Useche. The firm Esguerra Suarez – Urdaneta 
Suarez led the construction's administration. (The same architects of CUAN, and the firm in which Samper 
Gnecco also became partner). Yolanda Martinez appears here as the promoter and coordinator, and Germán 
Samper as the leading architect and designer of the project. 
666 After Samper Gnecco returned from Paris, where he worked in Le Corbusier's atelier, he collaborated 
with Francisco Pizano de Brigard on the design of a project for a market and a community center in Muzu. 
In: Samper, German. "Proyecto Para un Centro Comercial En El Barrio de Muzu. Bogotá." Proa: 
Urbanismo, Arquitectura, Industrias 78 (January 1954): 25–27. 
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Through this proposal, the ideas developed in CINVA found their way into a concrete 
project now adopted by the ICT.667  
While it is not certain if the mutual self-help project with the shoeshine workers 
and lottery ticket vendors in Bogotá ever materialized, the experience of La Fragua was 
the first time the ICT participated in a self-help program. It coincided with a series of 
events that enhanced its impact and guaranteed its further implementation in other ICT 
projects. First, self-help was one of the main tools established by the technicians working 
at CINVA, which had been nurtured by the previous experience in Puerto Rico. The 
policies implemented in Puerto Rico served guidelines for future technical interventions 
in Latin America.668 In this context, Jacob Crane had already published, in 1944, an 
article on the experience in Puerto Rico. Crane apparently coined the term “self-help” and 
promoted this system even earlier than Turner.669 Second, the development of La Fragua 
coincided with the creation of Juntas de Acción Communal (Communal Action 
Committees) in Colombia. Jorge Gaitán Cortés, the same architect who a decade earlier 
had worked with the ICT and designed the neighborhood Muzú, was a councilman in 
                                                
667 To better understand the connections during this complex period, see: Jorge Alberto Rivera Páez, “El 
CINVA: Un Modelo de Cooperación Técnica: 1951-1972” (Universidad Nacional de Colombia Facultad de 
Ciencias Humanas, 2002). Martha Liliana Peña Rodríguez, El Programa CINVA y La Acción Comunal: 
Construyendo Ciudad a Través de La Participación Comunitaria, Colección Punto Aparte (Bogotá: 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Bogotá, 2010): it explains, though not completely clearly, that 
CINVA focused the first years more on the technical aspects of housing with the ICT in Quiroga. 
Progressively, the community involvement in the planning process gained relevance. The presence of 
sociologist Orlando Fals Borda played a relevant role in this change. In 1957, CINVA uses this approach in 
Siloé, Cali for the first time. The experience further developed in CINVA and originally developed in 
Puerto Rico (unlike Martha Peña, who emphasizes the experience of the TVA, and following Bermengui, 
Puerto Rico, as a poor country and good example of the way a poor country could overcome 
underdevelopment, was the antecedent to the introduction of this construction system in the ICT). 
668 On the connections between CINVA, the planning ideas current at that moment that favored this type of 
approach, and the Inter-American institutions, see: Rivera Páez, “El CINVA.” and Peña Rodríguez, El 
Programa CINVA y La Acción Comunal, 101-118. 
669 Rivera Páez, “El CINVA,” 51. Further reading on the role of Crane previous to Turner: Harris, Richard. 
"Slipping through the Cracks: The Origins of Aided Self-Help Housing, 1918-53." Housing Studies 14, no. 
3 (May 1, 1999): 281–309; Richard Harris, “The Silence of the Experts. Aided Self-Help in the Developing 
World, 1939-1954,” Habitat International 22(2) (1998): 165–89. 
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Bogotá from 1958 through 1961. He was convinced of this strategy of action, and, as 
councilman, introduced into the municipality the regulations on communal action.670 For 
him, the principles of self-help were directly connected to the work developed in 
community action.671 Finally, in November of 1958, the ICT implemented the system of 
ayuda mutua (mutual self-help) in Aguablanca, Cali.672 The ICT probably used Samper’s 
and his wife's proposal to solve an enormous problem in a different context.673 Toward 
this end, the ICT developed a financial strategy that would be used in the numerous 
projects the agency built over the next years under this system.674 Thus, under the 
transformed housing policies, which introduced self-help methods to build significantly 
more houses with the available means, planning for Ciudad Kennedy was already 
ongoing when the ICT initiated the process of applying for loans made available through 
the Alliance for Progress. 
The interactions between CINVA and the ICT intensified after this encounter 
reaching common ground around the importance of promoting self-help projects, which 
were completely in line with the ideas CINVA was trying to develop and which 
                                                
670 Although Dávila claimed that it was the experience in La Fragua that gave a decisive impulse to the 
practical implementation of this concept. Dávila, Planificación y Política En Bogotá, 123, 185, 186; Gaitán 
Cortés, Jorge. Exposición de motivos. Acuerdo No. 4 de 1959 Orgánico de la Acción Comunal en el 
Distrito Especial de Bogotá. Bogotá: Fundación Universidad de América. 1959. 
671 Dávila referenced an article published by Jorge Gaitán on this topic in the Revista de America, vol. 
XXV, No. 81, 1957: 51-58. He also presented the success of La Fragua as a further reason for Gaitán to 
support the basic ideas on mutual help and on community action in general. Dávila, Planificación y Política 
En Bogotá, 186. 
672 In: "Instituto de Crédito Territorial. 25 Años." Escala, no. 7 (1964): 1–7. 
673 On the other hand, Germán Samper wrote in a Proa article on la Fragua that they asked the ICT to meet 
the same quality conditions in La Fragua as in Aguablanca, Cali. In other words, both experiences 
influenced each other. 
674 Although Saldarriaga coincides with Samper in claiming that Aguablanca was the first project in which 
the ICT implemented the system of self-help housing, in the chapter on the Cali case, the authors claim that 
the first project was La Floresta. They do not mention Aguablanca in this context at all. In: Saldarriaga 
Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda, 53-54 (Saldarriaga pledges for Aguablanca). P. 218, 255 (La Floresta as 
first housing development through self-help); Germán Samper, “Primer Ensayo de Construcción de 
Viviendas Por Ayuda Mutua y Esfuerzo Propio. Barrio ‘La Fragua’, Bogotá.” 
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contributed strongly to widening the ICT’s reach.675 In fact, over 50% of the housing 
units built by the ICT between 1958 and 1963 were built through self-help.676 The 
general manager was able to present to the board of directors a great achievement as a 
consequence of implementing this program. According to the general manager's report, 
while the ICT had built 13,771 housing units in the decade between 1946 and 1956, it 
built 8,471, or nearly 2/3’s that number, in the three years between 1957 and 1959.677 
Thus, when the general manager asked for authorization to entering into a contract with 
CINVA in order to educate technical staff on housing through scholarships offered by the 
OAS, to receive the technical assistance sought by the ICT, and to publish materials on 
the ICT’s housing programs, the board of directors gladly gave their authorization.678 
One of CINVA's first goals was "the development of self-help methods of 
construction," and its understanding of self-help guided the implementation of this 
program in Ciudad Kennedy.679 CINVA defined self-help as  
that system in which the members of a group help each other reciprocally, each 
one of the participants benefitting from an amount of work equal to that which 
they themselves contribute. And, they are aided self-help methods because, to be 
put in practice, aid from some entity outside the group is required –whether it 
comes from national or municipal government, or more often, from official or 
semi-official organizations specializing in low-cost housing.680 
                                                
675 Against Rivera Paez, who argues that CINVA lost its independence once it became the institution 
through which the Alliance for Progress developed its program, I would argue that CINVA aimed to 
comply with the policies the U.S. was trying to carry out in Latin America through the Pan-American 
institutions, to which CINVA clearly belonged.  
676 "Of the 79,651 housing units constructed by the ICT between 1958 and 1963, aproximately 49,971 (over 
50%) were built using these methods of "autoconstrucción."" In: Rudell, “Community Development in 
Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their 
Coordination and Expansion,” 15 (4).  
677 Minute 15, April 19, 1961, p. 0855-back. 
678 Minute 16, April 26, 1961, p. 0898. 
679 Anatole A. Solow, “Urban Progress in Latin America. ‘Point IV’ Technical Assistance to Help People 
Help Themselves,” The American City 66:2 (February 1951): 112–13. 
680 CINVA's "Self-Help Housing guide," reproduced in: United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help 
Housing, Its History and Potential, 3. Harold Robinson was "formerly, Chief, Housing and Urban 
Development, Latin America Bureau, Agency for International Development."  
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This basic definition facilitates understanding the primary actors in the self-help building 
process. In addition to a participating family or families, the support of an outside 
"entity" was seen as essential to conducting a self-help program. That said, even if the 
term self-help evokes an idea of self-empowerment, it did not work without the aid, 
guidance and support from an external participant. 
Therefore, both mobilizing "domestic resources for private home ownership" and 
implementing self-help programs became essential requirements for receiving loans 
through the "Social Progress Trust Fund," the institution responsible for disbursing the 
aid given through the Alliance for Progress program, administered by the United States 
aid agencies and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Social Progress Trust 
Fund had additional requirements for receiving aid as well: adequate national housing 
policies and programs, state and private home financing institutions with efficient 
operations, and the creation or expansion of homebuilding and home-financing 
industries.681 These requirements were the basis for the cooperation between Colombia 
and the U.S. through the Alliance for Progress, and Ciudad Kennedy its realization.682  
                                                
681 Timothy Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing,” George Washington Law Review 31, no. 3 
(March 1963): 547–86. Content retrieved from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org), November 25, 2013. 
682 Alliance for Progress, ed., Resumen de La Ayuda de Los Estados Unidos a Colombia; Informe Sobre La 






Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) warned in his speech 
before Congress on July 20, 1960 about the danger that tensions between Cuba and the 
U.S. represented for Colombia’s progress and continental security.684 He was not alone in 
his concern, and especially, with its possible implications. Under Soviet threat in the 
tensions of the Cold War, the United States soon found it necessary to strengthen its ties 
to Latin America at both the political and economical levels. Within this political context, 
Colombia became one of the closest allies of the U.S. in Latin America.  
The U.S. initiative to strengthen ties with Latin American governments developed 
through several encounters. In September of 1960 the Organization of American States, 
OAS, met in Bogotá, which resulted in the Bogotá Act, in which: 
                                                
683 Accessed: august 7, 2017. 




the United States committed itself formerly to (1) the position "that the 
preservation and strengthening of free and democratic institutions in the American 
republics requires the acceleration of social and economic progress in Latin 
America adequate to meet the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the 
Americas for a better life and to provide them the fullest opportunity to improve 
their status," and to (2) aid to improve housing and community facilities as an 
important aspect of social progress. At the same time, the United States 
committed itself to seek an initial appropriation of $500 million in support of 
projects in the social development field, much of which was to be directed to 
housing improvement.685 
After taking office on January 20, 1961, President Kennedy presented his proposal for the 
Alliance for Progress program, for which he asked Congress to appropriate the finances 
prescribed in the Bogotá Act.686 More specifically, he claimed that "the most promising 
means of improving mass housing is through aided self-help projects"687 Next, he 
composed a study group, known as the "Task Force on Latin America," to study 
hemispheric relations and move the Alliance for Progress forward.688 Almost 
simultaneously, the ICT board of directors was discussing the need to activate U.S. 
government loans with the general manager, instead of pursuing loans with private banks. 
The risks associated with loans in dollars were too high to be assumed by the agency due 
to the extreme fluctuations in currency exchange rates.689 
Subsequently, President Kennedy announced in March 1961 at the White House, 
"before Latin American diplomats and Members of Congress", that the Alliance for 
Progress was "a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of 
purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, 
                                                
685 In: Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing.” 
686 Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 158. 
687 The quotation continues: "and this sentiment was supported with AID dollar loans, in addition to those 
made by the Inter-American Development Bank, ..." since AID was launched on May 26, 1961. See: 
Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 161; United States and Robinson, 
Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 17. 
688 On February 2, 1961. Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 159. 
689 Minute 3, February 1, 1961, p. 0737-back. 
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health and schools – techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela."690  According to his 
proposal, this program should be developed as a ten-year plan to "transform the 1960´s 
into an historic decade of democratic progress." He stressed especially the need to work 
on economic and social development.691  Kennedy´s speech was embedded in a discourse 
of modernization and progress and emanated optimism and confidence. In this narrative, 
the construction of housing projects as part of this immense program enabled the 
improvement of the inhabitants’ living conditions. It operated simultaneously as a 
strategy to impede the expansion of communism. 
Concurrently, the Colombian government had already started the process of 
applying for loans through the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). In March of 
1961 the Minister of Development communicated to the board of directors the need to 
present the U.S. government with a housing plan to justify the loan. Ciudad Kennedy was 
one of the ongoing housing plans included in this application.692 Thus, at the moment the 
Alliance of Progress was taking shape, the ICT already had a number of plans that could 
be used to apply for loans. Shortly after, the general manager announced $500,000 had 
                                                
690 In: John F. Kennedy, President Kennedy Speaks on the Alliance for Progress: Addresses and Remarks, 
the First Year (Washington: Agency for International Development, U. S. Dept. of State, 1962), 5. 
691 "Our continents are bound together by a common history-the endless exploration of new frontiers. Our 
nations are the product of a common struggle-the revolt from colonial rule. And our people share a 
common heritage-the quest for the dignity and the freedom of man. 
.... 
Our Hemisphere´s mission is not yet completed. For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate [...] that man´s 
unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working 
within a framework of democratic institutions. 
.... 
As a citizen of the United States, let me be the first to admit that we North Americans have not always 
grasped the significance of this common mission, just as it is also true that many in your own countries 
have not fully understood the urgency of the need to lift people from poverty and ignorance and despair. 
But we must turn from these mistakes-from the failures and the misunderstandings of the past-to a future 
full of peril but bright with hope." President Kennedy. Address at the White House before Latin American 
diplomats, and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961. In: Kennedy, President Kennedy Speaks on the 
Alliance for Progress, 3-4. 
692 Minute 8, March 3, 1961, p. 0778-back. 
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been donated through the Point IV Program of the U.S. government. The ICT intended to 
use the money to purchase building materials for the self-help projects in Bogotá, but also 
in Medellín, Cali and La Dorada.693 Grateful for the augmented resources, the board of 
directors sent a note of thanks to president Lleras Camargo for his support, and expressed 
the agency’s wish "to work with determination and enthusiasm to achieve the ambitious 
housing plan defined by the national government through the ICT."694 
On May 26, 1961, the U.S. launched the Agency for International Development 
(AID), through which the funding for the Alliance for Progress program would run.695 On 
July 8th of that year, Kennedy's "Task Force on Latin America" delivered its final report 
on the Alliance for Progress, "United States Policy Toward Latin America."696 Finally, 
and as a result of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting between all 
the countries in North and South America led by the United States in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, in August 1961, the "Declaration of Punta del Este" was signed.697 This 
declaration formalized the program’s initiation and committed the U.S. government to 
provide one billion dollars in aid during its first year.698 With its stated goal of developing 
"urban and rural housing programs to provide decent homes for all our people," housing 
policy and improvement became a central point of the Alliance program.699 Further, the 
signatory countries "proclaimed their decision to ‘increase the construction of low-cost 
houses for low-income families in order to replace inadequate and deficient housing and 
                                                
693 Minute 10, March 15, 1961, p. 0794-back - 0795. Two months later, the ICT was still "formalizing the 
negotiations" for the disbursement of this donation. But the general manager also expressed his confidence 
that the contract would be soon signed. Minute 19, May 17, 1961, p. 0954 - 0954-back. 
694 Minute 28, July 19, 1961, p. 1056-back – 1057. 
695 Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 161. 
696 Ibid. 
697 At the same time the Berlin wall was built. 
698 Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 162. 
699 Alliance for Progress, ed., Resumen de La Ayuda de Los Estados Unidos a Colombia; Informe Sobre La 
Asistencia Económica de Los Estados Unidos (Bogotá, 1966).  
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to reduce housing shortages.’" Aided self-help was the method selected to provide such 
housing.700 Also during this meeting, the Inter-American Commission for the Alliance for 
Progress was established as the program’s directing body, and the IDB was chosen as the 
institution in charge of the financial its aspects.701 Before that meeting, the U.S. 
government handed $349 million over to the IDB for the Alliance for Progress.702   
When the Alliance for Progress was finally launched in 1961, President Kennedy 
appointed Teodoro Moscoso as its Coordinator and as Regional Administrator for Latin 
America for AID.703 The Alliance for Progress required the implementation of self-help 
programs. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as the institution responsible 
for administering the financial assistance for the Alliance for Progress program, 
recognized a number of benefits in the implementation of self-help housing programs: 
...the social values of families cooperating with others in creating housing with 
their own hands, and lower construction costs, ... reduce the initial cash down 
payment, increase the participant's equity by the value of his labor, and permit the 
acquisition of new skills which might eventually be employed in other sectors of 
the country's development.704  
                                                
700 United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 22. 
701 Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 162. 
702 Ibid., 161. 
703 https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-11-14-D.aspx. Accessed: September 
28, 2017. 















Figure 4.4. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator of the program Alliance for Progress, in 
Ciudad Kennedy. In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. Revista 
Ciudad Kennedy. Vol. No. 01. Bogotá: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 
Departamento de Relaciones Públicas, 1964. 
As administrator of the Economic Development Administration in Puerto Rico, 
Teodoro Moscoso developed and led Operation Bootstrap on the island.705 Operation 
Bootstrap was seen, as scholar Leandro Benmergui maintains, "as the exemplar of how a 
                                                
705 This was an economic plan for modernizing the island through industrialization under the leadership of 




poor country could progress economically."706 Concomitantly with this program, a 
housing program commenced in 1949 in Puerto Rico. Self-help and mutual aid methods 
played an important role in its development, which increased its pace throughout the 
1950s.707  
Shortly after the Declaration of Punta del Este was signed, a commission of 
experts met in Washington on August 18, 1961, to initiate the program and define its 
implementation in each country.708 Colombia was selected as one of the first countries 
where the Alliance would be active, and Ciudad Kennedy became an example of how 
U.S. support could be understood. The work the ICT was already doing at Ciudad 
Kennedy was a major factor in favor of the project receiving a substantial amount of the 
initial aid. "This preparedness was a major point in favor of the project, and represented 
the intent of the Colombian Government."709 
Thus, Colombia became a kind of showcase of the Alliance for U.S. 
policymakers, who "saw it as one of the countries having the best chance for rapid 
economic and social development." The country was most likely to become, as one of 
them put it, "an anchor point of stability in the unsettled Caribbean." Furthermore, 
"American foreign policy badly needed a success story in Latin America ..., and 
Colombia led the polls as the most likely to succeed."710  Colombia needed some help 
                                                
706 Benmergui, “The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 
1960s.” 
707 Vázquez Calcerrada, Housing in Puerto Rico under the Mutual Aid and Self-Help Program. 
708 Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 162. 
709 George A. Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its 
Economic Aspects,” CINVA Summer Research Fellow. Harvard University (Bogotá: Colección Centro 
Interamericano de Vivienda – CINVA, September 1962), Publicaciones, Box 61, file 4, Colección Centro 
Interamericano de Vivienda – CINVA, Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 10. 
710 Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate and the Comptroller General. Survey of the 
Alliance for Progress. Colombia –a Case History of U.S. Aid. Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 1969, 10. 
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too. President Lleras Camargo explained Vice President Nixon in a conversation with 
him during his trip to Latin America in 1958 that "if a better way of life could not be 
available to the people, an 'explosion' was inevitable."711 In fact, on October 12, 1961, a 
state of siege was declared in Colombia. President Lleras Camargo had already asked the 
U.S. to train the military to fight insurgency.712 A month later, Kennedy announced that 
the U.S. would provide help for internal security.713 Despite the clear deference to Lleras 
Camargo, Kennedy's visit to Colombia in December of 1961 was hastily planned.714 In 
fact, the board of directors only mentioned his visit on December 6, 1961, two weeks 
prior to his arrival, and only to approve the contribution of one million pesos for the 
construction of the first school in Ciudad Kennedy in his honor.715 
                                                
711 Williams, Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations, 201. 
712 In October, 1960. Caballero Argáez et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, 157. 
713 Ibid., 163.  
714 Ibid. 
715 Minute 47, December 6, 1961, p. 1388. 
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Figure 4.5. Colombian President Lleras Camargo, the US President´s wife Jacquelyn 
Kennedy, and US President John F. Kennedy in the inauguration of Ciudad 
Kennedy, during their official visit on December 17, 1961, Bogotá, Colombia. 
Foto: Daniel Rodríguez. Fondo Daniel Rodríguez. Colección Museo de Bogotá. 
MdB16395. 
As a result of this cooperation, the Government of Colombia received, on behalf 
of the ICT, substantial loans with long-term amortizations and low interest rates 
throughout the 1960s, including $12 million from the Development Loan Fund (DLF) 
between 1961 and 1970 to "assist programs of aided self-help housing, with an 
amortization of 20 years and 4% interest, repayable in dollars."716 In July of 1961, the 
ICT's general manager wrote a report on a trip to Washington to negotiate this loan, 
                                                




stating that the loan "was secured and the proposed investment program accepted: $6 
million for the self-help program, $3 million for the three-part program, and $3 million 
for the program of loans for lot owners.”717 The same month, the contract for this loan 
was signed,718 and with it, the construction of houses through self-help programs in 
Ciudad Kennedy were financed: 971 houses type B through aided self-help with utilities, 
totaling $5,592,700 pesos and 453 houses type B plus $3,500 pesos through aided mutual 
help with utilities, totaling $1,585,500 pesos.719 Furthermore, from 1962 to 1973 
Colombia also received two loans for the ICT from the Inter-American Development 
Bank through the Social Progress Trust Fund. The first was for $15.2 million US dollars, 
and the second was for 25.2 million US dollars. These monies were to be applied to the 
"Assistance in financing program of low-cost housing (some built by public bidding, 
some aided self-help housing, some mortgage lending)." The first IDB loan had an 
amortization of "20 years, 1 1/4% interest, and 3/4% service charge, repayable in local 
currency."720 The second had the same amortization period, but with an interest rate of 
2.75%.  
Although the ICT had already begun its application for an IDB loan at the 
beginning of 1961, as stated earlier, by July of 1961 no decision about the application had 
yet been made, neither at the time the general manager was in Washington in October of 
                                                
717 Minute 26, July 5, 1961, p. 1042-back – 1043. 
718 Minute 27, July 12, 1961, p. 1053: The president and the finance minister sent the contract for a 
12million loan with the Development Loan Fund.  Minute 28, July 19, 1961, p. 1056-back: Signature of the 
contract (#207) for the 12 million loan from the Development Loan Fund. 
719 Minute 5, February 7, 1962, p. 0124: In the same minute, following financing plan was listed: 300 
houses type A and $4.750 through aided mutual help within the first phase for 930,000 pesos. Material 
purchase for 280 houses type plan through aided self-help (previous denominations were actually only self-
help. This is the first time it really means aided self-help: EPD, Esfuerzo Propio Dirigido) -4 plus $ 2,500 
pesos in the first phase for $700.000 pesos. 302 houses type aided self-help – 4 plus 1,500 pesos in the first 
phase for $453,000 pesos. 
720 Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing.” The initial interest rate was 3 ¼%, and was then lowered to 
2%; Minute 51, November 19, 1962, p. 0829-back. 
282 
 
1961.721 At this time, however, the secretary of the Ministry of Development announced 
that the National Government communicated to the IDB its intention to assume the debt 
of the loan the ICT was applying for with the IDB. The aim of this decision was to 
increase the ICT’s capital through the Finance Ministry.722 The loan was finally approved 
in November of 1961, and the contract signed in December of 1961, shortly before 
President Kennedy's visit.723 Even so, in April of 1962, documents for receiving the first 
disbursement of the IDB loan were still being signed.724 The disbursement of the IDB 
loans was not an easy issue. Several times, the ICT's general manager asked for 
authorization to seek short term loans to bridge the financial gaps produced by delays in 
loan disbursements.725 In spite of this, the Colombian government was already preparing 
the application for a second loan of $25 million dollars. At the beginning of 1963, the 
general manager reported that the application was presented to the Department of State, 
"with special recommendation to Doctor Fosum," and that it had a good chance to "be 
approved in the short term."726  
From the portion of these loans assigned to the ICT, the agency allocated the 
following resources for Ciudad Kennedy: 
                                                
721 Minute 26, July 5, 1961, p. 1042-back/1043. "The $ 129 million pesos loan requested by the Inter-
American Development Bank is most likely to succeed." This amount corresponds roughly to the first loan 
granted to Colombia of 15,2 million dollar, to a exchange rate of 8,5. 
722 Minute 42, October 25, 1961, p. 1293-back. 
723 Minute 45, November 22, 1961, p. 1318. Minute 48, December 13, 1961, p. 1425. 
724 Minute 15, April 25, 1962, p. 0279-back. 
725 Minute 56, December 6, 1962, p. 0860-back. The disbursement of the US loans had some delays, thus an 
extension to pay back the debts contracted with commercial US banks was necessary. Also, other short 
term loans are necessary to cover the delay until the final disbursement of the US loans. Otherwise, the ICT 
would need to suspend or delay the construction program. Minute 6, 1963 / 024-back: Need to seek a short-
term loan of $1 million US dollars to pay the immediate expenses for the projects, for the IDB has taken 
longer to disburse the payment for which the bills were already sent. There is an offer from the French-
Italian Bank to give this short-term loan, 5 months, with annual interest of 9%. The board approves the 
request. 
726 Minute 1, 1963, p. 002-back. 
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DLF      $14,000,000 pesos (US$1,400,000) 
IDB      $56,000,000 pesos (US$5,600,000) 
Export-Import Bank   $10,000,000 pesos (US$1,000,000) 
Aid for International Development $1,200,000 pesos (US$120,000)727 
The ICT’s building activity was greatly shaped by these loans. From 1939 to 1964 
the ICT built ca. 118,000 housing units in the country. But the period with the highest 
construction activity was 1961 to 1964, when the ICT built 71% of all their housing 
projects.728 Beginning in 1961, all systems of operation were implemented at the same 
time. With the U.S. and the IDB´s loans, the ICT built 73,400 housing units in that 
period. The economic crisis of 1963 showed its effects in the following years. After that, 
the agency’s construction activity decreased enormously.  
Ciudad Kennedy met nearly exactly the guidelines and requirements defined by 
the U.S. aid agencies, and represented the measure by which the success of U.S. 
American foreign policy in Latin America could be assessed. Similarly as in other Latin 
American cities, U.S. American technical and financial support converged in Ciudad 
Kennedy. The self-help programs operated in Ciudad Kennedy differentiate, however, 
between individual aided self-help and mutual aided self-help. Although the ICT 
implemented and supported both, the latter prevailed.729 In the former, "each family 
works on its own house only," and no down payment was necessary. In the latter, “a 
group of families works as a team."730 Because hiring experienced "construction labor for 
                                                
727 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects,” 16. According to same author, "the rate of exchange in terms of US dollars is approximately 10 
to 1, as of September, 1964," 7. 
728 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ed., Ciudad Kennedy Una Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965 (Bogotá, 
1965). 
729 Gómez Gómez, “Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. 
Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas,” 7.  
730 United States and Robinson, Aided Self-Help Housing, Its History and Potential, 4. 
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the ordinary five-day work week" was nonetheless necessary, the program implemented 
in Ciudad Kennedy was referred to as a "modified mutual-aid housing program."731 In 
Ciudad Kennedy, after agreeing upon the design and financial arrangements, the 
participating families were assigned to a specific work team, which included the other 
families of one and the same housing block. The families agreed to work at least ten 
hours per week, usually during hours outside of their regular work hours, often on 
"Saturday afternoons, Sunday mornings, and [during] vacations.”732 The ICT, in turn, 
provided "an urbanized plot, sold in rates, and a credit in building materials for each 
participant family." Both social workers and technicians from ICT and CINVA provided 
technical assistance in the construction of the houses and coordinated participants' teams 
"to work together in the construction of the houses, under a series of rules."733  From the 
567 housing units that were planned in superblock 6A (Figure 4.6.), at least 342 houses 
were built under the self-help program as part of the course "Training in self-help 
housing," taught for the first time at CINVA. The course, in which housing professionals 
from different American countries and disciplines participated, took place from 
September 1962 to February 1963.734 Two types of houses were built in this superblock, 
House type A and B.  
                                                
731 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects,” 9. 
732 Ibid. 
733 Gomez Gomez, “Investigacion Individual. Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua 
de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas.” 6. 
734 Colección Centro Interamericano De Vivienda –CINVA, Publicaciones, 342 casas A.M.D4MAS Losa 
3500 Tipo A/B, 1962, box 22, files 85/86/87, planchas. Ciudad de Techo. And: Colección Centro 
Interamericano De Vivienda –CINVA, Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy, September 1963 - 
February 1964, Box 42, file 73, curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstruccion, Practicas 
de construcción por Rubén Donath, Planchas Ciudad de Techo. 
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Figure 4.6. Ciudad Kennedy. 24/12/1963. Saúl Orduz. Fondo Saúl Orduz / Colección 
Museo de Bogotá. MdB05613 
Since this superblock was built in collaboration with the students of CINVA’s 
course on self-help construction, there is detailed information on the plans of each block. 
The block was the planning and building basic unit. Every block, except for one reserved 
for a group of journalists, was built by the families assigned to it and supervised by a 
group of professionals participating in the course. Ideally, different nationalities should 
be represented in each small CINVA student’s group.735 Each group had four 
professionals in two different areas: the social and the technical. Corresponding to the 
former, the most common profession was the social worker, and to the latter, the 
architect. Many groups had a member with a more practical background, such as a master 
                                                
735 In this course specifically, the countries participating were: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, El 




builder (maestro de obra).736 The ICT in general took responsibility for the employment 
of the workforce needed to construct the houses.737 CINVA seems to have been working 
on prefabricated elements to be implemented in the SM 16, and was in charge of 
developing the technical aspects of the construction and of training the staff.  CINVA 
also advised the ICT on the technical issues that emerged during the process. The 
building materials were disposed in a previously determined place in each block.738 
The Alliance for Progress had remarkable consequences in Colombia. With the 
program, in some cities the ascendant housing deficit was halted, as happened in 1962. In 
others, the social tensions deriving from the lack of a home were reduced, "a definitive 
step has been taken towards social balance."739 Despite this positive impact on the housing 
shortage, it had to be acknowledged that under this scheme, the available financing would 
not suffice to accomplish such ambitious goals, the main reason being the sheer 
immensity of the urban housing deficit in Latin America.740 The United Nations 
estimated the existing deficit at that time to be twelve to fourteen million homes, not 
                                                
736 Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. sep 1963-feb 1964, box 42, Carpeta 73, curso 002 
CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstruccion, Practicas de construccion por Rubén Donath., 
Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheet 2-4. 
737 However, some restrictions applied. In: Field visit report. Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad 
Kennedy. September 1963-February 1964, box 42, Carpeta 73, curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento 
en autoconstruccion, Practicas de construccion por Rubén Donath, Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección 
Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
Sheet 84. 
738 Memorandum from Rafael Mora Rubio, fieldwork director, to the engineer Eduardo Guzmán Bravo, 
leading professor of this course in CINVA. In: Planchas, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. Sep. 1963-
Feb. 1964, box 42, File 73, course 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstrucción, Prácticas de 
construcción por Rubén Donath., Planchas Ciudad de Techo. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda 
y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheets 78, 79. 
739 The acute housing deficit nurtured the rising social unrest in the cities, and building housing rapidly, was a way to avoid worse 
unrest. Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), ed. Proyectos y Realizaciones En Vivienda: La Alianza Para El Progreso. 
Colombia: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 1962. 
740 U.N. Demographic Yearbook (1961). In: Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing.” 
287 
 
including the almost one million new additional homes that would be needed for an urban 
population expanding at the rate of five per cent (5%) annually. 
Although initially planned to operate for at least ten years, the Alliance only 
lasted from 1961 to 1969. Diverse factors, which contributed to its untimely end, give 
account of the different levels playing a role in this program.741 However, the 
assassination of president Kennedy in 1963 marked a shifting moment. Although the new 
president, Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his commitment to sustaining the Alliance for 
Progress, the selection of Thomas Mann, an Alliance skeptic, to replace Teodoro 
Moscoso as the new coordinator of the program, initiated a reduction of its importance in 
U.S. government affairs.742 In Colombia, the 1962 election of the conservative politician 
Guillermo Leon Valencia also contributed to a less committed effort by the Colombian 
Government to seek financial means for the construction of low-cost housing.  
Evaluating the impact of US financial assistance on the construction of Ciudad 
Kennedy, different reports agree on that despite the enormous help, the proposed goals, 
as specified in the Program Alliance for Progress, have not been achieved. In its Survey 
of the Alliance for Progress, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated in 1969 that "the 
U.S. foreign assistance program in Colombia has achieved a basic political objective, but 
it has fallen far short of the economic and social goals."743 One indication of this failure is 
the per capita gross national product, which "increased only from $276 to $295 a year, an 
annual average rate of 1.2 percent, compared to the Punta del Este goal of 2.5 percent."744 
Additionally, the high devaluation and extreme inflation in several Latin American 
                                                
741 From the Vietnam War to the demographic and social transformations in Latin America, the complex 
interaction of those different factors is pedagogically explained in: Williams, Understanding U.S.-Latin 
American Relations, 190-214. 
742 Ibid., 205. 




economies in the late 1960s and early 1970s diminished the hopes expressed in 
Kennedy´s speech. The Colombian peso depreciated from 8.5 to the dollar in 1961 to 
16.45 in 1968, and this had negative consequences for the agency’s financial stability.745 
Lastly, the ICT states in its final report concerning U.S. aid through the Alliance for 
Progress, that despite its best efforts, the housing shortage had continued at an ascendant 
rate, except for the year 1962, during which the housing deficit remained stable after 
building 55,000 new housing units.746 
U.S. aid through the Alliance for Progress and its application to social housing 
projects like Ciudad Kennedy leave a bitter aftertaste. First, the hope that the aid would 
activate the economy to a level at which the country could abandon the label 
underdeveloped country never came to pass. Second, as the U.S. government stated in its 
evaluation of this experience, many factors hampered the achievement of the programs 
initial goals. These factors correlate with the Colombian government and elites’ failure to 
carry out the necessary policy reforms and to diminish income differences. These 
concerns led to he U.S. government to pose the following question:  
The aid program in Colombia has bought time for Colombian political institutions 
to work out the changes which almost everybody in a position of responsibility in 
either country agrees must come. But Colombians have used this time at their 
leisure. The question which this study raises but cannot answer is: Would they 
have moved more expeditiously if they had had less time, or would the pressures 
have been so great that the whole structure of the country would have collapsed 
into anarchy or dictatorship?747  
                                                
745 As saldarriaga noted: “[T]he cost of debt had a high influence on the decapitalization of the agency. It 
repayed the debt as well as the interest in dollars, while it granted soft loans in the increasingly devalued 
national currency. In: Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda 
Social En Colombia 1939-1989, 33. 
746 Instituto de Crédito Territorial and United States, eds., Programa de Vivienda de Interés Social Dentro 
de La Alianza Para El Progreso; Préstamo D.L.F. No. 207, Informe Final (Bogotá, 1966), 10. 
747 Committee on Foreign Relations and United States Senate, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 5. 
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Finally, the aid was a loan, and though the conditions of the loan were favorable, 
this situation would change over time owing to steadily higher interest rates and strong 
inflation rates. Consequently, by the time the loans came due in the seventies, the debt 
was much higher than the money received ten years before.  
To conclude, the development of Ciudad Kennedy played out at both national and 
international levels. Internationally, U.S. aid to Colombia during the Cold War, against a 
broad and complex political backdrop, heavily shaped relations within and between Latin 
American countries. Nationally, through the projects of the ICT, and especially Ciudad 
Kennedy, multiple actors came together at different levels. Many politicians were heavily 




Chapter 5:  Housing as a controlling tool. Civilizing and educating the 
people. Morality and Hygiene in the work of the ICT 
 
While the ICT certainly ameliorated living conditions for its targeted population 
with its modern houses in spacious neighborhoods, those housing projects also served as 
a tool to civilize and promote the moral integrity of their inhabitants. Even the task of 
providing housing itself can be seen as a moralizing one: Carlos Lleras Restrepo 
emphasized in a speech in 1942 that the transformation of housing and social habits was 
an educational and civilizing work.748 The civilizing character of the ICT's housing 
projects applied to both rural and urban populations. Offering ICT-built housing in the 
different parts of the country, the board of directors brought "the consolations of 
Christian civilization...."749 On the other hand, seeking to promote moral integrity, the 
ICT enforced social control in several ways, which varied over time. The process of 
selecting residents, the guidelines for living in the new environment (printed or 
transmitted in workshops), and visits by social workers after the houses were occupied 
                                                
748 Speech held in June of 1942 by the inauguration of the first model popular neighborhood in Bogotá. In: 
Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 30 Años de Servicio, 7. 
749 This assertion is part of a broader report by board member Camilo Gómez, on the living conditions of 
the Magdalena River region. In this report he also stated "this is a problem that official entities are required 
to resolve in a way that prevents the depletion of the population and the destruction of the race..." Having 
established clear "statistics" on the population, Gomez' proposal insisted that it was necessary "to elaborate 
a plan of colonization, technical, hygienic and of easy execution..." In:  Minute 446, October 5, 1950, p. 
1118 – 1118-back. Camilo Gómez moved forward with the housing proposal for the residents living on the 
banks of the Magdalena River, asking the general manager to designate the necessary staff to elaborate a 
plan with the necessary number of dwellings and their location, building types that could be constructed 
methodically and according to the needs of each part of the region. In: Minute 448, October 26, 1950, p. 
1126. Interestingly, Carlos Martinez, PROA magazine’s editor, also brings the three terms together: 
Christianianity, civilization and the Magdalena River in his Book on Colombian architecture: “The 
Magdalena River has rightly been called ‘the father of the nation.’ It is the great road. The great navigable 
road through which all that was related to industries, commerce and wars traveled for 400 years in slow and 
painful pilgrimage. Christianity and civilization moved on its back. Today airplanes are snatching its 
excellence.” In: Martínez and Arango, Arquitectura En Colombia, 8. 
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are some of the mechanisms through which social control was exercised. Thus, social 
control refers to the different measures the ICT took to maintain order in their newly 
created neighborhoods and to the provision of means to learn how to "adequately" use the 
new houses. This meant educating the inhabitants, which was the core of social 
component of the housing projects the ICT built. 
Social control started with the selection of future inhabitants. The process of 
selecting residents was intended to be as objective as possible, but it also served as a tool 
for controlling what kind of inhabitants could populate the projects. The selection criteria 
went beyond the families’ financial means, and included questions such as family 
composition and the nature of marital relationships. Such questions served to assess the 
families’ moral integrity. There were not few applications rejected by the agency because 
the partners were unmarried or due to adultery. Moral integrity was a required 
characteristic for the targeted population of ICT housing projects. Even when the selected 
families became homeowners, the fact that the state made this ownership possible 
subjected them to state control in its different forms. 
Because the agency was convinced that their task went beyond merely providing 
housing, the social component of the urban housing projects in Colombia, so far as it is 
described in ICT publications, aimed to alleviate the shocks of migration from rural areas 
and to support future residents in learning the rules of good citizenry—among other 
things, becoming reliable clients of the agency by paying back their loans.750  
                                                
750 “The objectives of the program, difficult to fulfill, are to achieve a change of attitudes and values in 
order to adopt a way of life not practiced before. The goal is that in a short time families adopt the proposed 
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The recognition that residents’ previous living conditions were not only 
conditions of poverty, but also of "ignorance and instability," demonstrates the rationale 
behind the ICT's social programs.751 This departs from the preconception that the new 
residents were previously in a state of both material and spiritual need. This scarcity is 
what the different agencies, not only the ICT, tried to address through education in the 
period of this study.752 Ciudad Kennedy is an interesting case in point. There, different 
agencies attempted  "to assimilate the new residents … into the urban system..."753 
through a wide array of educational programs. In doing so, Ciudad Kennedy became a 
vast field of experimentation for "social engineering."754 
This perceived state of moral scarcity is associated with the debate on eugenics 
that took place from the beginning of the 20th century in Latin America. In Colombia, 
this discussion focused on the means to overcome disadvantages derived from being 
mixed race.755 In that context, the country’s elites saw in education and hygiene 
appropriate strategies for achieving progress. Thus, politicians and physicians alike 
shared the notion that the  "moral and physiological restoration" of the low-income 
population could be achieved through teaching basic rules of hygiene and education in 
                                                                                                                                            
changes, after overcoming the instability that they suffer in every order, and especially in the psychological 
one, when they suddenly are transplanted to a new environment, without traditions, without history, 
without known neighbors, without established organization. They are also committed to new economic, 
social and administrative responsibilities.” In: Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Ciudad Kennedy Una 
Realidad, 1961-Diciembre-1965, 15. 
751 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 8. 
752 "On the fields of Colombia, ignorance and illness still reign in a disconcerting way: Millions of 
Colombians and vast extensions of the national territory suffer the consequences not only of the tropical 
climate, but also of those inherent to the absolute lack of health and hygiene.” Jorge Bejarano, National 
Director of Health and Vice Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau of Washington. Bejarano, Jorge. 
"La Higiene En Colombia." La Reforma Médica 32 (468) (February 1946): 96–99. 
753 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 8. 
754 Ibid., 9. 
755 Noguera, Medicina y política. Parte II: La Politización de la Medicina, Evolucionismo y movimiento 
eugenésico en Colombia. 
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new habits and customs.756 The educational aspects of the social component in the ICT 
housing program respond to this notion.  
Consequently, the underlying idea of the ICT's housing projects was to create an 
ordered environment with hygienic housing. Order and hygiene were instruments to 
achieve the moral restoration of low-income residents. This principle accounts well for 
the goals that the country’s elites, represented in the agency’s leaders, tried to achieve 
with the provision of housing and the education of its residents. Order and hygiene are 
thus the connectors between architecture and moralism. The aims of social housing in 
Colombia, as architects, politicians and bureaucrats proclaimed, were related to the 
provision of an immaculate environment where families could conduct a healthy and 
moral life. As president Eduardo Santos expressed in a note for a publication 
commerating ICT’s thirtieth anniversary, "[i]n many cases, ..., morality can be, and is, a 
matter of housing. Nothing is so dangerous as the cohabitation of entire families in tight 
places, neglected and poor. That is an evil that must be eliminated…”757 These dwellings, 
then, were built to create an environment able to foster a new kind of citizenship, one that 
would transform society itself. In terms of the ICT, it meant: "And if someone asks what 
does the ICT aim at? It could be simply answered: to shape citizens, to make with this 
housing policy a factory of citizens for the Republic of Colombia."758  Hygiene, as a way 
to transform a society the elites considered to be backward, was crucial in the project to 
transform the built environment of those living in precarious conditions. Improving the 
                                                
756 Discussed in depth by: Noguera, Medicina y política. Parte II: La Politización de la Medicina, 
Evolucionismo y movimiento eugenésico en Colombia. p. 102; Muñoz, “To Colombianize Colombia;” 
Gutierrez, “Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En Colombia 
En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX.” 
757 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 30 Años de Servicio. 
758 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario Nacional 
de Vivienda, 1955. 
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housing conditions of the poor was also seen as a strategy to increase the performance of 
the labor force, to "elevate the moralism in customs," and to enhance the "hygiene and 
health" of its inhabitants.759 
 
HYGIENE AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AS AN EDUCATIONAL TOOL 
In colonial America, the city was a place to realize a rational idea of social 
order.760 The house, as the city's fundamental cell in the logic of modern urban thinking, 
reflects the same ideas that once were held about the city as a whole. Thus, the housing 
projects built by the ICT were the physical expression of a hygienic and ordered 
environment.  
Hygiene was an essential part of the housing programs from the agency’s 
inception. In the institutional discourse, houses needed to be hygienic; they were the 
bearer of the message of hygiene. Rural housing was defined by this main characteristic 
from the start. When the board of directors met for the first time on March 8, 1939, one 
of the initial issues Carlos Lleras Restrepo, former Minister of Finance and Public Credit 
and the main representative of the board, discussed was the necessity to fight the spread 
of bartonellosis in Nariño Department. According to the authorities, this disease could 
only be eradicated through tearing down the "infected houses," and building new 
[hygienic] ones. This was seen as a sanitation emergency that needed to be addressed as 
soon as possible.761   
                                                
759 Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 30 Años de Servicio, 11. 
760 Angel Rama, The Lettered City. Translated by John Charles Chasteen. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press Books, 1996; Richard M. Morse and Jorge Enrique Hardoy, eds. Rethinking the Latin American City. 
Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
761 The general manager informed that the bartonellosis infection was more alarming every day, and that it 
required more attention and ten times more resources to those currently employed, otherwise the infection 
would spread to other departments causing immense problems. Minute 11, 21 June 1939, p. 29. 
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Hygiene also defined the urban housing projects. After visiting the first Urban 
Working-class Model Neighborhood finished in Bucaramanga, in the Santander 
department in 1943, the general manager emphasized the great benefits these 
neighborhoods would bring to the country when it became evident to the national 
government "how little money is necessary to build a "nice, confortable, hygienic house,” 
and not the "monstrosities that are usually built in the towns with a high cost but with no 
comfort and even without hygiene."762  Through this hygiene campaign, which was part 
of a larger phenomenon in the country, the ICT received the support of diverse state 
institutions, especially the Ministry of Labor and Hygiene, whose engineers worked very 
closely with the ICT from the start, and until 1943 still gave direct advice when referring 
to issues related to hygiene. At that point, the discourse of hygiene was still limited to the 
physical characteristics of the houses.763  
While in Alberto Saldarriaga's fundamental publications on the ICT and housing 
built by the state, the "hygienic period" of social housing in Colombia ended in 1942; the 
notion of hygiene was consistently present in ICT discourse during the entire decade of 
the 1940s.764 As a matter of fact, according to Maria Teresa Gutierrez, the hygienic 
period in Colombia "ended in 1953, with the creation of the Ministry of Health, when the 
hygienist ideology transformed into a public health ideology."765 Some events give 
account of the importance of hygiene in the ICT’s housing programs during the 1940s. 
                                                
762 Minute 159, September 1943, p. 382. 
763 Minute 166, November1943, p. 393 - back. The Ministry of Labor and Hygiene sent engineers to 
evaluate the first house built following the winning model for a "Minimal House" competition under 
hygienic aspects, for they considered that even if it was a "minimal house" it still had to comply with 
minimal requisites posed by the rural life dynamic, and by the hygienic norms. 
764 This periodization has been broadly accepted and used by later publications on Social Housing in 
Colombia. Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio Siglo de Vivienda Social En 
Colombia 1939-1989; Saldarriaga Roa, Estado, ciudad y vivienda.  
765 Gutierrez, “Proceso de Institucionalización de La Higiene: Estado, Salubridad e Higienismo En 
Colombia En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XX.” 
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First, the ICT introduced nurses into its housing programs to teach the inhabitants the 
essentials on hygiene.766 In addition, Dr. Jorge Bejarano, "National Director of Health in 
Colombia," planned an exhibition on hygiene in December 1945, to which the ICT 
contributed a presentation of the models of the rural housing types, and with information 
booklets on the same topic so that "large land owners could see options to improve the 
living conditions of their workers."767 Bejarano, whose role was essential in the 
discussion on hygiene in Colombia, was very close to the agency during that decade. 
Also, the central goal of Law 85 of 1946 was precisely to build "hygienic houses for the 
rural workers" and "low-cost hygienic urban housing for the middle class, employees and 
workers," (article 3th.). Finally, the Ministry of Hygiene was established in 1947, as an 
independent ministry from the Ministry of Labor. 
Even though hygiene was a basic principle in the development of the ICT’s 
housing programs, it seems that the agency was not only concerned about the hygiene of 
physical space but about the moral hygiene of its residents. Certainly, hygiene referred 
mostly to the physical characteristics of space, insofar as the houses were equipped with 
basic services like water, sewage, and electricity, and a private bathroom, and were built 
with "clean" building materials: no earth walls and floors, and no roofs made of plants. In 
Muzú however, the concern with moral hygiene becomes evident through its imprint on 
the physical space. Muzú housing units had three bedrooms in the upper level. Since it 
was necessary to cross one bedroom to enter the second one, no privacy was guaranteed 
for these smaller bedrooms. There is at least a clearly differentiated space that could be 
further isolated from the rest of the house through a door, however: the master (parent's) 
bedroom. Accounts of the overcrowded living conditions among the workers before their 
                                                
766 Minute 205, January 15, 1945, p. 454-back. 
767 Exhibition in the "Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia." Minute 221, October 10, 1945, p. 476 - back. 
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move into ICT housing projects demonize promiscuity as one of the most malignant 
habits of the working class’ traditional way of living, one that necessarily led to a loss of 
morality. 768 Consequently, a clearly isolated space for the parents became one of the 
most important parts of the new houses. Children, or at least some of them, seem to have 
no need for or right for privacy in this context; yet girls and boys were to sleep in 
separated bedrooms, but open to surveillance.769 Furthermore, the areas for activities 
related to physical hygiene are remarkable meager. The bathrooms of the two minimal 
housing types, the 57-F-3 and the 79-F are 2.3 m2 and 1.92 m2 respectively. Not only is 
the size too small for conducting the necessary hygienic activities, but also for the 
number of occupants who were to inhabit the homes and use this one space: seven 
persons. Thus, when the planners referred to hygiene, they probably had moral hygiene in 
mind. The space in its different scales turns into a vehicle through which its occupants 
become acquainted with the precepts of physical and moral hygiene as promoted by the 
ICT. Consequently, the housing projects perform as an instrument for educating the 
population, and overcoming its flaws. 
The educational aims of the ICT’s housing projects are clearly portrayed from the 
beginning. Not fortuitously, most of the projects the ICT built in the 1940s in different 
municipalities throughout the country were called "Model Working-class 
neighborhoods." They were part of a process that had started already at the end of the 
                                                
768 Minute 306, February 27, 1948, p. 688-back – 689. At the meeting on Tropical Housing in Caracas, “it 
was agreed to recommend three bedrooms as a minimum dwelling, which allows to live comfortably and 
provide the means for a proper separation of children by sex, whose promiscuity brings such dire 
consequences…” 
769 Both housing types in Muzú present a similar distribution. However, for the type 79F there are no 
original plans for the second floor; therefore, the drawings of this housing type were published in: Martínez 
and Arango, Arquitectura En Colombia. 
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1930s, and which derives from what architectural historian Silvia Arango refers to as " 
architecture as model."770  According to her, the model architectural unit  
…. consisted in the execution of specific constructions that represented the correct 
way to physically organize a society. An example can clarify the concept: as part 
of the celebration of the Fourth Centenary of the foundation and Bogota in 1938, 
an exhibition was set up where two workers' houses were shown; one of them 
traditional, with a single space, without windows or furniture, where everything 
was disorganized and dirty. This represented the tradition that it was necessary to 
abolish, while the other house, with small separated spaces for the social area, 
bedrooms, and services, with windows and furniture, tidy and clean, dimmed the 
right and desirable way to live. It expressed, with a paternalistic spirit and through 
demonstrative cases, the intentions of an ideology that tried to break the ancestral 
backwardness and replace it with a new ideal of organization and progress. This 
way of thinking about architecture through exemplary models was applied 
fundamentally to the design of schools and the housing of peasants, workers and 
employees.771 
In that sense, these popular model housing projects were built as an educational 
tool that aimed at overcoming "ancestral backwardness" to achieve a state of progress. 
Housing as a means to educate residents can be evidenced in the projects’ 
different scales. Examining the three case studies from this perspective sheds light on 
other aspects of housing not specifically stated anywhere. In that sense, the extensive 
green areas, while indeed an accomplishment of modern urban thought, expose another 
dimension of Jorge Gaitán Cortés' proposal for Muzú. Were the ample green areas a 
strategy to offer inhabitants open spaces for socializing to strengthen their commitment to 
society through an increased sense of community? Perhaps. In a statement, the ICT 
tackled the issue of open spaces in its neighborhoods. According to the municipal codes, 
the ICT explained, every developer needed to transfer at least 35% of the total of the land 
                                                
770 Based on the periodization that she elaborates on Colombian architecture, this concept emerged during 
the transitional period of architecture in Colombia, between1930 and 1945. Silvia Arango, Historia de la 
Arquitectura en Colombia. 
771 Ibid., 202. 
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to the municipality for streets, parks, and other public services—a percentage that was, in 
its eyes, adequate for a residential area, "where a large number of children would need 
spaces of sufficient size for their recreation." It also stated that the "modern tendency" 
was to increase free areas in neighborhoods as much as possible. In Muzú, 70% of the 
land was open space, double the amount demanded by the municipality.772 In his book 
Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920, Paul Boyer developed the idea 
that positive-environmentalist work in tenement reform, the park and playground 
movements, and city planning, are interconnected with a "larger urban moral-control 
movement."773 It is possible that the way these open spaces could shape the project’s 
inhabitants runs parallel to Boyer’s description of the parks and playgrounds movement 
in the U.S., especially if one considers the image proceeding the presentation of Muzú in 
the Proa publication of December 1949. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Proa 30, December 1949. 
                                                
772 In this statement, the ICT responded to questions raised by the banking superintendent about the high 
costs of land for the neighborhood Los Alcazares, a housing project built in Bogotá in 1948. Minute 410, 
January 13, 1950, p. 1000. 
773 Paul S. Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1978). Chapter 16: Housing, Parks, and Playgrounds. Positive Environmentalism in 
Action, 234, 237. 
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Figure 5.2. Proa 30, December 1949.  
Examining the content of these images, the authors of the article (Martinez and 
the ICT's Technical Department?) established a clear connection between the lack of 
adequate "housing, schools, hospitals, nurseries, recreation areas, and urban 
transportation" with "degeneration, abandonment, irresponsibility, crime, insecurity, 
speculation, rickets, tuberculosis, child delinquency." Interestingly, their account 
intermingles attributes of "wrong conduct" and physical illnesses. Furthermore, they 
claimed that "men badly housed was the cause of social disorder," and that "the moral 
and material imbalance in a group of individuals converts directly into the disorder of the 
community." With this information in mind, it is possible to conclude that the adequate 
built environment was thought to contribute to eliminating "degeneration, abandonment, 
[and] irresponsibility," and incidentally, to restraining the “disorder of the community,” 





The rationale behind ample open spaces and social services might also have 
applied to CUAN. Here, an additional argument for social services and green communal 
areas was the new experience of living in "community." One image that people have of 
living in a multifamily housing complex is the idea that the residents depend on each 
other. And in fact, the co-ownership of such a project requires making decisions for the 
whole community. The guiding idea of the proposal to have an urban center with most all 
the needs of day to day life met inside it was thought to promote a closer community life. 
However, as the interviews conducted in 1964 show, people did not develop a stronger 
sense of "community" than would have happened in other forms of living. This group 
was too diverse and by far less open to get engaged in any substantial kind of communal 
life.774 The residents only seem to have congregated around the Catholic Church, as in 
any other traditional neighborhood. Similarly to Muzú, where the social services were in 
place not only to serve the neighborhood’s inhabitants, but also to promote a very 
specific attitude among them, CUAN served as an educating tool. With CUAN, the ICT 
included the middle class into the project of educating the population. Yet, the aim was 
different: to teach people how to live in a multifamily housing project. 
 
ICT PROJECTS AS SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS 
The three case studies provided the ICT with enough opportunities to explore new 
measures that would assure social cohesion in the new neighborhoods. Each of them was 
pioneer in a specific area; hence, all three case studies can be understood as experiments. 
Muzú was one of the three neighborhood units the ICT initiated in 1949. Here, the 
project’s scale, its technical innovations introduced by Alvaro Ortega and Gabriel Solano, 
                                                
774 Based on the information compiled in Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."  
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and finally its architectural and urban configuration, designed by Jorge Gaitán Cortés, 
defined the scope of experimentation implemented in Muzú. In CUAN, the ICT's task to 
promote a new way of living appropriate to the "modern" housing complex was as 
important as providing homes at accessible prices to a segment of the urban workers. The 
ICT understood the experience with the CUAN residents as a social experiment. Lastly, 
Ciudad Kennedy was built as the first satellite city around Bogotá, and its scale turned it 
into the largest housing development built at that time through self-help. The project’s 
scale posed a challenge to the city that had not been seen before. Ciudad Kennedy was 
planned for roughly 80,000 new inhabitants, who probably did not know each other 
before moving into this more or less isolated location.  This required that the ICT tackled 
all aspects of its development as a major experiment. While in past ICT projects some 
architects had used these projects as a field of technical experimentation, as in Muzú, a 
series of agencies and private initiatives converged in Ciudad Kennedy to execute social 
programs. Since the experiments at Muzú are associated with the physical space and 
those in Ciudad Kennedy are further explained later, I focus only on CUAN in what 
follows here. 
After the country returned to a civil government in1958, the ICT received CUAN 
with the goal of rapidly renting apartments to middle class families. CUAN enabled the 
ICT to finally experiment with the provision of housing in a multi-family housing project. 
The ICT was able to fulfill the aim it had pursued since the mid-1940s, when its first 
general manager, Garces Navas, presented a plan to build a multi-family housing project 
to lease to official and private employees in San Diego, north of Bogotá's traditional 
center. Incidentally, Garces Navas was the first manager of CUAN on behalf of the 
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ICT.775 From the time he presented his proposal for San Diego, the members of the ICT's 
board of directors discussed the question about whether or not to build high-rise buildings 
to house the targeted population. The discussions focused, however, on the alternative 
between renting and selling its houses, rather than on the implications such new building 
typologies might have for the city and its future residents.  
As the booklet "Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño" published in 1958 by the ICT 
acknowledged, CUAN was the "first official experience in multifamily housing."776 The 
ICT was aware of the importance of a strict process of selecting residents to guarantee the 
success of this experiment. The ICT's role was therefore to select appropriate residents 
and guide them through an educational process, after which they would have learned how 
to behave in their new environment. That is why CUAN is so important to the narrative 
of the ICT's efforts to provide housing to different population groups in spite of not 
resulting from its own design efforts. 
The experiment of CUAN was complex, in the same way that the relationship 
between the ICT and CUAN's residents was. The ICT was the owner, the institution 
providing the loans, and the administrator. Several functions devolved to the same 
institution. Probably in response to this multiplicity of roles, the ICT sought to work with 
representatives of the residents to tackle administering CUAN together. While this 
collaboration was also intended as a means to facilitate interactions with residents, the 
results of this joint effort was not very successful. The tense relations between the ICT 
and the representatives are best conveyed in a letter written in August 1960 by the 
                                                
775 Through a letter signed by Flavio Jaramillo Mejia, director of CUAN, on July 21 of 1965, it is possible 
to learn that at that point, Garcés Navas was not the director of CUAN anymore. Archive of the Ministry of 
Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 




general manager to the residents' representatives. The representatives voiced a series of 
complaints that were apparently very confrontational, to which ICT's general manager, 
Anibal López Trujillo (1959-1961), responded in an equally harsh tone.777 This 
confrontation resulted eventually in the sanction of Decree 1234 of 1963 that mandated 
the ICT reassume sole management of CUAN. According to a letter from another ICT 
general manager, Fabio Robledo (1957-1958, 1961-1965), sent on June 4 of 1963 to all 
apartment owners, the government made this decision due to the negative results of the 
joint administration between the ICT and the owners’ board. This measure was 
understood as a transitional one. The ICT wanted first to resolve the multiple problems 
accumulated over previous years. The final goal however, was to "prepare the 
community" undertake the complete and independent management of CUAN in a short 
period of time.778 The residents’ association, URAN (Union de Residentes de CUAN), 
was eventually eliminated after the passing of decree 1234 of 1963. What consequences 
its elimination had is not clear, but it certainly reduced the residents’ spaces for 
participation in administrative decisions. The decision to manage CUAN in collaboration 
with residents’ representatives was probably based on an idea of a society the ICT 
dreamed of.779 Clearly, this part of the experiment was the least successful. What seemed 
a space for democracy and participation was not one. The residents did not feel well 
represented by the residents’ association, who seems to have built a group with its own 
internal dynamics, independent of the other residents’ participation.  
                                                
777 Letter from The ICT's general manager, Anibal López Trujillo, to URAN representatives. August 21, 
1960. Archive Ministry of Housing, La Fragua. Box No. 0012. File 00001. Page 5-13. 
778 “It is and has been the desire of the Board to prepare the community so that, hopefully in a short time, it 
can fully assume the administration of CUAN, as it is customary in this kind of multifamily buildings.” In: 
Archive Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
779 G. Triana and J. Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas."  
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Despite this failed collaboration between the residents' representatives and the 
ICT, the experiment with CUAN was successful. All apartments were leased and then 
awarded in a relatively short period of time. In fact, general manager López Trujillo 
claimed in a letter to the residents' representatives in 1960 that the first tenants having 
priority in purchasing the apartments was justified, since they were the ones who 
"contributed to a successful experience in this kind of housing, about which many were 
so skeptical."780 The residents accepted the complex and despite some complaints 
regarding storage or laundry spaces, did like the apartments they were living in.781 
However, the experiment of spurring community through community services was not so 
successful. It would seem that they were not the kind of services the people needed. They 
had a supermarket and schools but not all residents used them because they preferred 
others in other parts of the city for various reasons. On the one hand, the schools they 
preferred were not necessarily those in CUAN, and in the case of supermarkets, the 
residents went where they could get fresher, cheaper, and more varied food. In other 
words, the residents did not confine their lives to the urban center. They looked for the 
best options of the many available in this rapidly growing city. 
 
THE PROCESS OF SELECTING RESIDENTS 
The process of selecting residents was one of the main tools the ICT possessed to 
guarantee that the inhabitants of their neighborhoods complied with their expectations. 
From its inception, the laws and decrees governing the ICT’s work specified the ideal 
characteristics of the targeted population, mostly in terms of income. After the agency 
                                                
780 Letter from The ICT's general manager, Anibal López Trujillo, to URAN representatives. August 21, 
1960. Archive Minvivienda, La Fragua. Box No. 0012. File 00001, 7. 
781 Triana and Vallejo, "Investigacion Individual. Encuestas." 
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assumed the task of building urban housing in 1942 and before it started to build its own 
housing projects, the process of selecting residents laid in the hands of municipalities and 
cooperatives. This procedure did not always result in the kind of inhabitants the ICT 
expected. When general manager Hernando Posada Cuéllar visited the “Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo” neighborhood developed with the municipality in Pamplona, Norte de 
Santander Department, he discovered a family who connected three adjacent houses 
without anyone noticing. This led him to observe that the “conditions of morality 
demanded of the inhabitants of those neighborhoods were not fulfilled.” ⁠782 Consequently, 
after Law 85 of 1946 was passed, the agency developed a precise and thorough procedure 
to select future residents. Law 85 was one of the turning points for the agency since it 
enabled it to build urban housing projects on its own. It also ordered the agency to define 
the norms for awarding the houses built under this law (article 11). According to this law, 
the applicants should be dependent or independent workers, and their assets should not 
exceed  $30,000 Colombian pesos (article 11.1). The law also stated that among the 
applicants who met the basic requirements, "parents would be preferred, and of these, 
those with a greater number of children." (article 11.1). It stated that applicants be asked 
to conduct an "honest home life." (article 11.5), and in addition to requirements framing 
applicants’ income level, also defined the type of families it wanted to support: a family 
model typical for the major urban centers in the Andean areas, with marked patriarchal 
bias and a strong emphasis on the nuclear family.783 Furthermore, the law referred to the 
                                                
782 Minute 312, April 3, 1948, p. 707. 
783 Virginia Gutiérrez de Pineda, Familia y Cultura En Colombia: Tipologías, Funciones y Dinámica de La 
Familia: Manifestaciones Múltiples a Través Del Mosaico Cultural y Sus Estructuras Sociales, Biblioteca 
Básica Colombiana (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, Subdirección deComunicaciones Culturales, 
1975); Virginia Gutiérrez de Pineda, La Familia En Colombia: Trasfondo Histórico, 2. ed (Medellín: 
Ministerio de Cultura : Editorial Universidadde Antioquia, 1997). 
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moral suitability of applicants by posing an "honest home life" as a requisite for the 
acceptance of the application. 
The document regulating the ICT’s process of selecting residents was finally 
issued as Decree 898 of 1949.  These regulations were thus the response to the mandate 
of law 85 of 1946, and as such, followed the basic requirements defined in the law. 
However, the final form of the regulations was the result of a series of discussions among 
the members of the board of directors that lasted at least one year.784 The goal was to 
elaborate a procedure through which the selection of awardees would happen in the most 
objective manner. The final form the board members agreed on was indeed very clear and 
sought to dispatch any suspicion of not being fair with all applicants.785 In that sense, the 
procedure was objective. Yet, the preconceptions about the ideal family and the moral 
suitability of the applicants, as previously defined in Law 85 of 1946, are present here 
again. The limits of the family model at the core of the process of selecting residents are 
best seen in the board’s concern that, in many regions of the country and "especially 
among the working class," it was not uncommon to be unmarried and have illegitimate 
children, which could hamper the awarding process in those regions.786  
In the process of selecting residents, applicants were given points for the various 
characteristics of their family. Although this decree did not exclude singles, the point 
index increased with the number of "legitimate children" in the household (article 5). 
This would give larger families more chances to be awarded a house in the drawing that 
usually took place when the number of applicants surpassed the number of houses 
                                                
784 Minute 337, September 2, 1948, p. 772-back. Minute 338, September 16, 1948, p. 779-back. Minute 
339, September 20, 1948, p. 780 - 780-back. Minute 351, December 13, 1948, p. 822-back. Minute 364, 
February 15, 1949, p. 851-back. Minute 366, February 21, 1949, p. 853. Minute 369, March 3, 1949, p. 
872. Minute 371, March 8, 1949, p. 874-back. 
785 Minute 383, May 28, 1949, p. 909. 
786 Minute 339, September 20, 1948, p. 780-back. 
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available in a project (article 3.b.). The extended family was also considered, by granting 
a small number of additional points for each extra member (parents, siblings, and adult 
children with disabilities or unable to work for themselves). But an extended family was 
not the primary familial form the ICT wanted to serve through the housing programs. An 
"honest home life" was also part of this decree (article 4), and this could be proved "by 
means of a certificate sworn before a judge, of two capable, honorable and suitable 
persons, who know the applicant and his family."787 The question here is who, in turn, did 
certify them? 
 After this regulating document was finally issued as a decree in April 1949 and 
implemented by awarding the housing units that had been completed during that year, 
further discussion that aimed to transform this regulation continued to take place. Several 
conflicts were identified during the first year of operation.788 Guillermo Wiesner, as a 
representative of the Chamber of Commerce on the board of directors, but also, as he 
himself claimed, as a representative of the industrialists, on whose board of directors he 
also served, defended the idea that it was better to award dependent workers than 
independent ones. His arguments were related to the financial support an employer could 
provide his employees, and the moral control he could exercise over them to further 
guarantee "faultless conduct," and the timely payment of mortgages. By contrast, the 
independent workers were not subject to any kind of control.789 In addition, the initial 
requisite of having an "honest home life" was transformed into an "honest life and good 
customs."790 The insistence on this requisite persisted during this revision process and 
                                                
787 Minute 369, March 3, 1949, p. 872. 
788 The regulations were implemented for the first time in Barranquilla, and they seemed to have worked 
well. Minute 381, May 12, 1949, p. 902-back. 
789 Minute 438, August 3, 1950, p. 1088-back. 
790 Minute 463, February 8, 1951, p. 1192-back. In the original form even in capital letters. 
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further.791 In fact, this had been used as an argument to reject applications well into the 
1950s.792   
During these meetings, the proposal to assign illegitimate children the same 
number of points as legitimate children caused an interesting discussion. On February 8, 
1951, Norberto Diaz, possibly the last member that joined the board as representative of 
the Ministry of Labor (though this is nowhere expressly stated), expressed his strong 
disagreement with the decision to award legitimate and illegitimate children the same 
number of points.793 His reasoning was based on the argument that with these kind of 
measures the "unity of marriage is attacked, incorporating the children of incest, the 
adulterous, the sacrilegious and those from damaged and punishable unions." Even after 
Miguel Escobar, another member of the board of directors, let him know "that these 
abusive denominations have been disappearing in the law as the human person has gained 
greater equality and has complied with the Christian principle of equality of people," 
Diaz insisted "because this was a matter that seriously affected the position of Catholic 
marriage in terms of the acceptance of illegitimate children similarly to the legitimate 
ones within an institution, such as the ICT, which should contribute to the social welfare, 
and due to the fact that Catholic marriage, following the principles of the concordat, was 
the only one recognized as such in Colombia and the only one that effectively produces 
the well-being and the progress of the peoples.”794 Although Diaz seems to be alone in 
his views, and in spite of the fact that members of the two political parties were 
represented on the board of directors, the moral virtues of the future inhabitants expressed 
                                                
791 Minute 454, November 23, 1950, p. 1147-back. 
792 Minute 524, June 2, 1952, p. 0003. 
793 The selection of the applicants considered a series of issues to award them with a specific number of 
points. The number and the gender of the children were among them. 
794 Minute 463, February 8, 1951, p. 1192-back - 1193. 
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the expectations of the elites, of the ruling class, clearly represented in this board. These 
expectations seem to be less associated to a specific religious position or to one specific 
party affiliation. The exceptional case of Norberto Diaz reminds rather the voice of some 
extreme polemic voices during this period: the president himself, Laureano Gómez, and 
one of his most staunch supporters, the bishop of Santa Rosa de Osos, Monsignor Builes. 
 The basic procedure for resident selection changed relatively little over the period 
of this study. The main exception was CUAN. In this multifamily housing project, the 
information booklet specified income and household size as the criteria for the first part 
of the process of selecting residents,795 The required income placing the targeted 
population in the middle class, i.e. the income group the ministry of public works had in 
mind when it initiated the project 7 years before it began taking applications.  
According to an ICT statement published in the same booklet, the final process of 
selecting residents would take place at the end of the first phase of experimentation. 
During this period, the apartments would be leased to the families selected, then their 
"behavior toward this new housing system and the[ir] general collaboration in the 
project’s development," would inform any final decisions.796 This statement explains why 
the apartments were not sold immediately. Architect Nestor Gutierrez stated that the 
housing board would select the residents they deemed apt for the complex at the end of 
this first phase, and then offer those families an apartment to purchase.797 Nevertheless, 
the majority of apartments were sold to the first selected group.798   
                                                
795 Instituto de Credito Territorial, Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño. 
796 "Based on the results obtained in this period of the intial lease, the ICT will decide on the possibility of 
handing over the apartments, under the conditions and for the people that those same experiences advise. 
The behavior of families towards this new housing system and the general collaboration in the development 
of the project, are fundamental for the possible determination to be attained." Ibid. 
797 Interview with architect Nestor Gutierrez. In: Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie,” 164.  
798 Law 143 of 1959. (December 24). With this law, the government authorized the ICT to award 
apartments to  the tenants already living in CUAN. 
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Unlike the stricter family composition requirements in other ICT projects, there 
were no kinship requirements for families awarded an apartment at CUAN through the 
advantageous ICT financing program. Nonetheless, moral standards were set for those 
living there. As article 9 of CUAN’s community regulations states:  
The owner, or one who represents or may substitute for him, may inhabit [the 
apartment] with the persons he desires, provided they are not persons of 
misconduct, or of dissolute or disarrayed life, or who habitually disturbs the 
tranquility of other inhabitants or scandalizes with their habits or actions, nor that 
they exceed in number the hygienic dwelling standards inside the apartments.799 
The limitations stated in this article clearly articulate the ICT’s fears regarding the 
future inhabitants of CUAN. It would be of greatest interest to know what the authors 
meant by a person of "misconduct, or dissolute or disarrayed life." Unfortunately, this is 
not further explained in the regulations.  
The process of selecting residents played a central role in the development of 
Ciudad Kennedy. Because of its scale, of the number of homes to be filled, a publicity 
strategy of letters, radio broadcasts, and talks with "civil and religious leaders" was set in 
place from the beginning.800 The sheer number of applications issued and received—
7,697—shows the huge demand for low-cost housing,801 which may reflect two things. 
On the one hand, the cost at which the homes were offered might have been more 
affordable to a broader group of people than in the past. On the other hand, the acute 
housing shortage surely plays a role. 1,998 of the received applications were not 
accepted. The agency did not eliminate only those applications that did not comply with 
basic requirements, such as age and income. Its social workers also interviewed first, and 
                                                
799 Archive Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. Deed of Registration of co-ownership 
regulations of CUAN by the ICT. December 20, 1960. 
800 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 13. 
801 Minute 42, October 9, 1962, p. 0671. 
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then visited, the applicant families applying through the self-help program. The interview 
aimed to assess the “true interest” and capability of each family to participate in the 
program, and the visit set out to confirm the truthfulness of their application (the number 
of family members, their socio economic status, probably even their address) and the 
‘moral’ suitability of the applicants themselves, as set out in the regulations.802 
Whereas the procedure to select future housing project residents did not 
significantly change from its first implementation in the late 1940s, the requisites did. 
These changes express some of the economic and social transformations the country 
endured between the 1940s and 60s, and to which the agency was not immune. What is 
more, given the basic issues it worked on, the agency itself can be considered a mirror of 
those same social, political and economic transformations. Thus, the requirements that 
were used in the process of selecting residents in Ciudad Kennedy at the beginning of the 
1960s correlates only somewhat with those originally set in 1949. As discussed above, 
the first significant change was granting illegitimate children the same number of points 
as legitimate children. In addition, decree 1465 of 1953, passed on June 11th, two days 
before the military regime took power, sought to prioritize those families with personal 
savings held in banks (article 8).803 Furthermore, the procedure, updated through internal 
document Number 1 of 1961 and implemented in Ciudad Kennedy’s process of selecting 
residents, reveals significant social changes through the way the agency positioned itself 
toward the ideal urban family model.804 Although the "married couple" (cónyugues) is at 
the core of this regulation, the definition of the family does not specifically correspond 
with the nuclear family evidenced in the original version from 1949.  Here, those 
                                                
802 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 13. 
803 To understand these changes in the economic context, see Romero Sánchez, “Ruralizing Urbanization.” 
804 Minute 11, March 22, 1961, p. 0813-back – 818. 
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applicants with a higher number of dependents were preferred, with no specific 
categorization of the applicant or the dependents in terms of gender or relationship 
(article 3). The difference in the family configuration probably reflects the effects of the 
civil war, La Violencia. Now widows with children, dependent orphans (grandchildren, 
nieces or nephews), or dependent widowed daughters were also counted in the 
assignation of points in the point index. This updated version of the selection regulations 
also included more diverse family types: unmarried mothers with dependent children, 
couples and single persons without children, though with dependents. The children of 
either partner could be legitimate, legally adopted, or illegitimate. It also included adult 
daughters "abandoned" by their husbands and their children, parents, and minor siblings 
of the heads of the family as possible dependents. Each of these was worth one point 
each.805 In the case of the self-help programs, a family’s capacity to contribute its own 
labor weekly for a set amount of time was a plus in favor of being selected.   
Despite the evident broad understanding the ICT held of “the family” in the 
1960s, some remnants of the past, unstated in the referred regulating document, reveal a 
particular image of the family morality still expected from applicants. Aside from 
disqualifying age and income factors, unmarried cohabitation ("union libre") and adultery 
were also reasons to reject applications.806 
 
                                                
805 The only exception was widows, widowers and single mothers with dependent children, who received 
two points. Minute 11, March 22, 1961, p. 0814-back – 815. 
806 Minute 42, October 9, 1962, p. 0679-back. This question if the rejected applicants found a place to live 
among the rapidly spreading squatters in the urban centers would be worth approaching. 
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Who is who in this play - The working and middle urban Class- 
The ICT targeted blue- and white-collar workers, cooperative-members, the 
middle class, and official employees to inhabit their urban housing projects. Among 
these, a preference for some groups over others varied over time, though the selection of 
official employees remained constant.807 The model neighborhoods built with ICT 
support between 1942 and 1946 aimed to house factory workers or managerial and 
(mostly) official employees. Though the municipalities were encouraged to build housing 
for both of these groups, they mostly decided to build only for white-collar workers and 
official employees during that period. Law 85 of 1946 allowed them to broaden their 
range of client, especially to the middle class.  
Although the ideology underlying the terminology used to categorize these 
targeted groups is a complex issue, the ICT's leaders considered them in primarily 
economic terms. They defined each group by their average earnings and subsequent 
repayment capability. Accordingly, the housing type suitable for each group was defined 
by its final price, which varied considerably throughout the country. Once Law 85 began 
specifically targeting the middle class, newer, more specified terminology was required. 
Just who was the middle class? Roughly defined categories of work activities began to be 
with connected each category of inhabitant. For example, an ICT report from 1948 
focussing on possible sites for future housing projects differentiated between the upper 
middle class, "reduced but in need," [one imagines "in need of a house," for those who 
did not have the capability to use the loans of private banks, with higher rates and shorter 
mortgage terms], an intermediate group with middle income, in which group the authors 
white-collar-workers, craftsmen, small industrialists, small businessmen, and skilled 
                                                
807 If this was a strategy to consolidate the state needs to be further studied. 
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workers with an income between $8.00 and $10.00 pesos a day,808 and the working class 
earning less than $4.00 pesos a day.809  In order to get a broader understanding of this 
group, Roberto Salazar, the board’s representative of the president in 1950 and 1951, 
proposed elaborating upon an a socioeconomic study of the families living in Muzú to 
better understand middle class living conditions in regard to the housing problem.810 
However, nothing about this study has been found. 
As stated earlier, the targeted group at CUAN was the middle class. Unlike other 
housing projects, CUAN required a minimal income, but there was no limit for the 
maximal income.  The required monthly income ranged from $750.00 pesos for 
apartments whose monthly rent was $181.00 pesos to $1,500.00 pesos for a $520.00 
monthly rent.811  The limit was set by the family’s assets, which could not exceed 
$100,000.00 pesos. Moreover, the family could not own a house in Bogotá. 
By the time Ciudad Kennedy was built in the 1960s, the ICT built projects 
targeting the middle class, white- and independent or dependent blue-collar workers; yet 
different programs were put in place to serve these various groups in different ways. In 
addition, these programs sought to attract private capital to build the homes. In Ciudad 
Kennedy, self-help housing overwhelmingly predominated, at roughly 60%. Nonetheless, 
P-3 (Three Part system), P-T (Workers Program), incremental housing and direct 
                                                
808 The Colombian peso was valued at that moment approximately US$ 0.57. So, 10.00 pesos were US$ 5.7 
In: Violich and Jones, Low-Cost Housing in Latin America, 58.The equivalence in todays terms would be 
roughly US$ 59.0 per day. http://www.usinflationcalculator.com 
809 Minute 313, April 8, 1948, p. 708-back. 
810 An interesting proposal, that permits us to see that the working class did not find refuge even in Muzú. 
811 In between, different minimal income amounts were required for different apartment types with 
different rental rates. In: Instituto de Credito Territorial, Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño. 
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management (construction, financing and awarding of the housing units by the ICT itself) 
types were also executed.812 
 The self-help housing program aimed at targeting a segment of the population 
that did not have access to other housing projects previously built by the ICT. A large 
part of Ciudad Kennedy’s roughly 80,000 inhabitants were not necessarily the poorest of 
the poor, for a steady income was still needed to be considered for the process of 
selecting residents. Nonetheless, they certainly belonged to the working class. This can 
be corroborated through a demographic study a CINVA student conducted on 28 families 
of block 38 in super-block 8A.813 The results of this study do not necessarily transfer to 
the super-block, let alone to the whole housing development. Yet, they certainly allow 
partial illumination of who the first inhabitants of Ciudad Kennedy were. Most of the 
block’s residents were aged fifteen and under. The maximum age was 59 years old. On 
average, the families who moved into this block comprised 9.6 members.814 The nuclear 
family predominated, and only in two cases was the father completely absent.815 15.4% of 
the residents were illiterate, and most had not finished primary school.816 The residents 
were predominantly from rural areas around Bogotá, in the departments of Cundinamarca 
and Boyacá. Notably, only a very small minority came originally from Bogotá. Thus, 
migration was one important component in Ciudad Kennedy’s demographic 
                                                
812 In the Three Part program, the total costs of the housing program were allocated through the capital 
provided equally by the private investor, the participating family and the ICT. Minute 8, October 16, 1957, 
p. 0042-0046. In the P-T program, firms that underwrite ICT's bonds could obtain up to 60% financing for 
their workers through the ICT. The remaining 40% was to be financed between the firm employer (30%) 
and the participating worker (10%). In: Instituto de Credito Territorial and Saldarriaga, Medio siglo de 
vivienda social en Colombia, 1939 - 1989. 36. 
813 Gómez Gómez, “Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua de La Supermanzana 8A. 
Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas.” 
814 Ibid., 9. 




composition.817 Finally, the average monthly income of these families was $1,114.00 
pesos in 1964.818 
Theoretically, the ICT sought to address those more in need. In reality, most of 
the projects covered those with a steady job, and even the middle class. Only after the 
military regime of General Rojas Pinilla came to an end in 1957 did programs to 
eradicate slums become a more pressing task.819 The high growth rates of the urban 
population, and the unequal growth of affordable housing, even less the increase in 
available jobs, contributed definitively to making the long latent reality of a high number 
of urban inhabitants living as squatters undeniable.  
 
EDUCATING THE INHABITANTS 
The built environment alone was considered the tool through which residents 
could be educated until the 1950s, when ICT leaders became clear that their work did not 
end in awarding a house, but required educating the people in the task of living in these 
new environments. The agency began using social workers to educate the residents after 
they had moved in, in everything from furniture acquisition," to the complex net of social 
support implemented in Ciudad Kennedy.820 
                                                
817 Ibid., 12-13. 
818 The rate of exchange was 10:1 (Colombian pesos to U.S. dollars) in September of 1964. As stated by 
Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 18 (7). Gomez Gomez, the author of 
this report, compared this salary in 1964 with the salary two years later, in 1966, when the study was 
conducted. She determined that this salary decreased on 6%, from 1,114.00 in 1964 to 1,069.00 in 1966. 
Ibid., 15. 
819 During the transitional Military Junta  this was ascribed as one of the tasks of the ICT in the decree 1368 
of 1957 (July 1st), after the agency recovered its autonomy. The board of directors discussed this topic, and 
included this task as part of the regulations of the ICT: Agreement 0006 of 1957 (November 6th). In: 
Minute 11, November 6, 1957, p. 0068, 0073. 
820 "The general manager notes that, once the house has been awarded, the agency abandons the beneficiary 
without teaching him how to use the property or how to maintain it. It is necessary for an educational work 
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CUAN constitutes an interesting case in point. Here, the idea of being able to live 
in this new housing typology is persistent. The new typology implied a new way of living 
in relation to the city and to others. According to the ICT's leaders, a special educational 
process of future middle class residents was therefore a key aspect of CUAN. Educating 
the population was not restricted to the working class; with this project the ICT extended 
the project of educating the population to the middle class. Yet, the difference is the aim 
of the educational task: to learn how to live in a multifamily housing project. CUAN 
served the ICT as a way to introduce the inhabitants in a new way of urban living. 
In Ciudad Kennedy, the daunting number of new residents, with their rural 
background, brought the ICT’s educational practices to a new level. Indoctrination 
became part of the self-help housing programs, and social workers further developed a 
high number of new strategies to "educate" the residents. The role of CINVA and its 
fellows was crucial in this process. They also contributed to the formation of future social 
workers and to the production of written materials to reach out to the inhabitants of 
Ciudad Kennedy. 
 
Nurses, social workers, housing educators 
Once the selected families moved into their homes, different mechanisms to 
guarantee adequate use of the space were discussed. Toward that end, the ICT sought to 
maintain some kind of presence in the neighborhoods after the homes were awarded 
through its social workers. While these social workers contributed to the new inhabitants’ 
                                                                                                                                            
in all the agency’s neighborhoods, through bodies of social assistance" In: Minute 564 (incorrectly 
numbered: 664), July 17, 1953, p. 0108.  The recognition was that the "peasant, the employee, the worker 
who received a really nice house had to furnish it with the old and inadequate furniture they had before. In: 
Minute 405, November 10, 1949, p. 982-back. 
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successful incorporation into the neighborhoods, their role as rule-prescribing forces from 
above is undeniable. These rules, aimed at achieving the well-being and empowerment of 
the community, reveal the expectation of a candid, well-behaved, reliable urban citizen. 
In light of politicians’ acknowledgment that state-housing projects were a tool for 
preventing revolution in an era of high social tensions, these rules appear as subtle 
strategies to achieve this primary goal. In that sense, educating the residents of the ICT's 
housing projects worked also as way to control the targeted population and maintain the 
status quo. 
The ICT’s understanding of social work changed over time. It was initially 
characterized by the discourse of hygiene, which was limited to the physical aspects of 
the houses.821 Beginning in 1945, however, this message was reinforced through the 
introduction of "visiting nurses" in the rural housing program to teach the peasants how 
to preserve a clean house and to follow the basic rules of hygiene.822 Although these 
visiting nurses played an inconsequential role within the agency, they would later become 
its social workers, responsible not only for teaching about physical but also social 
hygiene as an essential part of ICT’s the construction program. 
By the time Muzú was inaugurated and the first residents moved in, a group of 
agency representatives were inserted into the neighborhood to maintain order, resolve 
conflicts, and control the residents’ behavior as a subtle form of education. The main 
figure in Muzú was an administrator appointed by the ICT who lived in the 
neighborhood. He also acted as a supervisor, and in this role, was responsible for 
                                                
821 The Ministry of Labor and Hygiene sent engineers to evaluate the first house built following the winning 
model for a "Minimal House" competition under hygienic aspects, for they considered that even if it was a 
"minimal house" it still had to comply with minimal requisites posed by the rural life dynamic, and by 
hygienic standards. In: Minute 166, November1943, p. 393 - back.  
822 Minute 205, January 15, 1945, p. 454-back. 
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maintaining "order" in the neighborhood and for intervening in resident disputes. This 
administrator - supervisor ("contestable") was a member of the national army, and 
through his office, attended to resident' complains.823 In addition, a watchman at the 
entrance of the neighborhood assured that alcoholic beverages and other goods were not 
brought in824. Finally, ICT's "visitors" entered the homes to supervise the state in which 
they were maintained, and as one former resident remembered, the residents were obliged 
by contract to allow this entry.825 
The experience in Muzú probably led the general manager to propose to the board 
of directors having an office in all ICT neighborhoods to conduct surveys on social issues 
and educate the inhabitants.826 In 1956, the ICT published a booklet presenting a 
maturing vision of its social programs, which refocused its “self-help” vision for the 
individual, group, or community through the lens of the social services it dispensed. 
These it described as an "essentially educational and democratic process, based on the 
dignity of the human being and on the confidence that each individual has the capability 
to solve his / her own problems, and that if he / she does not do so, it is due to the lack of 
orientation and encouragement." It stated that the agency applied the social service to the 
family, the group, or the community to encourage their betterment.827 According to this 
document, the offices of social services were in charge of developing neighborhood 
programs defined by the social service department of the ICT.828 
                                                
823 Interview with one former dweller. In: Aguilera Rojas, "Un Dialogo Sobre La Serie,” 157; Marco Fidel 
Piñeros Arango in: http://muzulmanesenelmundo.blogspot.com. Accessed: February 25, 2015. 
824 Interview with one former dweller. In: Aguilera Rojas, “Un Dialogo sobre la serie. El ICT como 
laboratorio de arquitectura 1948-1953.” 157. 
825 Ibid., 158. 
826 Minute 553, March 9, 1953, p. 0064-back. 
827 Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos and Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Colombia), eds., El 
Servicio Social En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, Manuales y Cartillas, 




 In CUAN, the ICT exerted its presence through an administrator who answered 
to the general management.829 This post was mandated by law 143 of 1959, (December 
24), which stated that "as long as the value of the apartments had not been fully paid 
back, the ICT would continue managing and administrating the CUAN." Since the 
mortgages had an amortization period of 20 years, this would mean that the ICT would 
stay in this role for at least during period of time.  
Some CUAN residents interpreted the ICT's role as administrator as intransigent 
and harsh,830 in its attitude towards residents who fell behind in their installment 
payments. For these residents, the ICT quickly initiated a legal process that sometimes 
ended with eviction.831  Obviously, the ICT did not share this assessment. In a 1967 
memorandum, it explained to the CUAN residents that awarding houses to receive them 
later back did not represent the agency’s aims. However, given the low monthly rates and 
the loan’s favorable conditions, the ICT did not have any sympathy for late payments or 
no payments at all. Even more, the ICT argued that this late recovery of payment 
happened at the expense of the resources it had to tackle the housing shortage, which 
affected others with far less financial means.832  Its paternalistic role stands out clearly in 
the requests the first CUAN administrator sent to the board of directors, for the agency’s 
intercession in conflicts with residents.833  
                                                
829 Article 40 of Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN by the ICT. Archive of 
Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box. December 20, 1960; A letter of July 21 of 1965 shows 
that CUAN was still under the management of ICT and that Flavio Jaramillo Mejia was the director of 
CUAN. 
830 Triana and Vallejo, “Investigacion Individual. Encuestas.”  
831 Some of the recovered apartments were offered again to the public, as the request from CUAN’s then 
director to publish newspaper ads in 1965 gives account. Archive of Ministry of Housing, La Fragua, 
Bogotá. Fondo ICT, box 589. Memorandum, July 27 of 1965. 
832 Memorandum of the legal department of the ICT of February 20th, 1967. Page 3. Archive of Ministry of 
Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. 
833 But this also might stem from this first CUAN’s administrator being José Vicente Garcés Navas, the 
agency’s first general manager of the agency (and probably as CUAN’s director/administrator until the end 
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The social component also played a key role at Ciudad Kennedy, which was 
based on the structure of the social component already developed in the 1950s. The ICT 
assigned a team of social workers to assist at the housing program, making the presence 
of social workers and "housing educators" ubiquitous; their methods interacting with the 
residents becoming much more sophisticated. Various ideas spreading within sociology 
questioning the one-sidedness of development theories left an imprint on relations 
between the social workers and the resident—at least in theory. The courses for housing 
educators conducted through CINVA, which taught the social staff working at Ciudad 
Kennedy, were nurtured by the principles of "contemporary sociology," according to 
which, the imposition of practices was neither appropriate nor effective for a democratic 
state. Rather, the educational processes implemented here were to be based on 
persuasion, and the social worker’s attitude was essential in achieving the programs’ 
goals.834 Against this background, the social workers home visits served to control the 
adequate use of the dwellings. In addition, they coordinated and accompanied a series of 
courses that provided residents with basic resources for conducting a decent life in their 
new homes, but they also served as a intermediary between residents and the ICT.  
 Consequently, with the social component’s increasing relevance, the structure of 
the social program itself also grew more complex. The social component of the program 
was coordinated by one person, who looked after the convergence of all the department’s 
programs on "the social integration of its inhabitants." In addition, this person was in 
charge of coordinating the work of the social department with the agency’s other 
                                                                                                                                            
of 1961, since he appears as the new director of the awarding department from the beginning of 1962). Two 
examples in: Minute 5, February 15, 1961, p. 0749. Minute 29, July 26, 1961, p. 1060-back. 
834 Carmen Sofía Torres Medina, “Curso de Educadores En Vivienda.  Curso 02 CFEV, Mejorando El 
Hogar y Uso Adecuado de La Vivienda” (Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, 1964), Colección 
Centro Interamericano de Vivienda –CINVA, Escritos y Monografìas, box 63, file 4, file 57, Fondo 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá. 
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departments, and with external official and private entities.835  The main work, however, 
was delivered by the team of social workers in the field. The agency foresaw one social 
worker for every 500 families (!), and in 1964, 17 social workers were active in Ciudad 
Kennedy.836 Their task was to achieve the agency’s educational goals through research, 
social work on the individual and group level, and through community development.837 
Furthermore, the ICT assigned 10 "housing educators," whose role was to "instruct" and 
guide the families of the self-help and core-housing programs in the "appropriate use and 
improvement of the home." They all were supposed to stay at Ciudad Kennedy until at 
least the end of 1965.838 In addition, students of Social Work School of Colegio Mayor de 
Cundinamarca, interned at Ciudad Kennedy under the supervision of the ICT's staff. 
Finally, a series of volunteer groups participated in the realization of many of the social 
programs.839 Peace Corps Volunteers, voluntary social workers, educators, health 
officers, social service agencies, such as the Instituto Familiar y Social de Bogotá (also 
called "Nina Reyes"), the Jesuits, the Red Cross, and even "three women from the 
National Institute of Nutrition were at one time coming to the health center (Superblock 
6) to present demonstrations and talks."840 
The social workers played an important role as the communicators of institutional 
policies to the public. They served as bridges between the families and the agency, 
getting acquainted with the families’ socio-economic situations and communicating the 
characteristics of the program and the mutual obligations between the agency and the 
                                                
835 "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." Escala, no. 7 (1964) 18–19. 
836 Ibid., and Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing 
Programs of Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,”48. 
837 Ibid. 
838 Ibid. 
839 Ibid., 33. 
840 Ibid., 25, 26, 33, 39. 
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participants extensively. The social workers were to be informed about "the resources and 
capabilities of the families that can be used by the agency in the development of the 
programs."841  The social workers' reports occasionally sought to lower costs or to defend 
a person in conflict with the agency. They ranged from a most picturesque report, 
according to which a wife had not been unfaithful to her husband, to a request to give 
more time until people would make their first payment.842 
The housing educators were crucial to the program since they gave special 
attention to the improvement of the physical space, was the frame, at each level, through 
which the individual and the community were to be molded by the ICT’s ideals. The 
spatial ideal encompassed both private and public space. On the private level, the house 
was the field of action. On the public level, public spaces, such as front yards, walkways, 
and the neighborhood’s common green areas, were the focus. Women were the means 
through which the goal of an ordered environment was to be accomplished. Practically all 
programs regarding space improvement were aimed specifically at women, whom the 
housing educators guided in acquiring the tools for appropriate and optimal use of the 
home, and for the improvement of the common areas.  
As one of the most cited concepts when discussing the housing educators’ main 
tasks, ‘improvement’ refers to a space that cannot stay in its original state; it has to 
change in a specific direction: for the better, as defined by agency representatives. Since 
the houses were unfinished when the ICT officially turned them over to the residents, 
there was the expectation that they would be completed over time. But did the word 
"improvement" have the same meaning for the ICT as for the residents? To ensure that 
                                                
841 "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." Escala, no. 7 (1964) 18–19. 
842 Minute 37, September 20, 1961, p. 1248. Although this case is from another project, it clearly shows the 
range of tasks of a social worker. Minute 18, 1963, p. 136. The participants of the self-help program asked 
for an additional period of three months, during which they did not need to start paying back the loan. 
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improvement took place "in a decorative and economic manner," the housing educators 
were assigned by the ICT to work in the different superblocks.843  There was in fact the 
fear that, as one of CINVA’s fellows put it, "due to the lack of funds, and probably good 
taste too, the simple appearance of the community may very well get destroyed by over-
enthusiasm."844 
In addition, activities promoting "good habits" aimed at the conservation and 
"proper use" of the houses, public spaces, and new facilities were essential to the work of 
the housing educators.845 Such activities were manifold. They organized and supervised 
"cleanliness brigades" (brigadas de aseo), which executed "gardening, street-cleaning, 
window-washing, and other improvement activities related to the homes’ exteriors." 
These brigades met almost every morning and were comprised of the women living in the 
superblock. They also organized meetings "each week in a different house" in the 
housing block, in which the educators demonstrated the "care and use of the kitchen and 
other rooms, cooking, care of facades, gardening, tree planting, furniture arrangement, 
etc."846 Finally, classes on home decoration, arts and crafts, and on construction of rustic 
furniture were offered.  
The housing educators were trained at CINVA, which administered a course for 
“housing educators” tackling different topics such as the "improvement of the home and 
the adequate use of the house." Under this main topic, different educational campaigns 
                                                
843 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 47. 
844 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects.” 
845 "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." Escala, no. 7 (1964) 18–19. Rudell, 
“Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of Social 
Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,” 15, 47. 
846 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 




were considered: improvement of diet, dressing, health, culture, family finances, and 
familial and social relationships. Another course topic was "improvement in the political 
and religious behavior of the population," administered as part of the course 
"management of the home." Lastly, the course on "adequate use of the house" tackled 
practical aspects such as the cleaning and the conservation of the house.  
In sum, the social component as implemented in Ciudad Kennedy went beyond 
the boundaries of the agency itself and offered a space for different kinds of institutions 
to advance their various social theories. Their involvement in the residents’ everyday life 
was more pervasive than it had been ever in the past. 
 
Indoctrination and social programs 
Specifically at Ciudad Kennedy, the social workers interacted with the residents at 
three different times: prior to construction, during construction, and after completion. 
These constitute the three phases the residents went through in the process of being 
selected, controlled, and educated to become the ideal resident the ICT imagined for the 
housing projects. The first phase was already discussed in the “process of selecting 
residents. The second phase took place during the construction process, specifically 
through the self-help program. The process of educating while construction was ongoing 
implied not only guidance through the intricacies of the self-help program, such as 
helping to build the juntas of community action, but also teaching a set of rules for 
working in a group of mutual self-help. This orientation process followed a very specific 
procedure clearly defined by the ICT as "Indoctrination."  The third phase of education 
began after the housing units were complete and the owners had moved in. At that point, 
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the ICT stayed in Ciudad Kennedy with its "highly organized social service program."847  
The program required that the social workers stay in Ciudad Kennedy for two and a half 
years after completion of the construction process,848 during which time they led a series 
of social programs to "stabilize the development of the community right from the 
outset."849 
Indoctrination was part of the ICT's educational strategy to create housing 
projects through self-help.850 Shortly before construction started, the families 
participating in the aided mutual self-help program went through an educational process 
that ensured the final goal of completing the houses planned. The participating families 
not only learned the practical aspects of constructing a house; they also became 
acquainted with a set of rules for participating in the construction of the houses of the 
entire work group. This procedure involved ICT staff and the construction journeymen 
and foremen required to complete the work the families were not able to provide through 
their own participation. In two specific superblocks at least, CINVA professors and 
fellow course participants were also involved. In those superblocks where CINVA was 
demonstrably engaged, fellow students coordinated their work with the participating 
families on site, but also conducted other kinds of research activities. Finally, this 
procedure involved the selected families, who were organized in groups corresponding to 
                                                
847 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects,” 12. 
848 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,” 14-15. 
849 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects,” 12. 
850 The term is already presented in this document from 1961: Inter-American Housing and Planning 
Center, Housing Institutions in Bogota. Development and Administration (Bogotá, Colombia: Pan 
American Union, Department of Social Affaires, 1961), 9. 
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each housing block as a basis for the construction process under the mutual aided self-
help scheme.851  
  A "good indoctrination" was the precondition for the success of the organization 
and development of the aided mutual self-help program. The conditions that favored a 
good indoctrination were, among others, working in small groups, meetings taking place 
at predetermined times, dates, and places for the sake of "discipline, order, and method", 
and that the weekly meetings with each group were at a time that allowed most 
participants to attend. Successful indoctrination was measured by the participants 
demonstrating several things: a grasp of the program’s characteristics and conditions, an 
understanding of the program’s administrative structure such that compromises between 
them and the ICT could be successfully reached, respecting and strictly following 
regulations, understanding and accepting that the loans and technical assistance offered 
by the ICT were only the beginning of the solution to the housing problem they faced, 
and that they accepted the design of the houses.852  
Indoctrination took place during four meetings, which the participants were 
required to attend.853  At each, "a film on mutual aid prepared by the United States 
information Agency" was screened.854 During an initial organizational meeting, a social 
worker and an architect presented an overview of procedures to the selected families. The 
participants provided their available schedules for working on the project. With this 
information, and considering the age, sex, family size, occupation and income of each 
                                                
851 Gomez Gomez, “Investigacion Individual. Evaluación Socioeconómica Del Proyecto de Ayuda Mutua 
de La Supermanzana 8A. Ciudad Kennedy. Bogotá. Estudio de Caso de 28 Viviendas,” 7. 
852 Instituto de Credito Territorial, Subgerencia Juridica Social, and Departamento de Servicio Social, 
Autoconstruccion. Como Asegurar Un Buen Adoctrinamiento (Bogota, 1963). 





program participant, the social workers divided them into work groups.855 Their size 
"corresponded to the number of units planned for construction in a particular [housing 
block]."856 Each work group was assigned one social worker and one architect to conduct 
"a full program of construction and community development."857 
During the first meeting, the two professionals in charge explained "the meaning 
of mutual aid work as an unpaid cooperative enterprise," and each member's 
responsibilities toward the ICT and the other members of the group."858 In addition, they 
showed the group the project's location within the superblock, the house’s architectonic 
features, and a model dwelling.  Specifically, in the construction of the superblock 16, the 
CINVA teachers and the participating families met on site with ICT staff.859 The 
CINVA's course fellows also explained the possible uses of the house, “the location of 
the furniture,” and issues such as cleaning, illumination, ventilation, materiality, the 
construction system (slabs and foundations), wall construction, roof construction, and 
other construction details. These issues were explained through plan drawings and at the 
model house on site.860 "At the second meeting, work assignments were made and an 
explanation [was] given of the building procedure and the materials to be used."861 The 
                                                
855 Ibid. 
856 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion,” 14. 
857 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects.”22. 
858 Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, Housing Institutions in Bogota. Development and 
Administration, 9. 
859 The depiction of this proceeding is based on the fieldwork report of the "Second Training Course in 
Self-Help Construction," of CINVA, from which the procedure in the superblock 16 is documented. In: 
Rubén Donath, Prácticas de construcción, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy. Curso 002 CAA, II Curso 
de adiestramiento en autoconstrucción. September 1963- February 1964, Planchas Ciudad de Techo, box 
42, File 73. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia. 
860 Rubén Donath, Prácticas de construcción, Trabajo de campo en ciudad Kennedy, 41. 




group was also informed that the meetings were mandatory and that they would 
eventually "choose a leadership committee of [its] own," consisting of "a president, 
secretary, treasurer, and coordinator." These leaders would represent the work groups in 
their "dealings with the agency."862 The third meeting was devoted "to explanations of 
material loans, technical assistance, and the social service program, with extensive 
attention given to the terms of the loan and to the regulations governing construction 
work." At the last training session, the contractual obligations of the deed were presented, 
and a description was given of "how materials would be delivered and work be 
performed under the supervision of an architect and foreman."863 
The reasons for explicitly naming this process "indoctrination" are not stated 
anywhere. However, the term denotes a wish to go beyond the simple process of 
transmitting a set of rules or proceedings. Although the boundary between educating and 
indoctrinating is thin and easily blurred, the way these training meetings were used in this 
concrete case implies a wish to mark people in a more profound way. It presupposes that 
there are two parts to the equation. The one part has the authority to impart the content to 
be taught, the other receives “teaching” uncritically, accepts it, and does not question it. 
In a broader sense, even if the indoctrination meetings sought to activate the participant's 
skills for working in a group, they also can be understood as a tool to pacify the latent 
unrest in the low-income group targeted by the self-help programs. Once the participating 
families of the aided mutual self-help program had gone through Indoctrination, many 
were more akin to become the "worthy poor," those who were low-income, but well 





behaved, amiable, approachable, able to be further shaped into the model of the ideal 
dweller.864  
The social programs developed by the contingent of social workers of all 
proveniences aimed at the development of skills on the individual (which also implied the 
familial) and communal level  (which implied both the group -neighborhood / housing 
block, and at a larger scale, the superblock and the entire housing development). They 
also sought to help shape the use of the free time with "beneficial activities", such as 
recreational and cultural events. Finally, they worked to create in the residents a 
"conscious and ordered desire to improve in the different areas of their lives."865 The 
implementation of these programs was part of the broader goal of educating the residents 
of Ciudad Kennedy. Education needs to be seen here as the cultivation of certain skills 
the new residents lacked. The kind of programs offered thus reflects the agency’s broader 
educational goals. 
On an individual level, the social programs’ goals seemed to empower the 
families trying to recognize their potential and to access the resources available to them, 
but at the same time, the proposed guidelines are ruled by the principle of efficiency. The 
programs aimed, at this level "to foster self-help, self-care, and rehabilitation,"866 and to 
guide the residents in the acknowledgment and inquiry of their needs and in the 
attainment and good use of the physical, human and economic resources." They also 
sought "to stimulate and canalize each family's resources for their social improvement 
through an ‘organized and methodic development of the family work’", and develop 
                                                
864 The "worthy poor" as developed by Vale in: Lawrence J. Vale, From the Puritans to the Projects: Public 
Housing and Public Neighbors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
865 "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." Escala, no. 7 (1964) 18–19. 
866 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 
Social Service with Proposals for Their Coordination and Expansion.” 
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‘useful abilities’ by overcoming those existing previously." This would however imply 
that the older abilities were not so useful anymore.  
The programs offered on the individual level were strongly gendered. The women 
of Ciudad Kennedy were the targeted population of the educational programs that 
focused on skills on the individual and family level.867  Since they were in charge of the 
house, the food, and the children, it seems that the responsibility of having a livable 
environment devolved upon them. This image well corresponds with the prevailing 
family ideal, a nuclear family with the woman at home. Under this framework, it was her 
duty to keep the family healthy and neatly dressed, and the environment of the house 
hygienic. Hence, programs on nutrition, preventive medicine, dental care, and physical 
fitness, were related to self-care, but also to family care. Some basic skills were to 
provide women with tools to take care of their family; therefore programs on first-aid, 
pre-natal and childcare, and cooking, were offered. To that end, "audio-visual and 
demonstration program for housewives" on these issues were conducted.868 In addition, 
programs for acquiring skills to enhance their role as family caregivers were offered to 
women, as well as on sewing by hand and machine, women's dressmaking and tailoring, 
weaving and knitting, and on beauty.869 
Social programs less defined by gender encompassed English and literacy classes. 
However, the latter was aimed at children not enrolled in school due to lack of space in 
the superblock’s primary schools, at least in the superblock that served as the basis for 
this survey on social programs. The literacy program targeted therefore children between 
                                                





6 and 10. Thus, no adult literacy classes were offered, despite the high analphabetism rate 
among residents. 
The social workers participated in various programs to achieve goals at the 
community level, but the most important process was the constitution of the Juntas of 
Communal Action. Representatives from each housing block comprised these Juntas—
the same leaders "discovered,"870 selected, and educated during the indoctrination phase 
to carry out specific construction duties in the aided mutual self-help groups. The duality 
of the ICT's presence in this process becomes evident when the ICT's social workers 
attended the meetings of the Juntas, and dominated the sessions, as some accused 
them.871 
 
Written Materials: Booklets and guides 
The ICT produced a series of materials to explain to the dwellers of the housing 
projects their duties towards the community and the agency. These documents were very 
much focused on the obligations and prohibitions. This aspect of the materials produced 
by the agency is the very opposite to the materials produced to show the work of the ICT 
in the neighborhoods it built. To this group belongs the nicely documented booklet on the 
social services of the ICT published in 1956.  
                                                
870 "Aspectos Sociales En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto." Escala, no. 7 (1964) 18–19. 
871 Rudell, “Community Development in Ciudad Kennedy: An Examination of the Existing Programs of 




Figure 5.3. Corporación Nacional de Servicios Públicos and Instituto de Crédito 
Territorial, eds., El Servicio Social En Los Programas de Vivienda Del Instituto 
de Crédito Territorial, Manuales y Cartillas, no. 1 (Bogotá: Corporación Nacional 
de Servicios Públicos, 1956). 
Conversely, the materials for the dwellers presented simple drawings or were 
simply in text format. I will refer here to two kinds of documents. The first one is a 
booklet for dwellers of multifamily buildings, the second one are the regulations for 
living in CUAN and participating in the aided mutual self-help programs in Ciudad 
Kennedy.  
The booklet "Manual Basico para Adjudicatarios" (the basic manual for 
awardees) was developed in 1964 in CINVA, but it is based on a similar document 
developed in Costa Rica ten years earlier. This document on its part was the result of a 




1952.872 It was written in a simple language and with very basic graphics. It seems that 
this was the kind of language that, according to the agency, the dwellers were able to 
understand. The basic idea of this manual was to provide "some practical advice," that 
could be beneficial once occupying the new house.873 In the first chapter, the manual 
emphasized the rules to live in a multifamily housing project. Each advice was reinforced 
by a traditional proverb. "The master's eye makes the horse fat," served, for instance, to 








                                                
872 Maria de los Angeles Cavallini Quirós went back to Costa Rica and became the head of the Social 
Service of the Departamento de la Habitacion de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. This booklet was 
reprinted with the permission of the Departamento de la Habitacion by CINVA in 1954. Departamento de 
la Habitacion de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Modelo de Manual de Adjudicatarios, 
Traducciones, Adaptaciones y Reimpresiones No. 3 (Bogota: Centro interamericano de vivienda. Centro de 
Intercambio Científico, 1954). The students of CINVA probably used this model for the booklet discussed 
in this part. In: Paul Campbell and José A. Villegas, Manual Básico Para Adjudicatarios. Proyecto 
Interprofesional 114. V Etapa. Diseño Arquitectónico y Programa Educacional (Bogotá: Centro 
interamericano de vivienda y planeamiento. XII Curso Regular., 1964). 
873 Campbell and Villegas, Manual Básico Para Adjudicatarios. Introduction. 




Figure 5.4. Campbell, Paul, and José A. Villegas. Manual Básico Para Adjudicatarios. 
Proyecto Interprofesional 114. V Etapa. Diseño Arquitectónico y Programa 
Educacional. Bogotá: Centro interamericano de vivienda y planeamiento. XII 
Curso Regular, 1964. 
In addition, a series of guidelines were indicated in regard to the physical 
appearance of the apartments, for which the duty to maintain the apartment "always clean 
and ordered" was the backdrop. Here the proverb claimed, "Where the sun comes in, the 
doctor does not."875 The second part of the manual focused on the "human relations." In 
this chapter, the importance of the development of good relations for the development of 
                                                
875 Ibid., 12. 
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the community was explained. In that context, the importance of a well functioning 
family, with a "boss that is a responsible and hard working man, with a hard working, 
ingenious mother, dedicated to her children..." was presented.876 Finally, the third part 
tackled an important topic for the agency, which was always intermingled with the well-
minded advice: the obligations of the awardee with the agency. The punctual payment of 
the mortgage rates was an enormous preoccupation for the agency. The message was 
wrapped in the positive sounding message of "dream of the own house" and how the 
punctual payment of the rates was part of accomplishing this dream. Again, a series of 
proverbs helped to reinforce the message.  
The document with the regulations of co-ownership of CUAN outlined the rights 
and obligations of the co-owners; hence, the residents needed to observe certain limits 
defined and imposed by the agency itself.877 These regulations were inherent to the 
contracts with the former tenants and later owners of the apartments. They were in force 
as long as the institute was in charge of CUAN. The regulations can be understood as part 
of the education process provided by the agency. This process was permeated with a view 
of the served group as uninformed of the principles according to which people live in this 
new environment; principles that resemble rather the high culture in opposition to the 
popular culture.  
The long list of forbidden actions in the regulations reflects the wish to control 
and to propel an image of a "modern society" in CUAN. Through this list, one can sense 
a way of life that clearly differs from that in traditional settlements or in the popular 
culture. In addition to the list of forbidden actions that could put the whole structure of 
                                                
876 Ibid., 20. 
877 Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN by the ICT. Archive of the Ministry of 
Housing, La Fragua, Fondo ICT, Box 589. December 20, 1960. 
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the buildings at risk, the list also considered customs that are typical for any traditional 
residential environment but that were seen as absolutely unacceptable in a modern 
complex; things that would diminish the image of modernity in the form of social 
progress. For instance, the use of the windows to "dry clothes, rugs, blankets and others 
in the sun" was prohibited. But also, subleasing single rooms of the apartments without 
previous permission of the management was forbidden.878 To control the residents' 
obedience of these rules, one of their duties was to "allow employees, with a written 
permit from the administration, visiting periodically the apartment879 ..." 
CUAN’s architecture expresses physical asepsis; its co-owner regulations sought 
a moral asepsis in conduct of life. The regulation of daily life encompassed all possible 
aspects, from the appropriate use of circulation areas to how to live in the apartments. 
The use of the circulation areas as meeting places, or any other use that made them "noisy 
or uncomfortable" was forbidden, as was their use as places for selling or storing 
products. In the apartments, noise produced by high volume radios or TVs, and in 
general, any kind of noise that could disturb the neighbors was not allowed. Pets were not 
allowed, "for the apartments were only to house human beings." Finally, the use of 
community areas for political meetings was forbidden.880 
In Ciudad Kennedy, the awarded families received a document with the "most 
important compromises" connected to participation in the superblock’s self-help 
construction program and with the sanctions in the case of not complying with the 
compromises.881 This document, which was thoroughly discussed in one of the first 
                                                
878 Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN. Article 10.  
879 Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN. Article 46.  
880 Deed of Registration of co-ownership regulations of CUAN. Article 6. 
881 Instituto de Credito Territorial, “Reglamento de Autoconstruccion. Planchas, Trabajo de Campo En 
Ciudad Kennedy. September 1963 – February 1964,” n.d., Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y 
Planeamiento –CINVA.Box 42, file 71, course CAA., Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 42-44. 
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meetings with the families, was a central part of the formative indoctrination process. 
Simultaneously, this document also sheds light over the proceedings in the mutual aided 
self-help program. Furthermore, these regulations, contained in the document as a sort of 
contract within the contract, express a methodology aimed at converting a segment of the 
population into a group of persons able to participate in communal endeavors. 
Concurrently, they should be able to conform to certain rules through obedience, 
discipline and even self-sacrifice. These were all characteristics the institutions working 
with the families were required to cultivate; the final goal being the building of houses, 
but the same characteristics undoubtedly contributed to the formation of obedient, 
conformed, uncritical, and reliable residents. Not only did the general document includ a 
series of rules to be followed, but the individual contract also contained "responsibilities 
that each participating family must assume for the maintenance of their home and 
surrounding open spaces. It is expected that the family will develop sufficient pride in 
their new home during the time of construction and the supervised period after occupancy 
to guarantee the future up-keep of the project."882 The convincing power of these 
documents was reinforced through information flyers such as the one clearly indicating 
that "the participating family, which does not satisfactorily fulfill the conditions and 
exigencies of the self-help program, will be eliminated from the program, and thus will 
lose their house;" a clear warning and blunt threat.883 
                                                
882 Mcbride, “A Description of Proyecto Ciudad Techo – and an Analysis of Some of Its Economic 
Aspects,”23. 
883 From: "Informacion para familias participantes en el programa de autoconstruccion de viviendas de la 
manzana 16, de Ciudad Techo. In: Rubén Donath, Prácticas de construcción, Trabajo de campo en ciudad 
Kennedy. curso 002 CAA, II Curso de adiestramiento en autoconstrucción. September 1963- February 
1964, Planchas Ciudad de Techo, box 42, File 73. Colección Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y 
Planeamiento –CINVA. Fondo Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sheet 137. 
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The obligations stated in this document spanned from following basic rules such 
as accepting the assigned group and agreeing to the mandatory precondition to contribute 
personal work and cash to the program. The participants of each team were compelled to 
build the entire number of houses required of the team in no more than six months. The 
participants had to accomplish a mandatory ten working hours per week, for which they 
could not request any retribution. Other obligations consisted of accepting the team 
representative’s decisions on matters such as the approval of bills elaborated by the ICT 
and the use of building materials specified by the ICT, and of attending all meetings 
called by the project or group coordinator. When a member was not able to attend a 
meeting, a designated responsible representative had to attend in his place, and the 
member had to accept the decisions agreed to. In sum, the members had to "rigorously" 
follow the technical, social, and administrative rules and instructions conveyed by the 
program directives.884 
The sanctions for not following the regulations were mostly financial in nature. 
For instance, if the missing hours of work were not paid in cash the week after the 
absence, the fine doubled. When a participant became an "undesirable element" for the 
program’s execution as well as for his/her community, or due to any other behavior 
against the interests of the group could eventually lead to his/her expulsion from the 
                                                
884 Instituto de Credito Territorial, “Reglamento de Autoconstruccion. Planchas, Trabajo de Campo En 
Ciudad Kennedy. September 1963 – February 1964,”42-44. 
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program885 Finally, the group members were required to define an agreement, signed by 
all members of the team, that would aid in meeting the regulations.886 
The series of regulations the ICT developed throughout the period of this study 
reveal a twofold understanding of the social aspects of the housing program. On the one 
hand, they provided a series of indications to guarantee the positive development of a 
community, and other hand, they traced clear guidelines on how to adequately use the 
space. More importantly, the regulations always included the importance of paying their 
debts to the agency on a timely manner.  
  
                                                
885 Expulsion is cause for the termination of the contract, with no right of the participant to any recognition 
or recompense for the labor contributed. In case of voluntary withdrawal, and if the contract was terminated 
by mutual agreement, the contribution in labor was to be paid, based on the minimal wage in the region. 
Reglamento de Autoconstruccion. Instituto de Credito Territorial. In: Trabajo de campo en ciudad 
Kennedy. September 1963 – February 1964, box 42, file 71, course CAA. Colección Centro Interamericano 




Chapter 6:  Conclusions 
 
ICT's significance for current scholarship 
 Although the agency operated nation-wide and contributed to the transformation 
of a good number of urban centers during a period of rapid urban growth, the current 
level of scholarship does not reflect this. Compared to other topics, little has been written 
about the ICT. Nonetheless, its significance can be evidenced not only in the number of 
units built during the 52 years of its existence (roughly 550,000 units), but in the many 
persons who claim to have lived in an ICT home.887 When mentioning my dissertation's 
topic to Colombians, there have been more than a few people—today middle clas, 
professionals—who claim to have parents or grandparents who owned an ICT home. This 
anecdotal experience expresses fulfillment of one of the agency’s goals: to advance and 
strengthen of the middle-class. However, current state of housing expresses its failure to 
solve the country’s housing shortage. Informal settlements rapidly grew during the period 
of maximal urban expansion throughout Colombia. Between success and failure, the ICT 
created a wide array of housing projects, which are the materialization of a highly 
complex, contradictory, and fascinating body of thought and practices. Furthermore, the 
agency offers a bottomless pit for research. An extensive number of interesting strands 
have not been explored yet. One limitation is the state of primary sources. However, 
alternative spaces for research open up when considering the magnitude of this agency’s 
                                                
887 The total number of housing units, which according to the author, Alberto Saldarriaga, is incomplete due 
to the unavailable information, is in: Alberto Saldarriaga Roa, Instituto de Crédito Territorial. ICT. Medio 
Siglo de Vivienda Social En Colombia 1939-1989, 239. 
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work. One might be the unexplored period between 1942 and 1948, when the ICT 
worked in a joint effort with multiple municipalities and local construction firms. Also, 
reconstructing the building process of important projects in smaller cities or 
uncovering/analyzing the intricacies of the building industry at the local level and the 
impact of the housing projects in other regions than the main cities are certainly of 
interest. 
 
The three case studies today 
Although the ICT no longer survives, many of its housing projects still do. The 
three case studies are worthy examples of how the different forces in play during their 
construction continue to shape their development, even as their dynamics continue to 
evolve, particularly for the groups for which each of the projects was built. Thus, Muzú, 
even after multiple architectonic transformations at the level of the housing unit, is still 
recognizable in its original shape. The green areas are still part of the urban configuration 
and the main open spaces fulfill their original function. However, along the main 
connection to the city center, a vital and vibrant alternate and specialized commerce 
center has developed. Thus, the houses located along its main axis have been transformed 
for commercial use. 
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Figure 6.1. Muzú, 2014. Photo by V. Sanchez H. 
 
CUAN is well conserved and still inhabited by the middle class. Its enclosure, 
typical for this kind of housing development, still defines its shape. Its privileged location 




Figure 6.2. Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño, CUAN, 2014. Photo by V. Sanchez H. 
 
Ciudad Kennedy, built for the most part through self-help and incremental 
processes, evolved in a fashion similar to many of the more informal urban developments 
around/throughout the country. Extreme densification through additions to most of its 
houses has had the effect of almost obscuring its original building typologies, and its 
general configuration resembles that of an informal settlement. The main streets that once 
separated the different "super-blocks" are now covered with commerce of all kinds. If at 
the time of its construction, experts already criticized the scant green areas, they would be 
shouting even louder today. However, the small playgrounds scattered through the 




Even if at the time of the construction of these housing projects, the agency 
changed the shape of the cities, in which these projects were located, over time they have 
become part of the urban fabric. Their once alien looking shape intermingles now with 
different morphologies surrounding them. 
Figure 6.3. Ciudad Kennedy, 2014. Photo by V. Sanchez H. 
 
The ICT and the industrialization of the building process 
 In 1970, the ICT's general manager, Luis Alberto Villegas, lamented that the 




mass-produced housing to reduce construction costs.888 Interestingly, much of what he 
expressed in that publication resembles the same complaints the agency’s technicians had 
made previously—that the industrialization of the building process, deploying 
construction elements across many projects to create an economy of scale, is restricted in 
Colombia by its great geographical differences—and that Juan Consuegra de la Cruz had 
identified even earlier. Indeed, this is the reason the ICT’s first general manager, Garcés 
Navas, could not implement the prefabrication model developed at that time in Puerto 
Rico and recommended for Colombia by the U.S. technicians working there. Despite the 
prefabricated elements developed at El Tabor, the experiments conducted later in 
collaboration with CINVA (and partly implemented in Ciudad Kennedy), and the use of 
prefabricated steel structures in the rural housing program, the industrialization of the 
building process was not significantly discussed within the agency during the period of 
this study. However, the ICT saw housing as important to keep people employed and to 
help reduce social tensions resulting from the large number of people industry had drawn 
into urban centers that were not able to absorb them. The absence of a high-tech building 
industry was thus not seriously lamented. 
 
Rereading the "unhygienic" house 
The ICT's publications and minutes contain the rationales politicians and ICT 
leaders used to carry out their housing programs, consistently describing "hygienic" 
                                                




housing in opposition to the homes the residents previously inhabited. In what terms did 
the agency understand "unhygienic" housing? It did differentiate between rural and urban 
housing. The ICT's publications and journals relish showing shacks in the urban context 
as the most powerful contrast to its own housing program, even when residents in these 
urban slums were not those who moved into ICT's housing projects.  
Figure 6.4. Image of shack in front of Quiroga neighborhood, Bogotá. In: Instituto de 
Crédito Territorial, Una Política de Vivienda Para Colombia; Primer Seminario 
Nacional de Vivienda, 1955. 
When agency documents discuss the overcrowded dwellings in which most of the 




probably referring to the tenements of Bogotá. However, no images of these tenements 
appeared in its publications. The traditional rural house was the preferred type depicted to 
display the contrast with the "hygienic" houses offered by the ICT. This traditional, 
vernacular architecture that had been built since pre-Columbian times seems to express 
exactly what ICT's bureaucrats understood as the epitome of backwardness.  
In trying to eliminate the image of a traditional home, the agency contributed to a 
comparable process of "racial whitening," which was also taking place in more radical 
ways in other Latin American countries at the beginning of twentieth century. In holding 
to the idea that the "hygienic" and ordered built environment served as an educational 
tool, the housing program aimed to improve “the race” through health and education, the 
house being the material expression of this goal. Thus, by replacing the old, "extremely 
unhygienic" traditional house with a new, modern ICT house, the indigenous and those 
with black ancestry, who produced this new architecture, could be tamed. In annihilating 
the traditional architecture, much of the undesired "backwardness" could be, if not 
eliminated, at least reduced by architectonic means.  
 
Rereading the modern functional housing unit 
The ICT's understood housing in terms of functionality, hygiene, and economy—
thus as a material unit. This materialistic understanding established the housing program 
on the basic principles of modern architecture. Yet the agency’s bureaucrats could not 
grasp or take into consideration the need to maintain family bonds beyond the nuclear 
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family, nor the wish to stay in place, even under substandard conditions. When agency 
representatives wondered why people in some cities did not aspire to own one of the 
ICT's homes, they concluded that people needed to be taught to aspire to more than what 
they had. But the people themselves were never asked. The agency arrived to its own 
conclusions, very much based on one and the same model: development. They permitted 
no other way of living, and any discrepancy with this model meant the Other was unable 
to grasp the better living conditions of an ICT house. This was probably especially true of 
those slums residents scheduled to be cleared in the central areas of major cities, such as 
Barranquilla and Cartagena, beginning in the 1950s. A song from the Cartagena 
neighborhood Chambacú, expresses its inhabitants resistance and lamentation: 
"Chambacú, Chambacú, Chambacú.... 
La historia la escribes tú [You are the one who writes the story] 
..... 
Chambacú, Chambaculero,  
De aquí no me sacas tú [You won't push me out of here]" 
Totó La Momposina (Afro-colombian singer) 
 
This dissertation spoke very much from the perspective of the agency, I gave the 
agency a voice, its voice, which shines through the minutes. But the postcolonial reading 
allows us to broaden the simplistic interpretation of the content of that voice. Seen from 
the agency's bureaucrats' perspective, they did believe they were doing the right thing. 
They surely believed that if the poor did not want an ICT house, it was because they did 
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not understand or know the significance of a nice home. Our contemporary postcolonial 
approach, 70 years later, understands that the problem of this failed communication 
resided in the fact that the agency was convinced of its own models, and did not deem it 
necessary to ask for the Other’s perspective, since for them, the Other was unable to 
speak for itself. The Other, the poor, non-male, non-white, non-urban, who populated the 
cities, became increasingly visible and threatening to those who had spoken in the name 
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